Guessing versus choosing – and seeing versus believing – in false belief tasks

Three‐ and 4‐year‐old children were tested using videos of puppets in various versions of a theory of mind change‐of‐location situation, in order to answer several questions about what children are doing when they pass false belief tests. To investigate whether children were guessing or confidently choosing their answer to the test question, a condition in which children were forced to guess was also included, and measures of uncertainty were compared across conditions. To investigate whether children were using simpler strategies than an understanding of false belief to pass the test, we teased apart the seeing‐knowing confound in the traditional change‐of‐location task. We also investigated relations between children's performance on true and false belief tests. Results indicated that children appeared to be deliberately choosing, not guessing, in the false belief tasks. Children performed just as well whether the protagonist gained information about the object visually or verbally, indicating that children were not using a simple rule based on seeing to predict the protagonist's behaviour. A true belief condition was significantly easier for children than a false belief condition as long as it was of low processing demands. Children's success rate on the different versions of the standard false belief task was influenced by factors such as processing demands of the stories and the child's verbal abilities.     

What do children learn about biology from factual information? A comparison of interventions to improve understanding of contagious illnesses

Background . Children have been shown to hold misconceptions about illness, and previous work has indicated that their knowledge can be improved through the use of interventions. Aims . This study aims to evaluate interventions based on the provision of factual information for improving understanding of contagious illness. Sample . The participants were 96 children from two age groups: 7 and 11 years. Methods . During the pre‐test, the children were asked about three contagious illnesses and one novel illness. There were three intervention conditions, differing in the level of factual information provided: explanations provided, no explanations provided and scientific factual style. The interventions were focused on contagious illnesses (cold, chickenpox). A post‐test was conducted 6 weeks later. Results . Results from the pre‐test show that the older children have more sophisticated understanding of illness than the younger children. Mean pre‐ to post‐test change was calculated and analyses revealed that there is greater pre‐ to post‐test change in the explanation and scientific fact conditions when compared with that in the no‐explanation condition. The improvements in knowledge generalized to other contagious illnesses, and the older children showed more improvements than the younger children. Conclusions . These findings add to the literature on children's understanding of contagious illnesses and contribute towards discussions on the best approach to health education.     

Implicit understanding of belief

Implicit understanding of false belief was investigated by monitoring where children look in anticipation of a protagonist reappearing, when the protagonist mistakenly thinks that his desired object is in a different place from the place where it really is. This implicit measure of understanding was contrasted with children's explicit answers to the experimenter's question about where the protagonist would look for the object. Children from 2 years 5 months to 2 years 10 months erroneously looked at the object's real location, which they gave for their answer. From 2 years 11 months to 4 years 5 months, about 90% of the children looked at the empty location where the protagonist thought the object was.In sharp contrast, only about 45% of the children in this age span gave that location as their explicit answer to the experimenter's question. These results are explained in terms of a distinction between representing a fact and making a judgment about that fact.     

A lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution in young children: Relationships with linguistic ability and mothers' mental‐state language

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental‐state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief‐based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief‐based emotion‐attribution tasks. A standard task in which the protagonist was a story character and the emotional outcomes were imagined, and two videos in which the story protagonist was a real infant and the emotional outcomes were observable (high and low expressed emotion conditions). Children's verbal ability (semantic competence) was also measured. In Experiment 2, children (N = 75) were given two belief‐based emotion tasks: the standard story task and the high expressed emotion video. In addition, children's verbal ability (syntactic competence) and mothers' use of mental‐state attributes when describing their children were also measured. The results showed that: (1) the lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution was a stable feature of children's reasoning across the three tests; and (2) children who were more linguistically advanced and whose mothers' described them in more mentalistic terms were more likely to understand the association between false belief and emotion. The findings underline the continuing importance of verbal ability and linguistic input for children's developing theory‐of‐mind understanding, even after they display an understanding of false belief.     

Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default

It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false‐belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist (what Leslie and colleagues called a “true‐belief default”). Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false‐belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the target object in the test phase. For a more accurate comparison of these two accounts, the present study tested the true‐belief default with adults. Four experiments measuring eye movements and response inhibition revealed that (a) adults do not have an automatic tendency to respond to the false‐belief question according to their own knowledge and (b) the true‐belief response need not be inhibited in order to correctly predict the protagonist's actions. The positive results observed in the control conditions confirm the accuracy of the various measures used. I conclude that the results of this study undermine the true‐belief default view and those models that posit mechanisms of response inhibition in false‐belief reasoning. Alternatively, the present study with adults and recent studies with children suggest that participants' focus of attention in false‐belief tasks may be key to their performance.     

The Roles of Explanation and Feedback in False Belief Understanding: A Microgenetic Analysis

The authors examined effects of feedback and explanation on false belief performance. Thirty-three children (42–54 months; 15 girls, 18 boys) were randomly assigned to four treatment conditions: explanation, feedback, feedback researcher explains, and feedback child explains. Children completed false belief tasks during pretraining, 8 training sessions, and posttraining across 6 weeks. Language comprehension was assessed at pretraining. The authors hypothesized that children would improve most when training involved feedback and explanation. Generalized estimating equations modeling was used to analyze the data. Children who received feedback and generated explanations for characters’ false beliefs improved across training sessions more so than children in other conditions. Children's explanations for false beliefs also were explored. Implications of the findings are discussed.     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

Five-year-old children's difficulty with false belief when the sought entity is a person

A total of 153 children (excluding those who erred on control questions), mainly 5 and 7 years of age, participated in two experiments that involved tests of false belief. In the task, the sought entity was first at Location 1 and then, unknown to the searching protagonist, it moved to Location 2. In Experiment 1, performance was well below ceiling in 5-year-olds when the sought entity was a person, and this contrasted with a task in which the sought entity was a physical object. Performance was especially inaccurate when the sought person moved of his or her own volition rather than when the sought person was requested to move by a third party. Interestingly, 5-year-olds were more likely to nominate Location 1 when asked where the searching protagonist would look first than when asked what he or she would do next. In Experiment 2, however, 5-year-olds also tended to nominate Location 1 following a question that included the word "first" even in a test of true belief--a patently incorrect response. Altogether, the results suggest that 5-year-old children have considerable difficulty with a test of false belief when the sought entity is a person acting under his or her own volition. This suggests that 5-year-olds' handle on states of belief is surprisingly fragile in this kind of task.     

The effect of peer collaboration on children's problem‐solving ability

Background. A Vygotskian framework links cognitive change to collaborative interaction with a more competent partner whereas a Piagetian perspective supports the view that cognitive conflict arising from peer interaction leads to cognitive change. Aims. The study investigated the effect of collaborative learning on children's problem‐solving ability and whether differences in knowledge status or the use of explanatory language were contributing factors. Sample. Participants were 100 Year 2 children (aged between 6 and 7 years), from schools in high socio‐economic areas, who individually completed a pre‐ and post‐test comprising a block sorting task. Method. During the experimental phase, children completed a card sorting activity, either individually or in same‐gender dyads. The dyads consisted of same or different ability children who operated under either a ‘talk’ or ‘no‐talk’ condition. Results. It was found that children who collaborated collectively obtained a significantly higher number of correct sorts than children who worked individually. However, post‐testing indicated that only those children of lower sorting ability who collaborated with higher sorting ability peers showed a significant improvement in sorting ability from pre‐test scores. In addition, it was found that when analysis was limited to this particular group, only those children who were required to explain the sort for their partner to carry out improved significantly from pre‐ to post‐test. Conclusion. It is suggested that perhaps the two theoretical positions are not as mutually exclusive as they are often portrayed. Implications of these findings for teachers and children's learning are also discussed.     

Knowing that I didn't know: preschoolers' understanding of their own false belief is a predictor of assents to fictitious events

The present study examines the relation between children's theory of mind abilities and their tendency to assent to fictitious events when questioned repeatedly across interviews. Children between the ages of 3 and 6 years were interviewed individually either four or seven times about a fictitious and a real staged event, and in addition given a false belief test as well as a fantasy‐reality distinction test. Children's performance on the false belief task addressing the understanding of their own false belief was a better predictor for assents to false events than was understanding the false belief of another person, age, number of interviews and performance on a fantasy‐reality distinction task. Children's memory for a staged event showed that repeated questions across interviews was related to a decrease in correct assents to having experienced a staged event, an increase in wrong yes‐responses about touch and erroneously mentioning names of children who had not been present during the staged event. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Charting the development of representational skills: When do children know that maps can lead and mislead?

This study was conducted to test Perner's (1991) hypothesis that 3-year-olds fail the false belief task because they cannot metarepresent (represent a representation's sense and reference). Preschoolers made and interpreted symbolic maps, and were tested on their understanding of the implications of following an incorrect map (false belief test). Young 3-year-olds showed some ability to make and use maps but performed poorly on the false belief tests. Children were more likely to use an incorrect map to predict behavior if the represented object was missing instead of in a wrong location. Many children were also able to predict that someone who used an incorrect map would not “find” the object. These results contradict Perner's hypothesis and suggest that representational skills develop gradually rather than appearing in a radical conceptual shift at age 4.     

Six-year-olds' difficulties handling intensional contexts

Previous research shows that children have difficulties handling intensional contexts even when they can pass a test of false belief (e.g. Cognition 67 (1998) 287; Cognition 25 (1987) 289). Some authors (Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Cognition 25 (1987) 289) place these difficulties in the linguistic and not the mental representational domain. The experiments reported here examined whether 6-year-old children could answer questions in an intensional context that did not require the explicit verbal characterization of a belief. We replicated previous findings and found that children answered according to their own knowledge in an intensional context. This occurred even though they responded by choosing a picture to insert into a protagonist's thought bubble rather than report the belief verbally. Children could correctly answer questions about the knowledge state of the protagonist and pass a test of false belief. Further experiments ruled out methodological explanations. Experiment 2 showed that the difference in answering according to own knowledge between the false belief and intensional stories is not accounted for by procedural factors in the two types of test. Experiment 3 revealed that children did not answer according to their own knowledge by default. Experiment 4 suggested that answering according to own knowledge was not a result of pictorial salience. Results are discussed in relation to the simulation-theory debate.     

Doesn’t see,doesn’t know: is anticipatory looking really related to understanding or belief?

Clements and Perner (Cognitive Development, 9 (1994), 377–397) reported that children show understanding of a story character’s belief in their anticipatory looking responses before they show this in their answers to test questions. According to Clements and Perner the anticipatory looking responses provide evidence of implicit understanding of belief. This paper examines the possibility that the anticipatory looking measure is indicative of (a) children using a seeing = knowing rule, i.e. children linking not seeing with ignorance rather than a sensitivity to belief, or (b) a tendency to associate the protagonist with the left‐hand container. Thirty‐two children aged between 2 years 11 months and 4 years were told a false belief story similar to that used in Clements and Perner (1994) except that three containers were used instead of two. The protagonist first looks inside the middle box but then puts the object in the left‐hand box. In his absence, a second character moves the object unexpectedly to the right‐hand box. If children’s anticipatory looking was based on sensitivity to belief then they should have looked clearly to the left‐hand box. If it was based on an association bias or sensitivity to the character not knowing then they should have looked equally to the left‐hand and middle boxes. The results were consistent with the former prediction suggesting that children’s anticipatory looking responses may indeed be governed by an implicit sensitivity to belief.     

The effects of single and dual representations on children's gesture production

Investigations that focus on children's hand gestures often conclude that gesture production arises as a result of having multiple representations. To date, the predictive validity of this notion has not been tested. In this study, we compared the gestures of 82 five-year-old children holding either a single or a dual representation. The children retold a story narrated to them, with pictures, by the experimenter. In one condition the children heard a false belief story and hence, when retelling, held two beliefs—or representations—concurrently. In the other conditions, the children retold a version of the story without the false belief component and therefore held single representations. Children were four times more likely to gesture in the false belief condition than in two comparable true belief conditions, supporting the notion that gestures may function to externalise some of the child's cognitive process, particularly when they hold multiple representations.     

Development of Inhibition as a Function of the Presence of a Supernatural Agent

In this study the author examined the developmental differences in inhibition and cognition of 4–8-year-old children as a function of the suggested presence of a supernatural agent. Previous evolutionarily-relevant research has suggested that humans are naturally primed to think in terms of supernatural agents and that, given the correct context, individuals readily accept novel supernatural entities and alter their behavior accordingly. All children in this study played 4 games designed to assess their present level of inhibitory and cognitive development. Children in the experimental condition were also introduced to an invisible Princess Alice and were told that she was watching during the games. Following these measures, all children engaged in a resistance-to-temptation task. Results revealed that cognitively advanced children were more likely to express belief in Princess Alice than were less cognitively advanced children. This research provides support that cognitive maturity, rather than immaturity, may be necessary for children to express belief in novel supernatural agents.     

Development of inhibition as a function of the presence of a supernatural agent

In this study the author examined the developmental differences in inhibition and cognition of 4-8-year-old children as a function of the suggested presence of a supernatural agent. Previous evolutionarily-relevant research has suggested that humans are naturally primed to think in terms of supernatural agents and that, given the correct context, individuals readily accept novel supernatural entities and alter their behavior accordingly. All children in this study played 4 games designed to assess their present level of inhibitory and cognitive development. Children in the experimental condition were also introduced to an invisible Princess Alice and were told that she was watching during the games. Following these measures, all children engaged in a resistance-to-temptation task. Results revealed that cognitively advanced children were more likely to express belief in Princess Alice than were less cognitively advanced children. This research provides support that cognitive maturity, rather than immaturity, may be necessary for children to express belief in novel supernatural agents.     

Acting and planning on the basis of a false belief: its effects on 3-year-old children's reasoning about their own false beliefs

This study examined 3-year-olds' explanations for actions of theirs that were premised on a false belief. In Experiment 1, children stated what they thought was inside a crayon box. After stating "crayons," they went to retrieve some paper to draw on. Children were then shown that the box contained candles and were asked to (a) state their initial belief and (b) explain their action of getting paper. Children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action. Experiments 2 and 3 ruled out several alternative interpretations for these findings. In Experiment 4, children planned and acted on their false belief. Again, children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action.     

Atypicalities in sleep and semantic consolidation in autism

Sleep is known to support the neocortical consolidation of declarative memory, including the acquisition of new language. Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is often characterized by both sleep and language learning difficulties, but few studies have explored a potential connection between the two. Here, 54 children with and without ASD (matched on age, nonverbal ability and vocabulary) were taught nine rare animal names (e.g., pipa). Memory was assessed via definitions, naming and speeded semantic decision tasks immediately after learning (pre‐sleep), the next day (post‐sleep, with a night of polysomnography between pre‐ and post‐sleep tests) and roughly 1 month later (follow‐up). Both groups showed comparable performance at pre‐test and similar levels of overnight change on all tasks; but at follow‐up children with ASD showed significantly greater forgetting of the unique features of the new animals (e.g., pipa is a flat frog). Children with ASD had significantly lower central non‐rapid eye movement (NREM) sigma power. Associations between spindle properties and overnight changes in speeded semantic decisions differed by group. For the TD group, spindle duration predicted overnight changes in responses to novel animals but not familiar animals, reinforcing a role for sleep in the stabilization of new semantic knowledge. For the ASD group, sigma power and spindle duration were associated with improvements in responses to novel and particularly familiar animals, perhaps reflecting more general sleep‐associated improvements in task performance. Plausibly, microstructural sleep atypicalities in children with ASD and differences in how information is prioritized for consolidation may lead to cumulative consolidation difficulties, compromising the quality of newly formed semantic representations in long‐term memory.     

Automatic and intentional processes in children's recognition memory: the reversed misinformation effect

This study investigated the contribution of automatic and intentional memory processes to 5‐ and 6‐year‐old children's suggestible responses in a reversed misinformation paradigm. The temporal order of the conventional eyewitness paradigm was altered such that children were initially presented with a pre‐event narrative containing misinformation that was either read to them or was self‐generated in response to semantic and linguistic cues, and the following day were presented with a witnessed event in the form of a picture story. Children then completed a standard forced‐choice recognition memory test under two instruction conditions. In the inclusion condition children were reminded about the presentations of the pre‐event narrative and the original story and asked to chose the witnessed event item. In the exclusion condition children were instructed to exclude pre‐event suggestions. Suggestibility effects were found with the magnitude of such effects differentially affected by the encoding of misleading suggestions and test instructions. In the exclusion condition, children were more likely to correctly reject suggestions that were ‘self‐generated’. Both automaticity and intentional recollection contributed to children's suggestible responding. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Judgments About Fact and Fiction by Children From Religious and Nonreligious Backgrounds

In two studies, 5‐ and 6‐year‐old children were questioned about the status of the protagonist embedded in three different types of stories. In realistic stories that only included ordinary events, all children, irrespective of family background and schooling, claimed that the protagonist was a real person. In religious stories that included ordinarily impossible events brought about by divine intervention, claims about the status of the protagonist varied sharply with exposure to religion. Children who went to church or were enrolled in a parochial school, or both, judged the protagonist in religious stories to be a real person, whereas secular children with no such exposure to religion judged the protagonist in religious stories to be fictional. Children's upbringing was also related to their judgment about the protagonist in fantastical stories that included ordinarily impossible events whether brought about by magic (Study 1) or without reference to magic (Study 2). Secular children were more likely than religious children to judge the protagonist in such fantastical stories to be fictional. The results suggest that exposure to religious ideas has a powerful impact on children's differentiation between reality and fiction, not just for religious stories but also for fantastical stories.