Causal explanation and scientific realism

It is widely believed that many of the competing accounts of scientific explanation have ramifications which are relevant to the scientific realism debate. I claim that the two issues are orthogonal. For definiteness, I consider Cartwright's argument that causal explanations secure belief in theoretical entities. In Section I, van Fraassen's anti-realism is reviewed; I argue that this anti-realism is, prima facie, consistent with a causal account of explanation. Section II reviews Cartwright's arguments. In Section III, it is argued that causal explanations do not license the sort of inferences to theoretical entities that would embarass the anti-realist. Section IV examines the epistemic commitments involved in accepting a causal explanation. Section V presents my conclusions: contra Cartwright, the anti-realist may incorporate a causal account of explanation into his vision of science in an entirely natural way.     

What Not to Multiply Without Necessity

The Razor commands us not to multiply entities without necessity. I argue for an alternative principle—The Laser—which commands us not to multiply fundamental entities without necessity.     

The ethics of empty worlds

Drawing inspiration from the ethical pluralism of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica, I contend that one empty world can be morally better than another. By ‘empty’ I mean that it is devoid of concrete entities (things that have a position in space or time). These worlds have no thickets or thimbles, no thinkers, no thoughts. Infinitely many of these worlds have laws of nature, abstract entities, and perhaps, space and time. These non-concrete differences are enough to make some of them better than others.     

Nominalizing Quantifiers

Quantified expressions in natural language generally are taken to act like quantifiers in logic, which either range over entities that need to satisfy or not satisfy the predicate in order for the sentence to be true or otherwise are substitutional quantifiers. I will argue that there is a philosophically rather important class of quantified expressions in English that act quite differently, a class that includes something, nothing, and several things. In addition to expressing quantification, such expressions act like nominalizations, introducing a new domain of objects that would not have been present in the semantic structure of the sentence otherwise. The entities those expressions introduce are of just the same sort as those that certain ordinary nominalizations refer to (such as John's wisdom or John's belief that S), namely they are tropes or entities related to tropes. Analysing certain quantifiers as nominalizing quantifiers will shed a new light on philosophical issues such as the status of properties and the nature of propositional attitudes.     

Shu and zhong as the virtue of the Golden Rule: a Confucian contribution to contemporary virtue ethics

I aim to show how Confucian philosophy can contribute to the contemporary resurgence of virtue ethics education by arguing that it has the resource to address a lacuna in Aristotelian ethics. Aristotelian ethics, which is arguably the main resource of contemporary virtue ethics, lacks a virtue that corresponds to the notion of loving each person as one’s self or the Golden Rule. To be more precise, Aristotelian ethics has no virtue about loving all people as one’s self, although philia comes close but is precisely limited because it lacks universality. However, I believe that Dai Zhen’s interpretation of the Confucian virtues of shu and zhong does have this universal scope which philia lacks. For Dai, the ground for loving another is not any characteristic that a particular group of people have in common, such as, in the case of philia, being virtuous. Rather, the ground is universal human nature itself.     

Heidegger the Metaphysician: Modes‐of‐Being and Grundbegriffe

Modes‐of‐being (Seinsarten) figure centrally in Heidegger's masterwork Being and Time. Testimony to this is Heidegger's characterisation of two of his most celebrated enquiries—the Existential analytic and the Zeug analysis—as investigations into the respective modes‐of‐being of the entities concerned. Yet despite the importance of this concept, commentators disagree widely about what a mode‐of‐being is. In this paper, I systematically outline and defend a novel and exegetically grounded interpretation of this concept. Strongly opposed to Kantian readings, such as those advocated by Taylor Carman and Cristina Lafont, I interpret a mode‐of‐being as a universal that defines a district (Bezirk)—that is, a natural class of entities that ought to be conceptualised in a special way. As such, every mode‐of‐being plays an important metaphysical and epistemic role: serving both to unify a natural class of a high degree of generality and as the interpretandum of an act yielding the basic‐concepts (Grundbegriffe) pertaining to the entities therein. In explicating and arguing for this interpretation, I attribute a characteristically Aristotelian philosophical position to the early Heidegger, encompassing both metaphysical and epistemological realism and a conceptualist theory of universals.     

A model-theoretic criterion of ontology

Conclusion My aim has been to adapt Quine's criterion of the ontological commitment of theories couched in standard quantificational idiom to a much broader class of theories by focusing on the set-theoretic structure of the models of those theories. For standard first-order theories, the two criteria coincide on simple entities. Divergences appear as they are applied to higher-order theories and as composite entities are taken into account. In support of the extended criterion, I appeal to its fruits in treating the various examples considered above and to the healthy intuitions of the non-noneists among us. Don't O(m) and E(m) comprise just the things we should have though existed according to a particular interpretation m of a language or a theory? Whatever the answer (and it will hardly be unanimous), I hope to have pointed the way towards a recognition of ontology as a worthwhile branch of modern theory.Earlier versions of parts of this paper were read at New York University, at the Australasian Association of Philosophy, and at the University of Sydney. I am very grateful to William Barrett, Keith Campbell, Gregory Currie, Kenneth Gemes, Toomas Karmo, and Stephen Read for comments and criticisms.     

Further Reflections on “The Divine Action Project”

It is now a communis opinio that Newton's metaphysics was highly theologically inspired. I will refer to this intertwinement by using the word “onto-theology,” i.e. a metaphysical system that is mainly derived from some fundamental theological assumptions. I will present the constituents of Newton's onto-theology. One important, but often neglected stratum of Newton's metaphysics is the “secularization of God.” Newton, then, was not only a reformer in science, he also was a defender of a more rationalized, i.e. secularized, conception of God. As we will see, God and all other existing entities exist on the same ontological level. Newtonian metaphysics can thus be seen as the expression of how religious attitudes adapted themselves to or secularized themselves in a world of growing complexity wherein the scientific outlook became more and more central. This analysis has implications for the secularization-debate. It will be argued that the secularization-process not only involved differentiating tendencies between the profane and the secular (as is widely accepted by the differentiation-thesis), but that unifying tendencies (exemplified by Newton's unified onto-theology) were equally important.     

Emotions–Adaptive Standards And/Or Primitive Constructs: A Reply to Mascolo and Mancuso

Abstract

In replying to Mascolo & Mancuso's paper, I have contrasted their functionalist approach to emotional states and experience with my position on emotions as epigenetically-available primitive constructs. Biologically, Mascolo & Mancuso treat emotions as mobilizaiton in the face of discrepancies. My proposal of a four-dimensional model provides a biological grounding for the marvellous diverisyt of human emotional experience. Where Mascolo & Mancuso treat emotions as discrete entities and highlight emotion knowledge, J have suggested emotions operate as bipolar constructs, and I have highlighted experience. We should attend to emotions in terms of both knowledge and experience, but it is important to maintain the distinction     

Truthmaker Theory without Truthmakers

Truthmaking without truthmakers (TWT, for short) is the thesis that although every true proposition is made true by reality, there need not be particular entities (like facts, states of affairs, or tropes) that make these propositions true. The first substantial part of this paper (section 2) is devoted to developing a particular version of TWT and at the same time defending TWT in general from arguments against it that have been advanced by orthodox truthmaker theorists. In the second part of the paper (section 3) I argue that talk about truthmakers within the theory can be understood as metaphoric and as conveying valuable information about something other than the supposed truthmakers: about truthmaking. The aim of this paper is therefore twofold. On the one hand, I intend to present the view on truthmaking, a version of TWT, that I find most plausible in the light of the arguments for and against truthmaker theory. On the other hand, I argue that friends of TWT have good reason to adopt a figuralist approach to truthmaker theory, rather than rejecting it outright.     

Armstrong And The Problem Of Converse Relations

In A World of States of Affairs(Cambridge University Press, 1997) David Armstrong offers acomprehensive metaphysics based on the thesis that the world consistsof states of affairs. Among the entities postulated by Armstrong's theory are relations, including non-symmetrical relations, and whileArmstrong does not agree with Russell that all relations have adirection or definite order among their places, he does explicitlyacknowledge that the slots of a non-symmetrical relation have adefinite order or direction. I first show that non-symmetricalrelations pose a problem for Armstrong's theory by raising TheProblem of Converse Relations. I then argue that the bestresolution of this problem in the context of Armstrong's theoryinvolves adopting an analysis of the order or direction of a relationthat differs from the analysis that Russell assumes. I conclude bydiscussing a further problem facing Armstrong's ontology: TheProblem of Converse Relational Properties.     

Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness

Something is good insofar as it achieves its end, so says a neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. Powers/dispositions are paradigm cases of entities that have an end, so say many metaphysicians. A question therefore arises, namely, can one account for neo-Aristotelian goodness in terms of an ontology of powers? This is what I shall begin to explore in this paper. I will first provide a brief explication of both neo-Aristotelian goodness and the metaphysics of powers, before turning to investigate whether one can give an account of neo-Aristotelian goodness in terms of powers. I will suggest that the answer to this question is yes.

     

God’s spatial unlocatedness prevents him from being the creator of the universe: A new argument for the nonexistence of God

I discuss the relations between God and spatial entities, such as the universe. An example of a relation between God and a spatial entity is the relation,causes. Such relations are, in D.M. Armstrong’s words, ‘realm crossing’ relations: relations between or among spatial entities and entities in the realm of the spatially unlocated. I discuss an apparent problem with such realm crossing relations. If this problem is serious enough, as I will argue it is, it implies that God cannot be the creator of the universe I also discuss that if God cannot be the creator of the universe, then God does not exist.     

Transparent and Opaque Performance Personas

Jeanette Bicknell has argued that a singer's public persona is relevant to the aesthetic evaluation of that singer's public performances of popular song. Here, I distinguish varieties of personas: those which are transparent (such as when a singer performs more or less as that singer) and those which are opaque (such as when a singer performs more or less as a fictional character). I also distinguish between performance personas and song personas. After introducing and elucidating these distinctions, I discuss ways in which they further inform aesthetic evaluation of such performances.     

KOOKY OBJECTS REVISITED: ARISTOTLE'S ONTOLOGY

Abstract: This is an investigation of Aristotle's conception of accidental compounds (or “kooky objects,” as Gareth Matthews has called them)—entities such as the pale man and the musical man. I begin with Matthews's pioneering work into kooky objects, and argue that they are not so far removed from our ordinary thinking as is commonly supposed. I go on to assess their utility in solving some familiar puzzles involving substitutivity in epistemic contexts, and compare the kooky object approach to more modern approaches involving the notion of referential opacity. I conclude by proposing that Aristotle provides an implicit role for kooky objects in such metaphysical contexts as the Categories and Metaphysics.     

Truthmaking and Fundamentality

I apply the notion of truthmaking to the topic of fundamentality by articulating a truthmaker theory of fundamentality according to which some truths are truth‐grounded in certain entities while the ones that don't stand in a metaphysical‐semantic relation to the truths that do. I motivate this view by critically discussing two problems with Ross Cameron's truthmaker theory of fundamentality. I then defend this view against Theodore Sider's objection that the truthmaking approach to fundamentality violates the purity constraint. Truthmaker theorists can have a trouble‐free theory of fundamentality.     

Missio Dei Trinitatis and Missio Ecclesiae: A Public Theological Perspective

In this article I address the mission of the triune God (missio Dei trinitatis) and the mission of the church (missio ecclesiae) that participates in the mission of God the Trinity, particularly from the perspective of public theology. First, I investigate that the concept of the missio Dei trinitatis so expanded our understanding of mission that the church‐centred view of mission was replaced by the public mission taking place in the midst of the world. Second, from the public theological perspective I argue for the need of the diakonia mission in order to realize the reign of God in the world. Third, I insist that the mission of the church participating in the mission of the triune God ought to appropriate the post‐colonial hermeneutics of suspicion and develop a post‐post‐colonial public mission theology for the sake of a mature democratic civil society. Fourth, I suggest that the mission of the church participating in God's mission should develop a transcultural‐indigenous public hermeneutics of mission in such a way as to encourage different stories through transcultural‐indigenous interpretations of the biblical narrative.     

Reading and reflecting sacred texts in the presence of the other. An empirical study on the use of ‘scriptural reasoning’ in teacher education

In this article the method of Scriptural Reasoning (SR), a text-based approach to interreligious dialogue between participants of the three Abrahamic religions, was implemented for a teacher education setting at a German university. Not only students with an outspoken religious conviction but also agnostic and atheist students, preparing themselves to become teachers in public schools, were invited into the conversation. The article documents and discusses the qualitative-empirical research in which the SR meetings were embedded. The aim of the article is not to create a hermeneutical theory for SR but rather to explore how SR as a method, with its specific learning tool of text-work, can be turned into a broader didactical model which can be transferred to other learning environments and which can in the long run provide empirical evidence on successful teacher education in multi-religious and multi-worldview societies and schools.