Positive mood + action = negative mood + inaction: effects of general action and inaction concepts on decisions and performance as a function of affect

General action and inaction concepts have been shown to produce broad, goal-mediated effects on cognitive and motor activity irrespective of the type of activity. The current research tested a model in which action and inaction goals interact with the valence of incidental moods to guide behavior. Over four experiments, participants' moods were manipulated to be positive (happy), neutral, or negative (angry or sad), and then general action, inaction, and neutral concepts were primed. In Experiment 1, action primes increased intellectual performance when participants experienced a positive (happy) or neutral mood, whereas inaction primes increased performance when participants experienced a negative (angry) mood. Including a control-prime condition, Experiments 2 and 3 replicated these results measuring the number of general interest articles participants were willing to read and participants' memory for pictures of celebrities. Experiment 4 replicated the results comparing happiness with sadness and suggested that the effect of the prime's adoption was automatic. Overall, the findings supported an interactive model by which action concepts and positive affect produce the same increases in active behavior as inaction concepts and negative affect.     

The time for doing is not the time for change: effects of general action and inaction goals on attitude retrieval and attitude change

Implicit in many informal and formal principles of psychological change is the understudied assumption that change requires either an active approach or an inactive approach. This issue was systematically investigated by comparing the effects of general action goals and general inaction goals on attitude change. As prior attitudes facilitate preparation for an upcoming persuasive message, general action goals were hypothesized to facilitate conscious retrieval of prior attitudes and therefore hinder attitude change to a greater extent than general inaction goals. Experiment 1 demonstrated that action primes (e.g., "go," "energy") yielded faster attitude report than inaction primes (e.g., "rest," "still") among participants who were forewarned of an upcoming persuasive message. Experiment 2 showed that the faster attitude report identified in Experiment 1 was localized on attitudes toward a message topic participants were prepared to receive. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 showed that, compared with inaction primes, action primes produced less attitude change and less argument scrutiny in response to a counterattitudinal message on a previously forewarned topic. Experiment 6 confirmed that the effects of the primes on attitude change were due to differential attitude retrieval. That is, when attitude expression was induced immediately after the primes, action and inaction goals produced similar amounts of attitude change. In contrast, when no attitude expression was induced after the prime, action goals produced less attitude change than inaction goals. Finally, Experiment 7 validated the assumption that these goal effects can be reduced or reversed when the goals have already been satisfied by an intervening task.     

Being active and impulsive: The role of goals for action and inaction in self-control

Although self-control often requires behavioral inaction (i.e., not eating a piece of cake), the process of inhibiting impulsive behavior is commonly characterized as cognitively active (i.e., actively exerting self-control). Two experiments examined whether motivation for action or inaction facilitates self-control behavior in the presence of tempting stimuli. Experiment 1 used a delay discounting task to assess the ability to delay gratification with respect to money. Experiment 2 used a Go/No-Go task to assess the ability to inhibit a dominant but incorrect motor response to the words ??condom?? and ??sex??. The results demonstrate that goals for inaction promote self-control, whereas goals for action promote impulsive behavior. These findings are discussed in light of recent evidence suggesting that goals for action and inaction modulate physiological resources that promote behavioral execution.     

Conscious control over the content of unconscious cognition

Visual stimuli (primes) presented too briefly to be consciously identified can nevertheless affect responses to subsequent stimuli - an instance of unconscious cognition. There is a lively debate as to whether such priming effects originate from unconscious semantic processing of the primes or from reactivation of learned motor responses that conscious stimuli afford during preceding practice. In four experiments we demonstrate that unconscious stimuli owe their impact neither to automatic semantic categorization nor to memory traces of preceding stimulus-response episodes, but to their match with pre-specified cognitive action-trigger conditions. The intentional creation of such triggers allows actors to control the way unconscious stimuli bias their behaviour.     

Conceptual and physical object qualities contribute differently to motor affordances

Priming studies have demonstrated that an object’s intrinsic and extrinsic qualities (size, orientation) influence subsequent motor behavior thus suggesting that these object qualities ‘afford’ actions that are congruent with the prime. We present four experiments that aim to evaluate the relative effect of conceptual and physical object qualities on action priming. In Experiment 1 equally graspable known and unknown tools are presented as primes. In Experiment 2 the primes depict high versus low graspable unfamiliar tools, and in Experiments 3 and 4 we present simple graspable shapes versus high graspable unfamiliar or familiar tools respectively. In all experiments the (unrelated) task consists of a timed motor response to the direction of a centrally placed arrow that is superimposed on the prime. Whereas tool familiarity reveals no significant difference on reaction time (Exp 1), responses to high graspable unfamiliar tools (Exp 2) and simple graspable shapes (Exps 3 and 4) are significantly faster. We conclude that motor affordances are most readily determined by object qualities that depend on the object’s physical appearance provided by visual information. Conceptual information about the stimuli, such as semantic category or stored knowledge about its function and associated movements, does not appear to produce detectable effects of action priming in this paradigm.     

Naïve definitions of action and inaction: The continuum,spread, and valence of behaviors

The cohesiveness of a society depends, in part, on how its individual members manage their daily activities with respect to the goals of that society. Hence, there should be a degree of social agreement on what constitutes action and what constitutes inaction. The present research investigated the structure of action and inaction definitions, the evaluation of action versus inaction, and individual differences in these evaluations. Action–inaction ratings of behaviors and states showed more social agreement at the ends of the inaction–action continuum than at the middle, suggesting a socially shared construal of this definition. Action–inaction ratings were also shown to correlate with the valence of the rated behaviors, such that the more active the behavior, the more positive its valence. Lastly, individual differences in locomotion, need for closure, and Christian religious beliefs correlated positively with a preference for action. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the source and scope of priming effects of masked stimuli on endogenous shifts of spatial attention

Unconscious stimuli can influence participants’ motor behavior as well as more complex mental processes. Previous cue-priming experiments demonstrated that masked cues can modulate endogenous shifts of spatial attention as measured by choice reaction time tasks. Here, we applied a signal detection task with masked luminance targets to determine the source and the scope of effects of masked stimuli. Target-detection performance was modulated by prime-cue congruency, indicating that prime-cue congruency modulates signal enhancement at early levels of target processing. These effects, however, were only found when the prime was perceptually similar to the cue indicting that primes influence early target processing in an indirect way by facilitating cue processing. Together with previous research we conclude that masked stimuli can modulate perceptual and post-central levels of processing. Findings mark a new limit of the effects of unconscious stimuli which seem to have a smaller scope than conscious stimuli.     

Locus of inhibition in the masked priming of response alternatives

Masked prime stimuli presented immediately before target stimuli in a choice reaction task give rise to behavioral costs when the primes and the target stimuli are mapped to the same response and result in benefits when they are mapped to opposite responses. Researchers assume that this negative compatibility effect reflects inhibitory processes in the control of perceptuomotor links. The authors investigated whether the inhibition operates at the level of abstract central codes or at effector-specific motor stages. In 2 experiments (N = 8 participants in each), left or right hand or foot responses were required to target stimuli that were preceded by masked arrow primes mapped to the same response side as the target stimuli in compatible trials and to the opposite response side in incompatible trials; the primes were irrelevant in neutral trials. In Experiment 1, when the masked primes determined both response side and modality, there was no transfer of negative compatibility effects across response modalities. That finding is inconsistent with a central abstract locus of inhibition and suggests that inhibition operates at effector-specific motor stages. In Experiment 2, primes conveyed only response side information but left response modality uncertain, and negative compatibility effects were elicited for both hand and foot responses, suggesting that partially informative masked primes can trigger a parallel activation and subsequent inhibition of response processes within separate effector systems.     

How important is a prime's gestalt for subliminal priming?

Masked stimuli (primes) can affect the preparation of a motor response to subsequently presented target stimuli. Under some conditions, reactions to the main stimulus can be facilitated (straight priming) or inhibited (inverse priming) when preceded by a compatible prime (calling for the same response). In the majority of studies in which inverse priming was demonstrated arrows pointing left or right were used as prime and targets. There is, however, evidence that arrows are special overlearned stimuli which are processed in a favorable way. Here we report three experiments designated to test whether the "arrowness" of primes/targets is a sufficient condition for inverse priming. The results clearly show that although inverse priming appeared when non-arrow shapes were used, the magnitude of the priming effect was larger with arrows. The possible reasons for this effect are discussed.     

Links between conscious awareness and response inhibition: evidence from masked priming

Recent results from “subliminal priming” experiments have shown that masked prime stimuli which can not be consciously perceived can trigger response activation processes, but that these response activations can later be subject to inhibition. Links between conscious awareness and response inhibition were investigated by manipulating the visibility of masked prime stimuli, from clearly visible primes to prime stimuli that were inaccessible to conscious perception. Response inhibition was observed with unperceived prime stimuli, but not for suprathreshold primes. Correlations between individual prime identification thresholds and the onset of response inhibition indicate that the absence or presence of conscious awareness can predict whether or not response inhibition is elicited. These results demonstrate qualitative differences in the effects of conscious and unconscious information. It is argued that response facilitation produced by consciously available perceptual information can counteract automatic effects of self-inhibitory motor control circuits.     

Limitations of semantic priming procedures for automatic goal activation

According to the auto-motive model, behavioral goals can be automatically activated by situational cues and may subsequently guide behavior without individual awarness. Semantic priming has become a popular paradigm for investigating effects of automatic goal activation. Nevertheless, a critical assumption of the model, i.e., that goals can be activated by semantic primes related to situational features associated with the goal, is often assumed rather than tested in experiments using semantic priming procedures. Results of four studies testing the potential of such a prime for goal activation by assessing emotional responses, subjective goal importance, behavioral intentions, and enhanced perception of goal-related stimuli do not support this assumption. The implications of these findings and a critical evaluation of results of other studies are discussed in terms of possible limitations of semantic priming procedures for testing hypotheses derived from the auto-motive model.     

Motivating exercise: The interactive effect of general action goals and past behavior on physical activity

Although exercise is recognized as a powerful tool to combat obesity, remarkably few US adults pursue adequate amounts of exercise, with one major impediment being a lack of motivation for active behaviors. Recent empirical work has demonstrated that behavior can be guided by goals to be generally active or inactive. In the present paper, an experiment is presented in which participants played or observed a video game, were primed with action or inaction goals, and practiced a stretching exercise for as long as desired. Exposure to environmental action cues led to increased time spent exercising. This effect was moderated by past behavior, such that individuals who had just engaged in an active task (played a videogame) were insensitive to attempts to motivate general action. This suggests that the effectiveness of attempts to motivate activity (??just do it??, ??be active??) hinges on the recent past-behavior of the targeted individuals. An implication of this work is that participation in certain leisure activities, such as playing videogames, may be causally related to a lack of motivation for exercise.     

Dissociating local and global levels of perceptuo-motor control in masked priming

Masked prime stimuli presented near the threshold of conscious awareness affect responses to subsequent targets. The direction of these priming effects depends on the interval between masked prime and target. With short intervals, benefits for compatible trials (primes and targets mapped to the same response) and costs for incompatible trials are observed. This pattern reverses with longer intervals. We argue (a) that these effects reflect the initial activation and subsequent self-inhibition of the primed response, and the corresponding inhibition and subsequent disinhibition of the nonprimed response, and (b) that they are generated at dissociable local (within response channels) and global (between channels) levels of motor control. In two experiments, global-level priming effects were modulated by changing the number of response alternatives, whereas local-level effects remained unaffected. These experiments suggest that low-level motor control mechanisms can be successfully decomposed into separable subcomponents, operating at different levels within the motor system.     

Active (not passive) spatial imagery primes temporal judgements

Previous research has shown that primes that induce particular spatial perspectives can influence temporal judgements. However, most studies have used priming stimuli that involve both spatial and motor language and imagery. Here we ask whether the motor content of these stimuli plays an important role in their ability to serve as effective primes. A total of 198 adult participants made temporal judgements after exposure to spatial primes involving varying levels of imagined effort. Spatial primes involving imagined motor actions, but not those involving equivalent passive motions through space, successfully primed decisions about time. This suggests that motor content, rather than spatial content alone, contributes to the priming effects that arise when people make temporal judgements after exposure to particular spatial perspectives.     

Response facilitation and inhibition in manual, vocal, and oculomotor performance: evidence for a modality-unspecific mechanism

In 2 experiments (N = 10, Experiment 1; N = 16, Experiment 2), the authors investigated whether evidence for response facilitation and subsequent inhibition elicited by masked prime stimuli can be observed for output modalities other than manual responding. Masked primes were followed by target stimuli that required a 2-choice manual, saccadic, or vocal response. Performance was measured for compatible trials in which primes and targets were identical and for incompatible trials in which they were mapped to opposite responses. When primes were presented centrally, performance benefits were obtained for incompatible trials; whereas for peripherally presented primes, performance benefits were found in compatible trials. That pattern of results was obtained for manual responses and for saccadic eye movements (Experiment 1), demonstrating that those effects are not mediated by specialized dorsal pathways involved in visuomanual control. An analogous pattern of effects was found when manual and vocal responses were compared (Experiment 2). Because vocal responding is controlled by the inferotemporal cortex, that result shows that prime-target compatibility effects are not primarily mediated by the dorsal stream, but appear to reflect modality-unspecific visuomotor links that allow rapid activation of motor responses that may later be subject to inhibition.     

Response Facilitation and Inhibition in Manual,Vocal, and Oculomotor Performance: Evidence for a Modality-Unspecific Mechanism

In 2 experiments (N = 10, Experiment 1; N = 16, Experiment 2), the authors investigated whether evidence for response facilitation and subsequent inhibition elicited by masked prime stimuli can be observed for output modalities other than manual responding. Masked primes were followed by target stimuli that required a 2-choice manual, saccadic, or vocal response. Performance was measured for compatible trials in which primes and targets were identical and for incompatible trials in which they were mapped to opposite responses. When primes were presented centrally, performance benefits were obtained for incompatible trials; whereas for peripherally presented primes, performance benefits were found in compatible trials. That pattern of results was obtained for manual responses and for saccadic eye movements (Experiment 1), demonstrating that those effects are not mediated by specialized dorsal pathways involved in visuomanual control. An analogous pattern of effects was found when manual and vocal responses were compared (Experiment 2). Because vocal responding is controlled by the inferotemporal cortex, that result shows that prime-target compatibility effects are not primarily mediated by the dorsal stream, but appear to reflect modality-unspecific visuomotor links that allow rapid activation of motor responses that may later be subject to inhibition.     

The basis of shared intentions in human and robot cognition

There is a fundamental difference between robots that are equipped with sensory, motor and cognitive capabilities, vs. simulations or non-embodied cognitive systems. Via their perceptual and motor capabilities, these robotic systems can interact with humans in an increasingly more “natural” way, physically interacting with shared objects in cooperative action settings. Indeed, such cognitive robotic systems provide a unique opportunity to developmental psychologists for implementing their theories and testing their hypotheses on systems that are becoming increasingly “at home” in the sensory--motor and social worlds, where such hypotheses are relevant. The current research is the result of interaction between research in computational neuroscience and robotics on the one hand, and developmental psychology on the other. One of the key findings in the developmental psychology context is that with respect to other primates, humans appear to have a unique ability and motivation to share goals and intentions with others. This ability is expressed in cooperative behavior very early in life, and appears to be the basis for subsequent development of social cognition. Here we attempt to identify a set of core functional elements of cooperative behavior and the corresponding shared intentional representations. We then begin to specify how these capabilities can be implemented in a robotic system, the Cooperator, and tested in human–robot interaction experiments. Based on the results of these experiments we discuss the mutual benefit for both fields of the interaction between robotics and developmental psychology.     

The effects of subliminal anger and sadness primes on agency appraisals

Two studies examined whether appraisals can be differentially affected by subliminal anger and sadness primes. Participants from Singapore (Experiment 1) and China (Experiment 2) were exposed to either subliminal angry faces or subliminal sad faces. Supporting appraisal theories of emotions, participants exposed to subliminal angry faces were more likely to appraise negative events as caused by other people and those exposed to subliminal sad faces were more likely to appraise the same events as caused by situational factors. The results provide the first evidence for subliminal emotion-specific cognitive effects. They show that cognitive functions such as appraisals can be affected by subliminal emotional stimuli of the same valence.     

Neuroticism and Attitudes Toward Action in 19 Countries

Although individuals scoring high on Neuroticism tend to avoid taking action when faced with challenges, Neuroticism is also characterized by impulsivity. To explore cognitive biases related to this costly behavior pattern, we tested whether individuals who rated themselves as higher in Neuroticism would evaluate the general concepts of action and inaction as, respectively, more negative and positive. We further investigated whether anxiety and depression would mediate and individualism‐collectivism would moderate these relations in a large international sample. Participants (N = 3,827 college students; 69% female) from 19 countries completed surveys measuring Neuroticism, attitudes toward action and inaction, depression, anxiety, and individualism‐collectivism. Hierarchical linear models tested the above predictions. Neuroticism negatively correlated with attitudes toward action and positively correlated with attitudes toward inaction. Furthermore, anxiety was primarily responsible for emotionally unstable individuals’ less positive attitudes toward action, and individuals who endorsed more collectivistic than individualistic beliefs showed a stronger negative association between Neuroticism and attitudes toward action. Researchers and practitioners interested in understanding and remediating the negative consequences of Neuroticism should pay greater attention to attitudes toward action and inaction, particularly focusing on their links with anxiety and individualism‐collectivism.     

Learning associations between action and perception: effects of incompatible training on body part and spatial priming

Observation of another person executing an action primes the same action in the observer's motor system. Recent evidence has shown that these priming effects are flexible, where training of new associations, such as making a foot response when viewing a moving hand, can reduce standard action priming effects (Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, Brass, & Heyes, 2008). Previously, these effects were obtained after explicit learning tasks in which the trained action was cued by the content of a visual stimulus. Here we report similar learning processes in an implicit task in which the participant's action is self-selected, and subsequent visual effects are determined by the nature of that action. Importantly, we show that these learning processes are specific to associations between actions and viewed body parts, in that incompatible spatial training did not influence body part or spatial priming effects. Our results are consistent with models of visuomotor learning that place particular emphasis on the repeated experience of watching oneself perform an action.