Spontaneous analog number representations in 3‐year‐old children

When enumerating small sets of elements nonverbally, human infants often show a set‐size limitation whereby they are unable to represent sets larger than three elements. This finding has been interpreted as evidence that infants spontaneously represent small numbers with an object‐file system instead of an analog magnitude system ( Feigenson, Dehaene & Spelke, 2004 ). In contrast, non‐human animals and adult humans have been shown to rely on analog magnitudes for representing both small and large numbers ( Brannon & Terrace, 1998 ; Cantlon & Brannon, 2007 ; Cordes, Gelman, Gallistel & Whalen, 2001). Here we demonstrate that, like adults and non‐human animals, children as young as 3 years of age spontaneously employ analog magnitude representations to enumerate both small and large sets. Moreover, we show that children spontaneously attend to numerical value in lieu of cumulative surface area. These findings provide evidence of young children’s greater sensitivity to number relative to other quantities and demonstrate continuity in the process they spontaneously recruit to judge small and large values.     

Gender equality in 4‐ to 5‐year‐old preschoolers’ early numerical competencies

Numerical competencies acquired in preschool are foundational and predictive for children's later mathematical development. It remains to be determined whether there are gender differences in these early numerical competencies which could explain the often‐reported gender differences in later mathematics and STEM‐related abilities. Using a Bayesian approach, we quantified the evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis of gender differences versus the null hypothesis of gender equality. Participants were 402 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children attending preschool in Flanders (Belgium). Children were selected via stratified cluster sampling to represent the full range of socioeconomic backgrounds. All children completed eight numerical tasks (verbal counting, object counting, numeral recognition, symbolic comparison, nonsymbolic comparison, nonverbal calculation, number order, dot enumeration). Results supported the gender equality hypothesis, and this evidence was substantial for seven of the eight numerical tasks. Preschoolers’ early numerical competencies are characterized by gender equality. They probably do not explain later‐reported gender differences.     

Comprehension and production of body part labels in 2‐ to 3‐year‐old children

This study examined which body part labels children could (i) produce when the experimenter touched different locations on her own body, asking each time ‘What's this?’ and (ii) comprehend by touching the correct locations on their own bodies in response to the experimenter asking ‘Where's the [body‐part label]?’. Seventeen children aged between 26 and 41 months, tested in a repeated measures procedure, were presented with 50 different body part stimuli in 200 test trials per child. Overall, the children produced fewer body part labels than they could comprehend. The accuracy of children's responses depended on (i) the location or extent of each body part (facial and broad body features were better known; joints and features in or attached to broad body parts the least well known); (ii) the amount of sensory (but not motor) representation each body part has in the human cortex; and (iii) whether a body part was commonly named by caregivers. These results present a precise mapping of the body parts that young children are able to name and locate on their own bodies in response to body part names; they suggest several possible determinants of lexical‐semantic body knowledge and add to the understanding of how it develops in childhood.     

Children’s causal reasoning: Counterfactual thinking occurs for ‘negative’ outcomes only

Harris, German and Mills (Children’s use of counterfactual thinking in causal reasoning. Cognition, 61 (1996), 223–259), following Mackie, argue that children make explicit use of counterfactual thinking in arriving at causal judgments. They showed that children as young as 3, in explaining simple mishap events, made reference to courses of action that a protagonist had rejected, when that course of action would have prevented the observed outcome. It is hypothesized here that such counterfactual thinking might have been invoked by the ‘negative’ mishaps rather than as part of the causal reasoning process. Although the generation of counterfactuals in explanation was replicated using mishap outcomes such as those used by Harris et al., counterfactual thinking was not evident in children’s explanations of ‘positive’ outcomes. These results undermine the view that a counterfactual thinking process, as indexed by reference to possible actions rejected by a protagonist, is necessary for causal reasoning. Alternative characterizations of the relationship between causals and counterfactuals are discussed.     

The neural correlates of processing newborn and adult faces in 3‐year‐old children

The current study examines the processing of upright and inverted faces in 3‐year‐old children (n = 35). Event‐related potentials (ERPs) were recorded during a passive looking paradigm including adult and newborn face stimuli. We observed three face‐sensitive components, the P1, the N170 and the P400. Inverted faces elicited shorter P1 latency and larger P400 amplitude. P1 and N170 amplitudes were larger for adult faces. To examine the role of experience in the development of face processing, the processing of adult and newborn faces was compared for children with a younger sibling (n = 23) and children without a younger sibling (n = 12). Age of sibling at test correlated negatively with P1 amplitude for adult and newborn faces. This may indicate more efficient processing of different face ages in children with a younger sibling and potentially reflects a more flexible face representation.     

Ensemble perception of size in 4–5‐year‐old children

Groups of objects are nearly everywhere we look. Adults can perceive and understand the ‘gist’ of multiple objects at once, engaging ensemble‐coding mechanisms that summarize a group's overall appearance. Are these group‐perception mechanisms in place early in childhood? Here, we provide the first evidence that 4–5‐year‐old children use ensemble coding to perceive the average size of a group of objects. Children viewed a pair of trees, with each containing a group of differently sized oranges. We found that, in order to determine which tree had the larger oranges overall, children integrated the sizes of multiple oranges into ensemble representations. This pooling occurred rapidly, and it occurred despite conflicting information from numerosity, continuous extent, density, and contrast. An ideal observer analysis showed that although children's integration mechanisms are sensitive, they are not yet as efficient as adults’. Overall, our results provide a new insight into the way children see and understand the environment, and they illustrate the fundamental nature of ensemble coding in visual perception.     

10‐month‐old infants’ inference of invisible agent: Distinction in causality between object motion and human action1

Abstract: Two habituation experiments investigated 10‐month‐old infants’ interpretation of events where a stationary object began to move without any visible causes. During habituation, infants saw that an object partly hidden by an occluder began to move away from the occluder. Then, they were tested with three test events without the occluder: the ?rst event showed a hand pushing the object, the second event showed a hand failing to touch the object, and the last event had no agent. The objects were a ball in Experiment 1, and a person in Experiment 2. The test event that the infants looked at for the shortest duration in Experiment 1 was where the hand pushed the ball, whereas they looked at the three test events almost equal amounts of time in Experiment 2. These results indicate that 10‐month‐old infants responded to the events in terms of causality and could infer the presence of the agent behind the occluder only when they saw the habituation event featuring the ball.     

Can 2‐ and 3‐year‐old children be trained to perform visual perception tasks?

Children aged 2 and 3 years were exposed to a novel paradigm designed to train visual perception skills. The results indicate that children of this age could be trained to perform both percept deprivation and percept diagnosis tasks. Results are discussed with reference to engagement, a precursor to an adult‐like understanding of perception.     

Development of navigational working memory: Evidence from 6‐ to 10‐year‐old children

The ability to learn complex environments may require the contribution of different types of working memory. Therefore, we investigated the development of different types of working memory (navigational, reaching, and verbal) in 129 typically developing children. We aimed to determine whether navigational working memory develops at the same rate as other types of working memory and whether the gender differences reported in adults are already present during development. We found that navigational working memory is less developed than both verbal and reaching working memory and that gender predicts performance only for navigational working memory. Our results are in line with reports that children made significantly more errors in far space than adults, showing that near space representation develops before far space representation.     

Words,shape, visual search and visual working memory in 3‐year‐old children

Do words cue children's visual attention, and if so, what are the relevant mechanisms? Across four experiments, 3‐year‐old children (N = 163) were tested in visual search tasks in which targets were cued with only a visual preview versus a visual preview and a spoken name. The experiments were designed to determine whether labels facilitated search times and to examine one route through which labels could have their effect: By influencing the visual working memory representation of the target. The targets and distractors were pictures of instances of basic‐level known categories and the labels were the common name for the target category. We predicted that the label would enhance the visual working memory representation of the target object, guiding attention to objects that better matched the target representation. Experiments 1 and 2 used conjunctive search tasks, and Experiment 3 varied shape discriminability between targets and distractors. Experiment 4 compared the effects of labels to repeated presentations of the visual target, which should also influence the working memory representation of the target. The overall pattern fits contemporary theories of how the contents of visual working memory interact with visual search and attention, and shows that even in very young children heard words affect the processing of visual information.     

Cognitive components of a mathematical processing network in 9‐year‐old children

We determined how various cognitive abilities, including several measures of a proposed domain‐specific number sense, relate to mathematical competence in nearly 100 9‐year‐old children with normal reading skill. Results are consistent with an extended number processing network and suggest that important processing nodes of this network are phonological processing, verbal knowledge, visuo‐spatial short‐term and working memory, spatial ability and general executive functioning. The model was highly specific to predicting arithmetic performance. There were no strong relations between mathematical achievement and verbal short‐term and working memory, sustained attention, response inhibition, finger knowledge and symbolic number comparison performance. Non‐verbal intelligence measures were also non‐significant predictors when added to our model. Number sense variables were non‐significant predictors in the model and they were also non‐significant predictors when entered into regression analysis with only a single visuo‐spatial WM measure. Number sense variables were predicted by sustained attention. Results support a network theory of mathematical competence in primary school children and falsify the importance of a proposed modular ‘number sense’. We suggest an ‘executive memory function centric’ model of mathematical processing. Mapping a complex processing network requires that studies consider the complex predictor space of mathematics rather than just focusing on a single or a few explanatory factors.     

Children’s solutions of logical versus empirical problems: What’s missing and what develops?

This research examined the development of the ability to differentiate logical from empirical problems and the different ways in which children solve these problems. Thirty-two 4- and 5-year-olds, thirty-four 8- and 9-year-olds, and thirty-five 11- and 12-year-olds were given five questions regarding an imaginary character’s predictions as to where a ball would land after being dropped through a ‘tautology machine’. The questions examined encoding and recall of problems, children’s understanding of when evidence was necessary, and children’s evaluation of form and evidence. Data were analyzed in two ways: (1) by comparing differences across participants on component questions and (2) an individual analysis examining the consistency of responses to component questions across the problem set. Overall, the results indicated that: (1) sixth graders tended to differentiate logical from empirical problems while preschool and third grade children rarely did; (2) young children tend to ignore both the logical connective and the second half of problems-termed a ‘cut;’ (3) these cuts are less frequent when a problem is compatible with one empirical possibility; (4) cuts do not stem from encoding or recall errors, but seem to be the product of incomplete problem processing and (5) from third to sixth grade, children’s understanding of logical form increased as the rate of cuts decreased.     

Behaviors speak louder than explicit reports: Implicit metacognition in 2.5‐year‐old children

Recent research has shown that children as young as age 3.5 show behavioral responses to uncertainty although they are not able to report it explicitly. In this study, we tested the hypothesis that some form of metacognition is already available to guide children's decisions before the age of 3. Two groups of 2.5‐ and 3.5‐year‐old children were asked to complete a forced‐choice perceptual identification test and to explicitly rate their confidence in each decision. Moreover, participants had the opportunity to ask for a cue to help them decide if their response was correct. Our results revealed that all children asked for a cue more often after an incorrect response than after a correct response in the forced‐choice identification test, indicating a good ability to implicitly introspect on the results of their cognitive operations. On the contrary, none of these children displayed metacognitive sensitivity when making explicit confidence judgments, consistent with previous evidence of later development of explicit metacognition. Critically, our findings suggest that implicit metacognition exists much earlier than typically assumed, as early as 2.5 years of age.     

Motor and cognitive control in a normative sample of 7‐year‐olds

The aim of the present study was to explore the relationship between cognitive and motor control by correlating individual performance on a variety of complex tasks in a normative sample of over 100 7‐year‐olds. While there are a few studies including children with specific developmental disorders (i.e. ADHD and DCD) showing that they share similar comorbid deficits, it is still unclear whether control processes share variance in normative samples. Results presented here reveal on the one hand that some aspects of cognitive and motor control are significantly interrelated, even when controlling for age. On the other hand, individuals’ ability to efficiently respond to the speed and accuracy demands of any of the included tasks appeared to constitute an important aspect of executive functioning.     

A 2‐year‐old child's memory of hospitalization during early infancy

A child who had had surgery at 5 months of age, and who had been treated at the time for post‐traumatic symptoms (reported in a previous paper by the author), was interviewed 2 years later and almost 3 years later to test for possible verbal recall of his hospitalization. He appeared to have some memories of the experience at 29 months of age, and he was able to superimpose verbal labels onto the preverbal memories. At 40 months of age, however, the memories were no longer verbally accessible. The results are discussed in the context of different theories of encoding, storage, retrieval, and loss of early memories. The findings from this study support other findings indicating that there appears to be some form of long‐term memory in place early in life, at least for highly salient, traumatic events. There may be one memory system for traumatic memories, fully functional at birth, and a later developing, different system for neutral memories. It is further hypothesized that there may be a sensitive period around 2–3 years of age for the recall of early traumatic memories, and that verbal recall is more likely to be present in verbally precocious children during that period. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Processing of facial and non‐facial visual stimuli in 2–5‐year‐old children

The present experiments examined the degree to which analytic and holistic modes of processing play a role in the way 2–5‐year‐old children process facial and non‐facial visual stimuli. Children between 2 and 5 years of age were instructed to categorize faces (in Experiment 1) and non‐facial visual stimuli, such as birds and planes (in Experiment 2), into two categories. The categories were so constructed as to allow the children to categorize the facial and non‐facial stimuli either analytically (by focusing on a single attribute) or holistically (in terms of overall similarity). The results demonstrated that the previous conclusions concerning older children's (from 6 years onwards) holistic mode of facial processing could not be generalized to younger children because most of the 2–5‐year olds processed the faces by taking single facial attributes into account. A similar pattern of results emerged for the processing of objects, showing that the majority of the children focused on single attributes. Thus, for both visual domains, holistic processing was the exception rather than the rule. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Anxiety disorders in 8–11‐year‐old children: Motor skill performance and self‐perception of competence

Ekornås, B., Lundervold, A. J., Tjus, T. & Heimann, M. (2010). Anxiety disorders in 8–11‐year‐old children: Motor skill performance and self‐perception of competence. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 51, 271–277. This study investigates motor skill performance and self‐perceived competence in children with anxiety disorders compared with children without psychiatric disorders. Motor skills and self‐perception were assessed in 329 children aged 8 to 11 years, from the Bergen Child Study. The Kiddie‐SADS PL diagnostic interview was employed to define a group of children with an anxiety disorder without comorbid diagnosis, and a control group (no diagnosis) matched according to gender, age, and full‐scale IQ. Children in the anxiety disorder group displayed impaired motor skills and poor self‐perceived peer acceptance and physical competence compared with the control group. Two‐thirds of the anxious boys scored on the Motor Assessment Battery for Children (MABC) as having motor problems. The present study demonstrated impaired motor skills in boys with “pure” anxiety disorders. Anxious children also perceived themselves as being less accepted by peers and less competent in physical activities compared with children in the control group.