More than words: A reply to Malt and Sloman

In four experiments, Malt and Sloman [Malt, B. C., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator’s intention in naming and what’s really what. Cognition, 105, 615-648] show that the naming of artifacts is affected by discourse context. They see this phenomenon as posing a problem for the intentional-history theory of artifact categorization (e.g., [Bloom, P. (1996). Intention, history, and artifact concepts. Cognition, 60, 1-29]), and as supporting instead their alternative theory that naming is determined by communicative goals. This response begins by distinguishing the problem of artifact categorization (determining the categories that artifacts belong to) from the problem of artifact naming (deciding how to talk about members of these categories). In light of this distinction, it turns out that Malt and Sloman’s findings are fully consistent with all theories of artifact categorization, including the intentional-historical one. Moreover, contrary to what they argue, there are actually many cases where the relative contributions of categorization and pragmatics can be clearly distinguished. Finally, it is argued that Malt and Sloman’s own account of artifact naming presupposes a capacity for artifact categorization; it cannot work without one.     

Lateral preferences and writing hand posture in left-handers: A reply to Levy

In reply to the commentary from J. Levy about a recent article of ours (A. Searleman, C. Porac, & S. Coren, 1984, Brain and Cognition, 3, 86–93), we find that she has shifted the level of analysis from between-sex comparisons (as demanded by our original hypothesis) to within-sex comparisons. Since she is addressing a different set of questions, we therefore find no compelling reasons to alter any of our conclusions or the confidence that we have in these conclusions.     

Correction to: Non-transitive Better than Relations and Rational Choice

Philosophia - There is a mistake in the definition of the covering criterion on page 6.     

错认总比错过好——面孔视错觉的发生机制及其应用

面孔视错觉现象表现为个体从其他事物中感知到并不存在的面孔。面孔视错觉要素已广泛应用于艺术、广告及商品中,起到吸引注意、促进消费的作用。同时,先前的研究通过采用各种范式,发现患者在面孔视错觉的产生上同常人的差异,以及视错觉与视幻觉之间的联系。根据视觉加工通路的不同,相关范式可分为视错觉监测范式,以及视错觉辨认范式。前者侧重于基于提取的类面孔特征所做出的快速预测,后者侧重于主观期望引导个体对物体特征的提取,两者最终均会影响到后续的认知判断。日后研究可从面孔视错觉的发生机制出发,结合自上而下和自下而上两种加工通路,为面孔视错觉产生机制提供理论依据,并拓宽该要素在临床诊断及商业广告领域上的应用。     

Accreditation: A reply to mathers

Accreditation in counselling is meant not for the benefit of the counsellor but for the protection of the public. It is concerned more with guaranteeing certain standards of ethics than with the acclamation of status. Whatever method is used, it must avoid the pitfalls of conservatism and academicism which in other professions have been jointly responsible for the attack on accreditation itself as a process. Those involved in counselling and psychotherapy should not wait passively until Parliament acts, but need to be critically involved in bringing into being a system of accreditation which is both flexible and creative.     

Forensic neuropsychology: A reply to the method skeptics

Various critics or method skeptics have contended that clinical neuropsychology is not sufficiently developed as a science to be offered as evidence in legal or trial proceedings. The present article attempts to balance the extreme position of the method skeptics with an overview of legal and research data that support forensic applications of neuropsychology. It is suggested that clinical evidence can usefully inform legal decision making and that the modern trend has been for courts to be increasingly open to such expert testimony. The relevance of studies of clinical judgment, experience, and actuarial prediction is discussed, and neuropsychological assessment validity is specifically addressed. It is concluded that the arguments of the method skeptics should guide future research and caution forensic neuropsychologists, but that a retreat from the courtroom is unwarranted.     

Misunderstanding stigma: A reply to Bobys

In his comment on our approach to understanding stigma (Elliott, Ziegler, Altman, and Scott, 1982), Bobys presents an interesting and provocative form of stigma: the stigma of excellence. He notes that it may be just as damaging to appear to be superior as it is to be inferior, and several lines of research quoted by Bobys provide evidence that this is indeed the case.     

Disunity defended: A reply to Bayne

In this paper, I critically examine the two dominant views of the concept of luck in the current literature: lack of control accounts and modal accounts. In particular, I argue that the conditions proposed by such views—that is, a lack of control and the absence of counterfactual robustness—are neither necessary nor sufficient for an event's being lucky. Hence, I conclude that the two main accounts in the current literature both fail to capture what is distinctive of, and central to, the concept of luck.     

Inconsistent child-rearing: A reply to rosenthal

Abstract

In a reply to our paper (Kohlmann, Schumacher, & Streit, 1988), Rosenthal (in a Letter to the Editors, this issue) primarily gives some comments on findings regarding the association of inconsistent child-rearing behavior and anxiety in the child. Results of our study were compared to results from a study by Rosenthal, Finkelstein, Ni, and Robertson (1959).