Man The Rational Animal?

This paper considers well known results of psychological researchinto the fallibility of human reason, and philosophical conclusionsthat some have drawn from these results. Close attention to theexact content of the results casts doubt on the reasoning that leadsto those conclusions.     

Is Genuine Satisficing Rational?

There have been different interpretations of satisficing rationality. A common view is that it is sometimes rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when one does not know that it is the best option. But there is available a more radical view of satisficing. On this view, it is rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when a better option is known to be available. In this paper I distinguish between two possible interpretations of ‘genuine’ satisficing, a de re and a de dicto interpretation. I then argue that while de re genuine satisficing is always irrational, de dicto genuine satisficing might be rationally permissible. In fact, de dicto genuine satisficing does not appear to be covered by existing accounts of satisficing behaviour.

Is Human Learning Rational?

We can predict and control events in the world via associative learning. Such learning is rational if we come to believe that an associative relationship exists between a pair of events only when it truly does. The statistical metric ΔP, the difference between the probability of an outcome event in the presence of the predictor and its probability in the absence of the predictor tells us when and to what extent events are indeed related. Contrary to what is often claimed, humans' associative judgements compare very favourably with the ΔP metric, even in situations where multiple predictive cues are in competition for association with the outcome. How do humans achieve this judgemental accuracy? I argue that it is not via the application of an explicit mental version of the ΔP rule. Instead, accurate judgements are an emergent property of an associationist learning process of the sort that has become common in adaptive network models of cognition. Such an associationist mechanism is the “means” to a normative or statistical “end”.     

Is attempted suicide an offense?

The English poet William Ernest Henley wrote: “I am the master of my fate, I am the captain of my soul.” However, Hamlet's dilemma of “to be or not to be” faces many a soul in times of distress, agony and suffering, when the question asked is “to die or not to die”. If the decision were to die and the same is implemented to its fructification resulting in death that is the end of the matter, the dead is relieved of the agony, pain and suffering and no evil consequences known to our law follow. But if the person concerned were unfortunate to survive, the attempt to commit suicide becomes punishable with imprisonment and fine under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Petitions have assailed the validity of Section 309 IPC praying time and again to declare the section void. On the other hand, euthanasia and physician assisted suicide have become prominent public issues in many countries over the past few years. Several countries or regions of countries have debated legislation on euthanasia and/or physician assisted suicide. Although there is growing public acceptance of physician-assisted deaths all over the world, many professional organizations remain opposed to it. Most of the debates on the issue are usually framed as issues of morality while many basic empirical questions remain unanswered. This paper attempts to examine the causes and consequences of attempted and completed suicide.     

Is Teenage Sexual Behavior Rational?1

We evaluate the applicability of a decision making framework to the teenage contraceptive and sexual behavior of 1032 Philadelphia teenagers. We examine three reasons why the decision making perspective may not apply in this domain: (a) because the decision makers are teenagers, (b) because the decision concerns sexual behavior, and (c) because the costs of contraception and abstinence are immediate and certain, while the benefits are delayed and uncertain. Using multiple regression, we examine the predictors of sexual activity and contraceptive use. We find support for the decision making model in that the variables ordinarily included in decision analyses do significantly predict behavior. But respondents seem to place disproportionate weight on some considerations, such as the discomfort of using birth control, and very little on others, such as the effectiveness of birth control or their attitude toward motherhood.     

What Is Rational About Nash Equilibria?

Nash Equilibrium is a central concept ingame theory. It has been argued that playing NashEquilibrium strategies is rational advice for agentsinvolved in one-time strategic interactions capturedby non-cooperative game theory. This essaydiscusses arguments for that position: vonNeumann–Morgenstern's argument for their minimaxsolution, the argument from self-enforcingagreements, the argument from the absence ofprobabilities, the transparency-of-reasons argument,the argument from regret, and the argument fromcorrelated equilibrium. All of these argumentseither fail entirely or have a very limited scope.Whatever the use of Nash Equilibrium is, therefore,it is not useful as a rational recommendation inone-time strategic interactions. This is good newsfor Bayesians: although this discussion does notargue directly for the Bayesian idea of rationalityas expected utility maximization, it argues againsta position that has been regarded as a contender insituations of strategic interaction.     

Physician-assisted suicide: what's the story?

After telling a story of a family's inquiry into physician-assisted suicide on behalf of a loved one, John F. Kilner uses the story to discuss some specific ways in which modern medicine often fails to supply life-affirming alternatives in situations like the one this family faced. Knowing about these alternatives is important for Christians, since God is the author of freedom, justice, and life itself. Moreover, when medicine has nothing more to offer suffering patients, it should be prepared to assist them in their suffering, rather than simply eliminate the sufferer. The example of Jesus' suffering is important here.     

Does democracy increase suicide and homicide rates?

Changes in the measures for the level of democracy in 34 nations from 1965 to 1980 were positively associated with the percentage change in the homicide rate over 30 nations.     

How do personality disorders modify suicide risk?

There is a lack of psychological autopsy studies assessing the influence of axis II disorders on other risk factors for suicide. Therefore, we investigated if the estimated suicide risk for axis I disorders and socio-demographic factors was modified by personality disorders. Psychiatric disorders were evaluated by a semi-structured interview including the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I (SCID-I) and Personality Disorders (SCID-II) by psychological autopsy method in 163 completed suicides and by personal interview in 396 population-based control persons. Personality disorders modify suicide risk, differently for affective disorders, substance use disorders, smoking, life events during the last three months, and socio-demographic factors such as being single. Estimated suicide risk for socio-demographic factors and life events is not substantially altered following adjustment for affective disorders or substance use disorders. These findings suggest that treatment of personality disorders is essential for suicide prevention.     

Are Persons Low in Self-Control Rational and Deterrable?

This work addresses a question raised by Wright et al. (2004 Wright , Richard T. and Scott H. Decker. 1994 . Burglars on the Job: Street life and Residential Breakins . Boston : Northeastern University Press . [Google Scholar]) pertaining to the rationality and deterrability of individuals with low self-control. According to some, all persons are presumed to be equally rational; according others, individuals who possess little self-control, who are impulsive and present-oriented are less likely to be influenced by a perceived risks and costs of punishment; and according to a third group of scholars, those who do possess such self-control/restraint are either not motivated toward offending or are inhibited by moral constraints and are, thus, unresponsive to sanction threats. These rival predictions are examined with the use of self-report survey data on academic dishonesty from a sample of undergraduate college students. Across a tremendous number of models employing a variety of functional forms for the effects of perceived sanction threats, we consistently observed that the effects of perceived sanction threats on college students' self-reported academic dishonesty did not vary by their level of offending propensity (self-control).     

Can Virtuous Actions be Both Habitual and Rational?

Virtuous actions seem to be both habitual and rational. But if we combine an intuitive understanding of habituality with the currently predominant paradigm of rational action, these two features of virtuous actions are hard to reconcile. Intuitively, acting habitually is acting as one has before in similar contexts, and automatically, that is, without thinking about it. Meanwhile, contemporary philosophers tend to assume the truth of what I call the reasons theory of rational action, which states that all rational actions are actions for reasons. Whilst interpretations of this phrase are disputed, I argue that neither of the two leading views – which I call reasons internalism and reasons externalism – makes room for habitual actions to count as actions for reasons; by the reasons theory, they cannot be rational either. I suggest one way of effecting the reconciliation which, whilst it allows us to keep the reasons theory, requires us to conceive of reasons as even more radically external than current externalists believe them to be.     

Probability judgments of agency: Rational or irrational?

We studied how people attribute action outcomes to their own actions under conditions of uncertainty. Participants chose between left and right keypresses to produce an action effect (a corresponding left or right light), while a computer player made a simultaneous keypress decision. In each trial, a random generator determined which of the players controlled the action effect at varying probabilities, and participants then judged which player had produced it. Participants’ effect control ranged from 20% to 80%, varied blockwise, and they could use trial-by-trial feedback to optimize the accuracy of their agency judgments. Participants tended to attribute action effects to themselves (agency bias), probably reflecting a rational guessing strategy of always naming the more likely player. However, participants systematically neglected information favoring the computer player as the agent, even under conditions where this bias could only harm judgment accuracy. We conclude that agency biases have both rational and irrational components.     

What is the mechanism by which suicide attempts predispose to later suicide attempts? A mathematical model

A state dependence model of serial behavior suggests that each occurrence increases the subsequent likelihood of that behavior being repeated. A heterogeneity model, by contrast, suggests that the likelihood of a behavior occurring is predetermined, and uninfluenced by intervening occurrences. We have applied the random-effects probit model of Gibbons and Bock (1987) to examine the fit of the state dependence and heterogeneity models to longitudinal data on suicide attempts by 928 patients with affective disorder. Heterogeneity but not state dependence was required to model these data. The findings suggest that when considering patients with moderate to severe major affective disorder, the clinician should not interpret the absence of any recent suicide attempts to mean that the patient is at relatively low risk for attempting suicide in the future. An implication of the heterogeneity model is that suicide attempts made many years ago may have equal value to recent attempts when estimating an individual's "predisposition" to nonlethal attempts in the future.