Representation,Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the representational theory of perception, on which the world is represented as being a certain way in perceptual experience, cannot explain how there can be a genuinely epistemic connection between experience and belief. I try to show that we are positively required to deny that perceptual consciousness is contentful if we want to make its fitness for epistemic duties intelligible. (So versions of the representational theory on which experience has a merely causal purchase on belief are not considered.) But my aim is not just negative. I try to defeat representationalism in such a way as to motivate a robustly presentational theory of perception. According to such a theory, perceptions are relations not between a subject and a content but between a subject and an ordinary object (such that if the relation holds at t, an appropriate subject and object must exist at t, and the object must be presented to the subject). I end by sketching an account of perceptual experience that is meant to show that, contrary to a very popular misconception, there is a way to conceive perceptual consciousness as relational and presentational (not intentional and representational) that does not succumb to the celebrated ‘myth of the Given’.     

Waves,streams, states,and self: An outline of an integral psychology 1

Abstract

Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross‐cultural literature search on the “mind” side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self (or self‐system). A “master template” of these various phenomena, culled from over one‐hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the “mind” side of the brain‐mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the “hard problem,” or how the mind‐side can be integrated with the brain‐side to generate a more integral theory of consciousness.     

Is Sāṁkhya a Form of Idealism? An Exploration into Classical Sāṁkhya

Introduction

I have aims to shed light on two points in this paper. The first is to illumine that Sāṁkhya realist conception is based on false assumptions, and second is to shed light on the idealistic leanings of the system.

Text and Methods

I argue that in the light of textual evidences as well as phenomenological interpretation, Sāṁkhya metaphysics can be viewed as a form of idealism. I begin by proposing that the established realistic interpretation is based on an assumption that prakṛti and its evolutes are material and cosmic. In fact, prakṛti and its evolutes are mental categories, and the ontological dualism of puruṣa and prakṛti enunciated in the Sāṁkhya system is nothing but a form of idealism. The prakṛti and its evolutes are the principles/categories of cognition or experience. The conception that evolution is a process in prakṛti that takes place in the presence of puruṣa can also be conceived after the manner of form idealism. In fact, even the conception of puruṣa being simple and pure consciousness, together with its notion of liberation as aloneness of puruṣa and its separation from prakṛti and its activities (kaivalya), tends to advocate a form of idealism.

Conclusion

Thus, notion of evolution and liberation becomes the apparatus to interpret the Sāṁkhya as idealism.

     

Leibniz on Memory and Consciousness

In this article, I develop a higher-order interpretation of Leibniz's theory of consciousness according to which memory is constitutive of consciousness. I offer an account of Leibniz's theory of memory on which his theory of consciousness may be based, and I then show that Leibniz could have developed a coherent higher-order account. However, it is not clear whether Leibniz held (or should have held) such an account of consciousness; I sketch an alternative that has at least as many advantages as the higher-order theory. This analysis provides an important antecedent to the contemporary discussions of higher-order theories of consciousness.     

A biphasic relational approach to the evolution of human consciousness

Background/objectiveHuman consciousness is arguably unique, and its features are hard to explain. Continuous and discrete accounts of consciousness are commonly viewed as incompatible, but both have limitations. Continuous accounts cannot readily account for what appears to be unique about human consciousness; discrete accounts have a hard time explaining how human consciousness could have evolved. The present position paper shows how both continuous and discontinuously elements can be combined.MethodA biphasic model is constructed by unifying complex systems theory, the evolution of symbolic reasoning as a relational extension of human cooperation, and evolutionary science. The application of this approach to modern views of consciousness is then explored.ResultsOur analysis suggests that human consciousness may be viewed as a discontinuous event, that emerged from continuous foundations. This biphasic account contains processes that can be targeted clinically. For example, developmentally delayed children with problems in consciousness may be helped by targeting the processes the present account suggests are important at different levels of complexity.ConclusionsThis biphasic relational approach fits with the evolutionary record and with data on human cognitive development. It may be useful in guiding clinical intervention.     

Demystifying Without Quining: Wittgenstein and Dennett on Qualitative States

Abstract

In his 1991 book Consciousness Explained, Daniel Deimett presents his “Multiple Drafts” model of consciousness. Central to his theory is the rejection of the notion of ‘qualia’ of the existence of the purported ‘qualitative character’ of conscious experience that many argue rules out the possibility of a purely materialist theory of mind. In eliminating qualia from his theory of consciousness, Dennett claims to be following in the footsteps of Wittgenstein, who also had much to say regarding the nature of ‘private’ experience. In this paper I reject this claim and argue that the elimination of qualia plays no part in Wittgenstein’s radical understanding of conscious experience.’¹     

Is consciousness intrinsically valuable?

There are some things that we think are intrinsically valuable, or valuable for their own sake. Is consciousness—subjective, qualitative experience—one of those things? Some theorists favor the positive view, according to which consciousness is intrinsically valuable. According to a positive theorist, consciousness itself accrues intrinsic value, independent of the particular kind of experience instantiated. In contrast, I favor the neutral view, according to which consciousness is neither intrinsically valuable nor disvaluable. The primary purpose of this paper is to clarify what is at stake when we ask whether consciousness is intrinsically valuable, to carve out the theoretical space, and to evaluate the question rigorously. The secondary purpose is to show why the neutral view is attractive and why certain arguments for the positive view do not work.

     

Toward the re‐enchantment of psychotherapy: Stories as container

Abstract

Storytelling by a therapist to clients may serve to increase clients’ ability to bear pain, to increase self‐complexity, and expand clients’ senses of the allowable. A model delineating the therapeutic impact of therapist storytelling in psychotherapy is proposed. Stories may change clients’ selves so that they may accommodate traumatic experiences and internal complexity. Stories increase clients’ capacity to tolerate painful experience and therefore serve as a container of tragic life experiences. The artistry of therapeutic story selection is defined as choosing stories consonant with clients’ strengths, rather than with the nature of the trauma. The power of story‐listening to alter consciousness in pleasant ways (storystoned) increases its usefulness as an intervention that is neither anxiety provoking nor re‐traumatizing.     

Secular Buddhism and Justice

Abstract

Starting point: The core idea of secular Buddhism is to grasp the spirit of early Buddhism and transpose it into the present. The best known approach to implement this idea is Stephen Batchelor’s Buddhism Without Beliefs, an approach which advocates an agnostic stance with regard to the doctrine of rebirth and denies its relevance for daily practice.

Type of problem:

? Is there a way to revise the doctrine of rebirth, instead of completely dropping it?

? What is the impact on the notion of justice?

Result: The doctrine of rebirth cannot be revised in a strict sense, but there are some striking similarities between the ancient and modern (biological) view on the topic. Since the stream of genetic and epigenetic information has the power to create consciousness and reflects experiences of past lives, it can be associated with the stream of consciousness (cittasantāna) in the Mahayana model of rebirth. Parents not only determine the genetic constitution of their children, they also transfer character traits by means of epigenetic heredity. If genetic inheritance is associated with karma, then genes become an element of synchronic and diachronic connectedness (pratītya-samutpāda). Instead of an individual learning process across successive lives, there is a collective learning process across successive generations.

Given the biological model of rebirth, the belief in cosmic justice turns into a quest for mundane justice. There is a thought experiment for constructing such a concept, which complies well with the secular Buddhist spirit. John Rawls assumes that the legislative deliberation is taking place ‘behind a veil of ignorance’, so that the participants of the deliberation do not know their future genetic constitution and their future position within the society. If the participants imagine that their future self is contingent and impermanent – in accordance with the Buddhist doctrine of anātman and anitya – then the resulting principles of justice will be impartial.     

The Memory of Micro-Organisms: An Essay on the Experience of Environmental Alterations by Bacteria

Using a generalized conception of experience, from which all features characteristic for higher animals (such as consciousness and thought) have been removed, allowed relating experience to adaptive processes in lower organisms. The temporal vector character of every current experience, containing as well memories of past experiences as intentions for future activities, can then be found in the adaptive response of cyanobacteria to alterations in phosphate supply, particularly in energetic manifestations of this phenomenon. A possible analogy between adaptive events as the “atomic units” of physiological adaptation and Whitehead's actual occasion of experience is discussed.     

What is Literature? Revisited: Sartre on the Language of Literature

This article argues that Sartre's distinction in What Is Literature? between prose and poetry should be understood in the light of his earlier distinction in The Imaginary between two kinds of meaning. Sartre argues against the “Cartesian picture” of consciousness in The Imaginary, specifically concerning our experience of images. Not only is a mental image not an “inner object” mediating between consciousness and the world, even a picture drawn on paper should not be understood as an object standing between the viewer and what this picture represents. Our experience, Sartre argues, is that of seeing things in a picture rather than seeing through it, such that the meaning of pictures and images in general is embodied in them and cannot be separated from them. He then goes on to contrast this kind of embodied meaning (which he calls “sense”) with a kind of meaning that can be completely grasped independently of its expression (which he calls “signification”) and identify the two with painting and language respectively. It is for this reason, this article argues, that Sartre later sees poetry as a deviation from language's proper function. This rigid distinction is maintained by Sartre until the end of his career, and the change that some commentators found in him are its outcome rather than a revolt against it. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty has demonstrated more convincingly that sense and signification are both essential aspects of linguistic meaning, and their relation is much more dynamic and complimentary than Sartre would have allowed.     

Virtual reflection: Antoine Arnauld on Descartes' concept of conscientia

ABSTRACT

Although Descartes has often been portrayed as the father of the modern concept of mind, his approach to consciousness is notoriously problematic. What makes it particularly hard to assess his role in the development of the theories of consciousness is the difficulty of clarifying the kind of consciousness he might have in mind when using the associated Latin terms (conscius, cogitatio, conscium esse, etc.). In this article, I analyse Antoine Arnauld’s early interpretation of the passages in Descartes that refer to the issue of consciousness. I argue for two separate but interconnected claims. Firstly, I show that when Arnauld sets out to make a case for Descartes’ concept of cogitatio, he reads the central passages in light of some scholastic theories of cognition, in particular, the concept of ‘reflexio virtualis’ which, far from being a Cartesian invention, comes from the late scholastic discourse. Secondly, I argue that by talking about virtual reflection Arnauld provides an interpretation of Descartes’ views in terms of the intrinsic structure of the first-order thought – a reading which is still plausible, even by our contemporary standards.     

Towards modern post-coma care based on neuroscientific evidence

BackgroundUnderstanding the mechanisms underlying human consciousness is pivotal to improve the prognostication and treatment of severely brain-injured patients. Consciousness remains an elusive concept and the identification of its neural correlates is an active subject of research, however recent neuroscientific advances have allowed scientists to better characterize disorders of consciousness. These breakthroughs question the historical nomenclature and our current management of post-comatose patients.MethodThis review examines the contribution of consciousness neurosciences to the current clinical management of severe brain injury. It investigates the major impact of consciousness disorders on healthcare systems, the scientific frameworks employed to identify their neural correlates and how evidence-based data from neuroimaging research have reshaped the landscape of post-coma care in recent years.ResultsOur increased ability to detect behavioral and neurophysiological signatures of consciousness has led to significant changes in taxonomy and clinical practice. We advocate for a multimodal framework for the management of severely brain-injured patients based on precision medicine and evidence-based decisions, integrating epidemiology, health economics and neuroethics.ConclusionsMajor progress in brain imaging and clinical assessment have opened the door to a new era of post-coma care based on standardized neuroscientific evidence. We highlight its implications in clinical applications and call for improved collaborations between researchers and clinicians to better translate findings to the bedside.     

Enactive or inactive? Cranially envatted dream experience and the extended conscious mind

When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on Alva Noë’s enactive view, according to which the vehicles of perceptual experience extend beyond the brain, I argue that dreams are a quandary. Noë’s view is that dreaming is consistent with enactivism because even if dreams are inactive and shut off from the external environment, they are not “full-blown” perceptual consciousness, and also, there is some reason to reject the inactive claim. However, this view rests on an unjustified and reductive account of dreams which is not supported by empirical evidence. Dreams can indeed replicate waking phenomenal experience during inactive periods of sleep, and we have no reason to suspect that dreams which are more inactive are less “full-blown”. Taken together, this shows that dreams are indeed relevant to extended conscious mind theories and need to be taken into account by enactivists.     

Emotions–Adaptive Standards And/Or Primitive Constructs: A Reply to Mascolo and Mancuso

Abstract

In replying to Mascolo & Mancuso's paper, I have contrasted their functionalist approach to emotional states and experience with my position on emotions as epigenetically-available primitive constructs. Biologically, Mascolo & Mancuso treat emotions as mobilizaiton in the face of discrepancies. My proposal of a four-dimensional model provides a biological grounding for the marvellous diverisyt of human emotional experience. Where Mascolo & Mancuso treat emotions as discrete entities and highlight emotion knowledge, J have suggested emotions operate as bipolar constructs, and I have highlighted experience. We should attend to emotions in terms of both knowledge and experience, but it is important to maintain the distinction     

WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS AND HAS IT EVOLVED?

Research into consciousness has now become respectable, and much has been written about it. Is consciousness the exclusive property of human beings, or can it be found also in animals? Can machines become conscious? Is consciousness an illusion, and are all mental states ultimately reducible to the movement of molecules? If consciousness is other than matter, what connection does it have with matter? These and others like them are now serious scientific questions in the West. This article discusses consciousness within the frame of the following assertions: Consciousness has evolved from earlier states of awareness to be found in lower forms of life. The current scientific method is too restrictive for the study of conscience and its evolution. In particular classical logic leads scientists to ignore or reject consciousness as a legitimate field of study. Mind and matter, generalized as knowing and being, have equal status.