‘Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is!’: Effects of Streaks on Confidence and Betting in a Binary Choice Task

Human choice under uncertainty is influenced by erroneous beliefs about randomness. In simple binary choice tasks, such as red/black predictions in roulette, long outcome runs (e.g. red, red, red) typically increase the tendency to predict the other outcome (i.e. black), an effect labeled the “gambler's fallacy.” In these settings, participants may also attend to streaks in their predictive performance. Winning and losing streaks are thought to affect decision confidence, although prior work indicates conflicting directions. Over three laboratory experiments involving red/black predictions in a sequential roulette task, we sought to identify the effects of outcome runs and winning/losing streaks upon color predictions, decision confidence and betting behavior. Experiments 1 (n = 40) and 3 (n = 40) obtained trial‐by‐trial confidence ratings, with a win/no win payoff and a no loss/loss payoff, respectively. Experiment 2 (n = 39) obtained a trial‐by‐trial bet amount on an equivalent scale. In each experiment, the gambler's fallacy was observed on choice behavior after color runs and, in experiment 2, on betting behavior after color runs. Feedback streaks exerted no reliable influence on confidence ratings, in either payoff condition. Betting behavior, on the other hand, increased as a function of losing streaks. The increase in betting on losing streaks is interpreted as a manifestation of loss chasing; these data help clarify the psychological mechanisms underlying loss chasing and caution against the use of betting measures (“post‐decision wagering”) as a straightforward index of decision confidence. © 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Knowledge about the distribution of information and group decision making: When and why does it work?

Research has shown that decision-making groups with distributed information perform better when group members know which member is knowledgeable about what. Thus far research has been unable to identify the process responsible for this effect. In the present study, we propose that group members’ task representations mediate the effect of knowledge about the distribution of information on decision performance. Building on this proposition, we also propose that reflection about the task moderates the effect of knowledge about distributed information through its effect on task representations. These hypotheses were put to the test in an experimental study of decision-making groups (N = 125). As predicted, knowledge of distributed information interacted with reflection to affect decision quality. Findings confirmed the proposed mediating role of task representations and information elaboration.     

The transience of constructed preferences

A large body of research suggests that preferences are constructed rather than merely accessed in the course of making decisions. The current research examines the stability of constructed preferences over time. Preferences for various factors relevant to a job choice were measured prior to presentation of the job‐choice task, at the point of decision, and again following a delay. It was found that relative to baseline pre‐decision levels, preferences shifted to provide stronger support for the emerging decision. Preference changes proved to be transient, receding to baseline after 1 week (Experiment 1), and even within 15 minutes (Experiment 2). These findings, which can be interpreted in terms of decision‐making by constraint satisfaction, suggest that preferences are constructed to serve the decision at hand, without constraining the decision maker in future decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

个体自信度对双人决策的影响

群体决策是重要的社会现象, 个体自信度在群体决策中发挥了重要作用。本文开展了不同难度和信息交流方式下的双人决策实验, 通过分析自信度和个体决策以及决策调整行为的关系, 研究了个体自信度的交流对双人决策的影响。实验结果表明, 个体的自信度与选择的正确率高度正相关; 双人决策过程是个体根据对方的自信度和选择来不断调整自己的选择最终达成一致的过程, 并通过交互过程提高双人决策的正确率; 实验中双人决策的质量明显优于“自信度分享模型”和“更自信者主导决策模型”的预期结果, 表明群体决策不是通过分享自信度进行的贝叶斯优化整合过程, 也不是由更自信的个体完全主导的过程。     

Ostracism Reduces Reliance on Poor Advice from Others during Decision Making

Decision making is rarely context‐free, and often, both social information and non‐social information are weighed into one's decisions. Incorporating information into a decision can be influenced by previous experiences. Ostracism has extensive effects, including taxing cognitive resources and increasing social monitoring. In decision making situations, individuals are often faced with both objective and social information and must choose which information to include or filter out. How will ostracism affect the reliance on objective and social information during decision making? Participants (N = 245) in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized in a standardized, group task. They then performed a dynamic decision making task that involved the presentation of either non‐social (i.e. biased reward feedback) or social (i.e., poor advice from a previous participant) misleading information. In Experiment 2, participants (N = 105) completed either the ostracism non‐social condition or social misleading information condition with explicit instructions stating that the advice given was from an individual who did not partake in the group task. Ostracized individuals relied more on non‐social misleading information and performed worse than included individuals. However, ostracized individuals discounted misleading social information and outperformed included individuals. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. Across two experiments, ostracized individuals were more critical of advice from others, both individuals who may have ostracized them and unrelated individuals. In other words, compared with included individuals, ostracized individuals underweighted advice from another individual but overweighed non‐social information during decision making. We conclude that when deceptive objective information is present, ostracism results in disadvantageous decision making. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Trait Anxiety on Self‐frame and Decision Making

The present study investigated how trait anxiety influenced the formation of a self‐frame and decision making. Participants (N = 1044) responded to the Trait Anxiety Inventory. Those with trait anxiety scores ±1 Z score from the sample mean (N = 328) were recalled to respond to the self‐frame questionnaire. The results suggested that trait anxiety differences could result in differences in the editing of decision‐making information, thereby influencing the risky choice. Compared with the low trait anxiety group, participants from the high trait anxiety group showed a greater tendency to use negative vocabulary to construct their self‐frame and tended to choose conservative plans. Self‐frame suppressed the influence of trait anxiety on decision making. These results further confirmed the hypothesis that individual differences in personality traits might influence the processing of information in a framed decision task. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contextual framing of loss impacts harm avoidance during risky spatial decisions

Although the same decision to act can occur in multiple contexts, how these contexts differentially influence behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we investigate whether contextual framing affects individuals' behavior in spatial decision making. Although previous research suggests that individuals' judgments are sensitive to contextual (and particularly moral) factors of a scenario, no work has addressed whether this effect extends to spatial decisions. To investigate the impact of context on perceptual sensorimotor behavior, we superimposed two moral dilemmas (which we call help and harm) on a spatial decision-making paradigm. The basic task required participants select a target area while avoiding an overlapping nontarget area. Although the visuospatial task was constant, the moral context was changed when participants had to execute either a drone missile strike on enemies in the harm context or deliver ammunition to allies in the help context. Participants more strongly avoided losses in the harm context, reflected by a greater selection bias away from the nontarget (i.e., allies) on drone strike trials. These findings suggest that the contextual framing of a subjective perceived loss on a spatial decision can drive avoidant motor execution behavior.     

Order effects and memory for evidence in individual versus group decision making in auditing

Sequential processing of evidence may lead to recency effect, a potential bias in judgment. The present research seeks to extend the literature on recency effects by assessing the potential moderating influence of team work: whether group decision making moderates the severity of recency effects predicted by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992), and whether group processing influences the accuracy of, and confidence in memory for evidence. Experienced auditors from a Big‐6 accounting firm made audit judgments, either individually or as groups. They were randomly assigned to one of two levels of evidence presentation order. After performing the judgment task, participants completed two evidence recognition tests. Consistent with prior findings, recency effects on judgments were observed, but only for individuals. Group judgments or audit reports were not affected by recency. Order effects, however, did not translate into different choices of audit reports, and did not persist in memories of either individuals or groups. As expected, group memory was more accurate than individual memory and groups were more confident than individuals. Overall, confidence in accurate memories was greater than in inaccurate ones. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choice‐making,Expectations, and Treatment Positivity: How and When Choosing Shapes Aversive Experiences

Every day we use products and treatments with unknown but expected effects, such as using medication to manage pain. In many cases, we have a choice over which products or treatments to use; however, in other cases, people choose for us or choices are unavailable. Does choosing (versus not choosing) have implications for how a product or treatment is experienced? The current experiments examined the role of choice‐making in facilitating so‐called expectation assimilation effects—or situations in which a person's experiences (e.g., discomfort and pain) are evaluated in a manner consistent with their expectations. In Experiment 1, participants were initially exposed to a baseline set of aversive stimuli (i.e., sounds). Next, some participants were given expectations for two “treatments” (i.e., changes in screen display) that could ostensibly reduce discomfort. Critically, participants were either given a choice or not about which of the two treatments they preferred. Participants in a control condition were not provided with treatment expectations. Results revealed that discomfort experiences assimilated to expectations only when participants were provided with choice. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and provided evidence against the idea that demand characteristics and choice‐making unrelated to the core task (i.e., choices without associated expectations) could account for the results. Further, Experiment 2 showed that choosing reduced discomfort because of increased positivity about the treatment. Results are discussed in the context of extant research on choice‐making and expectation effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Influence of Task Dynamics on Inductive Generalizations: How Sequential and Simultaneous Presentation of Evidence Impacts the Strength and Scope of Property Projections

Young children are remarkably flexible reasoners insofar as they modify their inferences to accommodate the conceptual information or perceptual relations represented in an inductive problem. Children’s inductive reasoning is highly sensitive to what evidence is presented to them. Four experiments with 115 preschoolers (M_age = 4;8) and 119 adults (M_age = 21;9) examined whether induction is influenced by how evidence is presented. Specifically, these studies explored the extent to which presenting evidence exemplars at the same time (i.e., simultaneous presentation) or one by one (i.e., sequential presentation) would influence property projections to a range of targets. Experiment 1 revealed that simultaneous presentation yielded a higher rate and a broader scope of projections than did sequential presentation. Experiment 2 confirmed that these effects were not due to how items were labeled. Experiments 3 and 4 explored the interplay between evidence presentation and specific task features that impact how participants compare evidence and target exemplars. In Experiment 3, there were no differences between the 2 presentation formats when evidence exemplars were removed prior to the projection phase, thereby eliminating the opportunity to compare evidence exemplars and targets. Finally, Experiment 4 showed that sequential presentation yielded a high rate of projections when participants were not afforded the opportunity to compare exemplars within the evidence sample. These results have implications for understanding the mechanisms that guide children’s inductive decisions.     

Intelligence, reaction time (RT) and a new ‘odd-man-out’ RT paradigm

A sample of adult Ss of reasonably normal intelligence were given an ‘IQ’ test, a series of RT tests using 0, 1, 2, 3 bits of information in a Hick paradigm and an RT task requiring choice of 1 of 3 lights as an ‘odd-man-out’ on the basis of its relative position. Negative correlations were found between both RT and measures of variation in RT and ‘IQ’ for both of the two tasks. Recent results showing no correlation between Hick slope and ‘IQ’ and no increase in correlation between ‘IQ’ and RT with increasing number of bits, are confirmed. An explanation for findings of Ss whose RT data do not conform to Hick's law is tested and found inadequate. The ‘odd-man-out’ task is found to show an effect of ‘learning’ across the period of the task, the size of the learning effect was found also to correlate with ‘IQ’, but no evidence for learning was found with the choice RT task.     

Perceptions of accuracy and effort of decision strategies

A critical tenet of cost-benefit theories of decision strategy choice is that decision makers’ perceptions of accuracy and effort determine strategy selection. However, little research has been conducted on human perceptions of decision strategy accuracy and effort. Instead, researchers have substituted deductively derived inferences on strategy accuracy and effort for perceptions in interpreting decision processes. In this study, we used a survey to study perceptions of decision strategies. The results indicate that participants as a group understood the accuracy and effort dimensions of decision strategies. The participants’ perceptions of the accuracy and effort of various decision strategies largely agreed with researchers’ deductions. However, there was substantial variation across individuals in perceptions of various decision strategies and in the composition of efficient frontiers of decision strategies.     

The power of causal beliefs and conflicting evidence on causal judgments and decision making

In two experiments, we investigated the relative impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence on both decision making and causal judgments, and whether this relative impact could be altered by previous experience. Participants had to decide which of two alternatives would attain a higher outcome on the basis of four cues. After completing the decision task, they were asked to estimate to what extent each cue was a reliable cause of the outcome. Participants were provided with instructions that causally related two of the cues to the outcome, whereas they received neutral information about the other two cues. Two of the four cues—a causal and a neutral cue—had high validity and were both generative. The remaining two cues had low validity, and were generative in Experiment 1, but almost not related to the outcome in Experiment 2. Selected groups of participants in both experiments received pre-training with either causal or neutral cues, or no pre-training was provided. Results revealed that the impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence depends on both the experienced pre-training and cue validity. When all cues were generative and participants received pre-training with causal cues, they mostly relied on their causal beliefs, whereas they relied on empirical evidence when they received pre-training with neutral cues. In contrast, when some of the cues were almost not related to the outcome, participants’ responses were primarily influenced by validity and—to a lesser extent—by causal beliefs. In either case, however, the influence of causal beliefs was higher in causal judgments than in decision making. While current theoretical approaches in causal learning focus either on the effect of causal beliefs or empirical evidence, the present research shows that both factors are required to explain the flexibility involved in human inferences.     

Now or Later? Attentional Processing and Intertemporal Choice

The tendency to discount future prospects in lieu of smaller immediate outcomes is known as temporal discounting. The current work used eye‐tracking methodology to examine attentional processing to different elements of choice during an intertemporal decision task. Our findings reveal that those who tend to prefer the immediate option demonstrate attentional biases that were predictive of choice. When losses were at stake, selective attention biases also predicted unique variance in self‐report measures of risk taking, impulsivity, and self‐control beyond what was accounted for by a discounting parameter (k), a typical method for summarizing intertemporal choice data. Overall, our findings suggest that eye‐tracking measures of selective attention may allow for a better theoretical understanding of the mechanisms and processes involved in intertemporal choice. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Developmental trends in everyday conditional reasoning: the retrieval and inhibition interplay

Two experiments examined developmental patterns in children’s conditional reasoning with everyday causal conditionals. In Experiment 1, a group of pre-, early, young, and late adolescents generated counterexamples for a set of conditionals to validate developmental claims about the counterexample retrieval capacity. In Experiment 2, participants in the same age range were presented with a conditional reasoning task with similar conditionals. Experiment 1 established that counterexample retrieval increased from preadolescence to late adolescence. Experiment 2 showed that acceptance rates of the invalid affirmation of the consequent inference gradually decreased in the same age range. Acceptance rates of the valid modus ponens inference showed a U-shaped pattern. After an initial drop from preadolescence to early adolescence, modus ponens acceptance ratings increased again after the onset of adolescence. Findings support the claim that the development of everyday conditional reasoning can be characterized as an interplay between the development of a counterexample retrieval and inhibition process.     

Rhesus monkeys lack a consistent peak-end effect

In humans, the order of receiving sequential rewards can significantly influence the overall subjective utility of an outcome. For example, people subjectively rate receiving a large reward by itself significantly higher than receiving the same large reward followed by a smaller one (Do, Rupert, & Wolford, 2008). This result is called the peak-end effect. A comparative analysis of order effects can help determine the generality of such effects across primates, and we therefore examined the influence of reward-quality order on decision making in three rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta). When given the choice between a high–low reward sequence and a low–high sequence, all three monkeys preferred receiving the high-value reward first. Follow-up experiments showed that for two of the three monkeys their choices depended specifically on reward-quality order and could not be accounted for by delay discounting. These results provide evidence for the influence of outcome order on decision making in rhesus monkeys. Unlike humans, who usually discount choices when a low-value reward comes last, rhesus monkeys show no such peak-end effect.