The persistence of false beliefs

Do false beliefs last? To explore this question, this study planted false beliefs or memories of a childhood experience with asparagus. We found that these false beliefs had consequences for subjects, when assessed directly after the suggestive manipulation. Moreover, subjects were brought back two weeks later to see if their false beliefs persisted. After two weeks, subjects' confidence in their new memories, and the consequences of those memories were diminished, but not extinguished. These false beliefs were found to be somewhat weaker than other subjects' true beliefs for the same events. Another novel finding was that the manipulation was sufficiently powerful to affect actual food choices.     

The effect of false memory on temporal perception

This study examined the effect of false memory on temporal perception. The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, which elicits false recognition of a nonpresented word, was used to determine whether the perceived duration of falsely remembered words was longer than that for control words. The study results revealed that the perceived duration for falsely recognized words was longer than that for correctly rejected words. This is the first study to show the effect of false memory on temporal perception and suggests that temporal perception can be affected by conceptual fluency without any perceptual repetition.     

The robustness of false memory for emotional pictures

Emotional material is commonly reported to be more accurately recognised; however, there is substantial evidence of increased false alarm rates (FAR) for emotional material and several reports of stronger influences on response bias than accuracy. This pattern is more frequently reported for words than pictures. Research on the mechanisms underlying bias differences has mostly focused on word lists under short retention intervals. This article presents four series of experiments examining recognition memory for emotional pictures while varying arousal and the control over the content of the pictures at two retention intervals, and one study measuring the relatedness of the series picture sets. Under the shorter retention interval, emotion increased false alarms and reduced accuracy. Under the longer retention interval emotion increased hit rates and FAR, resulting in reduced accuracy and/or bias. At both retention intervals, the pattern of valence effects differed based on the arousal associated with the picture sets. Emotional pictures were found to be more related than neutral pictures in each set; however, the influence of relatedness alone does not provide an adequate explanation for all emotional differences. The results demonstrate substantial emotional differences in picture recognition that vary based on valence, arousal and retention interval.     

The case against a criterion-shift account of false memory

M. B. Miller and G. L. Wolford (1999) argued that the high false-alarm rate associated with critical lures in the Roediger-McDermott (H. L. Roediger & K. B. McDermott, 1995) paradigm results from a criterion shift and therefore does not reflect false memory. This conclusion, which is based on new data reported by Miller and Wolford, overlooks the fact that Roediger and McDermott's false-memory account is as compatible with the new findings as the criterion-shift account is. Furthermore, a consideration of prior work concerned with investigating the conditions under which participants are and are not inclined to adjust the decision criterion suggests that the criterion-shift account of false memory is unlikely to be correct.     

The effect of Twitter exposure on false memory formation

Social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter have increased drastically in popularity. However, information on these sites is not verified and may contain inaccuracies. It is well-established that false information encountered after an event can lead to memory distortion. Therefore, social media may be particularly harmful for autobiographical memory. Here, we tested the effect of Twitter on false memory. We presented participants with a series of images that depicted a story and then presented false information about the images in a scrolling feed that bore either a low or high resemblance to a Twitter feed. Confidence for correct information was similar across the groups, but confidence for suggested information was significantly lower when false information was presented in a Twitter format. We propose that individuals take into account the medium of the message when integrating information into memory.     

Attentional cueing induces false memory

The fluency of stimulus processing significantly contributes to recognition memory judgments. We investigated the effect of processing fluency induced by attentional cueing on recognition judgments. Participants performed a Remember/Know recognition test, while their spatial attention was manipulated in the test session. Stimulus location was either predicted (congruent condition) or unpredicted (incongruent condition) using an arrow cue. The results revealed that familiarity-based false recognition increased in the incongruent condition wherein the participants may have attributed part of the perceived disfluency to the attentional cue, and they may have overestimated the fluency for the stimulus, leading to increased false recognition. However, in the congruent condition, the participants may have attributed some parts of the perceived fluency to the attentional cue and underestimated the fluency for the stimulus, leading to decreased false recognition. In sum, stimulus-irrelevant attentional cueing induces unintentional processing about the source of fluency and biases recognition memory.     

Presentation modality affects false memory

Roediger and McDermott (1995) rejuvenated interest in Deese’s (1959) paradigm for producing reliable intrusions and false alarms. Using this paradigm in three experiments, we demonstrated that visual study presentation dramatically reduces the rate of false memories. Only auditory study presentation resulted in equal production of studied and critical items. Correct recall and recognition were unaffected. The suggestion that visual presentation provides a means for discriminating between false and true memories was supported by Experiment 3: Pleasantness rating of study items significantly reduced the creation of false memories regardless of modality.     

The role of rehearsal and generation in false memory creation

The current research investigated one possible mechanism underlying false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In the DRM paradigm, participants who study lists of related words (e.g., "table, sitting, bench ...") frequently report detailed memories for the centrally related but non-presented critical lure (e.g., "chair"). One possibility is that participants covertly call to mind the critical non-presented lure during the study phase, and later misattribute memory for this internally generated event to its external presentation. To investigate this, the DRM paradigm was modified to allow collection of on-line thoughts during the study phase. False recognition increased following generation during study. False recognition also increased following study of longer lists; this effect was partially explained by the fact that longer lists were more likely to elicit generations of the critical lure during study. Generation of the lure during study contributes to later false recognition, although it does not explain the entire effect.     

Iconic memory and visible persistence

There are three senses in which a visual stimulus may be said to persist psychologically for some time after its physical offset. First, neural activity in the visual system evoked by the stimulus may continue after stimulus offset (“neural persistence”). Second, the stimulus may continue to be visible for some time after its offset (“visible persistence”). Finally, information about visual properties of the stimulus may continue to be available to an observer for some time after stimulus offset (“informational persistence”). These three forms of visual persistence are widely assumed to reflect a single underlying process: a decaying visual trace that (1) consists of afteractivity in the visual system, (2) is visible, and (3) is the source of visual information in experiments on decaying visual memory. It is argued here that this assumption is incorrect. Studies of visible persistence are reviewed; seven different techniques that have been used for investigating visible persistence are identified, and it is pointed out that numerous studies using a variety of techniques have demonstrated two fundamental properties of visible persistence: theinverse duration effect (the longer a stimulus lasts, the shorter is its persistence after stimulus offset) and theinverse intensity effect (the more intense the stimulus, the briefer its persistence). Only when stimuli are so intense as to produce afterimages do these two effects fail to occur. Work on neural persistences is briefly reviewed; such persistences exist at the photoreceptor level and at various stages in the visual pathways. It is proposed that visible persistence depends upon both of these types of neural persistence; furthermore, there must be an additional neural locus, since a purely stereoscopic (and hence cortical) form of visible persistence exists. It is argued that informational persistence is defined by the use of the partial report methods introduced by Averbach and Coriell (1961) and Sperling (1960), and the term “iconic memory” is used to describe this form of persistence. Several studies of the effects of stimulus duration and stimulus intensity upon the duration of iconic memory have been carried out. Their results demonstrate that the duration of iconic memory is not inversely related to stimulus duration or stimulus intensity. It follows that informational persistence or iconic memory cannot be identified with visible persistence, since they have fundamentally different properties. One implication of this claim that one cannot investigate iconic memory by tasks that require the subject to make phenomenological judgments about the duration of a visual display. In other words, the so-called “direct methods” for studying iconic memory do not provide information about iconic memory. Another implication is that iconic memory is not intimately tied to processes going on in the visual system (as visible persistence is); provided a stimulus is adequately legible, its physical parameters have little influence upon its iconic memory. The paper concludes by pointing out that there exists an alternative to the usual view of iconic memory as a precategorical sensory buffer. According to this alternative, iconic memory is post-categorical, occurring subsequent to stimulus identification. Here, stimulus identification is considered to be a rapid automatic process which does not require buffer storage, but which provides no information about episodic properties of a visual stimulus. Information about these physical stimulus properties must, in some way, be temporarily attached to a representation of the stimulus in semantic memory; and it is this temporarily attached physical information which constitutes iconic memory.     

Driving without memory: The strength of schema-consistent false memories

Drivers’ memory for their recent trips has been shown to be surprisingly poor, with relatively low accuracy of both recall and recollection and substantial levels of false memories. Driving research has suggested that arousal, such as from risk, leads to more accurate memories. Memory research suggests that the typicality of objects and events makes them harder to remember accurately, compared to schema-inconsistent or atypical objects, and leads to greater likelihood of false memories. In contrast, it has been suggested that memory for actions is different to memory for objects, and that typical actions are remembered more accurately than atypical actions. The present research examined the role of typicality or schema consistency in the accuracy of memory for driving. Participants drove a 15 km route in their own cars and then answered questions about their drive. The results showed that atypical objects and actions were recalled with greater accuracy than typical objects and actions. The results also showed that false memories were most common for typical objects, but not for typical actions. We interpret these results in terms of both memory theory and implications for understanding skilled behaviour such as driving.     

The effect of divided attention on false memory depends on how memory is tested

In three experiments, we investigated the effects of divided attention on false memory, using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants studied six DRM lists with full attention and six in one of two divided-attention conditions (random number generation or digit monitoring). Both divided-attention conditions increased false recall of related words (Experiment 1) but reduced false recognition (Experiment 2). These results were confirmed in Experiment 3, in which the type of secondary task was manipulated within groups. We argue that the increase in false recall with divided attention reflects a change in participants' response criterion, whereas the decrease in false recognition occurs because the secondary tasks prevent participants from generating associates of the words presented at study.     

The role of associative strength in children's false memory illusions

The effects of associative strength on rates of 7- and 11-year-old children's true and false memories were examined when category and Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists were used to cue the same critical lure. Backward associative strength (BAS) was varied such that the category and DRM lists had the same strength (DRM=category), DRM lists had more BAS (DRM>category), or category lists had more BAS (DRM<category). If BAS drives children's false memories then BAS, not the type of relation across items in a list, should determine false memory production. The results confirmed this prediction using both recall and recognition measures: (1) both true and false memories increased with age, (2) true memory was better for category than DRM lists but there were no differences for false memory, and (3) at all ages, false memories varied predictably with changes in BAS but were unaffected by list-type manipulations. These findings are discussed in the context of models of false memory development.     

The role of rehearsal and generation in false memory creation

The current research investigated one possible mechanism underlying false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In the DRM paradigm, participants who study lists of related words (e.g., “table, sitting, bench …”) frequently report detailed memories for the centrally related but non-presented critical lure (e.g., “chair”). One possibility is that participants covertly call to mind the critical non-presented lure during the study phase, and later misattribute memory for this internally generated event to its external presentation. To investigate this, the DRM paradigm was modified to allow collection of on-line thoughts during the study phase. False recognition increased following generation during study. False recognition also increased following study of longer lists; this effect was partially explained by the fact that longer lists were more likely to elicit generations of the critical lure during study. Generation of the lure during study contributes to later false recognition, although it does not explain the entire effect.     

Working memory affects false memory production for emotional events

Whereas a link between working memory (WM) and memory distortions has been demonstrated, its influence on emotional false memories is unclear. In two experiments, a verbal WM task and a false memory paradigm for negative, positive or neutral events were employed. In Experiment 1, we investigated individual differences in verbal WM and found that the interaction between valence and WM predicted false recognition, with negative and positive material protecting high WM individuals against false remembering; the beneficial effect of negative material disappeared in low WM participants. In Experiment 2, we lowered the WM capacity of half of the participants with a double task request, which led to an overall increase in false memories; furthermore, consistent with Experiment 1, the increase in negative false memories was larger than that of neutral or positive ones. It is concluded that WM plays a critical role in determining false memory production, specifically influencing the processing of negative material.     

On the susceptibility of adaptive memory to false memory illusions

Previous research has shown that survival-related processing of word lists enhances retention for that material. However, the claim that survival-related memories are more accurate has only been examined when true recall and recognition of neutral material has been measured. In the current experiments, we examined the adaptive memory superiority effect for different types of processing and material, measuring accuracy more directly by comparing true and false recollection rates. Survival-related information and processing was examined using word lists containing backward associates of neutral, negative, and survival-related critical lures and type of processing (pleasantness, moving, survival) was varied using an incidental memory paradigm. Across four experiments, results showed that survival-related words were more susceptible than negative and neutral words to the false memory illusion and that processing information in terms of its relevance to survival independently increased this susceptibility to the false memory illusion. Overall, although survival-related processing and survival-related information resulted in poorer, not more accurate, memory, such inaccuracies may have adaptive significance. These findings are discussed in the context of false memory research and recent theories concerning the importance of survival processing and the nature of adaptive memory.     

Self-relevance enhances susceptibility to false memory

Eyewitness testimony serves as important evidence in the legal system. Eyewitnesses of a crime can be either the victims themselves—for whom the experience is highly self-referential—or can be bystanders who witness and thus encode the crime in relation to others. There is a gap in past research investigating whether processing information in relation to oneself versus others would later impact people's suggestibility to misleading information. In two experiments (Ns = 68 and 122) with Dutch and Chinese samples, we assessed whether self-reference of a crime event (i.e., victim vs. bystander) affected their susceptibility to false memory creation. Using a misinformation procedure, we photoshopped half of the participants' photographs into a crime slideshow so that they saw themselves as victims of a nonviolent crime, while others watched the slideshow as mock bystander witnesses. In both experiments, participants displayed a self-enhanced suggestibility effect: Participants who viewed themselves as victims created more false memories after receiving misinformation than those who witnessed the same crime as bystanders. These findings suggest that self-reference might constitute a hitherto new risk factor in the formation of false memories when evaluating eyewitness memory reports.     

Gender differences in false memory production

The present study investigated differences in false memory production between men and women, using the Deese/Roedgier McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Five word lists were used (MAN, GIRL, BREAD, BLACK, HIGH) and it was predicted that males would produce more false memories for the MAN word list while females will produce more false memories for the GIRL word list. Results did not confirm our predictions. Gender was neither a significant main effect, nor did it interact with any factors. Test and List x Test were the only significant main or interaction effects, respectively. Results are discussed as they relate to gender differences in cognitive processing.     

Gender differences in false memory production

The present study investigated differences in false memory production between men and women, using the Deese/Roedgier McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Five word lists were used (MAN, GIRL, BREAD, BLACK, HIGH) and it was predicted that males would produce more false memories for the MAN word list while females will produce more false memories for the GIRL word list. Results did not confirm our predictions. Gender was neither a significant main effect, nor did it interact with any factors. Test and List x Test were the only significant main or interaction effects, respectively. Results are discussed as they relate to gender differences in cognitive processing.     

Explaining developmental reversals in false memory

We report the first demonstration that a simple, theory-driven manipulation produces opposite developmental trends in false memory for the same information. When 6-, 10-, and 14-year-olds studied lists containing exemplars of familiar taxonomic categories, false memory for the same unpresented items (category exemplars and labels) increased with age if list items were semantically related but decreased with age if semantic relations could not be formed among list items. A control experiment ruled out the hypothesis that these results were due to young children having generic deficits in forming relations among list items.