Rationality and Value: The Epistemological Role of Indeterminate and Agent-dependent Values

An important trend in contemporary epistemology centers on elaborating an old idea of pragmatist pedigree: theory selection (and in general the process of changing view and fixing beliefs) presupposes epistemic values. This article focuses on analyzing the case where epistemic values are indeterminate or when the sources of valuation are multiple (epistemic values like coherence and simplicity need not order options in compatible ways). According to the theory that thus arises epistemic alternatives need not be fully ordered by an underlying notion of information-value and therefore the usual economic techniques of optimization cannot be applied in order to compute optimal contractions. But in cases of this sort it is still rational to maximize, i.e. to deem an option as choosable when it is not known to be worse that any other. We present here basic results about a notion of liberal contraction based on maximizing quasi-orderings. This requires the previous solution of some open problems in the theory of rational choice functions, namely a full characterization of choice functions rationalizable in terms of maximization of quasi-transitive relations. We conclude by discussing the problem of what is the adequate feasible set for calculating maximizing solutions for contraction problems and by considering the epistemological roots of some counterexamples against the most fundamental axioms on choice functions (like α). While the first part of the paper shows how economic insights can be used to improve our understanding of the principles of belief formation and change, this final section reverses this strategy by showing the utility of epistemological insights and techniques for providing invariance conditions capable of regulating the applicability of the pure principles of choice.     

Abundance and Variety in Nature: Fact and Value

Philosophia - The mass extinction visited upon us by capitalism involves many kinds of devastation. Here I clarify the grounds for assessing the most obvious of these harms, i.e., decimation of...     

Indeterminate Preferences

It is commonly assumed that preferences are determinate; that is, that an agent who has a preference knows that she has the preference in question and is disposed to act upon it. This paper argues the dubiousness of that assumption. An account of indeterminate preferences in terms of self-predicting subjective probabilities is given, and a decision rule for choices involving indeterminate preferences is proposed. Wolfgang Spohn’s and Isaac Levi’s arguments against self-predicting probabilities are also considered, in light of Wlodek Rabinowicz’s recent criticism.     

Implications of Indeterminate Factor-Error Covariances for Factor Construction, Prediction, and Determinacy

The assumptions of the model for factor analysis do not exclude a class of indeterminate covariances between factors and error variables (Grayson, 2003). The construction of all factors of the model for factor analysis is generalized to incorporate indeterminate factor-error covariances. A necessary and sufficient condition is given for indeterminate factor-error covariances to be arbitrarily small, for mean square convergence of the regression predictor of factor scores, and for the existence of a unique determinate factor and error variable. The determinate factor and error variable are uncorrelated and satisfy the defining assumptions of factor analysis. Several examples are given to illustrate the results. Requests for reprints should be sent to Wim P. Krijnen, Lisdodde 1, 9679 MC Scheemda, The Netherlands.     

Summation of punishment suppression

In two experiments, eight rats were trained to lever press with food on a variable-interval schedule. Bar pressing produced shock on a variable-interval schedule in the presence of two independently presented stimuli, a light and a tone. Two rats in each experiment received alternative presentations of the light and the tone and were consequently always in the presence of a stimulus that signalled variable-interval punishment. The other two rats in each experiment were treated similarly except that they received periods in which neither light nor tone was present. During these periods, bar pressing was not punished. The two stimuli that signalled punishment were then presented simultaneously to evaluate the effect of stimulus compounding on response suppression. The subjects trained without punishment-free periods did not show summation to the compound stimulus; the subjects trained with punishment-free periods showed summation of suppression. The major difference between the two experiments was the longer mean interval of variable-interval punishment used in the second experiment. This manipulation made the summation effect more resistant to extinction and thus increased its magnitude.     

Summation relations and portions of stuff

According to the prevalent ‘sum view’ of stuffs, each portion of stuff is a mereological sum of its subportions. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the sum view in the light of a modal temporal mereology which distinguishes between different varieties of summation relations. While admitting David Barnett’s recent counter-example to the sum view (Barnett, Philos Rev 113:89–100, 2004), we show that there is nonetheless an important sense in which all portions of stuff are sums of their subportions. We use our summation relations to develop, as an alternative to the sum view, an analysis of stuffs that distinguishes between the ways in which different sorts of stuffs are sums of their subportions.

Summation of conditioned suppression

Four rats were trained to suppress responses in the presence of two separately presented stimuli that signalled shock in a conditioned-suppression paradigm. The two stimuli that signalled shock were then presented simultaneously to evaluate the effect of stimulus compounding on conditioned suppression. Two rats were tested by presenting the compound conditioned stimulus while conditioned suppression was being maintained to the individual conditioned stimuli. The other two rats were tested by giving them random presentations of the compound conditioned stimulus and the single conditioned stimuli during extinction of conditioned suppression. All four rats showed greater suppression to the compound stimulus than to either stimulus presented alone.     

The Principle of Summation

The principle of Summation, which is a technically sharpened version of the familiar claim that a whole is a sum of its parts, is presented by Peter van Inwagen as a trivial truth. I argue to the contrary, that it is incompatible with the natural assumption that a whole may gain or lose parts non-instantaneously. For, as I show, the latter assumption implies that something can be determinately a whole without being determinately a sum of parts, and this, in turn, indicates the falsity of Summation. I point out that the tension between Summation and the possibility of non-instantaneous gain or loss of parts compels us to rethink the relations between the concepts of whole and sum, and may have far reaching consequences for the mereology of physical objects.

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Vague Objects within Classical Logic and Standard Mereology,and without Indeterminate Identity

Weatherson (The Philosophical Quarterly, 53, 481–501 2003) argues that whoever accepts classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, should conclude that there are no vague objects. Barnes and Williams (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90, 176–187 2009) claim that a supporter of vague objects who accepts classical logic and standard mereology should recognize that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity. Even though it is not clearly stated, they all seem to be committed to the assumption that reality is ultimately constituted by mereological atoms. This assumption is not granted by standard mereology which instead remains silent on whether reality is atomic or gunky; therefore, I contend that whoever maintains classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, is not forced to conclude with Weatherson that there are no vague objects; nor is she compelled to revise her point of view according to Barnes and Williams’s proposal and to accept that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity.     

Summation of food and shock based responding

In a multiphase experiment, dogs first received discriminative, discretetrial, barrier-jumping training with two tones (S^D, S^Δ) in a shuttle box reinforced by either shock avoidance (Group I) or by food (Group II). Then the dogs were trained on free-operant barrier-jumping reinforced by the qualitatively opposite reinforcer—food in Group I and shock avoidance in Group II. Finally, test presentations of the tone stimuli were superimposed on the free-operant behavior. The tone S^Ds markedly facilitated responding in all animals. This experiment demonstrates a summation of responding maintained by shock avoidance and food reinforcement and casts doubt on explanations of conditioned suppression outcomes that appeal solely to incompatible motivational states within the organism.     

Vague Objects Without Ontically Indeterminate Identity

The supporter of vague objects has been long challenged by the following ‘Argument from Identity’: 1) if there are vague objects, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3) there are no vague objects. Some supporters of vague objects have argued that 1) is false. Noonan (Analysis 68: 174–176, 2008) grants that 1) does not hold in general, but claims that ontically indeterminate identity is indeed implied by the assumption that there are vague objects of a certain special kind (i.e. vague objects*). One can therefore formulate a ‘New Argument from Identity’: 1′) if there are vague objects*, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3′) there are no vague objects*. Noonan’s strategy is to argue that premiss 1′) is inescapable, and, as a consequence, that Evans’s alleged defence of 2) is a real challenge for any supporter of vague objects. I object that a supporter of vague objects who grants the validity of Evans’s argument allegedly in favour of 2) should reject premiss 1′). The threat of the New Argument from Identity is thus avoided.     

奎因彻底翻译的不确定性论题

奎因在《语词和对象》这部著作中第一次提出了翻译的不确定性论题,这一论题的提出,引起了广泛的论证与反驳。通过分析奎因本人对此论题的分析与论证,可以看出:翻译的不确定性论题是奎因哲学思想整体中不可分割的一个部分;是对“经验论的两个教条”在语言中的继续批判;是他的整体论思想的逻辑发展;以及本体论相对性思想的理论前提。通过分析戴维森、大卫·刘易斯、普特南论对翻译的不确定性论题的分析与论证,可以使我们对彻底翻译的不确定性论题有一个更好的把握。     

Summation in Autoshaping with Short- and Long-duration Stimuli

Five autoshaping experiments with pigeons examined the effects of presenting in compound two stimuli that had individually been paired with food. The rate of responding during the compound was the same as for the individual stimuli when the stimulus duration was 10 sec. When the duration of the stimuli was 30 sec, the compound elicited a higher response rate than its components. This enhanced rate of responding during the compound was evident only for the initial portion of each trial. Moreover, the enhanced rate of responding was no greater than for a compound composed of an excitatory and a neutral element. These results present difficulties for both elemental and configural theories of conditioning.