Improving the Accuracy of Group Judgment: A Process Intervention Combining Group Facilitation,Social Judgment Analysis,and Information Technology

Interacting groups fail to make judgments as accurate as those of their most capable members due to problems associated with both interaction processes and cognitive processing. Group process techniques and decision analytic tools have been used with groups to combat these problems. While such techniques and tools do improve the quality of group judgment, they have not enabled groups to make judgments more accurate than those of their most capable members on tasks that evoke a great deal of systematic bias. A new intervention procedure that integrates group facilitation, social judgment analysis, and information technology was developed to overcome more fully the problems typically associated with interaction processes and cognitive processing. The intervention was evaluated by testing the hypothesis that groups using this new procedure can establish judgment policies for cognitive conflict tasks that are more accurate than the ones produced by any of their members. An experiment involving 16 four- and five-member groups was conducted to compare the accuracy of group judgments with the accuracy of the judgments of the most capable group member. A total of 96 participants (48 males and 48 females) completed the individual part of the task; 71 of these participants worked in groups. Results indicated that the process intervention enabled small, interacting groups to perform significantly better than their most capable members on two cognitive conflict tasks (p < .05). The findings suggest that Group Decision Support Systems that integrate facilitation, social judgment analysis, and information technology should be used to improve the accuracy of group judgment.     

On self-referencing differences in judgment and choice

Compared to judgment, choice is argued to elicit more self-referent processing and thereby produce greater subsequent recall of evaluated information. This response mode effect is shown to be dependent upon sufficient visualization to overcome the use of heuristic processing during choice. When visualizing prior to the task, choice leads to increased thinking about personal consumption occasions relative to judgment, leading to enhanced recall of vivid (vs. non-vivid) attributes. This proposed interaction of task and visualization was found in two experiments that assessed incidental recall following a choice or judgment task. In experiment 1, participants recalled more vivid product attribute information after choosing between options than after rating each option separately, but only when instructed to visualize during evaluation. To eliminate a comparison-based explanation of this effect, a second experiment was conducted that presented only one option in each category. Participants who evaluated their intention to purchase the option (a judgment equivalent of choice) demonstrated greater recall of vivid product attribute information than did participants who rated their liking for the option, and this recall difference was again moderated by instructions to visualize.     

Fast similarities: efficiency advantages of similarity-focused comparisons

People constantly have to make efficient use of their limited cognitive resources. Recently, T. Mussweiler and K. Epstude (2009) demonstrated that comparative thinking simplifies information processing and increases the efficiency of judgment. However, there are different types of comparative thinking. While comparing 2 entities, people may focus on either similarities or dissimilarities between target and standard. The authors propose that these 2 comparative thinking styles differ in their efficiency. Specifically, the authors hypothesize that comparisons with a focus on similarities lead to more focused information processing and faster judgments than comparisons with a dissimilarity focus. In line with these hypotheses, the authors demonstrate that participants are indeed faster at judging the similarity of 2 stimuli (Study 1) and that they search for less target information in a comparative judgment task (Study 2) if they focus on similarities rather than dissimilarities. Focusing on similarities thus appears to be the more efficient comparative thinking style.     

认知闭合需要、框架效应与决策偏好

在带有模糊性的决策情境中,决策者个人的认知特征会对其判断决策产生重要影响。通过实验的方法,考察了认知闭合需要和特征框架效应对个体决策偏好的影响。93名工商管理硕士（MBA）参与了实验,研究的结果支持了本研究的3个假设,即认知闭合需要与特征框架效应不仅对被试的决策偏好存在显著的影响,而且二者还存在显著的交互作用。具体来说,研究发现,在模糊情境中：高认知闭合需要的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而低认知闭合需要的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;接收到正向框架信息的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而接收到负向框架信息的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;认知闭合需要与特征框架对被试的决策偏好还存在显著的交互作用。研究结论为根据个体认知闭合需要的水平来选拔决策者、利用框架效应来影响个体的信息加工方式进而提高决策质量提供了理论依据     

Deliberation Versus Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making

What produces better judgments: deliberating or relying on intuition? Past research is inconclusive. We focus on the role of expertise to increase understanding of the effects of judgment mode. We propose a framework in which expertise depends on a person's experience with and knowledge about a domain. Individuals who are relatively experienced but have modest knowledge about the subject matter (“intermediates”) are expected to suffer from deliberation and to benefit from a more intuitive approach, because they lack the formal knowledge to understand the reasons underlying their preferences. Individuals who are high (“experts”) or low (“novices”) on both experience and knowledge are expected to do well or poorly, respectively, regardless of decision mode. We tested these predictions in the domain of art. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that intermediates performed better when relying on intuition than after deliberation. Judgments of experts and novices were unaffected. In line with previous research relating processing style to judgment mode, Experiment 3 showed that the effect of processing style (global versus local) on judgment quality is similarly moderated by expertise. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of option framing on consumer choices: Making decisions in rational versus experiential processing modes

• In the marketplace, consumers often encounter framed scenarios for optional product features, whereby they can add desired product options to a base model or delete undesired product options from a fully loaded model. The results of two experiments show that such option framing can influence consumers' decision making regarding the total number of finally chosen product options. Also, consumers' processing modes – rational versus experiential, can influence their choice behavior under option framing. Specifically, consumers choose a higher number of options in the delete (versus add) frame, and the effect is magnified when making decisions in an experiential mode, and it is diminished when making decisions in a rational mode. Moreover, cognitive constraints further moderate these effects.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intuition in Judgment and Decision Making: Extensive Thinking Without Effort

We claim that intuition is capable of quickly processing multiple pieces of information without noticeable cognitive effort. We advocate a component view stating that intuitive processes in judgment and decision making are responsible for information integration and output formation (e.g., preference, choice), whereas analytic thinking mainly guides input formation such as search, generation, and change of information. We present empirical evidence corroborating this notion and show that integration of information and preference formation works without cognitive control and is unconstrained by the amount of encoded information and cognitive capacity. We discuss the implications of our findings for the bounded rationality perspective and the multiple strategy approach to judgment and decision making. Finally we outline a connectionist framework for integrating intuitive and analytic thought processes.     

Can implicit measures detect source information in crime-related amnesia?

Participants who are asked to simulate amnesia for a mock crime have a weaker memory for this event when they have to give up their role as a feigner, than those who are not asked to feign memory loss. According to the source monitoring framework (SMF), this memory-undermining effect of simulating amnesia for a crime would be due to misattribution of the right source of information. However, we know that the content of self-generated information (e.g., feigned version of the crime) might be preserved and recognised over time as a result of elaborative cognitive processing. In the present study, we aimed to contrast these two explanations. We showed participants a mock crime video and we instructed them to either feign amnesia (simulators) or confess the mock crime (confessors). Next, a free recall memory test was administered. After one week, participants were asked to perform a personalised source monitoring task using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT). As predicted, we found that simulators were able to discriminate the content of their self-generated feigned story of the crime from the original version. Moreover, simulators were quicker than confessors at the aIAT task. Practical and theoretical implications of our results are discussed.     

相似性判断和差异性判断的不对称性及其机制探索

本文阐述了相似性判断和差异性判断不对称性的相关研究。首先介绍了不对称性的发展及理论解释。其次,根据事件相关电位的研究结果,阐述了图-词信息的双编码模型对相似性判断的影响。接着分析和介绍了相似性判断的双编码过程及其时间进程。最后,作者提出有待深入研究的几个问题：（1）差异性策略在分类和推理中的应用;（2）相似性双编码过程的实证研究及其应用;（3）从发展认知神经科学的角度探讨不对称的认知神经机制。     

Instrumental Bias in Motivated Reasoning: More When More Is Needed

Decision makers must often make judgments in an environment in which they have a strong motivation to reach a particular conclusion. While normative theory would indicate that they should use available information to make their most accurate judgment without being influenced by the conclusion or outcome it may imply, evidence from the social judgment literature suggests that motivation does bias the judgment process. Specifically, decision makers motivated to support a particular conclusion tend to adopt information processing strategies most likely to yield the desired conclusion. We propose and empirically demonstrate two extensions to the motivation literature. First, we argue that motivated reasoning isinstrumental,meaning motivated decision makers bias their judgments more or less as needed to support the desired conclusion, subject to “reasonableness” constraints. Second, we propose that motivated decision makers exhibitconfidence bolsteringand thereby remain at least as confident as non-motivated decision makers in their biased estimates. We illustrate that motivated subjects even report confidence in utilizing these estimates outside the original motivating context. We investigate motivational effects within a business context involving forecasting, strategic decision making, and new product introductions. We explore the impact of motivation on quantitative forecasts and estimates, rather than on social judgments and perceptions. In addition, we go a step beyond the judgment phase to demonstrate that motivation influences choice.     

Unraveling the Aging Skein: Disentangling Sensory and Cognitive Predictors of Age‐related Differences in Decision Making

Age‐related differences in sensory functioning, processing speed, and working memory have been identified as three significant predictors of the age‐related performance decline observed in complex cognitive tasks. Yet, the assessment of their relative predictive capacity and interrelations is still an open issue in decision making and cognitive aging research. Indeed, no previous investigation has examined the relationships of all these three predictors with decision making. In an individual‐differences study, we therefore disentangled the relative contribution of sensory functioning, processing speed, and working memory to the prediction of the age‐related decline in cognitively demanding judgment and decision‐making tasks. Structural equation modeling showed that the age‐related decline in working memory plays an important predictive role, even when controlling for sensory functioning, processing speed, and education. Implications for research on decision making and cognitive aging are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consumer decision making and aging: A commentary

Yoon, Cole and Lee's review suggests two strategies to address elderly individuals' limitations in processing information and decision making. One is accommodation, which entails designing information processing and judgment tasks so that they are compatible with the elderly's resource limitations. The other strategy involves stimulating self-regulation. Here the premise is that elderly individuals often have the resources necessary to engage in a task, but only activate them in response to explicit directions. We discuss whether this observation reflects older individuals' inability to activate self-regulation strategies spontaneously, or their purposive rationing of their limited resources so they remain available for more profound activities.     

The Heart and the Head: On Choosing Experiences Intuitively and Possessions Deliberatively

An enduring question in the field of judgment and decision making is when people are likely to choose on the basis of intuition and when they are likely to pursue a more deliberative decision strategy. Here, we attempt to shed light on that question by examining whether people tend to weight intuition more heavily when making experiential purchases, and to weight deliberation more heavily when making material purchases. Results from seven studies indicate that they do. In Study 1 (and a replication), participants expressed an explicit preference for choosing experiential purchases intuitively and material purchases analytically. In Study 2 (and a replication), participants anticipated experiencing more regret after going against reason for material purchases and going against intuition for experiential purchases. Participants in Study 3 who were asked to think about an experiential purchase wanted to see the relevant information presented by alternative, which facilitates intuitive/holistic processing, more than did those who were asked to consider a material purchase. In two additional studies, participants who were induced to think intuitively chose experiential purchases more often (Study 4) and reported a higher willingness to pay for them (Study 5) compared with participants induced to think analytically. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Influence of Self-Ratings versus Peer Ratings on Supervisors'' Performance Judgments

This study investigated the extent to which supervisors use feedback from outside sources in making performance judgments. A simulation was conducted in which participants with organizational supervisory experience made an initial performance judgment about a profiled employee. Participants then received additional information that was discrepant from their initial judgment (positive or negative) from one of two sources (the profiled employee himself or one of his peers). The direction of the discrepant information and its source interacted in determining final ratings, such that, participants were more likely to use discrepant information to alter their performance judgments in a consistent direction when the source was a peer than when the source was the employee himself. Furthermore, participants' opinions about the usefulness of peer information for performance judgments moderated this interaction. Specifically, participants who believed that information from an employee's peers was useful, were more likely to use discrepant information provided by a peer when making final performance judgments than were participants who did not believe that information from an employee's peers was useful.     

Goal-directed memory: the role of cognitive control in older adults' emotional memory

The present study revealed that older adults recruit cognitive control processes to strengthen positive and diminish negative information in memory. In Experiment 1, older adults engaged in more elaborative processing when retrieving positive memories than they did when retrieving negative memories. In Experiment 2, older adults who did well on tasks involving cognitive control were more likely than those doing poorly to favor positive pictures in memory. In Experiment 3, older adults who were distracted during memory encoding no longer favored positive over negative pictures in their later recall, revealing that older adults use cognitive resources to implement emotional goals during encoding. In contrast, younger adults showed no signs of using cognitive control to make their memories more positive, indicating that, for them, emotion regulation goals are not chronically activated.     

Willingness to pay for advice: The role of rational and experiential processing

Everyday, millions of decision makers receive advice from one or more sources. Although research has addressed some of the issues concerning how people take and use advice that they are given, less is known about the psychological processes that underlie decision makers’ willingness to pay for advice. In the present research, we explore the important role that mode of information processing and decision-specific knowledge have on willingness to pay for advice. In a pretest and two experiments, we use a priming procedure to induce either a rational or experiential mode of processing. We find that people processing information rationally are willing to pay substantially more for advice than those who are processing information experientially, and that this effect is moderated by the individual’s decision-specific knowledge.     

The Benny Hill effect: Switching cognitive programmes underlying subjective estimations of the outcomes of bargains concerning distributions of rewards

The pun of a sketch from the Benny Hill show was related to a switch of cognitive in formation processing programmes underlying the interpretation of the scene represented. The audience would be biased to interpret it following a cognitive programme anchored on the constructs self and other (SO-programme), while Benny Hill makes a statement that would impose a cognitive programme anchored on constructs associated with the third pronominal person (3P-programme). In an experiment it was attempted to make subjects to switch from SO- to 3P-programmes (Benny Hill effect) when they were making subjective estimations of outcomes of bargains concerning distributions of rewards. The hypothesis was confirmed that the 3P-programme was activated by providing additional in formation pertaining to substantiate the stimulus persons in such a way as to make them stand out as anchors for the processing of the in formation. However, the data showed also that the mere substantiation of stimulus persons was not yet sufficient to produce the given shift of cognitive programmes. The results are discussed in the light of theories concerning fairness, social values and allocation rules.     

认知闭合需要研究评述

认知闭合需要是个体稳定的认知特征,描述了个体在面对模糊情境时是否愿意系统处理信息的动机。已有研究表明,认知闭合需要对个体的信息处理过程和决策结果有显著的预测能力。总体上说,高认知闭合需要的个体更容易利用启发式进行思考,因此此类个体更容易受到过度归因、首因效应等的影响。虽然大多数的研究表明认知闭合需要是个体稳定的认知特质,但也有研究者发现环境因素如噪音等可以在一定程度上、在短时期内改变个体的认知闭合需要的水平。因此,在相关研究中,认知闭合需要既可以通过量表测量,也可以通过在实验中改变环境噪音和时间压力等方法来操纵。已有的关于认知闭合需要的研究也有不足之处。首先,如何引导高认知闭合者克服匆忙做出决策的动机并采用分析式的方式处理信息和进行决策,目前的相关研究还很少;其次,已有的关于认知闭合的研究大都为实验室研究,因此这些研究的外部效度较低;第三,认知闭合需要在冲突研究领域的应用被忽略了。未来有必要针对这些不足之处进行相应研究     

Judgment Difficulty and the Moral Intensity of Unethical Acts: A Cognitive Response Analysis of Dual Process Ethical Judgment Formation

This study analyzes cognitive responses to explore a dual processing perspective of ethical judgment formation. Specifically, the study investigates how two factors, judgment task difficulty and moral intensity, influence the extent of deontological and teleological processing and their effects on ethical judgments. A single experiment on 110 undergraduate research participants found that judgment task difficulty affected the extent of deontological and teleological processing. Although moral intensity affected ethical judgments, it did not produce effects on either deontological or teleological cognitive responses. Results did not support the hypotheses that deontological and teleological cognitive responses would mediate the relationships between the experimental factors and ethical judgments. Overall, the results support continued research of factors that affect the nature of information processing in ethical decision situations and the use of cognitive response analysis as a tool for conducting this research.