Critical notice of On the people's terms: a Republican theory and model of democracy,by Philip Pettit,Cambridge University Press, 2012, xii+333pp.

This paper is a critical notice of Philip Pettit's On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Pettit argues that only Republicanism can respond appropriately to the ‘evil of subjection to another's will – particularly in important areas of personal choice’ because its ideal of liberty – freedom as non-domination – both captures better than liberalism our commitment to individual liberty and explains better our commitment to the legitimacy of democratic decision-making than standard democrat accounts. If this argument succeeds, it demonstrates that there is no real tension between the liberal thought that justice provides a standard for evaluating public decisions independent of the fact that they are taken democratically and the democratic thought that the fact that a decision is democratic suffices to make it legitimate. I argue, however, that Pettit finds himself caught between two contradictory positions: a version of Isaiah Berlin's negative concept of liberty and a positive liberty account of democracy. And I show that his attempt to resolve the tension fails because it requires him to embrace the positive liberty account he is committed to rejecting.     

Phillips and Eternal Life: A Response to Haldane

This paper responds to John Haldane's recent criticisms of D. Z. Phillips’ treatment of the Christian belief in eternal life. I argue that Haldane's attempt to show that Phillips only partially elucidates, and hence misrepresents, this belief is unsuccessful, the biblical and theological passages cited by Haldane being amenable to elucidation in terms of which Phillips would have approved. Haldane makes three points to support his main claim, and I argue that none of these has significant force against Phillips’ position unless we presuppose the truth of some realist account of meaning, which Phillips would, of course, reject.     

Regarding a Regress

Is there a successful regress argument against intellectualism? In this article I defend the negative answer. I begin by defending Stanley and Williamson's (2001) critique of the contemplation regress against Noë (2005). I then identify a new argument – the employment regress – that is designed to succeed where the contemplation regress fails, and which I take to be the most basic and plausible form of a regress argument against intellectualism. However, I argue that the employment regress still fails. Drawing on the previous discussion, I criticise further regress arguments given by Hetherington (2006) and Noë (2005).     

Hume and the nominalist tradition

Many of the central theses of Hume's philosophy – his rejection of real relations, universals, abstract objects and necessary causal relations – had precedents in the later medieval nominalist tradition. Hume and his medieval predecessors developed complex semantic theories to show both how ontologies are apt to become inflated and how, if we understand carefully the processes by which meaning is generated, we can achieve greater ontological parsimony. Tracing a trajectory from those medieval traditions to Hume reveals Hume to be more radical, particularly in his rejection of abstraction and abstract ideas. Hume's denial of general, abstract ideas is consistent with his philosophical principles but fails to appreciate the more sophisticated nominalist approaches to abstraction, the result of which is a theoretically impoverished account of our capacity for generalization.     

In the Temple of the Passions: D. Z. Phillips and the Possibility of Philosophical Contemplation

D. Z. Phillips’ work in philosophy was animated by his interest in the diversity and heterogeneity of moral and religious perspectives and his antipathy towards philosophical theories that afford this variety little or no conceptual space. In contrast to what he perceived as essentialist efforts to promote certain viewpoints and to disparage others, Phillips championed a “contemplative conception” of philosophy, according to which the philosopher's aim is neither to underwrite nor to undermine but to understand. This paper argues that philosophy, while disinterested in its aims, nevertheless derives its elucidatory force from the normative contexts within which it is practised and read.     

The Legacy of Neoplatonism in F. W. J. Schelling's Thought

F.W.J. Schelling, one of the essential thinkers in the development of German Idealism, formed his own thought not only in a critical dialogue with Kant's and Fichte's transcendentalism and Hegel's earlier conception of thinking, but also in an intensive discussion with Plato and Aristotle. Over and above that, Neoplatonism – especially Plotinus, Proclus and the Christian Dionysius the Areopagite – played a decisive role in Schelling's reception and transformation of ancient philosophy. Selecting the manifold aspects which could be reflected on in this field, I want to make plausible as a transcendental analogy to Plotinus' concept of self-knowledge Schelling's requirement for a raising-up and transformation of the finite 'I' into the form of the Absolute, whose central features converge with the goal of the Plotinian self – transformation of thought into a timeless self-thinking and its ground. A main part of this paper discusses Schelling's and Plotinus' concept of nature as a dynamic process constituted by an immanent 'creating theoria'. Furthermore we find in Schelling's theory of the Absolute as the 'utterly One' a union of Plotinus' notion of a pure One beyond Being with that of the reflexive self-presence of nous, so that this Absolute can be understood as an All-Unity which grounds and embraces all actuality – because it is in itself the most unifying self-affirmation or self-mediation. What follows is a reflection on the anagogical function of art, especially from the viewpoint of Plotinus' non-Platonic rehabilitation of art as an imitation of nature. The last perspectives focus on Schelling's concept of matter and emanation – as different from and at the same time coherent with that of Plotinus – and on Schelling's theory of an absolute self – willing will in connection with Plotinus' Enneads VI.8, 'On free will and the will of the One' as a causa sui.     

Multi‐Component Theories of Well‐being and Their Structure

The ‘adjustment strategy’ currently seems to be the most common approach to incorporating objective elements into one's theory of well‐being. These theories face a certain problem, however, which can be avoided by a different approach – namely, that employed by ‘partially objective multi‐component theories.’ Several such theories have recently been proposed, but the question of how to understand their mathematical structure has not been adequately addressed. I argue that the most mathematically simple of these multi‐component theories fails, so I proceed to investigate more sophisticated ways to formulate such a theory. I conclude that one of these – the Discount/Inflation Theory – is particularly promising.     

EPISTEMIC VALUE AND ACHIEVEMENT

Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be an achievement, and so Pritchard's explanation of understanding's value fails. Next, I point out that Pritchard's is just one of many attempts to account for the value of an epistemic state – whether it be understanding, knowledge, or whatever – by appeal to the notion of achievement or, more generally, the notion of success because of ability. Tentatively, I offer reasons to be sceptical about the prospects of any such account.     

QUASI‐NATURALISM AND MORAL REALITY

In his recent book Moral Reality, Paul Bloomfield has put forward an original set of arguments for moral realism. Central to his treatment is an argument for the reality of moral properties, one which models them on the property of being healthy. The paper is a critical examination of Bloomfield's central line of argument. It is contended that his proposed method of grounding moral realism fails, inasmuch as his Distinction Test criterion for property reality – essentially the claim that a property exists if its existence is required for distinctions that we make and must make – is inadequate. An alternative approach toward properties is suggested, which has the result, inter alia, that Bloomfield's quasi‐naturalistic approach is unnecessary for the defense of moral realism.¹     

The Neo‐Barthian Critique of Reinhold Niebuhr

The author notes an unclarity in David Novak's defense of Reinhold Niebuhr against Stanley Hauerwas's critique and identifies some issues left unsettled in the exchange between Novak and Hauerwas over Niebuhr's ethics. Specifically, the author proposes that the Barthian‐Hauerwasian communitarian rejection of Niebuhrian natural theology and natural law ignores the historical abuse of biblical theology in the German Christian response to the Nazis, fails to account for the fact of general moral revulsion against Nazism, and flirts itself with a conventionalist form of nihilism.     

Infants' Understanding of Looking,Pointing, and Reaching as Cues to Goal-Directed Action

Phillips, Wellman, and Spelke (2002) provided experimental evidence indicating that by the age of 12 months infants use information about an adult's gaze-direction and emotional expression to predict action. We investigate the generality of this ability, using Phillips et al.'s paradigm across different referential gestures. If infants have a rich concept of people as intentional agents, they should encode the person-goal relation and predict action from a variety of referential gestures (such as looking and pointing), as well as from (goal-directed) reaching and grasping actions. Results of Studies 1 and 2 (within-subjects design) and Study 3 (between-subjects design) converge in indicating that Phillips et al.'s basic finding generalizes to reach-and-gaze as cue condition. In Study 3b generalization was demonstrated for point-and-gaze as cue condition. Whereas these findings suggest a general understanding of referential intent at 12 months, a control experiment (Study 4) showed that infants' action expectations could be reversed following a psychologically inconsistent habituation phase (actor points at Object A and subsequently picks up Object B) in the point-and-gaze condition, although no such reversal was obtained in the reach-and-gaze condition. These findings indicate that 1-year-old infants have well-established expectations about action goals signaled by an actor's gaze-direction and reaching and grasping movements but that an understanding of pointing as a cue to action intentions may develop later and follow a different route of acquisition.     

Wanted: real Children. about Innocence and Nostalgia in a Commodified Childhood

Today childhood takes place within amultimedia context where education, marketingand entertainment operate together in one bigmelting pot. Childhood is commodified, asituation not everybody seems happy with. Dueto increasing exposure with violence and sexualactivities, for example in children's games,children seem to lose the chance to be realchildren. In the discussions about thiscommodified childhood, innocence and nostalgiaseem omnipresent concepts. In this article wefirst analyse the discourse about the innocenceof childhood as presented by Neil Postman inhis bestseller ``The Disappearance ofChildhood.'' Here, childhood is seen as a periodwhich can mainly be characterised in terms of a``not yet.'' However, Postman's view on childhoodpresents only one side of the romanticcontinuum. The other side – in which the childappears as having a nature of her own – can beillustrated by ``On naïve and sentimentalpoetry,'' an essay written by Friedrich Schillerin 1795. Both opposing views on childhood canlead to a different interpretation of theinnocence of childhood. Finally, Schiller'sdichotomy – the naïve versus thesentimental poet – can be seen as a useful legup to the clarification of nostalgia whichseems to go hand in hand with the feeling ofthe loss of (one's own) childhood.     

More on the Power of God: A Rejoinder to William Hasker

In ‘The Power of God’ (Gleeson 2010) I elaborate and defend an argument by the late D.Z. Phillips against definitions of omnipotence in terms of logical possibility. In ‘Which God? What Power? A Response to Andrew Gleeson’ (Hasker 2010), William Hasker criticizes my defense of Phillips’ argument. Here I contend his criticisms do not succeed. I distinguish three definitions of omnipotence in terms of logical possibility. Hasker agrees that the first fails. The second fails because negative properties (like disembodiedment and simplicity) do not amount to a nature that licenses the attribution of causal powers. The third fails because it does not identify actions that can be performed without a body. It cannot be saved by appeal to the idea of purely mental acts.     

Autonomy,Vote Buying,and Constraining Options

A common argument used to defend markets in ‘contested commodities’ is based on the value of personal autonomy. (1) Autonomy is of great moral value; (2) removing options from a person's choice set would compromise her ability to exercise her autonomy; (3) hence, there should be a prima facie presumption against removing options from persons’ choice sets; (4) thus, the burden of proof lies with those who wish to prohibit markets in certain goods. Christopher Freiman has developed a version of this argument to defend markets in votes. I argue that Freiman's argument fails, and that its failure illustrates the falsity of the widespread claim that the more options a person has available to her the better able she will be to exercise her autonomy. In Part 1, I outline Freiman's argument from ‘the presumption of voter liberty’ for legalising markets in votes. In Part 2, I argue that the option to sell one's vote in a legal market for them would be a ‘constraining option’ – an option which, if chosen, would be likely to lead to a diminution in a person's future ability to exercise her autonomy. In Part 3, I respond to objections to my arguments.     

Beyond commitment: entrenchment in the buyer–seller exchange

A specific empirical finding in the buyer–seller literature – initially discovered by Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande and subsequently replicated by Grayson and Ambler – still suffers from incomplete explanation. In business-to-business marketing, why do some long-term buyers appear to trust their providers a great deal but not use the service provided? This research endeavours to more fully explain this ‘dark side’ of relationship selling by integrating work on the economic theory of entrenchment with Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh's seminal buyer–seller framework. The result is a modified conceptual model of the buyer–seller exchange in which potential seller entrenchment follows Dwyer et al.'s courting and commitment stages. Motivated by Dwyer et al.'s urging to examine their model using a negotiation lens, this research then borrows two contrasting orientations from the negotiation literature and offers propositions regarding how buyers and sellers interact at each stage of the exchange. In addition to enriching understanding of how buyers and sellers negotiate in the courting and commitment stages, this research is the first to offer insight into how both sides might negotiate when faced with seller entrenchment.     

The illuminative function of the agent intellect

Thomas Aquinas argues that the agent intellect's function is to abstract an intelligible species from a phantasm. However, insofar as he claims that the intelligible species is not present in the phantasm, it is unclear how the agent intellect accomplishes this task. In this paper I explore two models of abstraction – the extraction model and the production model – suggesting that each fails to capture Aquinas’ understanding of abstraction. I then offer my own interpretation of the function of the agent intellect – the illumination model – by employing Aquinas’ comparison of the agent intellect to light. I argue that the agent intellect neither extracts nor produces an intelligible species, but rather makes the nature that is already present in the object intelligible by actualizing its passive power of intelligibility. This involves the co-actualization of partner powers in the intellect and in the intelligible object, and ultimately makes it possible to cognize a particular, material object in a universal way.     

Emotional Disorder

In this paper I aim to provide a characterisation of emotional disorder. I begin by criticising the thought that an agent can be judged to be experiencing an emotional disorder if his emotion causes him some type of harm. This then leads me to develop the claim that emotional disorder relates to sufficiently inappropriate emotion, where (sufficiently) inappropriate emotion relates to emotion that fails to be (sufficiently) responsive to the agent's beliefs and/or desires. Finally, I conclude the paper by suggesting that if an essentially non‐cognitivist conception of emotion is accepted then – on the characterisation of emotional disorder that I defend – there may exist strong grounds for thinking that cognitive therapy will be an inappropriate form of treatment in cases of emotional disorder.¹     

Vahid,Burge, and Perceptual Entitlement

Hamid Vahid criticizes Tyler Burge's account of perceptual entitlement. Vahid argues that Burge's account fails to satisfy a criterion of adequacy that any correct account of perceptual warrant must satisfy. According to Vahid, a correct account of perceptual warrant must allow for perceptual beliefs which are produced by a properly functioning perceptual system yet which lack warrant. The present article argues that Vahid's critique of Burge fails. It presents numerous examples of such beliefs that are consistent with Burge's account of perceptual entitlement.     

Expanding the boundaries of psychological resource theories

This article introduces JOOP's special section on expanding the boundaries of resource theories in occupational and organizational psychology. After an introduction of the most relevant resource theories and their current application in occupational and organizational psychology – key resource theories, conservation of resources theory, resource theory of social exchange, and selective optimization with compensation theory – the opportunities and challenges for future research are outlined, as well as the innovative trends emerging from the contributions in this special section.