Effects of survival processing and retention interval on true and false recognition in the DRM and category repetition paradigms

ABSTRACT

Two experiments examined the effects of survival processing and delay on true and related false recognition. Experiment 1 used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm and found survival processing to increase true and related false recognition. Extending the delay from 5-mins to 1-day reduced true, but not false memory. Measures of the characteristics of true and false memories showed survival processing increased “remember” and “know” responses for related false memory, “know” responses for true memory and gist processing. Experiment 2 made use of the category repetition procedure and found a broadly similar pattern of results for true memory. However, related false memory was decreased by survival processing. Except for one result, no interactions were found between encoding task and delay. Overall, survival processing produced similar or different effects on true/false memory depending on the nature of the list. The mechanisms that might underpin these are evaluated and considered in relation to future work.     

Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal past

The nature of recollective experience was examined in a recognition memory task. Subjects gave “remember” judgments to recognized items that were accompanied by conscious recollection and “know” judgments to items that were recognized on some other basis. Although a levels-of-processing effect (Experiment 1) and a picture-superiority effect (Experiment 2) were obtained for overall recognition, these effects occurred only for “remember” judgments, and were reversed for “know” judgments. In Experiment 3, targets and lures were either preceded by a masked repetition of their own presentation (thought to increase perceptual fluency) or of an unrelated word. The effect of perceptual fluency was obtained for overall recogrntion and “know” judgments but not for “remember” judgments. The data obtained for confidencejudgments using the same design (Experiment4) indicated that “remember”/”know” judgments are not made solely on the basis of confidence. These data support the two-factor theories of recognition memory by dissociating two forms of recognition, and shed light on the nature of conscious recollection.     

Recognition memory and awareness: A large effect of study-test modalities on “know” responses following a highly perceptual orienting task

Abstract

Two experiments investigated the effects of varying the correspondence between presentation and test modes on states of conscious awareness in recognition memory. Experiment 1 used visual test items and showed that auditory and visual study modes differentially affected recollective experience and feelings of familiarity assessed by “remember” and “know” responses accompanying recognition: “know” responses were slightly enhanced following visual presentation, but this was largely offset by a similarly small increase in “remember” responses. Experiment 2 employed conditions designed to maximise any effect on “know” responses of the correspondence between presentation and test modes by using a highly perceptual orienting task at study. Under these conditions, there was a large mode correspondence effect on “know” responses. The results support the idea that “know” responses are particularly sensitive to perceptual factors.     

Cognitive effort and recollective experience in recognition memory

The difficulty of the cognitive operations required to process study items was manipulated in two experiments investigating recollective experience. In subsequent recognition tests, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements for items processed in these tasks were based on recollection ("remember" responses) or on familiarity ("know" responses). In Experiment 1 target items were presented in the context of a category decision task. It was found that remember responses increased with the difficulty of the category decision. For positive instances, remember responses were greater for items of low instance frequency than for items of high instance frequency, while for negative instances remember responses were greater for items from similar categories than for items from dissimilar categories. These effects were not present in know responses. In Experiment 2, remember responses were more frequent when study items had been presented in the form of anagrams to be solved than when they had been presented in the form of words to be read aloud. The incidence of know responses was not affected by the format in which study items were presented. Source judgements were also more accurate when recognition was based on recollection. It is argued that the type of conscious awareness experienced during recognition is determined by the knowledge activated by items presented in the recognition test, which in turn is determined by the nature of the operations engaged at encoding.     

Familiarity and recollection in item and associative recognition

Recognition memory for item information (single words) and associative information (word pairs) was tested immediately and after retention intervals of 30 min and 1 day (Experiment 1) and 2 days and 7 days (Experiment 2) using Tulving's (1985) remember/know response procedure. Associative recognition decisions were accompanied by more "remember" responses and less "know" responses than item recognition decisions. Overall recognition performance and the proportion of remember responses declined at similar rates for item and associative information. The pattern of results for item recognition was consistent with Donaldson's (1996) single-factor signal detection model of remember/know responses, as comparisons based on A' between overall item recognition and remember item recognition showed no significant differences. For associative recognition, however, A' for remember responses was reliably greater than for overall recognition. The results show that recollection plays a significant role in associative recognition.     

Two effects of repetition: Support for a dual-process model of know judgments and exclusion errors

In three experiments, aremember/know recognition test (Experiments 1–2) and an exclusion test (Experiments 2–3) were used to examine effects of repeated study presentations. An effect of study repetition was obtained for remember but not know judgments, similar to results reported by Gardiner, Kaminska, Dixon, and Java (1996). Experiment 2 demonstrated the similarity between know responses and exclusion errors; neither was affected by repeated study presentations. In Experiment 3, a response deadline procedure was used to show that exclusion errors are the product of two opposing processes—recollection and familiarity—both of which are influenced by repetition. The interpretation of exclusion errors and know responses is shown to require a dual-process model that includes an assumption about the relationship between processes.     

The effects of pure pair repetition on younger and older adults' associative memory

Although aging causes relatively minor impairment in recognition memory for components, older adults' ability to remember associations between components is typically significantly compromised, relative to that of younger adults. This pattern could be associated with older adults' relatively intact familiarity, which helps preserve component memory, coupled with a marked decline in recollection, which leads to a decline in associative memory. The purpose of the current study is to explore possible methods that allow older adults to rely on pair familiarity in order to improve their associative memory performance. Participants in 2 experiments were repeatedly presented with either single items or pairings of items prior to a study list so that the items and the pairs were already familiar during the study phase. Pure pair repetition (the effects of pair repetition after the effects of item repetition are taken into account) increased associative memory for older and younger adults. Findings based on remember and know judgments suggest that familiarity but not recollection is involved in mediating the repetition effect.     

Memory for scenes: Refixations reflect retrieval

Most conceptions of episodic memory hold that reinstatement of encoding operations is essential for retrieval success, but the specific mechanisms of retrieval reinstatement are not well understood. In three experiments, we used saccadic eye movements as a window for examining reinstatement in scene recognition. In Experiment 1, participants viewed complex scenes, while number of study fixations was controlled by using a gaze-contingent paradigm. In Experiment 2, effects of stimulus saliency were minimized by directing participants' eye movements during study. At test, participants made remember/know judgments for each recognized stimulus scene. Both experiments showed that remember responses were associated with more consistent study-test fixations than false rejections (Experiments 1 and 2) and know responses (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, we examined the causal role of gaze consistency on retrieval by manipulating participants' expectations during recognition. After studying name and scene pairs, each test scene was preceded by the same or different name as during study. Participants made more consistent eye movements following a matching, rather than mismatching, scene name. Taken together, these findings suggest that explicit recollection is a function of perceptual reconstruction and that event memory influences gaze control in this active reconstruction process.     

Early Stage Alzheimer's Disease Disrupts Encoding of Contextual Information

Two experiments examined whether impairments in recognition memory in early stage Alzheimer's disease (AD) were due to deficits in encoding contextual information. Normal elderly (NE) and patients diagnosed with mild stage AD learned one of two tasks. In Experiment 1 correct recognition memory required participants to remember not only what items they had experienced on a given trial but also when they had experienced them; Experiment 2 required that participants remember only what they had seen, not when they had seen it. Large recognition memory differences were found between the AD and NE groups in the experiment where time tagging was crucial for successful performance. An error analysis indicated that this was not due to the perseveration of previous learned responses. In Experiment 2, the only requisite for successful recognition was remembering what one had experienced; memory of the temporal record was not necessary for successful performance. In this instance, recognition memory for the NE and AD groups was identical. Taken together these results suggest that memory deficits found in early stage AD are partly due to impaired processing of contextual cues that provide crucial information about when events occur.     

The detection model of recognition using know and remember judgments

The signal detection model forknow andremember recognition judgments was tested in two experiments. In Experiment 1, two predictions of the model were tested: (1) that measures of memory sensitivity,A′, are equivalent in value when based on either the recognition (know or remember) criterion or on the remember criterion; and (2) that there is a positive correlation between recognition bias and the proportion of know judgments that are hits, but no correlation between recognition bias and proportion of remember hits (Donaldson, 1996). Both predictions were supported by the data. In Experiment 2, the context of test items was manipulated to make it more or less similar to learning context. The detection model requires that memory sensitivity be the same for both recognition and remember judgments, regardless of test context. Alternatively, if remember judgments reflect only the retrieval of episodic information from memory, the two measures of memory sensitivity should become more disparate in value as learning and test context are made more similar. Memory sensitivity was generally the same in value for recognition and remember criteria but different across context conditions, thus supporting the detection model. The nature of the memory continuum used in detection theory is also discussed.     

Reinstating effortful encoding operations at test enhances episodic remembering

Two experiments investigated the effects of reinstating encoding operations on remember and know responses in recognition memory. Experiment 1 showed that reinstating an effortful encoding task (generating words from fragments) increased remember responses at test but reinstating an automatic encoding task (reading intact words) did not. This pattern was confirmed in Experiment 2 in which words were either read intact or generated from anagrams. These findings show that repeating effortful (but not automatic) encoding operations at test cues not only the recognition of the information that was acquired via those operations but also the conscious recollection of the encoding episode.     

Reinstating effortful encoding operations at test enhances episodic remembering

Two experiments investigated the effects of reinstating encoding operations on remember and know responses in recognition memory. Experiment 1 showed that reinstating an effortful encoding task (generating words from fragments) increased remember responses at test but reinstating an automatic encoding task (reading intact words) did not. This pattern was confirmed in Experiment 2 in which words were either read intact or generated from anagrams. These findings show that repeating effortful (but not automatic) encoding operations at test cues not only the recognition of the information that was acquired via those operations but also the conscious recollection of the encoding episode.     

Achievement motivation and memory: achievement goals differentially influence immediate and delayed remember-know recognition memory

Little research has been conducted on achievement motivation and memory and, more specifically, on achievement goals and memory. In the present research, the authors conducted two experiments designed to examine the influence of mastery-approach and performance-approach goals on immediate and delayed remember-know recognition memory. The experiments revealed differential effects for achievement goals over time: Performance-approach goals showed higher correct remember responding on an immediate recognition test, whereas mastery-approach goals showed higher correct remember responding on a delayed recognition test. Achievement goals had no influence on overall recognition memory and no consistent influence on know responding across experiments. These findings indicate that it is important to consider quality, not just quantity, in both motivation and memory, when studying relations between these constructs.     

ON REPORTING RECOLLECTIVE EXPERIENCES AND "DIRECT ACCESS TO MEMORY SYSTEMS"

Abstract— Strack and Förster (1995) showed that, unlike remember responses, know responses in recognition memory were influenced by manipulating response bias. We describe and experiment that replicated theirs but additionally allowed subjects to report guesses. Only guess responses were influenced by this manipulation. Response bias had no effects on either know or remember responses. This outcome suggests that manipulating response bias influence know responses only when guessing is encouraged but not reported as such. More-over, though know responses reflected memory for the study events, guess responses did not.     

Recognition memory for pictorial material in subclinical depression

Depression has been associated with impaired recollection of episodic details in tests of recognition memory that use verbal material. In two experiments, the remember/know procedure was employed to investigate the effects of dysphoric mood on recognition memory for pictorial materials that may not be subject to the same processing limitations found for verbal materials in depression. In Experiment 1, where the recognition test took place two weeks after encoding, subclinically depressed participants reported fewer know judgements which were likely to be at least partly due to a remember-to-know shift. Although pictures were accompanied by negative or neutral captions at encoding, no effect of captions on recognition memory was observed. In Experiment 2, where the recognition test occurred soon after viewing the pictures, subclinically depressed participants reported fewer remember judgements. All participants reported more remember judgements for pictures of emotionally negative content than pictures of neutral content. Together, these findings demonstrate that recognition memory for pictorial stimuli is compromised in dysphoric individuals in a way that is consistent with a recollection deficit for episodic detail and also reminiscent of that previously reported for verbal materials. These findings contribute to our developing understanding of how mood and memory interact.     

Remembering parts and wholes: Configural processing in face recollection

In two experiments, we examined the role of configural processing on states of awareness in face recognition. Configural processing was manipulated by presenting upright and inverted faces during study and test. After studying facial photographs of humans (Experiment 1) and horses (Experiment 2), participants provided a remember/know judgement for each recognised test face. In both experiments, disrupted configural processing had selective effects on states of awareness, so that inversion reduced remember, but not know, responses. Experiment 2 revealed disproportionate inversion effects in that the difference in remember responses between upright and inverted items was significant for human faces but not horses. These findings suggest that configural processing facilitates explicit recollection by providing a distinctive combination of nonsalient event attributes.     

Levels-of-processing effects on "remember" responses in recognition for familiar and unfamiliar tunes

We investigated the effect of level-of-processing manipulations on "remember" and "know" responses in episodic melody recognition (Experiments 1 and 2) and how this effect is modulated by item familiarity (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants performed 2 conceptual and 2 perceptual orienting tasks while listening to familiar melodies: judging the mood, continuing the tune, tracing the pitch contour, and counting long notes. The conceptual mood task led to higher d' rates for "remember" but not "know" responses. In Experiment 2, participants either judged the mood or counted long notes of tunes with high and low familiarity. A level-of-processing effect emerged again in participants' "remember" d' rates regardless of melody familiarity. Results are discussed within the distinctive processing framework.     

Investigating the attentional demands of recognition memory: Manipulating depth of encoding at study and level of attention at test

Two experiments investigated the effects of divided attention at test after manipulating levels of processing at study. In Experiment 1 items were studied either intact or as anagrams. In Experiment 2 items were studied with either full or divided attention (DA). In both experiments participants carried out a recognition test with either full or divided attention. Analysis of remember and know responses revealed that DA at test had no effect on remember responses to anagrams or to items studied with full attention. In contrast, Know responses decreased with DA at test, and this occurred for items studied in both deep and shallow encoding conditions. The present study confirms recent findings (Knott & Dewhurst, 2007a) that knowing can rely on more controlled retrieval processes, whereas remembering can rely on more automatic retrieval processes. Differences in the controlled processes associated with recollection and familiarity and remember and know responses are discussed.     

The difference between implicit and explicit associative processes at study in creating false memory in the DRM paradigm

The effects of implicit and explicit associative processes for false recognition were examined by manipulating exposure duration of studied items; 20 ms or 2000 ms. Participants studied lists of words that were high associates to a nonpresented word (critical lure) in either condition. After learning each list, they took a recognition test and remember/know judgements immediately (Experiment 1) or 1 minute later (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, know responses for critical lures were more in the 20 ms than in the 2000 ms conditions, while remember responses for them were more in the 2000 ms condition. Implicit associative processes create familiarity of critical lures, and explicit associative processes create details of false memories. Comparing the results of Experiment 1 with those of Experiment 2, remember responses for critical lures were increased with the prolonged time only in the 20 ms condition. Characteristics of false memory made by implicit associative processes could be changed by prolonged time.     

The difference between implicit and explicit associative processes at study in creating false memory in the DRM paradigm

The effects of implicit and explicit associative processes for false recognition were examined by manipulating exposure duration of studied items; 20 ms or 2000 ms. Participants studied lists of words that were high associates to a nonpresented word (critical lure) in either condition. After learning each list, they took a recognition test and remember/know judgements immediately (Experiment 1) or 1 minute later (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, know responses for critical lures were more in the 20 ms than in the 2000 ms conditions, while remember responses for them were more in the 2000 ms condition. Implicit associative processes create familiarity of critical lures, and explicit associative processes create details of false memories. Comparing the results of Experiment 1 with those of Experiment 2, remember responses for critical lures were increased with the prolonged time only in the 20 ms condition. Characteristics of false memory made by implicit associative processes could be changed by prolonged time.