Perceptual projects:A theory of veridicality and distortion in perception

Abstract.— The split between objective and subjective information, characterizing dualistic theories of perception, is argued to have caused contradictions around the problems of veridicality of perception and the attention-attracting power of stimulus properties. The theory of threshold-regulation in categorical perception is criticized and an alternative model is suggested, where the main distinctions are between the "knowing how" and the "knowing that" of perception, between exteriorization and interiorization, and between the perceptual project and the perceptual foundation. It is demonstrated that concepts used in the analysis of dialogical communication are useful in the theory of perception to explain phenomena such as curiosity, boredom, and pathological perception.     

A revision of the psychological refractory period

A brief review of the major psychological refractory period (PRP) theories reveals that they have lost their original objective, i.e., to explain human information processing under rapid sequential stimulation. Conventional data interpretation has restricted attention to delay of reaction times as a result of interstimulus interval (ISI) variation. This form of data interpretation fails to capture important performance aspects under double-stimulation, e.g., the phenomenon that stimulus complexity affects the processing rate. Effects of stimulus rate and complexity are better analyzed in terms of reaction times as well as interresponse intervals (IRI). If this is done, behavioral phenomena emerge that cannot be explained within the frame of any of the existing PRP theories. To account for these newly revealed phenomena a processing interrupt model is introduced which is based on three major hypotheses: single-channel processor, additive stages, and perceptual interrupt facility.     

Neo-pragmatic intentionality and enactive perception: a compromise between extended and enactive minds

The general idea of enactive perception is that actual and potential embodied activities determine perceptual experience. Some extended mind theorists, such as Andy Clark, refute this claim despite their general emphasis on the importance of the body. I propose a compromise to this opposition. The extended mind thesis is allegedly a consequence of our commonsense understanding of the mind. Furthermore, extended mind theorists assume the existence of non-human minds. I explore the precise nature of the commonsense understanding of the mind, which accepts both extended minds and non-human minds. In the area of philosophy of mind, there are two theories of intentionality based on such commonsense understandings: neo-behaviorism defended, e.g., by Daniel Dennett, and neo-pragmatism advocated, e.g., by Robert Brandom. Neither account is in full agreement with how people ordinarily use their commonsense understanding. Neo-pragmatism, however, can overcome its problem—its inability to explain why people routinely find intentionality in non-humans—by incorporating the phenomenological suggestion that interactional bodily skills determine how we perceive others’ intentionality. I call this integrative position embodied neo-pragmatism. I conclude that the extended view of the mind makes sense, without denying the existence of non-human minds, only by assuming embodied neo-pragmatism and hence the general idea of enactive perception.     

Enhanced perceptual processing of speech in autism

Theories of autism have proposed that a bias towards low-level perceptual information, or a featural/surface-biased information-processing style, may compromise higher-level language processing in such individuals. Two experiments, utilizing linguistic stimuli with competing low-level/perceptual and high-level/semantic information, tested processing biases in children with autism and matched controls. Whereas children with autism exhibited superior perceptual processing of speech relative to controls, and showed no evidence of either a perceptual or semantic processing bias, controls showed a tendency to process speech semantically. The data provide partial support to the perceptual theories of autism. It is additionally proposed that the pattern of results may reflect different patterns of attentional focusing towards single or multiple stimulus cues in speech between children with autism and controls.     

Affordances,Dynamic Experience,and the Challenge of Reification

Why is it that affordances have received attention within psychology only in recent decades if they are supposedly what individuals perceive most fundamentally? This paradox can be explained, in part, by the fact that psychologists have usually considered the character of perceiving from a detached stance, and then reified the results of this analysis-an error that William James called the psychologist's fallacy-rather than attending to the immediate flow of perception-action. By the same token, if ecological psychologists were to take stimulus information as what is perceived, rather than as part of a conceptual framework offered to explain how we perceive, they would be committing a similar reification error. Ecological optics as a conceptual framework is always open to revision, even while the reality of affordances is assumed. Bearing in mind this distinction between what is perceived and how it is perceived, investigators need to return regularly to immediate experience, both as a means of verifying that our concepts connect back to our experience of the world and as a way of uncovering new qualities of perceptual experience for investigation. From this perspective, several exemplars of phenomenologically driven perceptual research are examined. Furthermore, the multidimensionality of affordances is considered, with an emphasis on their place in the flow of immediate experience, development, and sociocultural processes.     

The Defence Mechanism Test (DMT) revisited: experimental validation using threatening and non‐threatening pictures

Although the Defence Mechanism Test (DMT) has been in use for almost half a century, it is still unclear what it actually measures. The psychodynamic theory on which the test is based states that the threatful DMT pictures activate various defence mechanisms. To test this proposition, the original DMT pictures were redrawn by a professional artist, changing the emotional content without altering the structural properties. In this way, a neutral and a friendly variant were shaped. Sixty participants were randomly assigned to the threatful, neutral, and friendly stimulus conditions. In contrast to predictions made from psychodynamic theory, that the threatful picture would activate more ‘signs of defence’ than the others, the results disclosed that the three conditions activated the same amounts of ‘signs of defence’ and the same levels of various perceptual thresholds. Thus, rather than capturing psychodynamic defence mechanisms, our results suggest that the DMT taps perceptual or information‐processing difficulties in correct identification of brief stimulus exposures regardless of their emotional contents. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spatial and ordinal components of form perception and literacy

We suppose that the visual nervous system possesses compensatory rectifying mechanisms by means of which it achieves “constancy” of visual recognition despite variation in physical appearance of the stimulus object. Using geometric rotations, reflections, and other transformations of text as the physical variation, we studied the recognizability of the texts and the influence that practice in reading one type of transformation exerted on the recognition of others. The mathematical structure of the training set was used as a clue to the perceptual mechanisms mediating transfer, isolating perceptual functions involving a geometric transformation and an ordinal operator. The main feature of the theory is its emphasis upon a dialogue or interaction between ongoing problem-solving processes in visual rectification and the sample being recognized. The theory developed is contrasted with other theories of pattern recognition in which concepts such as stimulus generalization, tuned detectors, and preprocessing play major roles. A relation of this theory to problems encountered among disabled readers (“dyslexics”) is also brought out.     

冲突视阈下类别信息与个体信息知觉负载的认知控制效应

个体根据知觉选择、反应偏向以及实时更新的情境信息调节自身状态,以适应性地促进对当前知觉信息的灵活编码,这一过程即为印象形成的认知控制。采用词语判断任务与侧抑制任务的变式将他人信息(类别信息vs.个体信息)分成高、低知觉负载两种水平,考察了冲突视阈下认知控制策略对他人印象形成的调控作用及知觉负载的效应。结果发现:(1)知觉负载影响他人印象形成的认知控制策略。(2)当类别信息与个体信息存在知觉冲突且个体的知觉负载较高时,受到反应性控制的作用,他人印象形成易出现冲突适应偏向; 当个体的知觉负载较低时,他人印象形成易受主动性控制的作用,从而产生冲突抑制偏向。这些结果表明,当个体形成他人印象时,其认知控制策略因受知觉负载影响而呈现分阶段加工特征。     

Direct social perception of others’ subjective time

In this paper, I deploy Gallagher et al.’s theory of Direct Social Perception (DSP) to help explain how we perceive others’ subjective time. This process of second-person temporal perception plays an important role in interpersonal interaction, yet is often glossed over in discussions of intersubjectivity. Using A.D. Craig (2009) ‘awareness’ model of subjective time to unify converging evidence that subjective time is embodied, affective, and situated, I argue that subjective time cannot be considered as a hidden or invisible aspect of a private mind, but is partially externally visible through our gestures, expressions, and other behaviours as they unfold within a particular context. My central thesis is that, in face to face interactions, we are able to directly perceive these visible components of other people’s subjective time. This is made possible by our “enculturated” (Menary, 2015) and enactive perceptual faculties. The process of social perception is not a passive, unidirectional affair where static information about one person’s subjective time is transmitted to the other, but rather inextricably linked with action (both at the personal and subpersonal level) and interaction effects produced by a dynamic coupling between participants. Such an enactive perspective reveals how others’ subjective time can be perceived in everyday interactions.     

Direct perception in the intersubjective context

This paper, in opposition to the standard theories of social cognition found in psychology and cognitive science, defends the idea that direct perception plays an important role in social cognition. The two dominant theories, theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), both posit something more than a perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others, i.e., to “mindread” or “mentalize.” In contrast, certain phenomenological approaches depend heavily on the concept of perception and the idea that we have a direct perceptual grasp of the other person’s intentions, feelings, etc. This paper explains precisely what the notion of direct perception means, offers evidence from developmental studies, and proposes a non-simulationist interpretation of the neuroscience of mirror systems.     

A memory-based, Simon-like, spatial congruence effect: Evidence for persisting spatial codes

The Simon effect refers to the finding that in a task where stimulus location is irrelevant, reaction time is faster when stimulus and response locations are congruent than when they are not. Dominant theories of the Simon effect have generally attributed this spatial congruence effect to a spatial code automatically generated upon stimulus presentation. A common assumption of these theories is that this spatial code decays in less than a few hundred milliseconds following stimulus onset. We report two working-memory experiments suggesting a reexamination of this assumption—a Simon-like spatial congruence effect persisted over a delay of as long as 2400 ms. We propose that, in addition to generating short-lived perceptual codes, spatial information may be coded in working memory as part of the context associated with stimulus events. When reactivated by cues from the original event, such information may influence response selection and produce spatial congruence effects (in this case, positive when participants made a “yes” response and negative when they made a “no” response).     

Split-brain syndrome and extended perceptual consciousness

In this paper I argue that split-brain syndrome is best understood within an extended mind framework and, therefore, that its very existence provides support for an externalist account of conscious perception. I begin by outlining the experimental aberration model of split-brain syndrome and explain both: why this model provides the best account of split-brain syndrome; and, why it is commonly rejected. Then, I summarise Susan Hurley’s argument that split-brain subjects could unify their conscious perceptual field by using external factors to stand-in for the missing corpus callosum. I next provide an argument that split-brain subjects do unify their perceptual fields via external factors. Finally, I explain why my account provides one with an experimental aberration model which avoids the problems typically levelled at such views, and highlight some empirical predictions made by the account. The nature of split-brain syndrome has long been considered mysterious by proponents of internalist accounts of consciousness. However, in this paper I argue that externalist theories can provide a straightforward explanation of the condition. I therefore conclude that the ability of externalist accounts to explain split-brain syndrome gives us strong reason to prefer them over internalist rivals.     

Meta-awareness, perceptual decoupling and the wandering mind

Mind wandering (i.e. engaging in cognitions unrelated to the current demands of the external environment) reflects the cyclic activity of two core processes: the capacity to disengage attention from perception (known as perceptual decoupling) and the ability to take explicit note of the current contents of consciousness (known as meta-awareness). Research on perceptual decoupling demonstrates that mental events that arise without any external precedent (known as stimulus independent thoughts) often interfere with the online processing of sensory information. Findings regarding meta-awareness reveal that the mind is only intermittently aware of engaging in mind wandering. These basic aspects of mind wandering are considered with respect to the activity of the default network, the role of executive processes, the contributions of meta-awareness and the functionality of mind wandering.     

Learned changes in the sensitivity of stimulus representations: Associative and nonassociative mechanisms

Central to associative learning theory is the proposal that the concurrent activation of a pair of event representations will establish or strengthen a link between them. Associative theorists have devoted much energy to establishing what representations are involved in any given learning paradigm and the rules that determine the degree to which the link is strengthened. They have paid less attention to the question of what determines that a representation will be activated, assuming, for the case of classical conditioning, that presentation of an appropriately intense stimulus from an appropriate modality will be enough. But this assumption is unjustified. Ipresent the results of experiments on the effects of stimulus exposure in rats that suggest that mere exposure to a stimulus can influence its perceptual effectiveness—that the ability of a stimulus to activate its representation can be changed by experience. This conclusion is of interest for two reasons. First, it supplies a direct explanation for the phenomenon of perceptual learning—the enhancement of stimulus discriminability produced by some forms of stimulus exposure. Second, it poses a theoretical challenge in that it seems to require the existence of a learning mechanism outside the scope of those envisaged by current formal theories of associative learning. I offer some speculations as to how this mechanism might be incorporated into such theories.     

The perception/cognition distincton: Challenging the representational account

A central goal for cognitive science and philosophy of mind is to distinguish between perception and cognition. The representational approach has emerged as a prominent candidate to draw such a distinction. The idea is that perception and cognition differ in the content and the format in which the information is represented —just as perceptual representations are nonconceptual in content and iconic in format, cognitive representations are conceptual in content and discursive in format. This paper argues against this view. I argue that both perception and cognition can use conceptual and nonconceptual contents and be vehiculated in iconic and discursive formats. If correct, the representational strategy to distinguish perception from cognition fails.     

An empirical look at the Defence Mechanism Test (DMT) Stimulus effects

Based on a sample of non-clinical subjects (N=74) the study examines the Defence Mechanism Test (DMT) by focusing on when perceptual distortions, called ‘signs of defence’ in DMT terminology, occur (distribution in exposure duration), which part of the picture is involved (distribution in localisation), and which ‘signs’ go together (using correlation and factor analyses). The results disclosed that the occurrence of perceptual distortions (‘signs of defence’) was related to exposure duration (some ‘defences’ are more frequent at brief exposures, some others at longer exposure durations), and to localisation on the picture. The location of misperceptions to the central person (hero) or the peripheral person (pp) of the picture was the major explanatory principle for the distribution of ‘signs’ on factors. Rather than capturing psychodynamic defence mechanisms, which is the theoretical basis of the test, the analyses imply that the DMT seems to measure misperceptions which are a function of the localisation of persons on the stimulus picture and of exposure durations.     

Principles of feature integration in visual perception

Several recent theories of visual information processing have postulated that errors in recognition may result not only from a failure in feature extraction, but also from a failure to correctly join features after they have been correctly extracted. Errors that result from incorrectly integrating features are called conjunction errors. The present study uses conjunction errors to investigate the principles used by the visual system to integrate features. The research tests whether the visual system is more likely to integrate features located close together in visual space (the location principle) or whether the visual system is more likely to integrate features from stimulus items that come from the same perceptual group or object (the perceptual group principle). In four target-detection experiments, stimuli were created so that feature integration by the location principle and feature integration by the perceptual group principle made different predictions for performance. In all of the experiments, the perceptual group principle predicted feature integration even though the distance between stimulus items and retinal eccentricity were strictly controlled.     

Extinction of likes and dislikes: effects of feature-specific attention allocation

The evaluative conditioning (EC) effect refers to the change in the liking of a neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CS) due to its pairing with another stimulus (unconditioned stimulus, US). We examined whether the extinction rate of the EC effect is moderated by feature-specific attention allocation. In two experiments, CSs were abstract Gabor patches varying along two orthogonal, perceptual dimensions (i.e. spatial frequency and orientation). During the acquisition phase, one of these dimensions was predictive of the valence of the USs. During the extinction phase, CSs were presented alone and participants were asked to categorise the CSs either according to their valence, the perceptual dimension that was task-relevant during the acquisition phase, or a perceptual dimension that was task-irrelevant during the acquisition phase. As predicted, explicit valence measures revealed a linear increase in the extinction rate of the EC effect as participants were encouraged to assign attention to non-evaluative stimulus information during the extinction phase. In Experiment 1, Affect Misattribution Paradigm (AMP) data mimicked this pattern of results, although the effect just missed conventional levels of significance. In Experiment 2, the AMP data revealed an increase of the EC effect if attention was focused on evaluative stimulus information. Potential mechanisms to explain these findings are discussed.     

Visual awareness judgments are sensitive to accuracy feedback in stimulus discrimination tasks

In this study we tested the hypothesis that perceptual awareness judgments are sensitive to accuracy feedback about the previous action. We used a perceptual discrimination task in which participants reported their stimulus awareness. We created two conditions: No-feedback and Feedback (discrimination accuracy feedback was provided at the end of each trial). The results showed that visual awareness judgments are related to the accuracy of current and previous responses. Participants reported lower stimulus awareness for incorrectly versus correctly discriminated stimuli in both conditions; they also reported lower stimulus awareness in trials preceded by incorrect discrimination responses, compared to trials preceded by correct discrimination responses. This difference was significantly stronger in the Feedback condition, in which we also observed post-error slowing for PAS ratings. We discuss the relation between visual awareness and the effects of performance monitoring and interpret the results in the context of current theories of consciousness.     

The time course of similarity effects in visual search

It is well established that visual search becomes harder when the similarity between target and distractors is increased and the similarity between distractors is decreased. However, in models of visual search, similarity is typically treated as a static, time-invariant property of the relation between objects. Data from other perceptual tasks (e.g., categorization) demonstrate that similarity is dynamic and changes as perceptual information is accumulated (Lamberts, 1998). In three visual search experiments, the time course of target-distractor similarity effects and distractor-distractor similarity effects was examined. A version of the extended generalized context model (EGCM; Lamberts, 1998) provided a good account of the time course of the observed similarity effects, supporting the notion that similarity in search is dynamic. Modeling also indicated that increasing distractor homogeneity influences both perceptual and decision processes by (respectively) increasing the rate at which stimulus features are processed and enabling strategic weighting of stimulus information.