Cognitive and emotional empathy in typically developing children: The influence of age,gender, and intelligence

In the current study, the influence of age, gender and IQ on cognitive and emotional empathy in school-aged children and adolescents was examined adopting two behavioural paradigms: participants were shown film clips with different scenes of social interaction to which they were asked to respond. Thus, 134 children aged seven to 17 years (mean age = 138.4 months, sd = 31.66 months) were tested for emotion recognition, perspective taking and emotional empathy. Age strongly influenced components of cognitive empathy and explained 33.5% to 39.1% of the variance. Gender and IQ also were significant predictors, yet only explained 3% to 5%, respectively 8% to 9% of the variance. In contrast, neither age, gender nor IQ were related to emotional empathy. Results suggest developmental maturation of cognitive, but not emotional empathy throughout childhood and adolescence. To explain variability in emotional empathy, additional biological and psychosocial factors need to be studied.     

Give them what they want: The benefits of explicitness in gift exchange

Five studies show that gift recipients are more appreciative of gifts they explicitly request than those they do not. In contrast, gift givers assume that both solicited and unsolicited gifts will be equally appreciated. At the root of this dilemma is a difference of opinion about what purchasing an unsolicited gift signals: gift givers expect unsolicited gifts will be considered more thoughtful and considerate by their intended recipients than is actually the case (,  and ). In our final two studies, we highlight two boundary conditions for this effect: identifying a specific gift and using money as a gift. When gift recipients request one specific gift, rather than providing a list of possible gifts, givers become more willing to purchase the requested gift (Study 4). Further, although givers believe that recipients do not appreciate receiving money as much as receiving a solicited gift, recipients feel the opposite about these two gift options (Study 5).     

Blind spots in the search for happiness: Implicit attitudes and nonverbal leakage predict affective forecasting errors

We investigated implicit knowledge and affective forecasting, reasoning that although conscious evaluations are available to people when predicting their future emotional responses, nonconscious evaluations are not. However, these automatically-activated evaluations should contribute to in-the-moment emotional experiences, and thus they should account for misforecasts (i.e., discrepancies between affective forecasts and actual experiences). We conducted two studies to explore affective misforecasts, using food items as stimuli. In Study 1, participants' implicit attitudes (but not their explicit attitudes) predicted misforecasts of food enjoyment, supporting the role of nonconscious evaluations in affective forecasting errors. In Study 2, we examined participants' facial expressions (another index of nonconscious evaluation) upon the presentation of food items, and we found that these nonverbal behaviors predicted affective misforecasts as well. In sum, although nonconscious evaluations are unavailable when anticipating the future, they may contribute to one's in-the-moment experiences and thus serve as blind spots in affective forecasting.     

Reappraisal and expected value modulate risk taking

Decision making is informed by appraisals of appetitive cues and their associated opportunities for rewards. Such appraisals can be modulated by cognitive regulation strategies in order to promote goal-directed choices. Little is known about how cognitive regulation strategies, especially reappraisal, alter risk taking during decision making. To characterise the effect of reappraisal on risk taking, we systematically varied both the goal of regulation and the value of the decision options. Participants engaged in two reappraisal strategies with opposite goals, to increase (“emphasise”) or decrease (“de-emphasise”) the importance of an upcoming decision, during the presentation of cues signalling monetary decisions. The expected value of taking a risk was systematically varied across decisions such that a risky choice could be beneficial or disadvantageous. Reappraisal strategies increased or decreased risk taking in accordance both with regulation goals and expected value information. These results suggest that reappraisal can be used to flexibly alter behaviour associated with appetitive cues while maintaining value information.     

Is pride a prosocial emotion? Interpersonal effects of authentic and hubristic pride

Pride is associated with both prosocial and antisocial behaviour. Do others also infer such behaviours when pride is expressed and does this affect their own prosocial behaviour? We expected that authentic pride (i.e., confidence, accomplishment) would signal and elicit more prosocial behaviour than hubristic pride (i.e., arrogance, conceit). In a first laboratory experiment, a target in a public-good dilemma was inferred to have acted less prosocially when displaying a nonverbal expression of pride versus no emotion. As predicted, inferences of hubristic pride—but not authentic pride—mediated this effect. Participants themselves also responded less prosocially. A second laboratory experiment where a target verbally expressed authentic pride, hubristic pride, or no emotion replicated the effects of hubristic pride and showed that authentically proud targets were assumed to have acted prosocially, but especially by perceivers with a dispositional tendency to take the perspective of others. We conclude that authentic pride is generally perceived as a more prosocial emotion than hubristic pride.     

Cognitive-behavioral therapy and decision science

In recent decades cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and decision science (DS) have emerged within the field of psychological science. Though these are two vastly different areas of study, they are similar in that they address human information processing, cognition, behavior, and the link between them. In this article, we provide brief summaries of CBT and decision science, discuss their similarities and differences, and discuss how future research can identify ways in which these fields can inform each other. Several CBT techniques that might be of use to the efforts of the decision science field to prevent cognitive biases are suggested. Research that integrates these two fields may lead to the improvement of both.     

Risk taking under the influence: A fuzzy-trace theory of emotion in adolescence

Fuzzy-trace theory explains risky decision making in children, adolescents, and adults, incorporating social and cultural factors as well as differences in impulsivity. Here, we provide an overview of the theory, including support for counterintuitive predictions (e.g., when adolescents “rationally” weigh costs and benefits, risk taking increases, but it decreases when the core gist of a decision is processed). Then, we delineate how emotion shapes adolescent risk taking—from encoding of representations of options, to retrieval of values/principles, to application of those values/principles to representations of options. Our review indicates that: (i) gist representations often incorporate emotion including valence, arousal, feeling states, and discrete emotions; and (ii) emotion determines whether gist or verbatim representations are processed. We recommend interventions to reduce unhealthy risk taking that inculcate stable gist representations, enabling adolescents to identify quickly and automatically danger even when experiencing emotion, which differs sharply from traditional approaches emphasizing deliberation and precise analysis.     

Contingent reliance on the affect heuristic as a function of regulatory focus

Results from four studies show that the reliance on affect as a heuristic of judgment and decision making is more pronounced under a promotion focus than under a prevention focus. Two different manifestations of this phenomenon were observed. Studies 1–3 show that different types of affective inputs are weighted more heavily under promotion than under prevention in person-impression formation, product evaluations, and social recommendations. Study 4 additionally shows that valuations performed under promotion are more scope-insensitive—a characteristic of affect-based valuations—than valuations performed under prevention. The greater reliance on affect as a heuristic under promotion seems to arise because promotion-focused individuals tend to find affective inputs more diagnostic, not because promotion increases the reliance on peripheral information per se.     

Towards a common processing architecture underlying Simon and SNARC effects

It has been shown repeatedly that relatively small numbers are responded to faster with the left hand and relatively large numbers are responded to faster with the right hand. This so-called SNARC effect (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993) is thought to arise through activation of irrelevant spatial codes associated with the magnitude of the number. This conflict between irrelevant magnitude information and the response is conceptually similar to the well-known Simon effect. Recently, both Mapelli, Rusconi, and Umiltà (2003) and Keus and Schwarz (in press) directly compared both effects in a single task within the framework of the additive factor method (Sternberg, 1969). While Mapelli et al. found additive effects of SNARC and Simon levels, suggesting different processing stages, Keus and Schwarz found that the SNARC effect depended on the compatibility level of the Simon task leading them to propose a common origin at the response selection stage. In the present study we demonstrate in 2 experiments that the relationship between Simon and SNARC depends on the relevance of the magnitude code, thereby violating one of the core assumptions of the AFM. Instead we propose a temporal overlap model to interpret the relationship between these effects which allows to commensurate apparently divergent outcomes.     

Emotional Policy: Personal Sadness and Anger Shape Judgments about a Welfare Case

When making decisions about a welfare case, it is reasonable for one's thoughts and feelings about the potential welfare recipient to influence the decision. It is less reasonable for one's "incidental" feelings (e.g., sadness or anger arising from an event in one's personal life) to influence such decisions. In two studies, however, data reveal that incidental anger and sadness do in fact carry over, shaping welfare policy preferences. Study 1 found that incidental anger decreased the amount of welfare assistance participants recommended providing relative to neutral emotion, whereas sadness increased the amount recommended. Study 2 replicated the results and found that limiting participants' cognitive resources eliminated the difference between sadness and anger, thus implying that differences in depth-of-thought drove the effects. In sum, the results reveal ways in which: (a) personal emotions carry over to shape preferences for public policies, (b) emotions of the same valence have opposing effects, and (c) differential depth-of-cognitive-processing contributes to such effects.     

Implicit emotional biases in decision making: the case of the Iowa Gambling Task

Many authors have endorsed the hypothesis that previous emotional experiences may exert a covert influence on behavior, but some findings and replications of the original studies challenged this view. We investigated this topic by carrying out an experiment with the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), where a dissociation procedure was adopted to successfully isolate possible implicit components. After a typical interaction with the IGT, participants performed a "blind" card selection phase without receiving any feedback. Half of them were instructed to continue choosing as they did before, the other half was told that good card decks turned bad, and vice versa, so that explicit knowledge was necessary to overcome the previously learned deck-outcome associations. The results confirmed the existence of early acquired implicit biases, confirming that previously experienced emotional events may covertly affect subsequent behavior.     

Fairness considerations: Increasing understanding of intentionality during adolescence

The development of fairness considerations in decision making is not well understood. Here we tested the hypothesis that increased understanding of intentionality during adolescence underlies increased fairness considerations in social decision making. We conducted three experiments using an adapted version of the Ultimatum Game with participants during four stages of adolescence: 9, 12, 15, and 18 years of age. Participants made or evaluated monetary offers, and we manipulated the intentionality context of offers. Results show that strategic thinking is already present at 9 years of age. There was no age difference in fairness of offers when the responder could not reject an offer (Experiment 1), but when they could reject an offer there was an age-related increase in taking into account the perspective and intentionality of other players when making offers (Experiment 2) and evaluating offers (Experiment 3). Taken together, the results demonstrate a linear developmental transition in fairness considerations that may have important implications for our understanding of social interactions during adolescence.     

The effect of constant outcome value on judgments and decision making given linguistic probabilities

Two experiments were performed to determine whether judgments of the relative chances of two independent events occurring are biased by constant outcome values contingent on the events when the uncertainties are specified by linguistic expressions (e.g. doubtful). In Experiment 1, subjects directly judged the relative chances of the two events, of which one was represented by a spinner and the other by a linguistic probability expression. In Experiment 2, only linguistic probability expressions were used to describe the two events and a betting procedure was used. A bias was evident in both studies, such that the relative judgments tended to favour the event with the positive rather than the negative contingent outcome. The bias was smaller for the low- than for the high-probability phrases. Individual differences were great, with the bias appearing strongly in only about one-third of the population. Theoretical implications of the present and related results are discussed.