Choice, changeover, and travel

Since foraging in nature can be viewed as instrumental behavior, choice between sources of food, known as “patches,” can be viewed as choice between instrumental response alternatives. Whereas the travel required to change alternatives deters changeover in nature, the changeover delay (COD) usually deters changeover in the laboratory. In this experiment, pigeons were exposed to laboratory choice situations, concurrent variable-interval schedules, that were standard except for the introduction of a travel requirement for changeover. As the travel requirement increased, rate of changeover decreased and preference for a favored alternative strengthened. When the travel requirement was small, the relations between choice and relative reinforcement revealed the usual tendencies toward matching and undermatching. When the travel requirement was large, strong overmatching occurred. These results, together with those from experiments in which changeover was deterred by punishment or a fixed-ratio requirement, deviate from the matching law, even when a correction is made for cost of changeover. If one accepted an argument that the COD is analogous to travel, the results suggest that the norm in choice relations would be overmatching. This overmatching, however, might only be the sign of an underlying strategy approximating optimization.     

Free will,grace, and anti-Pelagianism

Critics of synergism often complain that the view entails Pelagianism (or at least semi-Pelagianism), and so, critics think, monergism looks like the only live (orthodox) option. Critics of monergism often claim that the view entails that the blame for human sin ultimately traces to God. Recently, several philosophers (including Richard Cross, Eleonore Stump, and Kevin Timpe) have attempted to chart a middle path by offering soteriological accounts which are monergistic (and thus avoid Pelagianism) but maintain the resistibility of God’s grace (with the aim of blocking the tracing of sin to God). In this paper, we present a challenge to such accounts of the resistibility of grace, namely that they imply that human beings are praiseworthy for omitting to resist God’s grace. Even if such views escape Pelagianism as it is typically defined, they fail to avoid the worry at the heart of prominent criticisms of Pelagianism concerning the praise for a human being’s salvation. At the end of the paper, we suggest three possible solutions to this problem.     

Autonomy,decisions, and free will

Can humans make decisions? Can machines? What ethical questions arise from using robotics in the education of children? Or in elderly care? These were some of the topics of the interdisciplinary college (IK), which took place from the 25th of March to the 1st of April in Günne, next to Lake Möhne. During this one-week spring school, more than 40 well-known lecturers from around the globe gave 170 participants an insight into a cornucopia of topics surrounding “autonomy, decisions, and free will”.     

Time travel,hyperspace and Cheshire Cats

H. G. Wells’ Time Traveller inhabits uniform Newtonian time. Where relativistic/quantum travelers into the past follow spacetime curvatures, past-bound Wellsians must reverse their direction of travel relative to absolute time. William Grey and Robin Le Poidevin claim reversing Wellsians must overlap with themselves or fade away piecemeal like the Cheshire Cat. Self-overlap is physically impossible but ‘Cheshire Cat’ fades destroy Wellsians’ causal continuity and breed bizarre fusions of traveler-stages with opposed time-directions. However, Wellsians who rotate in higher-dimensional space can reverse temporal direction without self-overlap, Cheshire Cats or mereological monstrosities. Alas, hyper-rotation in Newtonian space poses dynamic and biological problems, (e.g. gravitational/electrostatic singularities and catastrophic blood-loss). Controllable and survivable Wellsian travel needs topologically-variable spaces. Newtonian space, not Newtonian time, is Wellsians’ real enemy.     

Multimodal travel behaviour,attitudes, and cognitive dissonance

Multimodal travel behaviour, also termed multimodality, refers to as the phenomenon of an individual using more than one mode of transport in a given period. Studies indicate that encouraging multimodality may provide a solution to induce modal shifts towards sustainable transport. In this research, we investigate the distribution of mode-specific attitudes and attitude-mode use incompatibilities across clusters and levels of multimodality using the Netherlands Mobility Panel. We find that the most positive attitude does not necessarily correspond to the mode with the highest level of use. Attitudes towards car use are most positive, independent of the cluster membership and levels of multimodality. We also find that multimodal public transport users (compared with car-dominant users) and those with a higher level of multimodality are more likely to be attitudinally incompatible with frequently-used modes and the composition of their existing mode sets of travelling. This suggests that multimodal individuals may tend to experience cognitive dissonance with their mode use. Our findings also help uncover the psychological mechanism underlying a recent important finding that multimodal individuals are inclined to change their mode use patterns over time.     

Intending,believing, and supposing at will

In this paper I consider an argument for the possibility of intending at will, and its relationship to an argument about the possibility of believing at will. I argue that although we have good reason to think we sometimes intend at will, we lack good reason to think this in the case of believing. Instead of believing at will, agents like us often suppose at will.     

Persons, punishment, and free will skepticism

The purpose of this paper is to provide a justification of punishment which can be endorsed by free will skeptics, and which can also be defended against the “using persons as mere means” objection. Free will skeptics must reject retributivism, that is, the view that punishment is just because criminals deserve to suffer based on their actions. Retributivists often claim that theirs is the only justification on which punishment is constrained by desert, and suppose that non-retributive justifications must therefore endorse treating the people punished as mere means to social ends. Retributivists typically presuppose a monolithic conception of desert: they assume that action-based desert is the only kind of desert. But there are also personhood-based desert claims, that is, desert claims which depend not on facts about our actions, but instead on the more abstract fact that we are persons. Since personhood-based desert claims do not depend on facts about our actions, they do not depend on moral responsibility, so free will skeptics can appeal to them just as well as retributivists. What people deserve based on the mere fact of their personhood is to be treated as they would rationally consent to be treated if all they had in view was the mere fact of their personhood. We can work out the implications of this view for punishment by developing a “hypothetical consent” justification in which we select principles of punishment in the Rawlsian original position, so long as we are careful not to smuggle in the retributivist assumption that it is under our control whether we end up as criminals or as law-abiding citizens once we raise the veil of ignorance.     

Weakness of will, reasonability, and compulsion

Experimental philosophers have recently begun to investigate the folk conception of weakness of will (e.g., Mele in Philos Stud 150:391–404, 2010; May and Holton in Philos Stud 157:341–360, 2012; Beebe forthcoming; Sousa and Mauro forthcoming). Their work has focused primarily on the ways in which akrasia (i.e., acting contrary to one’s better judgment), unreasonable violations of resolutions, and variations in the moral valence of actions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will. A key finding that has emerged from this research is that—contrary to the predominant view in the history of philosophy—ordinary participants do not think of weakness of will solely in terms of akrasia but see resolution violations and moral evaluations as playing equally important roles. The present article extends this line of research by reporting the results of four experiments that investigate (i) the interplay between hastily revising one’s resolutions and the degree of reasonableness of the actions one had resolved to undertake, (ii) whether ordinary participants are willing to ascribe weakness of will to agents whose actions stem from compulsion or addiction, and (iii) the respects in which akratic action, resolution violations, and the seriousness of an addiction impact attributions of weakness of will to agents acting in accord with their addictions.     

还有这么好的杂志!

每年九月,在中山公园都要举行一年一度的报刊发行宣传,今年是我们杂志社第三次参加,根据前两年的经验,这次我不是很有信心.没想到,我刚摆好杂志,一些溜早的老先生、老太太们就凑上来了,这个问:"哟!这杂志什么时候办的呀,怎么早没看见呢?"那个说:"今年出到第几期了?我去年就来了."还有好多的人对杂志的创办表示肯定,说现在这样的杂志太少了,这方面的宣传也太少了,希望杂志越办越好.有一些老先生看到这个杂志后,想把以前的几期也买到,以后连续订.还有想多要几本的,要给亲戚、朋友带回去.有一对中年夫妇来到摊位前,拿起一本杂志后翻看了一下,男同志很感兴趣,想每一期都要一本,但是被他太太拦住了,因为手里有许多书报、杂志,拿不动了,于是只拿一本就走了.谁知等到下午,他们两个人又回来了.男同志说:"这杂志太好了,我多要几期,累点儿也值了!"很是让人感动.     

The complex tapestry of free will: striving will,indeterminism and volitional streams

The aim of this paper is to respond to recent discussion of, and objections to, the libertarian view of free will I have developed in many works over the past four decades. The issues discussed all have a bearing on the central question of how one might make sense of a traditional free will requiring indeterminism in the light of modern science. This task involves, among other things, avoiding all traditional libertarian appeals to unusual forms of agency or causation (uncaused causes, noumenal selves, non-event agent causes, etc.) that cannot be accounted for by ordinary modes of explanation familiar to the natural and human sciences. Doing this, I argue, requires piecing together a “complex tapestry” of ideas and arguments that involve rethinking many traditional assumptions about free will. The paper also argues that one cannot get to the heart of historical debates about free will without distinguishing different kinds of freedom, different senses of will, and different notions of control, among other distinctions. I especially focus here on different notions of freedom and control that are necessary to make sense of free will.