Seeing the big picture: map use and the development of spatial cognition

This paper considers the relation between the development of spatial cognition and children’s use of maps and models. A new theoretical perspective is presented that takes into account the influences of maps on the development of spatial cognition. Maps provide a perspective on spatial information that differs in important ways from the perspective gained from direct experience navigating in the world. Using and thinking about maps may help children to acquire abstract concepts of space and the ability to think systematically about spatial relations that they have not experienced directly. In addition, exposure to maps may help children to think about multiple spatial relations among multiple locations. The results of previous studies that have demonstrated developmental differences in children’s cognition of large‐scale environments are examined from this theoretical perspective. This review suggests that the development of spatial cognition consists partly of the acquisition of models of large‐scale space, and that maps influence the development of the modern Western model.     

The Little Prince – an introduction to spirituality: a moving experience in religious education for primary school children in a secularised world

In our research the right of the child for spiritual development is central. Grimmitt’s distinction in ‘teaching in’, ‘about’ and ‘from religion’ is extended with the concept of ‘teaching for’ – a concept that connects religion with children’s attitude of wondering as an ‘ontological calling’ in their life. The question whether a non-religious story can function as a rich learning environment for ‘teaching for’, is explored in a ‘picture voice’-research design. In a small pilot study with four children in primary school age an episode of the story of The Little Prince was presented as a ‘rich learning environment’. We conclude from this pilot that the narration of a non-religious story, together with the child’s drawing of the story’s ‘critical incident’ and a subsequent conversation (‘picture voice’) functions as a stepping stone for the development of spirituality.     

The robustness of communication of emotion via facial expression: Emotion recognition from photographs with deteriorated pictorial quality

This study

1 The studies reported here were conducted within the TELEMED project which is funded by the European Community within the RACE program.

examines whether the recognition of emotion from facial expressions is impaired by deterioration of spatial resolution, contrast resolution, and picture size. Eighty judges rated 65 stimuli under 11 conditions: Undistorted, reduced spatial resolution (three steps), reduced contrast resolution (three steps), reduced picture size (three steps), and a very ‘hard’ condition combining the severest spatial and contrast resolution. Variation in picture quality was achieved by using a digital video recorder. Recognition rate and intensity ratings were not significantly affected by variations in contrast resolution or picture size. The only significant reduction of recognition rate and intensity ratings resulted from reduction in spatial resolution, but only with the largest deterioration in such resolution. Results are discussed with respect to the fundamental importance of facial expressions in interaction and communication, and with respect to applications, such as tele-conferencing systems.     

Specifying the boundary conditions of the multimedia effect: The influence of content and its distribution between text and pictures

It was investigated whether the beneficial effect of picture presentation might be influenced by the content conveyed through text and pictures and the way information is distributed between them. Ninety‐nine students learnt in five between‐subjects learning conditions (i.e., text with spatial contents plus pictures, text with visual contents plus pictures, only text with spatial contents, only text with visual contents, only picture) about a tourist centre and a holiday farm. Results showed that pictures (i.e., maps) were beneficial for learning if spatial knowledge had to be acquired, but did not support learning when non‐spatial, visual knowledge had to be acquired. Furthermore, a high overlap of spatial information in text and picture was helpful, which can be explained by the assumption that learning is a text‐guided process. On the other hand, regarding non‐spatial visual information, a high text‐picture overlap did not influence learning, probably because text alone was sufficient for acquiring visual knowledge. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Representing Spatial Structure Through Maps and Language: Lord of the Rings Encodes the Spatial Structure of Middle Earth

Spatial mental representations can be derived from linguistic and non‐linguistic sources of information. This study tested whether these representations could be formed from statistical linguistic frequencies of city names, and to what extent participants differed in their performance when they estimated spatial locations from language or maps. In a computational linguistic study, we demonstrated that co‐occurrences of cities in Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings trilogy and The Hobbit predicted the authentic longitude and latitude of those cities in Middle Earth. In a human study, we showed that human spatial estimates of the location of cities were very similar regardless of whether participants read Tolkien’s texts or memorized a map of Middle Earth. However, text‐based location estimates obtained from statistical linguistic frequencies better predicted the human text‐based estimates than the human map‐based estimates. These findings suggest that language encodes spatial structure of cities, and that human cognitive map representations can come from implicit statistical linguistic patterns, from explicit non‐linguistic perceptual information, or from both.     

Does the body talk to the body? The relationship between different body representations while observing others’ body parts

The way human bodies are represented is central in everyday activities. The cognitive system must combine internal, visceral, and somatosensory, signals to external, visually driven information generated from the spatial placement of others’ bodies and the own body in the space. However, how different body representations covertly interact among them when observing human body parts is still unclear. Therefore, we investigated the implicit processing of body parts by manipulating either the body part stimuli’ posture (conditions a and b) or the participants’ response body posture (conditions c, d, and e) in healthy participants (N = 70) using a spatial compatibility task called Sidedness task. The task requires participants to judge the colour of a circle superimposed on a task-irrelevant body part picture. Responses are facilitated when the spatial side of the responding hand corresponds to the spatial code generated by the hand stimulus's position with respect to a body of reference. Results showed that the observation of the task-irrelevant body parts oriented participants’ attention and facilitated responses that were spatial compatible with the spatial position such body parts have within a configural representation of the body structure (i.e., Body Structural Representation) in all the five experimental conditions. Notably, the body part stimuli were mentally attached to the body according to the most comfortable and less awkward postures, following the anatomo-physiological constraints. Moreover, the pattern of the results was not influenced by manipulating the participants’ response postures, suggesting that the automatic and implicit coding of the body part stimuli does not rely on proprioceptive information about one's body (i.e., Body Schema). We propose that the human body's morphometry knowledge is enriched by biomechanical and anatomo-physiological information about the real body movement possibilities. Moreover, we discuss the importance of the automatic orienting of attention based on the sidedness within the context of imitational learning.     

Interference control in preschoolers: factors influencing performance on the day–night task

Two experiments investigated preschoolers' interference control in variants of the day–night task. The day–night task involves instructing children across 16 trials to say the word ‘day’ when viewing a card depicting a nighttime sky and to say ‘night’ when shown a picture of the daytime sky. The purpose of the experiments was to investigate whether the depiction on each card distracts children because it is semantically associated with the instructed response or because the depicted item cues the alternative (incorrect) response within the response set. The results in the first study (N=23, M=52.65 months) and second study (N=54, M=50.81 months) indicate that a close semantic relation between the picture and the target response does not pose substantial interference for preschoolers. In contrast, the pictured item poses a significant challenge for preschoolers when it depicts the interfering alternative in the response set. Theoretical implications of these results for the development of interference control are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

I See Not Only a Madonna,but Also a Hole,in the Picture

According to an intuitive claim, in saying that one sees a picture's subject, i.e., what a picture presents, in the picture's vehicle, i.e., the picture's physical basis, by ‘in’ one does not mean the spatial relation of being in, as holding between such items in the real space. For the picture's subject is knowingly not in the real space where one veridically sees the picture's vehicle. Some theories of pictorial experience have actually agreed with this intuition by claiming that the picture's subject lies in a pictorial space of its own, disconnected from the real space that includes the picture's vehicle. Yet, not only linguistic evidence suggests that when used as above, ‘in’ means precisely that very relation, but an appropriate theory of pictorial experience can justify the above claim.     

Appearances,Rationality, and Justified Belief

One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p.     

Truth in the Investigations

According to a widespread interpretation, in the Investigations Wittgenstein adopted a deflationary or redundancy theory of truth. On this view, Wittgenstein’s pronouncements about truth should be understood in the light of his invocation of the equivalences ‘p’ is true = p and ‘p’ is false = not p. This paper shows that this interpretation does not do justice to Wittgenstein’s thoughts. I will be claiming that, in fact, in his second book Wittgenstein is returning to the pre-Tractarian notion of bipolarity, and that his new development of this notion in the Investigations excludes the redundancy-deflationary reading. Wittgenstein’s thoughts about truth are instead compatible with another interpretative option: Wittgenstein remains faithful to his methodological pronouncements, and he merely presents us with (grammatical) platitudes about the notions of “true” and “false”.

     

An empirical look at the Defence Mechanism Test (DMT) Stimulus effects

Based on a sample of non-clinical subjects (N=74) the study examines the Defence Mechanism Test (DMT) by focusing on when perceptual distortions, called ‘signs of defence’ in DMT terminology, occur (distribution in exposure duration), which part of the picture is involved (distribution in localisation), and which ‘signs’ go together (using correlation and factor analyses). The results disclosed that the occurrence of perceptual distortions (‘signs of defence’) was related to exposure duration (some ‘defences’ are more frequent at brief exposures, some others at longer exposure durations), and to localisation on the picture. The location of misperceptions to the central person (hero) or the peripheral person (pp) of the picture was the major explanatory principle for the distribution of ‘signs’ on factors. Rather than capturing psychodynamic defence mechanisms, which is the theoretical basis of the test, the analyses imply that the DMT seems to measure misperceptions which are a function of the localisation of persons on the stimulus picture and of exposure durations.     

Separating comprehension from the verification process

The present experiments aimed at separating comprehension of a sentence from its verification. Presentation of a first sentence was terminated by the subject’s keypress after his comprehension. This gave a measure of sentence comprehension. A second sentence appeared immediately for a fixed interval. Then, a picture was presented, and the subject verified the first sentence against the picture. Finally, a second picture appeared, and the subject verified the second sentence against the second picture. The purpose of presenting a second sentence was to stop the processing of the first sentence after the subject’s keypress (so that comprehension did not continue beyond what was measured) and also to insure the subject’s full comprehension (comprehending the sentence to form a unitary representation) that would resist forgetting in the face of processing a second sentence. The purpose of presenting a second picture was to insure the subject’s processing of a second sentence. Using this experimental technique, an atypical pattern of verification latencies ITA < FA < TN < FN) was obtained (Experiment 1). When a sentence could be falsified in more than one way (Experiment 2), TN was found to be about equal to FN. A theoretical model was proposed to account for the present and the previous findings.     

Knowledge Under Threat

Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk just before forming her belief to the conclusion that S’s belief was formed unsafely. In light of lessons from their failure, I provide a new and successful counterexample to the safety condition on knowledge. It follows, then, that knowledge need not be safe. Safety at a time depends counterfactually on what would likely happen at that time or soon after in a way that knowledge does not. I close by considering one objection concerning higher‐order safety.     

Vulnerability and the Sovereign Individual: Nussbaum and Nietzsche on the role of agency and vulnerability in personhood

In her paper Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche's Stoicism, Martha Nussbaum argues that Nietzsche's philosophical project can be seen in part as an attempt to ‘bring about a revival of Stoic values of self-command and self-transformation’. She argues that, to his detriment, Nietzsche's ‘Sovereign Individual’ epitomises a kind of stoic ideal of inner strength and self-sufficiency that ‘goes beyond Stoicism’ in its valorisation of radical self emancipation from the contingencies of life and from our own human vulnerability. Nussbaum thus urges us to question whether the picture of strength in Nietzsche's Sovereign Individual is really a picture of human strength at which we would be willing to, or at which we ought to, aim. In this paper I take up Nussbaum's challenge, arguing that Nietzsche's Sovereign Individual is both less stoical and provides us with a far more attractive picture of personhood than Nussbaum suggests.     

Indefinite Divisibility

Some hold that the lesson of Russell’s paradox and its relatives is that mathematical reality does not form a ‘definite totality’ but rather is ‘indefinitely extensible’. There can always be more sets than there ever are. I argue that certain contact puzzles are analogous to Russell’s paradox this way: they similarly motivate a vision of physical reality as iteratively generated. In this picture, the divisions of the continuum into smaller parts are ‘potential’ rather than ‘actual’. Besides the intrinsic interest of this metaphysical picture, it has important consequences for the debate over absolute generality. It is often thought that ‘indefinite extensibility’ arguments at best make trouble for mathematical platonists; but the contact arguments show that nominalists face the same kind of difficulty, if they recognize even the metaphysical possibility of the picture I sketch.     

Do Trompe l'oeils Look Right When Viewed from the Wrong Place?

Picture perception and ordinary perception of real objects differ in several respects. Two of their main differences are: (1) Depicted objects are not perceived as present and (2) We cannot perceive significant spatial shifts as we move with respect to them. Some special illusory pictures escape these visual effects obtained in usual picture perception. First, trompe l'oeil paintings violate (1): the depicted object looks, even momentarily, like a present object. Second, anamorphic paintings violate (2): they lead to appreciate spatial shifts resulting from movement. However, anamorphic paintings do not violate (1): they are still perceived as clearly pictorial, that is, nonpresent. What about the relation between trompe l'oeil paintings and (2)? Do trompe l'oeils allow us to perceive spatial shifts? Nobody has ever focused on this aspect of trompe l'oeil perception. I offer the first speculation about this question. I suggest that, if we follow our most recent theories in philosophy and vision science about the mechanisms of picture perception, then, the only plausible answer, in line with phenomenological intuitions, is that, differently from nonillusory, usual picture perception, and similarly to ordinary perception, trompe l'oeil perception does allow us to perceive spatial shifts resulting from movement. I also discuss the philosophical implications of this claim.     

Specialization of the cerebral hemispheres in scanning for information in short-term memory

Lateral specialization of function in the cerebral hemispheres was investigated in the context of a memory scanning paradigm. The S first memorized a set of letters (the memory set) and then indicated whether or not a subsequent test stimulus, presented in either the right or left visual field, matched any letter in the set. The test stimulus was either a letter or a picture of some common object; for the picture, S’s response was based on the initial letter of the name of that object. Reaction time was recorded and plotted as a function of the number of letters in the memory set. The results support the hypothesis that in a memory scanning task of this type, letter and picture test stimuli are spatially and verbally represented, respectively, and are processed in different cerebral hemispheres.     

Psychotherapy research: an interplay between inner and outer and a succession of meanings

Psychotherapy research is a rapidly developing area of study that aims to explore the integration of inner and outer conditions of an individual’s experience, the interplay between subjective and objective, as well as between individual and collective. Questions regarding a more integrative view and qualitative research in psychotherapy are discussed in the paper. The author introduces some ideas from the studies on psychotherapy effectiveness that were done at Vilnius University by a group of researchers who work in the ‘Centre for research on the psychodynamics of personality’. Clinical psychologists who hold a doctorate degree or who are in doctoral studies in the Department of Psychology at Vilnius University are members of this research group. The subjective understanding about healing episodes and the development of depth premises were the main tasks of these studies. Among other methods, the researchers used the drawing a picture of a healing moment and telling a psychotherapy story recalled by the client to collect data. Two examples of drawing a picture of a healing moment and one example of telling a therapy story are analyzed in the paper. The themes of subjective experience of renewal in psychotherapy as well as the multiplicity of experience and results in psychotherapy are discussed in the paper with case illustrations. This study showed that drawing a picture opens one more dimension of reflection and that it can be an appropriate tool for developing individual narratives as well. Authoring and re‐authoring one’s life narrative is accepted as part of a productive therapy as well as discovering one’s inner authorship. The ability to follow a succession of meanings, as well as a connection to nature and culture could be one of the ways of actualizing an integrative view in psychotherapy research.     

The weight of facts: A puzzle about perception,reasons and deliberation

How should we understand the epistemic role of perception? According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), a subject’s perceptual knowledge that p is to be explained in terms of the subject believing that p for a factive and reflectively accessible reason. I argue that ED raises far‐reaching questions for rationality and deliberation; I illustrate those questions by setting up a puzzle about belief‐suspension, and I argue that ED does not have the resources to make sense of the rationality of belief‐suspension in cases in which suspending is clearly rational. The conclusion that I draw from the puzzle is mainly negative: the epistemic contribution of perception cannot be explained in terms of a warrant‐conferring relation between perception and belief. However, toward the end, I sketch a positive picture of the epistemic role of perception in terms of a direct explanatory relation between perception and knowledge.     

3~5岁儿童理解和使用空间表征的特点

以96名3~5儿童为被试,采用自编的儿童空间表征实验任务,在语言表征、模型表征和图画表征三种空间表征形式上,考察了儿童理解和使用空间表征的发展特点。结果表明:(1)总体上,3~5岁儿童理解空间表征的发展水平均显著高于使用空间表征的发展水平。(2)3~5岁儿童理解和使用空间表征的发展表现出显著的年龄效应。(3)从不同的空间表证形式来看,3岁儿童理解语言表征的能力与理解模型表征的能力之间差异显著,4岁儿童使用语言表征的能力与使用模型表征的能力之间的差异、使用语言表征的能力与使用图画表征的能力之间的差异、以及使用模型表征的能力与使用图画表征的能力之间的差异都显著,其余形式的空间表征理解之间的差异或空间表征使用之间的差异在各年龄段中均不显著。