Comparative Mental Development

To reconstruct the evolution of human cognitive development we are studying its comparative ontogeny in primate phylogeny (i.e., two monkey species, two chimpanzee species, and humans). The research has discovered primate conceptual universals including logical (e.g., classifying), arithmetic (e.g., quantitative substituting), and physical (e.g., causal) cognitions. But the ontogenetic covariation between these conceptual universals is progressively displaced or heterochronic in primate phylogeny. Heterochronic evolution produced the most synchronic and widest ontogenetic window for progressive cognitive development in humans.     

Evolution of Primate Cognition

Comparative analysis of the behavior of modern primates, in conjunction with an accurate phylogenetic tree of relatedness, has the power to chart the early history of human cognitive evolution. Adaptive cognitive changes along this path occurred, it is believed, in response to various forms of complexity; to some extent, theories that relate particular challenges to cognitive adaptations can also be tested against comparative data on primate ecology and behavior. This paper explains the procedures by which data are employed, and uses the best currently available evidence to derive a proposal for some of the stages through which human cognition evolved, before the last common ancestor with a nonhuman, and the reasons that cognitive adaptations were favored in primate evolution.     

Comparative cognitive development

This paper aims to compare cognitive development in humans and chimpanzees to illuminate the evolutionary origins of human cognition. Comparison of morphological data and life history strongly highlights the common features of all primate species, including humans. The human mother-infant relationship is characterized by the physical separation of mother and infant, and the stable supine posture of infants, that enables vocal exchange, face-to-face communication, and manual gestures. The cognitive development of chimpanzees was studied using the participation observation method. It revealed that humans and chimpanzees show similar development until 3 months of age. However, chimpanzees have a unique type of social learning that lacks the social reference observed in human children. Moreover, chimpanzees have unique immediate short-term memory capabilities. Taken together, this paper presents a plausible evolutionary scenario for the uniquely human characteristics of cognition.     

人类大脑、认知与行为进化的整合模型

物种进化的历史进程中,大脑、认知与行为系统的进化机能利于有机体控制社会、生物与自然资源,而有机体所控制的各种资源又会影响自身的生存与繁衍。社会、生物与自然资源可以相对稳定,也可以变化不定。资源的稳定变化所传递的信息会引起大脑、认知以及行为系统做出模块化的自主反应。资源的稳定变化利于人类整合朴素心理学、朴素生物学与朴素物理学,而资源的变化不定所传达出的信息会引起认知与行为系统有意识地进行自上而下的外显行为反应。人类外显行为反应系统的进化导致人类出现自我意识,并具有探索性解决问题的能力。朴素心理能力、意识与问题解决能力可以整合为动机－控制理论     

Protracted development of motor cortex constrains rich interpretations of infant cognition

Cognition in preverbal human infants must be inferred from overt motor behaviors such as gaze shifts, head turns, or reaching for objects. However, infant mammals – including human infants – show protracted postnatal development of cortical motor outflow. Cortical control of eye, face, head, and limb movements is absent at birth and slowly emerges over the first postnatal year and beyond. Accordingly, the neonatal cortex in humans cannot generate the motor behaviors routinely used to support inferences about infants’ cognitive abilities, and thus claims of developmental continuity between infant and adult cognition are suspect. Recognition of the protracted development of motor cortex should temper rich interpretations of infant cognition and motivate more serious consideration of the role of subcortical mechanisms in early cognitive development.     

A socioecological perspective on primate cognition,past and present

The papers in this special issue examine the relationship between social and ecological cognition in primates. We refer to the intersection of these two domains as socioecological cognition. Examples of socioecological cognition include socially learned predator alarm calls and socially sensitive foraging decisions. In this review we consider how primate cognition may have been shaped by the interaction of social and ecological influences in their evolutionary history. The ability to remember distant, out-of-sight locations is an ancient one, shared by many mammals and widespread among primates. It seems some monkeys and apes have evolved the ability to form more complex representations of resources, integrating “what-where-how much” information. This ability allowed anthropoids to live in larger, more cohesive groups by minimizing competition for limited resources between group members. As group size increased, however, competition for resources also increased, selecting for enhanced social skills. Enhanced social skills in turn made a more sophisticated relationship to the environment possible. The interaction of social and ecological influences created a spiraling effect in the evolution of primate intelligence. In contrast, lemurs may not have evolved the ability to form complex representations which would allow them to consider the size and location of resources. This lack in lemur ecological cognition may restrict the size of frugivorous lemur social groups, thereby limiting the complexity of lemur social life. In this special issue, we have brought together two review papers, five field studies, and one laboratory study to investigate the interaction of social and ecological factors in relation to foraging. Our goal is to stimulate research that considers social and ecological factors acting together on cognitive evolution, rather than in isolation. Cross fertilization of experimental and observational studies from captivity and the field is important for increasing our understanding of this relationship. This contribution is part of the Special Issue “A Socioecological Perspective on Primate Cognition”.     

从进化论视角看自我面孔识别加工

进化心理学家推测,自我认知是一组沿着不同进化历程发展起来的认知加工能力。史前人类的早期,自我面孔识别依赖于延展我的加工。由于我们对自我认知、自我意识的神经机制还知之不多,而它们对于理解人类行为复杂性又极其重要。自我面孔作为个体最显著的自我标识,可以作为延展我、私密我、概念我加工的独特刺激,对于揭示自我认知加工的机制具有重要作用。     

Primate Numerical Competence: Contributions Toward Understanding Nonhuman Cognition

Nonhuman primates represent the most significant extant species for comparative studies of cognition, including such complex phenomena as numerical competence, among others. Studies of numerical skills in monkeys and apes have a long, though somewhat sparse history, although questions for current empirical studies remain of great interest to several fields, including comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychology; anthropology; ethology; and philosophy, to name a few. In addition to demonstrated similarities in complex information processing, empirical studies of a variety of potential cognitive limitations or constraints have provided insights into similarities and differences across the primate order, and continue to offer theoretical and pragmatic directions for future research. An historical overview of primate numerical studies is presented, as well as a summary of the 17‐year research history, including recent findings, of the Comparative Cognition Project at The Ohio State University Chimpanzee Center. Overall, the archival literature on number‐related skills and counting in nonhuman primates offers important implications for revising our thinking about comparative neuroanatomy, cross‐species (human/ape) cognitive similarities and differences, and the evolution of cognition represented by the primate continuum.     

Modularity in cognition: framing the debate

Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that modularity, cleanly defined, provides a useful framework for directing research and resolving debates about individual cognitive systems and the nature of human evolved cognition. Modularity is a fundamental property of living things at every level of organization; it might prove indispensable for understanding the structure of the mind as well.     

Mother knows best: Epigenetic inheritance,maternal effects,and the evolution of human intelligence

Contemporary evolution biology has recognized the role of development in evolution. Evolutionarily oriented psychologists have similarly recognized the role that behavioral plasticity, particularly early in development, may have had on the evolution of species, harking back to the ideas of Baldwin (the Baldwin effect). Epigenetic theories of development provide a framework for interpreting the interacting roles of experience and genetics both in ontogeny and phylogeny and the transmission of nongenetic characteristics across generations (epigenetic inheritance). In mammals in particular, differences in maternal behavior may contribute substantially to epigenetic inheritance. Changes in early rearing experiences may have been especially important for humans’ ancestors, leading to the acquisition of symbolic functioning. Such representational changes were most influential in social cognition and led to new selective pressures furthering the evolution of symbolic abilities. Research with great apes is presented to suggest that our last common ancestor with chimpanzees likely had the behavioral plasticity and sociocognitive precursors to modify their behavior and cognition via maternal effects toward a more human-like social intelligence.     

Developing spirituality through the use of literature in history education

This paper demonstrates the significant potential for history teachers to contribute to the development of children’s spirituality through the use of literature within the history curriculum. Using four case studies of history teaching in English comprehensive schools, the paper outlines a holistic approach to the subject – drawing upon art and music as well as literature – to foster children’s capacity for meaning‐making from historical interpretations. The paper argues that history education prepares children for the spiritual by virtue of three elements unique to the subject: First, the subject matter and conceptual content of history provide the context for students to engage with the complexity of questions at the essence of the human condition, establishing a cognitive conflict through which spiritual development is fostered. Second, the subjectivity of historical knowledge allows for the development of a community of ethical enquiry within the classroom through which individuals can explore their own ideas and beliefs as well as those of others. Such enquiry fosters the development of reflexive empathy – the capacity to reflect on one’s own life in the light of understanding the lives of others. Third, the subject provides children with a language through which they can articulate their thoughts, beliefs and feelings. The paper argues that these unique elements are significantly strengthened through the complementary use of literature within history lessons, providing a powerful methodology which fosters children’s spirituality.     

A comparative review of the primate motor system

Primates have evolved separately from other mammals since the late Cretaceous, and during this time the two major extant primate groups, prosimians (lorises, lemurs, and tarsiers) and anthropoids (monkeys, apes, and humans) arose. Concurrently, structures within the central nervous system acquired primate characteristics. Not all of the uniquely primate features have been identified in the brain, but several are well known. The pyramidal system, the best studied motor system, shows a distinct primate pattern in its terminal connections in the spinal cord. Other descending systems are less well known, but primate specializations in the vestibular system and red nucleus have been observed. The primary and secondary motor cortices are topographically separated in primates, suggesting one basis for increased complexity. Given the size of the brain, structures in the basal ganglia are relatively enlarged in primates as compared with other mammals, whereas the cerebellum has the same relative size.     

The Role of Similarity Analysis in Understanding Movement

Primates have evolved separately from other mammals since the late Cretaceous, and during this time the two major extant primate groups, prosimians (lorises, lemurs, and tarsiers) and anthropoids (monkeys, apes, and humans) arose. Concurrently, structures within the central nervous system acquired primate characteristics. Not all of the uniquely primate features have been identified in the brain, but several are well known. The pyramidal system, the best studied motor system, shows a distinct primate pattern in its terminal connections in the spinal cord. Other descending systems are less well known, but primate specializations in the vestibular system and red nucleus have been observed. The primary and secondary motor cortices are topographically separated in primates, suggesting one basis for increased complexity. Given the size of the brain, structures in the basal ganglia are relatively enlarged in primates as compared with other mammals, whereas the cerebellum has the same relative size.     

Fading perceptual resemblance: A path for rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) to conceptual matching?

Cognitive, comparative, and developmental psychologists have long been intrigued by humans’ and animals’ capacity to respond to abstract relations like sameness and difference, because this capacity may underlie crucial aspects of cognition like analogical reasoning. Recently, this capacity has been explored in higher-order, relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks in which humans and animals try to complete analogies of sameness and difference between disparate groups of items. The authors introduced a new paradigm to this area, by yoking the relational-matching cue to a perceptual-matching cue. Then, using established algorithms for shape distortion, the perceptual cue was weakened and eliminated. Humans’ RMTS performance easily transcended the elimination of perceptual support. In contrast, RMTS performance by six macaques faltered as they were weaned from perceptual support. No macaque showed evidence of mature RMTS performance, even given more than 260,000 training trials during which we tried to coax a relational-matching performance from them. It is an important species difference that macaques show so hesitant a response to conceptual relations when humans respond to them so effortlessly. It raises theoretical questions about the emergence of this crucial capacity during humans’ cognitive evolution and during humans’ cognitive development.     

杜威反射弧概念中的具身认知思想

伴随第二代认知科学的兴起,大量研究者开始在具身认知这一主张上达成共识,即有机体的身体运动以及与身体运动相关的特征和感觉经验（或称身体经验）在认知过程中扮演重要角色,而有机体的身体又嵌入到其所处的动态环境之中,从而形成一个不可分割的整体。杜威在《心理学中的反射弧概念》一文中的论证蕴含了上述具身认知思想的雏形,主要体现在：（1）身体运动协调构成了感觉运动回路。（2）在身体运动协调基础上形成的身体经验在感觉运动回路中具有连续性。（3）感觉运动回路中的身体运动与经验以环境为背景,最终目的是为了适应环境。未来的具身认知研究可以借鉴杜威所论证的反射弧概念,对上述三个方面作出进一步探索。     

Uniquely primate,uniquely human

Two hypotheses about primate cognition are proposed. First, it is proposed that primates, but not other mammals, understand categories of relations among external entities. In the physical domain primates have special skills in tasks such as oddity, transitivity, and relation matching that require facility with relational categories; in the social domain primates have special skills in understanding the third-party social relationships that hold among other individuals in their groups. Second, it is proposed that humans, but not other primates, understand the causal and intentional relations that hold among external entities. In the physical domain only humans understand causal forces as mediating the connection between sequentially ordered events; in the social domain only humans understand the behavior of others as intentionally directed and controlled by desired outcomes. Both these uniquely primate and these uniquely human cognitive skills are hypothesized to have their origins in adaptations for negotiating complex social interactions.     

学前儿童朴素生物学理论及其获得机制

学前儿童朴素生物学理论发展的研究近20年来一直是儿童认知发展研究的热点。Carey等主张学前儿童的生物概念系统是从心理概念系统中分离出来的由一个系统到另一个系统的根本性概念转变,儿童还没有一个包含动植物的整合的生物系统。但另一些研究主张学前儿童能够对生物现象进行本体区分并形成内在一致的生物学因果解释,拥有朴素生物学理论,该理论是在一个概念系统（生物学概念系统）中逐渐的连续性变化过程。目前整合的观点认为儿童朴素生物学理论在童年早期就独立于心理学理论,但在分离一开始的一段时间里还要受心理学的影响。     

Primate Culture and Social Learning

The human primate is a deeply cultural species, our cognition being shaped by culture, and cultural transmission amounting to an “epidemic of mental representations” (Sperber, 1996). The architecture of this aspect of human cognition has been shaped by our evolutionary past in ways that we can now begin to discern through comparative studies of other primates. Processes of social learning (learning from others) are important for cognitive science to understand because they are cognitively complex and take many interrelated forms; they shape traditions, cultures and nonsocial aspects of cognition; and in turn they may be shaped by their cultural context. The study of primate social learning and culture has in recent years enjoyed a renaissance, providing a wealth of new findings, key aspects of which are reviewed. The focus is on cognitive issues, including learning about the consequences, sequential structure and hierarchical organization of actions; relating stored knowledge to the assimilation of new social knowledge; feedback guiding the construction of imitations; conceptual grasp of imitation; and the reciprocal relationship between social learning and culture.     

心智化社会认知观的演变及发展——来自潜心智化的思考

社会认知的机制一直存在心智化与具身认知观点的争论。前者认为社会认知是对心理状态的推测,而后者则认为社会认知是具身实践活动。虽然,心智化研究者认为具身认知有关灵长类动物和婴儿的社会认知的解释可以兼容于内隐心智化,但内隐心智化在解释社会互动时仍然存在间接性的问题。近期,潜心智化理论旨在挑战上述立场中有关社会认知先天论的预设,该理论将个体的潜心智化视为内隐心智化的替代,通过检验与分析相关研究的构想效度,强调社会认知是从非社会性的一般认知功能中衍生而来的,这种立场在社会认知的领域特殊性与非社会认知的领域一般性之间建立起了纽带,从而挑战了心智化与具身认知的争论。未来研究应设计更为严谨的心智化研究方法并对其进行方法学验证,借助先进的技术手段,尝试在神经科学层面探索一般认知功能与社会认知的关系。     

Cognition and emotion: on paradigms and metaphors

ABSTRACT

The field of cognition and emotion is characterised as the cognitive psychology of evaluative and affective processes. The most important development in this field is the fruitful adoption of cognitive psychology paradigms to study automatic evaluation processes, for example. This has led to a plethora of findings and theories. Two points are emphasised: First, the (often metaphorical) theoretical way of thinking has changed over the decades. Theorising with symbolic models (e.g. semantic networks), which was prevalent in earlier years, has been replaced more recently by subsymbolic models (i.e. PDP models). It is argued that – despite their still metaphorical character – the latter are better suited to capturing characteristics of emotional processes. Second, the field has adopted the methods of experimental cognitive psychology to develop and refine paradigms as “windows to the mind”.