幼儿对假装游戏中意图和行为作用的理解

关于儿童如何理解假装存在两种观点:一种观点认为幼儿能够从心理角度理解假装。另一种观点认为,幼儿只能从假装行为角度理解假装。本研究通过自制录像,考查了3～5岁幼儿对假装游戏中意图和行为作用的理解。实验中,给幼儿呈现3种不同类型的录像情境:有意图-有行为、有意图-无行为和无意图-有行为,要求幼儿回答录像中的主人公是否在假装。实验结果表明,随着幼儿年龄的增长,在录像中主人公明确表达其假装意图的情境下,幼儿能够从心理层面理解假装,并且3～4岁幼儿存在一个快速发展期;同时,假装实体的熟悉度可能影响幼儿对假装的理解。     

儿童对假装中的心理表征及意图的理解

心理表征和意图是假装中两种最重要的心理成分,关于年幼儿童是否能理解假装中的这两种心理成分,研究者们得出了不尽相同的结论。一种观点认为3岁儿童就能理解到假装中的心理层面(心理表征、意图);另一种观点则认为儿童到了6岁都仅仅把假装理解为一种外表上看起来像某物的行为,并不能理解到假装中的心理层面(心理表征、意图),而恰恰对假装中的心理层面的理解才是假装理解的关键方面。这些争论可能与测试问题的推论方向与提问方式、对抑制控制能力的要求、假装动作与心理状态的平衡、任务情景与现实生活情景的联系、实验材料呈现方式等方面的差异有关。未来研究可以从结合执行功能、区分假装主体和假装旁观者、采用内隐的测试方法、关注与假装相关的其他能力的发展等角度,对儿童理解假装中的心理表征和意图这一问题进行深入研究。     

3~5岁儿童对假装的辨认和对假装者心理的推断

研究设置了三种条件：玩具条件、替代物条件和虚构物条件;测查了3~5岁的儿童对假装的辨认和对假装者心理的推断。结果表明：(1) 大部分3岁儿童就能辨认假装,但是对假装心理的推断到5岁才逐步形成;(2) 3~5岁儿童对假装的辨认和对假装者心理的推断还受支持物的影响;(3) 3~5岁的学前儿童主要倾向于从外部特点理解假装     

儿童关于意图的二级心理状态的理解与归于权威人物的道德评价

用设置故事情境的方法研究了儿童关于意图的二级心理状态的理解与归于权威人物的道德评价的关系,结果表明:儿童关于意图的二级心理状态的理解影响儿童归于权威人物老师的道德评价,且存在年龄差异。5岁儿童已经能够认识到老师是否知道行为者的行为意图影响老师对行为者行为的道德评价,但5岁儿童的认识尚不够深刻,随着儿童年龄的增长,这种认识渐趋稳定成熟。权威人物的道德评价影响儿童关于意图的二级心理状态的理解,这种理解同时受到行为者行为结果的影响且存在年龄差异。     

聋童与正常儿童对假装表征、模仿性假装和欺骗性假装的认识

本研究认为,对假装的认识包含理解假装表征、模仿性假装和欺骗性假装。选取了86名3-5岁的学前儿童和122名3-12岁的聋童,考察他们对假装上述内容的认知情况及差异。结果表明：（1）当假装任务中涉及的事物特征不符合儿童经验时,9岁前的聋童和正常学前儿童难以理解假装表征和模仿性假装。反之若符合儿童的经验,大部分3岁正常儿童及7岁聋童就能正确理解上述内容;（2）5岁正常儿童和7岁聋童已能正确理解欺骗性假装,这比他们在同样情境下理解假装的表征和模仿性假装的年龄要迟。（3）聋童理解假装问题要比正常儿童滞后2-4年,但他们正确理解这些问题的年龄起点及达到的程度与正常儿童可能是一致的,而且发展的趋势也是相似的。（4）手语聋童理解假装问题的成绩好于口语聋童,那些父母会手语或父母是聋人的聋童的成绩好于其他聋童。本研究的结论是：低龄正常儿童和聋童还难以真正理解假装表征;聋童对假装的认识比正常儿童滞后2-4年,但发展趋势相似;聋童自身的手语水平及其父母的手语水平是影响他们理解假装的主要因素。     

5～9岁儿童对梦的可控性的理解

研究试图考察5～9岁儿童对梦的可控性的理解及其发展趋势.研究以半结构式访谈的方法测查了5岁、7岁、9岁各36名共108名儿童.访谈内容包括四个故事情景,故事的主人公想梦到或不想梦到某事物.其中两个故事情景带有正性或负性情绪色彩,其余两个故事情景带有中性情绪色彩.要求被试判断主人公是否会梦到该事物,并给出自己的理由.研究结果发现:(1)9岁儿童比5岁、7岁儿童更好地理解梦是不受个体意愿控制的心理过程;(2)5岁儿童倾向于认为负性情绪且不想梦见的梦较中性情绪且不想梦见的梦更容易被控制,而7岁、9岁儿童则不这么认为.这些结果说明随着年龄增长,儿童逐渐认识到梦是不可控的心理过程,而且5岁儿童认为负性梦更容易控制.     

学前儿童心理理论及欺骗发展的关系研究

本文采用两种标准心理理论任务和两种欺骗任务,以3~6岁儿童为被试,探讨了学前儿童心理理论与欺骗发展的关系,得出如下结论:(1)在不同的误信念任务中,学前儿童的表现不一致;但仍存在一般发展趋势:3岁儿童不能通过误信念任务,4、5岁是儿童误信念发展的关键时期.(2)3岁儿童不能拥有隐藏意图的欺骗能力,4岁儿童拥有隐藏意图的欺骗能力.(3)3岁儿童能说谎,但假装无知的欺骗直到6岁才出现.(4)误信念理解与隐藏意图的欺骗存在相关,但与说谎和假装无知不存在相关.     

幼儿心理状态术语的运用与心理理论的发展

本研究目的在于探讨幼儿在假装游戏中心理状态术语的应用,以及与错误信念的理解是否存在相关并具有一定的发展特征。57名3—5岁的幼儿参加了实验。研究程序包括两类标准错误信念任务及假装游戏的拍摄、麦卡锡幼儿言语智力测验。结果发现：(1)幼儿的一般言语能力与错误信念的理解存在显著相关;(2)幼儿心理状态术语的使用存在情境差异,且随年龄的增长具有“指向愿望一指向信念”的维度特征;(3)在控制相关因素之后,幼儿错误信念的理解与心理状态术语的应用及其特定范畴(习惯用语)之间仍然存在显著相关;与“真正涉及心理状态”之间的相关不再显著。     

学前儿童对“知道”和“会”的认知

72名3至5岁儿童接受了陈述性知识和程序性知识的学习任务,探查他们在获得新知识前后对自己是否“知道”和 “会”的认知和知识获取方式的认知 。结果显示,有部分学前儿童在不知道或不会的情况下报告自己“知道”或“会”,对自己的判断倾向于作出肯定回答;在学习新知识之后,学前儿童对自己是否“知道”的认识要比是否“会”的认知准确;儿童对陈述性知识的获取方式的认识好于程序性知识,3岁儿童对知识获取方式的认识存在困难。     

儿童推断他人知识状态的知识偏差和无知偏差

采用“看见-知道”任务考察了儿童对他人知识状态推断的特点和可能存在的偏差效应。被试为90名3-5岁儿童。结果表明,3-5岁儿童已经理解他人看见即知道的关系;5岁儿童已经能准确地推断他人的知识状态,不存在偏差;但3、4岁儿童对他人知识状态的推断受到自身知识的影响且表现出自我中心的倾向：既存在知识偏差即因为自己知道而高估他人的知识,也存在无知偏差即因为自己的无知而低估他人的知识。4岁儿童的知识偏差程度与3岁儿童无异,但无知偏差低于3岁儿童,且4岁儿童的知识偏差程度大于其无知偏差,儿童克服无知偏差的时间可能早于克服知识偏差的时间。     

Children's knowledge of the relation between intentional action and pretending

Two experiments investigated preschoolers’ understanding of the relation between pretending and intentional action. In Experiment 1, both 3- and 4-year olds recognized that characters whose actions were intended as pretense were pretending. However, children also judged that characters whose actions gave them the appearance of an entity unintentionally were pretending to be that entity. In Experiment 2, 3-year olds reliably chose a character whose pretense actions were intentional as pretending over a character whose actions were guided by another intention. These data suggest that preschoolers have some understanding of the role of intentional action in pretense.     

Preschooler's Understanding of the Role of Mental States and Action in Pretense

This research investigated 3- to 5-year-old's understanding of the role of intentional states and action in pretense. There are two main perspectives on how children conceptualize pretense. One view is that children understand the mental aspects of pretending (the rich interpretation). The alternative view is that children conceptualize pretense as "acting-like" and do not appreciate that the mind is crucial to pretense (the lean interpretation). The experiments in this article used a novel approach to test these two interpretations. Children were presented with two types of videotaped scenarios. In Experiment 1, children were presented with a scenario in which people wanted to be like something else (e.g., a kangaroo) and either acted like it or did not act like it. Children were asked whether the protagonists were pretending and whether they were thinking about the pretend entity. In Experiment 2, children were presented with the Experiment 1 scenarios and also with a scenario in which a person had the intention to do something else (e.g., look for her keys) but whose actions were similar to those of a pretend entity (e.g., a bear). Children were asked about the pretense, thoughts, and the intentions of the protagonists. Experiment 3 tested for the effect of asking an open-ended versus a forced-choice question on the Experiment 2 tasks. The results of this study suggest that in certain facilitating conditions (e.g., intention information salient, forced-choice question) children have an early understanding of the role of mind in pretense.     

Preschooler's Understanding of the Role of Mental States and Action in Pretense

This research investigated 3- to 5-year-old's understanding of the role of intentional states and action in pretense. There are two main perspectives on how children conceptualize pretense. One view is that children understand the mental aspects of pretending (the rich interpretation). The alternative view is that children conceptualize pretense as "acting-like" and do not appreciate that the mind is crucial to pretense (the lean interpretation). The experiments in this article used a novel approach to test these two interpretations. Children were presented with two types of videotaped scenarios. In Experiment 1, children were presented with a scenario in which people wanted to be like something else (e.g., a kangaroo) and either acted like it or did not act like it. Children were asked whether the protagonists were pretending and whether they were thinking about the pretend entity. In Experiment 2, children were presented with the Experiment 1 scenarios and also with a scenario in which a person had the intention to do something else (e.g., look for her keys) but whose actions were similar to those of a pretend entity (e.g., a bear). Children were asked about the pretense, thoughts, and the intentions of the protagonists. Experiment 3 tested for the effect of asking an open-ended versus a forced-choice question on the Experiment 2 tasks. The results of this study suggest that in certain facilitating conditions (e.g., intention information salient, forced-choice question) children have an early understanding of the role of mind in pretense.     

How fantasy benefits young children's understanding of pretense

Sobel and Lillard (2001) demonstrated that 4-year-olds' understanding of the role that the mind plays in pretending improved when children were asked questions in a fantasy context. The present study investigated whether this fantasy effect was motivated by children recognizing that fantasy contains violations of real-world causal structure. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were shown a fantasy character engaged in ordinary actions or actions that violated causal knowledge. Children were more likely to say that a troll doll who was acting like but ignorant of the character was not pretending to be that character when read the violation story. Experiment 2 suggested that this difference was not caused by a greater interest in the violation story. Experiment 3 demonstrated a similar difference for characters engaged in social and functional violations that were possible in the real world. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that preschoolers use actions and appearance more than mental states to make judgments about pretense, but that those judgments can be influenced by the context in which the questions are presented.     

Enabling conditions and children’s understanding of pretense

Two experiments examined whether preschoolers’ difficulties on tasks that required relating pretending and knowledge (e.g., Lillard, A. S. (1993a). Young children’s conceptualization of pretense: Action or mental representational state? Child Development, 64, 372-386) were due to children’s inability to appreciate the causal mechanism behind enabling conditions. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were told about a character who knew about one kind of animal and did not know about another. The character acted in a manner consistent with both animals. Children were asked whether the character was pretending to be the animal of which he was ignorant. The character’s knowledge was either represented in a generic manner (as a picture) or in a manner that suggested a particular enabling condition relation that children found accessible (as a battery, which most 4-year-olds recognize is critical for making toys work). Children were more successful at relating knowledge and pretending in the battery condition. This improvement in performance extended to another task in which children had to identify the enabling condition relation between knowledge and identification, in which there were reduced demands on the inhibitory mechanisms necessary for success. Experiment 2 found that the results in Experiment 1 were not due to demands of the procedure used in Experiment 1. These results are discussed in the context of recent theories of theory of mind that focus on the importance of causal relations among mental states.     

Lion Kings or puppies: the influence of fantasy on children’s understanding of pretense

Many have thought that children have an early appreciation of the mind in the case of pretend play. Results from several experiments are against this. However, an experiment by Lillard (Body or mind: children’s categorizing of pretense, Child Development, 67 (1996), 1717-1734, Experiment 4) suggested that when a pretense is about a fantasy character, instead of a real entity, children might have a better understanding of the mind’s involvement. The present experiment tested this, and found that indeed, when pretending to be a fantasy character is at issue, 4-year-olds are significantly more apt to indicate the mind’s involvement. Several possible reasons for this result are discussed.     

Effects of discrete emotions on young children's suggestibility

Two experiments investigated the effects of sadness, anger, and happiness on 4- to 6-year-old children's memory and suggestibility concerning story events. In Experiment 1, children were presented with 3 interactive stories on a video monitor. The stories included protagonists who wanted to give the child a prize. After each story, the child completed a task to try to win the prize. The outcome of the child's effort was manipulated in order to elicit sadness, anger, or happiness. Children's emotions did not affect story recall, but children were more vulnerable to misleading questions about the stories when sad than when angry or happy. In Experiment 2, a story was presented and emotions were elicited using an autobiographical recall task. Children responded to misleading questions and then recalled the story for a different interviewer. Again, children's emotions did not affect the amount of story information recalled correctly, but sad children incorporated more information from misleading questions during recall than did angry or happy children. Sad children's greater suggestibility is discussed in terms of the differing problem-solving strategies associated with discrete emotions.     

Children in Asian cultures say yes to yes-no questions: Common and cultural differences between Vietnamese and Japanese children

We investigated whether children's response tendency toward yes-no questions concerning objects is a common phenomenon regardless of languages and cultures. Vietnamese and Japanese 2- to 5-year-old (N = 108) were investigated. We also examined whether familiarity with the questioning issue has any effect on Asian children's yes bias. As the result, Asian children showed a yes bias to yes-no questions. The children's response tendency changes dramatically with their age: Vietnamese and Japanese 2- and 3-year-olds showed a yes bias, but 5-year-olds did not. However, Asian 4-year-olds also showed a yes bias only in the familiar condition. Also, Asian children showed a stronger yes bias in the familiar condition than the unfamiliar condition. These two findings in Asian children were different from the previous finding investigated North American children (Fritzley & Lee, 2003). Moreover, there was a within-Asian cross-cultural difference. Japanese children showed different response tendencies, which were rarely observed in Vietnamese children. Japanese 2-year-olds and some 3-year-olds showed a "no answer" response: they tended not to respond to an interviewer's questions. Japanese 4- and 5-year-olds also showed an "I don't know" response when they were asked about unfamiliar objects. Japanese children tended to avoid a binary decision. We discussed the cross-cultural differences.     

Two-year-olds grasp the intentional structure of pretense acts

Twenty-two- and 27-month-old children were tested for their understanding of pretending as a specific intentional action form. Pairs of superficially similar behaviors - pretending to perform an action and trying to perform that action - were demonstrated to children. The 27-month-olds, and to some degree the 22-month-olds, showed in their responses that they understood the intentional structure of both kinds of behaviors: after pretense models, they themselves performed appropriate inferential pretense acts, whereas after the trying models they properly performed the action or tried to perform it with novel means. These findings are discussed in the light of recent debates about children's developing understanding of pretense and theory of mind.