Under what conditions can human affective conditioning occur without contingency awareness? Test of the evaluative conditioning paradigm

The role of conscious cognitive processes in human affective conditioning remains controversial, with several theories arguing that such conditioning can occur without awareness of the conditioned stimulus (CS)-unconditioned stimulus (UCS) contingency. One specific type of affective conditioning in which unaware conditioning is said to occur is "evaluative conditioning." The present experiment tested the role of contingency awareness by embedding an evaluative conditioning paradigm in a distracting masking task while obtaining, in addition to subjective ratings of affect, both psychophysiological (skin conductance and startle eyeblink) and indirect behavioral (affective priming) measures of conditioning, along with a trial-by-trial measure of awareness from 55 college student participants. Aware participants showed conditioning with all of the measures; unaware participants failed to show conditioning with all measures. The behavioral, neurophysiological, and therapeutic implications of these findings are discussed.     

Reactance in affective-evaluative learning: Outside of conscious control?

Recent studies have shown that the basic evaluative conditioning (EC) effect (originally neutral stimuli acquiring an affective value congruent with the valence of the affective stimulus they were paired with) seems to be limited to participants who are unaware of the stimulus pairings. If participants are aware of the pairings, reactance effects occur (i.e., changes in the opposite direction of the valence of the affective stimulus). To examine whether these reactance effects are due to processes of conscious countercontrol or whether the ratings reflect intrinsic feelings towards the stimuli, a new procedure was developed that included a bogus-pipeline condition. In this procedure, which was adapted from attitude research, participants were connected to bogus lie detector equipment leading them to believe that their "true" affective-evaluative responses were being observed. In Experiment 1, reactance effects occurred also in this procedure, suggesting that the effect is spontaneous and not due to processes of conscious countercontrol. In Experiment 2, these effects were replicated using a between-subjects design in addition to the standard within-subjects control condition.     

未意识到错误影响错误后调整的电生理证据

现有研究一致认为意识到错误可引起错误后调整, 但是未意识到错误能否促使个体进行错误后调整尚存争议。本实验采用基于go/no-go范式的错误意识任务考察上述问题, 并根据被试对自己按键反应正误主观报告将no-go错误反应分为意识到错误和未意识到错误。行为结果发现, 意识到错误和未意识到错误后正确率均显著高于正确击中试次(正确go试次)后正确率; 但是, 意识到错误后试次反应时显著快于正确击中后反应时, 未意识到错误后反应时显著慢于正确击中后反应时。该结果表明两类错误均优化了错误后行为表现, 但是意识到错误后被试调整速度加快, 未意识到错误后被试调整速度减慢。进而, 时频分析发现意识到错误相较于未意识到错误诱发显著更强的alpha波能量。并且, 前者在错误意识主观报告前已诱发alpha波, 后者在错误意识主观报告反应后诱发alpha波。该结果表明意识到错误一直处于持续的注意监控中, 而未意识到错误是任务引起的暂时注意控制。因此, 本实验说明错误意识影响错误后调整, 意识到错误可能采用类似主动性控制的策略调节错误后行为, 而未意识到错误可能采用类似反应性控制的策略调节错误后行为。     

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Recent studies have shown that the basic evaluative conditioning (EC) effect (originally neutral stimuli acquiring an affective value congruent with the valence of the affective stimulus they were paired with) seems to be limited to participants who are unaware of the stimulus pairings. If participants are aware of the pairings, reactance effects occur (i.e., changes in the opposite direction of the valence of the affective stimulus). To examine whether these reactance effects are due to processes of conscious countercontrol or whether the ratings reflect intrinsic feelings towards the stimuli, a new procedure was developed that included a bogus‐pipeline condition. In this procedure, which was adapted from attitude research, participants were connected to bogus lie detector equipment leading them to believe that their “true” affective‐evaluative responses were being observed. In Experiment 1, reactance effects occurred also in this procedure, suggesting that the effect is spontaneous and not due to processes of conscious countercontrol. In Experiment 2, these effects were replicated using a between‐subjects design in addition to the standard within‐subjects control condition.     

Contingency awareness in a symptom learning paradigm: necessary but not sufficient?

In previous studies, we found that bodily symptoms can be learned in a differential conditioning paradigm, using odors as conditioned stimuli (CSs) and CO2-enriched air as unconditioned stimulus (US). However, this only occurred when the odor CS had a negative valence (a selective conditioning effect), and tended to be more pronounced in persons scoring high for Negative Affectivity (NA). This paper considers the necessity and/or sufficiency of awareness of the CS-US contingency in three studies using this paradigm. The relation between contingency awareness and the selective conditioning effect, and between contingency awareness and NA was also considered. Both self reported symptoms and respiratory physiology served as dependent variables. A learning effect on symptoms was found only for participants aware of the CS-US contingency, but not all participants reporting contingency awareness showed a learning effect. No conditioning effects appeared on the physiological measures. Also contingency awareness did not account for the selective conditioning effect, and did not interact with NA. Overall, the necessity but insufficiency hypotheses can only be withhold for group data and not for individual data.     

Aversive conditioning under conditions of restricted awareness: Effects on spatial cueing

In the literature on aversive conditioning there is still debate on the role of awareness. According to some authors, affective learning can occur with or without contingency learning (dual-process model), whereas others argue that a single process produces both affective responses and contingency knowledge. Although many studies have investigated these models, the results to date are inconclusive. Based on a review of the literature, a new series of experiments was designed to examine aversive conditioning in the absence of contingency awareness. In the present study we examined the effects of subliminal aversive conditioning on a spatial cueing task. Awareness was stringently tested after conditioning. Three kinds of awareness were distinguished: contingency awareness (awareness of the CS?US contingencies, where CS is the conditioned stimulus, and US is the unconditioned stimulus), perceptual awareness (awareness of the perceptual differences between the CSs), and US expectancy (awareness of a threat feeling when confronted with the CS+, but not when confronted with the CS?). The results of three experiments demonstrated that responses on the spatial cueing task were modulated by subliminal aversive conditioning. Importantly, none of the participants was contingency aware or able to perceptually discriminate between the conditioned stimuli. However, in Experiment 3, only those participants showing some level of postconditioning expectancy awareness exhibited conditioning effects. These experiments suggest that subliminal aversive conditioning produces small but significant effects, which may be modulated by expectancy awareness.     

Confidence and accuracy of near-threshold discrimination responses.

This article reports four subliminal perception experiments using the relationship between confidence and accuracy to assess awareness. Subjects discriminated among stimuli and indicated their confidence in each discrimination response. Subjects were classified as being aware of the stimuli if their confidence judgments predicted accuracy and as being unaware if they did not. In the first experiment, confidence predicted accuracy even at stimulus durations so brief that subjects claimed to be performing at chance. This finding indicates that subjects's claims that they are "just guessing" should not be accepted as sufficient evidence that they are completely unaware of the stimuli. Experiments 2-4 tested directly for subliminal perception by comparing the minimum exposure duration needed for better than chance discrimination performance against the minimum needed for confidence to predict accuracy. The latter durations were slightly but significantly longer, suggesting that under certain circumstances people can make perceptual discriminations even though the information that was used to make those discriminations is not consciously available.     

Judgments of learning are significantly higher following feedback on relatively good versus relatively poor trials despite no actual learning differences

Studies have consistently shown that prospective metacognitive judgments of learning are often inaccurate because humans mistakenly interpret current performance levels as valid indices of learning. These metacognitive discrepancies are strongly related to conditions of practice. Here, we examined how the type of feedback (after good versus poor trials) received during practice and awareness (aware versus unaware) of this manipulation affected judgments of learning and actual learning. After each six-trial block, participants received feedback on their three best trials or three worst trials and half of the participants were made explicitly aware of the type of feedback they received while the other half were unaware. Judgments of learning were made at the end of each six-trial block and before the 24-h retention test. Results indicated no motor performance differences between groups in practice or retention; however, receiving feedback on relatively good compared to relatively poor trials resulted in significantly higher judgments of learning in practice and retention, irrespective of awareness. These results suggest that KR on relatively good versus relatively poor trials can have dissociable effects on judgments of learning in the absence of actual learning differences, even when participants are made aware of their feedback manipulation.     

The amygdala is involved in affective priming effect for fearful faces

The object of this study was to investigate whether the amygdala is involved in affective priming effect after stimuli are encoded unconsciously and consciously. During the encoding phase, each masked face (fearful or neutral) was presented to participants six times for 17ms each, using a backward masking paradigm. During the retrieval phase, participants made a fearful/neutral judgment for each face. Half of the faces had the same valence as that seen during encoding (congruent condition) and the other half did not (incongruent condition). Participants were divided into unaware and aware groups based on their subjective and objective awareness assessments. The fMRI results showed that during encoding, the amygdala elicited stronger activation for fearful faces than neutral faces but differed in the hemisphere according to the awareness level. During retrieval, the amygdala showed a significant repetition priming effect, with the congruent faces producing less activation than the incongruent faces, especially for fearful faces. These data suggest that the amygdala is important in unconscious retrieving of memories for emotional faces whether they are encoded consciously or unconsciously.     

Evaluative conditioning and the awareness issue: assessing contingency awareness with the four-picture recognition test

An experiment is described that tested the moderating influence of contingency awareness on evaluative conditioning. After participants were conditioned within the picture-picture paradigm, contingency awareness was assessed by means of a recognition test (i.e., the 4-picture recognition test). Results indicate an inverse relationship between the conditioned affective reaction and contingency awareness: Only participants classified as unaware in the recognition test showed significant effects of evaluative learning. A closer inspection indicates that aware individuals stored not only the valence but also the nominal stimulus in mind.     

Standard delay eyeblink classical conditioning is independent of awareness

P. F. Lovibond and D. R. Shanks (2002) suggested that all forms of classical conditioning depend on awareness of the stimulus contingencies. This article considers the available data for eyeblink classical conditioning, including data from 2 studies (R. E. Clark, J. R. Manns, & L. R. Squire, 2001; J. R. Manns, R. E. Clark, & L. R. Squire, 2001) that were completed too recently to have been considered in their review. In addition, in response to questions raised by P. F. Lovibond and D. R. Shanks, 2 new analyses of data are presented from studies published previously. The available data from humans and experimental animals provide strong evidence that delay eyeblink classical conditioning (but not trace eyeblink classical conditioning) can be acquired and retained independently of the forebrain and independently of awareness. This conclusion applies to standard conditioning paradigms; for example, to single-cue delay conditioning when a tone is used as the conditioned stimulus (CS) and to differential delay conditioning when the positive and negative conditioned stimuli (CS+ and CS-) are a tone and white noise.     

Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology

Four basic approaches that have been used to demonstrate perception without awareness are described. Each approach reflects one of two types of experimental logic and one of two possible methods for controlling awareness. The experimental logic has been either to demonstrate a dissociation between a measure of perception with awareness and a measure that is sensitive to perception without awareness or to demonstrate a qualitative difference between the consequences of perception with and without awareness. Awareness has been controlled either by manipulating the stimulus conditions or by instructing observers on how to distribute their attention. The experimental findings based on all four approaches lead to the same conclusion; namely, stimuli are perceived even when observers are unaware of the stimuli. This conclusion is supported by results of studies in which awareness has been assessed with either objective measures of forced-choice discriminations or measures based on verbalizations of subjective conscious experiences. Given this solid empirical support for the concept of perception without awareness, a direction for future research studies is to assess the functions of information perceived without awareness in determining what is perceived with awareness. The available evidence suggests that information perceived without awareness both biases what stimuli are perceived with awareness and influences how stimuli perceived with awareness are consciously experienced.     

In sight but out of mind: do competing views test the limits of perception without awareness?

Over a century's worth of research suggests that "perception" without awareness is a genuine phenomenon. However, relatively little research has explored the question of whether all visually presented information activates representations in long term memory without awareness. Two experiments explored the use of a figure-ground display consisting of competing views in which one view dominates the other such that subjects are (initially) unaware of the non-dominant view. Neither experiment provided evidence that the non-dominant view (an embedded word) activated its representation in long term memory when the subject failed to report being aware of the embedded word in that priming was not seen on a subsequent stem completion task. In contrast, priming was seen when subjects reported being aware of the embedded word. It is suggested that two competing figure-ground relations are not concurrently computed unconsciously.     

Partial awareness creates the "illusion" of subliminal semantic priming

We argue that the lack of consensus regarding the existence of subliminal semantic processing arises from not taking into account the fact that linguistic stimuli are represented across several processing levels (features, letters, word form) that can independently reach or not reach awareness. Using masked words, we constructed conditions in which participants were aware of some letters or fragments of a word, while remaining unaware of the whole word. Three experiments using the Stroop priming paradigm show that when the stimulus set is reduced and participants are encouraged to guess the identity of the prime, such partially perceived stimuli can nonetheless give rise to "semantic" processing. We provide evidence that this effect is due to illusory reconstruction of the incompletely perceived stimulus, followed by usual semantic processing of the result. We conclude that previously reported unconscious Stroop priming is in fact a conscious effect, but applied to a perceptual illusion.     

The role of selective attention in visual awareness of stimulus features: Electrophysiological studies

Attention and awareness are closely related, but the nature of their relationship is unclear. The present study explores the timing and temporal evolution of their interaction with event-related potentials. The participants attended to specific conjunctions of spatial frequency and orientation in masked (unaware) and unmasked (aware) visual stimuli. A correlate of awareness appeared 100-200 msec from stimulus onset similarly to both attended and unattended features. Selection negativity (SN), a correlate of attentional selection, emerged in response to both masked and unmasked stimuli after 200 msec. This double dissociation between correlates of awareness and SN suggests that the electrophysiological processes associated with feature-based attentional selection and visual awareness of features can be dissociated from each other at early stages of processing. In a passive task, requiring no attention to the stimuli, early electrophysiological responses (before 200 msec) related to awareness were attenuated, suggesting that focal attention modulates visual awareness earlier than does selective feature-based attention.     

Knowing and avoiding: The influence of distractor awareness on oculomotor capture

Kramer, Hahn, Irwin, and Theeuwes (2000) reported that the interfering effect of distractors is reduced when participants are aware of the to-be-ignored information. In contrast, recent evidence indicates that distractor interference increases when individuals are aware of the distractors. In the present investigation, we directly assessed the influence of distractor awareness on oculomotor capture, with the hope of resolving this contradiction in the literature and gaining further insight into the influence of awareness on attention. Participants completed a traditional oculomotor capture task. They were not informed of the presence of the distracting information (unaware condition), were informed of distractors (aware condition), or were informed of distractor information and told to avoid attending to it (avoid condition). Being aware of the distractors yielded a performance benefit, relative to the unaware condition; however, this benefit was eliminated when participants were told to actively avoid distraction. This pattern of results reconciles past contradictions in the literature and suggests an inverted-U function of awareness in distractor performance. Too little or too much emphasis yields a performance decrement, but an intermediate level of emphasis provides a performance benefit.     

The effect of evaluation on co-occurrence memory judgement

Three experiments tested the effect of an attitude towards an object on the memory judgement of whether this object co-occurred with positive versus negative stimuli. We induced positive or negative attitudes towards novel male stimuli, and paired each man with an equal number of positive and negative animals. In a memory test, participants reported more co-occurrences of same-valence man/animal pairs than opposite-valence pairs. This valence-compatibility effect occurred even when attitudes were induced after the pairing (Experiment 1), when participants knew that each man occurred with an equal number of positive and negative animals (Experiment 2), and in reports of clear memory of pairs that did not co-occur (Experiment 3). The present findings suggest that evaluation causes illusory correlation even when the co-occurring stimuli are not traits or behaviours attributed to the attitude object. The results question the validity of co-occurrence memory judgements as measures of co-occurrence awareness in evaluative conditioning (EC) research.     

Single-cue delay eyeblink conditioning is unrelated to awareness

We examined the importance of awareness for eyeblink conditioning by directly comparing singlecue delay eyeblink conditioning and single-cue trace eyeblink conditioning. During single-cue delay conditioning, participants who became aware of the stimulus contingencies early in the conditioning session conditioned no better than those who became aware later in the session or did not become aware. Thus, the level of awareness was unrelated to the overall level of conditioning across the session. In contrast, awareness of the stimulus contingencies early in the session predicted the success of single-cue trace conditioning. These data, together with earlier findings, show that awareness is irrelevant to single-cue delay eyeblink conditioning but is critical for single-cue trace eyeblink conditioning. The findings from the present study are related to previous findings for differential (CS⁺ and CS⁻) eyeblink conditioning and awareness.     

Conceptual Implicit Memory in Advertising Research

A growing body of research examines the effect of advertising on implicit (unconscious or unintentional) forms of memory, in contrast with typical advertising research focusing on explicit (conscious or recollective) measures. This research primarily examines perceptual implicit memory, but conceptual implicit tests also have clear relevance for advertising research. The present experiments use a conceptual implicit test to determine if conceptual priming is obtained with brand materials and to assess the degree of explicit contamination (using a post‐test awareness questionnaire). The experiments first demonstrated that awareness is a threat to conceptual implicit measures within the advertising context. Steps were taken to reduce awareness, which were successful. Results suggest that brands can be conceptually primed when presented as text or as images but that awareness has to be accounted for as aware participants did show significantly more priming than those who were unaware (Experiment 3). Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evidence for an expectancy-based theory of avoidance behaviour

In most studies on avoidance learning, participants receive an aversive unconditioned stimulus after a warning signal is presented, unless the participant performs a particular response. Lovibond (2006) recently proposed a cognitive theory of avoidance learning, according to which avoidance behaviour is a function of both Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning. In line with this theory, we found that avoidance behaviour was based on an integration of acquired knowledge about, on the one hand, the relation between stimuli and, on the other hand, the relation between behaviour and stimuli.