Action embellishment: an intention bias in the perception of success

Na?ve theories of behavior hold that actions are caused by an agent's intentions, and the subsequent success of an action is measured by the satisfaction of those intentions. However, when an action is not as successful as intended, the expected causal link between intention and action may distort perception of the action itself. Four studies found evidence of an intention bias in perceptions of action. Actors perceived actions to be more successful when given a prior choice (e.g., choose between 2 words to type) and also when they felt greater motivation for the action (e.g., hitting pictures of disliked people). When the intent was to fail (e.g., singing poorly), choice led to worse estimates of performance. A final experiment suggested that intention bias works independent from self-enhancement motives. In observing another actor hit pictures of Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, shots were distorted to match the actor's intentions, even when it opposed personal wishes. Together these studies indicate that judgments of action may be automatically distorted and that these inferences arise from the expected consistency between intention and action in agency.     

Towards computational models of intention detection and intention prediction

Intention recognition is one of the core components of mindreading, an important process in social cognition. Human beings, from age of 18 months, have been shown to be able to extrapolate intentions from observed actions, even when the performer failed at achieving the goal. Existing accounts of intention recognition emphasize the use of an intent (plan) library, which is matched against observed actions for recognition. These therefore cannot account for recognition of failed sequences of actions, nor novel actions. In this paper, we begin to tackle these open questions by examining computational models for components of human intention recognition, which emphasize the ability of humans to detect and identify intentions in a sequence of observed actions, based solely on the rationality of movement (its efficiency). We provide a high-level overview of intention recognition as a whole, and then elaborate on two components of the model, which we believe to be at its core, namely, those of intention detection and intention prediction. By intention detection we mean the ability to discern whether a sequence of actions has any underlying intention at all, or whether it was performed in an arbitrary manner with no goal in mind. By intention prediction we mean the ability to extend an incomplete sequence of actions to its most likely intended goal. We evaluate the model, and these two components, in context of existing literature, and in a number of experiments with more than 140 human subjects. For intention detection, our model was able to attribute high levels of intention to those traces perceived by humans as intentional, and vice versa. For intention prediction as well, our model performed in a way that closely matched that of humans. The work highlights the intimate relationship between the ability to generate plans, and the ability to recognize intentions.     

Shared intention and personal intentions

This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman.     

Conscious intention and motor cognition

The subjective experience of conscious intention is a key component of our mental life. Philosophers studying 'conscious free will' have discussed whether conscious intentions could cause actions, but modern neuroscience rejects this idea of mind-body causation. Instead, recent findings suggest that the conscious experience of intending to act arises from preparation for action in frontal and parietal brain areas. Intentional actions also involve a strong sense of agency, a sense of controlling events in the external world. Both intention and agency result from the brain processes for predictive motor control, not merely from retrospective inference.     

Mental disorders and suicidal intention

This paper continues a previous report (Litman, 1984) in exploring the use of psychological autopsies to clarify intention in suicide; clinical experience is compared with courtroom experience. The certification of suicide requires a judgment that the deceased intended to use his or her own death to resolve his or her problems of living, as demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. Now that suicide has been decriminalized, the issue of "sane or insane" in insurance contracts has probably become irrelevant. Mental disorders are important as part of the suicide constellation, as one element of many interacting factors. The capacity to have the intent to commit suicide--that is, to understand the physical nature of one's own death--is lost due to mental disorders only under special and unique circumstances.     

Depth of intention

The paper attempts to reconstruct some notions of Naess's semantics, and at the same time to relate them to more recent developments. On Naess's view, there is no such thing as a language in the sense of a shared structure which determines clear‐cut literal meanings like Fregean Gedanken or propositions. We use words, and try to interpret each other; but there is no a priori or intuitive basis for secure and precise knowledge about language. Interpretation or understanding, as well as thinking and perception, involve discrimination at higher or lower levels. There is neither a ceiling of crystal‐clear propositions nor a floor of ‘given’ sensations or ‘objective’ stimuli independent of categorizations and discriminations, which might serve as a bridge for translation or interpretation between the conceptual‐perceptual schemes of individuals. The notions of ‘concept’, ‘conceptual framework’, ‘situation’, ‘situation type’ and ‘proposition’ are defined, with some reliance on Barwise and Perry's situation semantics. Two notions of accessibility of situation types are defined; one as constructibility of the type at a given level of discrimination, i.e. in terms of objects discerned and concepts discriminated; the other as intelligibility of the type. Intelligibility entails constructibility, but not conversely. A type of situation may be constructible at some person's level of discrimination, but not coherently intelligible to him. On this basis, a logic of senses or truth‐conditions for uses of expressions is developed, and a logic of interpretations of uses. The central notions of Naessian semantics are defined: ambiguity and direction of interpretation, level of discrimination and depth of intention.     

Disentangling behavioral intention and behavioral expectation

Social psychologists have extensively researched behavioral intention and its relation to future behavior, usually within the framework of M. Fishbein and I. Ajzen's (1975, Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to theory and research, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley) theory of reasoned action. However, the field has confounded two separate constructs while investigating intention: behavioral intention (BI) and what P. R. Warshaw, B. H. Sheppard, and J. Hartwick (in press, in R. Bagozzi (Ed.), Advances in marketing communication, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press) have coined behavioral expectation (BE), which is the individual's self-prediction of his or her future behavior. In this paper we define both constructs and explain how they differ in terms of the processes by which they are formed, their roles in determining behavior, and their utilities as behavioral predictors. We propose that behavioral expectation is the more accurate overall predictor since many common behaviors are unreasoned (i.e., mindless or habitual) behaviors, goal-type actions, or behaviors where the individual expects his or her intention to change in a foresseable manner. These are all cases where present intention (BI) is not the direct determinant of behavior but where the individual may be capable of appraising whatever additional determinants exist and of including them within his or her behavioral expectation. A study (N = 197) is reported in which student subjects received either a BE (n = 113) or a BI (n = 84) version of a questionnaire pertaining to their performance of 18 common behaviors. Overall, behavioral expectation was the better predictor of self-reported performance.     

Attention, intention and domain-specific processing

Many researchers use subliminal priming to investigate domain-specific processing mechanisms, which have classically been defined in terms of their autonomy from other cognitive systems. Surprisingly, recent research has demonstrated that nonconsciously elicited cognitive processes are not independent of attention. By extension, these findings have been used to call into question the autonomy of domain-specific processing mechanisms. By contrast, we argue that the demonstrated modulation of nonconscious cognitive processes by attention occurs at a predomain-specific stage of processing. Thus, although we agree that attention might be a prerequisite of nonconscious processes, we suggest that there is no reason to think that higher-level cognitive systems directly modulate domain-specific processes.     

A logic of intention and attempt

We present a modal logic called (logic of intention and attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of , we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.     

The intentionality of intention and action

This article presents a sketch of a theory of action. It does so by locating the relation of intention to action ‐vithin a general theory of Intentionality. It introduces a distinction between ptiorintentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally self‐referential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they allow suggested solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the accordion effect, basic actions, etc.); the demonstration of striking similarities between the logical structure of intentional action and the logical structure of perception; and the construction of an account of simple actions. A successfully performed intentional action characteristically consists of an intention in action together with the bodily movement or state of the agent which is its condition of satisfaction and which is caused by it. The account is extended to complex actions.     

The intentionality of intention and action

Cognitive Science is likely to make little progress in the study of human behavior until we have a clear account of what a human action is. The aim of this paper is to present a sketch of a theory of action. I will locate the relation of intention to action within a general theory of Intentionality. I will introduce a distinction between prior intentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally selfreferential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they enable me to suggest solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the accordian effect, basic actions, etc.), to show how the logical structure of intentional action is strikingly like the logical structure of perceptions, and to construct an account of simple actions. A successfully performed intentional action characteristically consists of an intention in action together with the bodily movement or state of the agent which is its condition of satisfaction and which is caused by it. The account is extended to complex actions.     

The intention interference effect

Intentions have been shown to be more accessible (e.g., more quickly and accurately recalled) compared to other sorts of to-be-remembered information; a result termed an intention superiority effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). In the current study, we demonstrate an intention interference effect (IIE) in which color-naming performance in a Stroop task was slower for words belonging to an intention that participants had to remember to carry out (Do-the-Task condition) versus an intention that did not have to be executed (Ignore-the-Task condition). In previous work (e.g., Cohen et al., 2005), having a prospective intention in mind was confounded with carrying a memory load. In Experiment 1, we added a digit-retention task to control for effects of cognitive load. In Experiment 2, we eliminated the memory confound in a new way, by comparing intention-related and control words within each trial. Results from both Experiments 1 and 2 revealed an IIE suggesting that interference is very specific to the intention, not just to a memory load.