Satan,Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg

We examine a distinctive kind of problem for decision theory, involving what we call discontinuity at infinity. Roughly, it arises when an infinite sequence of choices, each apparently sanctioned by plausible principles, converges to a ‘limit choice’ whose utility is much lower than the limit approached by the utilities of the choices in the sequence. We give examples of this phenomenon, focusing on Arntzenius et al.’s Satan’s apple, and give a general characterization of it. In these examples, repeated dominance reasoning (a paradigm of rationality) apparently gives rise to a situation closely analogous to having intransitive preferences (a paradigm of irrationality). Indeed, the agents in these examples are vulnerable to a money pump set-up despite having preferences that exhibit no obvious defect of rationality. We explore several putative solutions to such problems, particularly those that appeal to binding and to deliberative dynamics. We consider the prospects for these solutions, concluding that if they fail, the examples show that money pump arguments are invalid.     

The Saint

Today, within the Christian culture, the celebrity has replaced the idea of the saint. Very strangely, the celebrity is the dire opposite of the classic notion of the saint. Even more strikingly, the idea of celebrity runs contrary to Jesus' teachings. Of course, in Jesus' day, there were no celebrities, as we know them today. What passed for celebrities in his day were the rich and wealthy. They were the ones that everyone looked up to and admired, but Jesus tells us that they are actually the most unfortunate, and that wealth is the most dangerous of any of the idols that possess us and keep us from the fullness of life God has for us.     

Identifying rotated letter-like symbols

Previous research has shown that the identification of rotated alphanumeric symbols seems to be performed via the extraction of critical features encoded invariant to the symbol’s orientation. The present research argued that the use of such feature extraction processes might be a function of, first, a subject’s familiarity with the symbols, and second, the number of symbols from which a presented symbol is sampled. Earlier research has used highly over learned alphanumerics, in sets of six symbols; this practice is argued here as being seemingly conducive to feature extraction. In two experiments, the generality of a feature extraction interpretation, in contrast to one of mental rotation, was tested by having subjects previously trained to relative high- vs. low-familiarity criteria identify novel symbols in conditions in which a presented symbol was 1 of either 5 or 20 possibilities. Identification response times were found to be constant across all nonstandard orientations of presented symbols, irrespective of symbol familiarity or symbol set size. The findings support the generalization of a feature extraction interpretation to varying numbers of novel symbols of varying familiarity.     

Mathematical symbols as epistemic actions

Recent experimental evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience indicates that humans are equipped with unlearned elementary mathematical skills. However, formal mathematics has properties that cannot be reduced to these elementary cognitive capacities. The question then arises how human beings cognitively deal with more advanced mathematical ideas. This paper draws on the extended mind thesis to suggest that mathematical symbols enable us to delegate some mathematical operations to the external environment. In this view, mathematical symbols are not only used to express mathematical concepts??they are constitutive of the mathematical concepts themselves. Mathematical symbols are epistemic actions, because they enable us to represent concepts that are literally unthinkable with our bare brains. Using case-studies from the history of mathematics and from educational psychology, we argue for an intimate relationship between mathematical symbols and mathematical cognition.     

The Professor and the Saint

I review James E. Dittes' scholarship on St. Augustine through the perspective of my experiences as a student in his seminar on The `Theologies' of Freud and Jung, sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities. Throughout this review, I emphasize Dittes' personal engagement with Augustine, and note his unabashed introspection as a mode of theological reflection.     

Saint Paul School of Theology

Summary

Saint Paul School of Theology has an endowed program in aging studies. Aging materials have been integrated into the curriculum of both the M.Div. and D.Min. degrees. The program is headed by a tenured and trained gerontologist.     

Saint Thomas Aquinas's Pagan Virtues?

Today's conversations in virtue ethics are enflamed with questions of “pagan virtues,” which often designate non‐Christian virtue from a Christian perspective. “Pagan virtues,” “pagan vices,” and their historied interpretations are the subject of Jennifer Herdt's book Putting On Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (2008). I argue that the questions and language animating Herdt's book are problematic. I offer an alternative strategy to Herdt's for reading Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. My results are twofold: (1) a different set of conclusions and questions regarding the moral life that lend a fresh perspective to “pagan virtues” and (2) corresponding methodological suggestions for improving Herdt's project that would, to my mind, reaffirm her normative conclusions regarding the most viable ways forward for contemporary discussions of virtue.     

National symbols: Explorations in cosmology

A review of M. Douglas, London: Barrie and Rockliff: The Cresset Press, 1970. pp. xvii + 174. £2.25     

The Devil's Dilemma in Flaubert' Saint Antony

In La Téntation de Saint Antoine Gustave Flaubert dramatizes a philosophical exchange about the nature of divine providence and the efficacy of petitionary prayer. The Devil and Antony consider the question of whether God can be called upon for relief from suffering. The Saint assumes as popular religion teaches that it is possible to ask for God's help in emergency situations, while the Devil poses a dilemma to challenge Antony's faith. The Devil seeks to expose contradictions in some of the beliefs Antony holds about God's infinite perfection. The Devil's argument purports to prove that God is not a person, and that for this reason God is inaccessible to human interaction. The Devil's dilemma is supposed to be this:
(1) If God as an infinitely perfect being created the universe, then divine providence is not needed [does not exist].
(2) If divine providence is needed [exists], then the universe is defective [not the creation of God as an infinitely perfect being].
Although these look at first to be the opposite poles of an excluded middle, propositions (1) and (2) are mere contrapositives. Since the Devil's propositions (1) and (2) are logically equivalent, the Devil can only proceed to the conclusion that God does not exist or that divine providence is not needed or does not exist paradoxically by assuming that God exists or that divine providence is needed or exists. Yet if divine providence is needed or exists, then God exists as its divine source. If the Devil is supposed to succeed by logic, his dilemma as Flaubert portrays it is powerless to prove that the only reasonable religious attitude is an impassionate metaphysical acknowledgement of the existence of an impersonal infinitely perfect Substance, which is absolute unchanging unmoveable Being.