ON THE RELIABILITY OF MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

Abstract: I examine here whether reliability is a defining feature of (moral or intellectual) virtues. I argue (1) that reliability is not a defining feature of a virtue where virtues are conceived (as they often are) as “personal excellences,” but (2) that there is another (also intuitive and familiar) conception of a virtue according to which reliability is a defining feature. I also argue (3) that even on the former conception, a certain rational belief pertaining to reliability is essential and (4) that reliability itself, while not a defining feature of a virtue thus conceived, nevertheless is a concomitant of it.     

有关西方心理学分裂与整合问题的再思考

在心理学的分裂与整合问题上 ,西方心理学家一直争论不休。该文认为 ,心理学的确存在着分裂的危机 ,因为心理学至今没有一个共同的基础和出发点 ,且心理学的分化导致了心理学机构解体的危机。但是心理学内部各种矛盾冲突的观点是可比的 ,可公约的 ,因此整合是有希望的。在迈向整合的过程中 ,主要存在着两个障碍 ,其一是客观主义 ,客观主义力主以自然科学为楷模 ,通过严格客观方法的应用 ,实现心理学的大一统。客观主义由于压抑了不同的声音 ,阻碍了对话 ,给心理学的整合造成障碍。其二是相对主义 ,相对主义在“怎么都行”原则的指导下 ,认为任何一种理论观点和思想方法相对于它所产生的背景都是正确的、合理的 ,没有任何外在于话语群体的标准作为最终的尺度。相对主义的观点导致了理论观点和思想方法的无原则多元化 ,使得西方心理学分裂危机进一步加深。该文主张心理学的整合应该是在一个共同基础上的多元化的整合 ,即允许多元化和多样性成分的存在 ,但不同成分之间是互补的 ,而不是冲突的     

ONENESS AND SELF‐CENTEREDNESS IN THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF WANG YANGMING

Rather than “selfishness,” a more accurate and revealing interpretation of Wang's use of siyuis “self‐centeredness.” One of the main goals in Wang's model of moral cultivation was to attain a state devoid of self‐centered desires. Wang relied a great deal on the exercise and cultivation of an emotional identification and feeling of oneness with others. In this paper, I first provide a brief summary of the role of Wang's concept of siyu in his moral psychology. I then examine key passages in Wang's writings that reveal his nuanced understanding of siyu and, along the way, I draw on empirical research in psychology to help illuminate the significance of Wang's view of siyu to his overall model of moral cultivation.     

THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE VIRTUES

The paper examines a single, apparently simple argument for the existence of incompatibilities between the virtues as traits of character. This argument appeals not to empirical truths about human psychology or human nature but to the possibility of conflict between the exercise of different virtues in action. There are, for example, situations in which we can exercise the virtue of truthfulness only at the expense of not exercising the virtue of tact, as when we are asked a question to which the straightforward answer will pain our questioner. The person who in these situations would give a straightforward answer possesses the virtue of truthfulness to a higher degree than the person who would respond more evasively, whereas the latter person possesses the virtue of tact to a higher degree than the former. But since the two responses are mutually exclusive, it follows that the degree to which we possess the virtue of truthfulness must, at least in some measure, correlate inversely with the degree to which we possess the virtue of tact. And similarly for many other pairs of virtues. My paper focusses on the two cardinal assumptions of this argument, viz., (i) that sometimes the exercise of one virtue can conflict with the exercise of another, and (ii) that the degree to which a person possesses a virtue correlates directly with the extent of its exercise, and defends both assumptions against a variety of objections which allege that, in different ways, they are insensitive to the complexity of the virtues.     

女性心理学的进化与后现代女性心理学的产生

女性心理学的发展经历了女性经验主义、女性立场论和后现代女性心理学三个发展阶段。女性经验主义强调男女的共性,女性立场论强调女性经验的独特性,而后现代女性心理学认为尽管在女性经验主义和女性立场论之间存在着矛盾和对立,但是两者都认为存在着某种内在的东西决定着社会性别,因而是本质主义的观点,属于现代主义的范畴。后现代女性心理学认为,性别乃是一种文化的社会建构。     

从心理学的对象看心理学的科学性貭

心理学的科学性貭問題是一个决定心理学发展前途的重要問題。不确定心理学的科学性貭,就不能使它和邻近的科学明确分工,不能突出它在社会主义建設中所担負的任务,也不能肯定它在科学研究中所应該运用的方法,因而它的发展前途必然受到很大的限