Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Anticipated Guilt as Behavioral Motivation

The current study posits that messages used to elicit behaviors to help unknown others must present substantial perceptions of a threat and efficacy to be successful. Given that many prosocial helping messages depict a threat to unknown others, the current investigation proposed that anticipated guilt is a motivating force behind individuals' willingness to engage in behaviors to avert the unknown‐other‐directed threat. Specifically, this study hypothesized that messages which induce substantial perceptions of (a) threat, (b) response‐efficacy, and (c) self‐efficacy would result in feelings of anticipated guilt that subsequently motivate behavioral intent and, ultimately, behaviors to avert the threat to unknown others and avoid the future guilt that they might feel personally. Brehm's (1966) psychological reactance theory, however, notes that such appeals might result in reactance and thus decrease compliance with a message's prescribed actions. Two research questions were posed to determine (a) whether or not individuals experience reactance and (b) what effect, if any, reactance has on compliance. Additionally, participants' accuracy in forecasting guilt was assessed. The proposed model and research questions were tested by focusing on the topic of bone marrow donation. Participants were assigned randomly to one of three message conditions (control and two experimental messages), completed a questionnaire and returned to complete a follow‐up survey 7–10 days later. The data were consistent with the proposed model, and additional findings indicated that participants did not experience psychological reactance and were not accurate when forecasting future feelings of guilt.     

羞耻和内疚的差异

羞耻和内疚是日常生活中经常出现的两种十分相似的情感,难以对此作出明确的区分。近年来研究发现两者在概念、认知评价、情感体验和外显表现等方面都有着明显的差异,而且在与心理障碍之间的关系上羞耻比内疚更密切。这些研究发现无疑对情绪的理论研究和心理障碍的临床治疗都起到积极的作用。     

Guilt and Shame,Justice and Mercy

This essay argues that the criminal justice system in the United States is flawed because it focuses principally on punishment of illegal actions without considering offenders as persons in their entirety. It considers the role that constructive shame and mercy can play in addressing this flaw. The essay concludes by applying this argument to the case of shaming penalties within criminal justice.     

Validation of the Brief Shame and Guilt Questionnaire for Children

While both shame and guilt are described as self-conscious emotions, they differ in many ways, including their contextual antecedents and their associations with mental health. A measure that distinguishes proneness to experience shame and guilt is crucial.In the present study we present a brief questionnaire to measure shame- and guilt-proneness in children using short concrete items. Specifically, we presented our 12-item Brief Shame and Guilt Questionnaire to Dutch (n = 219) 9–14 year-olds along with measures of internalizing problems (social anxiety, worry) and externalizing problems (aggression and conduct behavior). In addition to self-reports, teacher-reports on the externalizing problems were also collected. Results confirmed the two-factor structure, showed good psychometric properties of the two scales and a good concurrent validity. Specifically, shame-proneness contributed to the prediction of more internalizing problems and guilt-proneness contributed to the prediction of fewer externalizing problems. As such, the Brief Shame and Guilt Questionnaire for Children is a reliable and accessible instrument to administer in children.     

Shame and Guilt: The Psychology of Sacramental Confession

Abstract

Altered states challenge an individual's established construction of reality, the personalized mythology by which one operates. Sometimes those altered states offer a glimpse into aspects of being that the mythology is unable to embrace. Experiences of this nature may challenge the prevailing mythic structure. This confrontation between the established construction of reality and the view provided in the altered state may inspire a profound and wholesome shift in the person's sense of being, or it may lead to destabilizing conflicts with previously unquestioned belief systems and patterns of behavior. This article discusses the lure—and the dilemmas — of attempting to incorporate directly into one's life the raw creativity of a powerful and inspiring altered state, the challenges of reconciling such experiences with one's existing mythology, and it presents a framework for facilitating such a reconciliation.     

Gender Differences in the Organization of Guilt and Shame

Lewis [(1971) Shame in Guilt in Neurosis, New York: International Universities Press] argues that guilt and shame represent distinct modes of perceiving and experiencing information about the self that are congruent with gender-linked differences in socialization. We tested predictions from Lewis' model that shame-proneness in adult White females (n = 102), but guilt-proneness in adult White males (n = 99), would account for a substantial proportion of the variance in measures assessing their characteristic use of defense mechanisms and endorsement of gender roles. Certain results confirmed Lewis' broader claim that guilt for men, but shame for women, were predominant modes of organizing information about the self. Other results did not support certain specific predictions made by Lewis or they provided only equivocal support (e.g., in men, the joint positive relationship of guilt-proneness to communal orientations but its negative relationship to externalization). Similar discrepant findings emerged for females' construal of guilt, which also related positively to internalization. Although shame-proneness did emerge as the principal emotion variable for females, it was linked to both internalization and externalization. Lewis' model is reconsidered in light of recent empirical findings and the need to conduct more on-line investigations of transgression-emotion induction-emotion reduction cycles.     

Assessment of Shame and Guilt and Their Relationships to Psychopathology

Two studies are reported. First, we tested the previously validated Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2 (PFQ2; Harder & Zalma, 1990) shame and guilt proneness measure and the Adapted Shame and Guilt Scale (ASGS; Hoblitzelle, 1982) Shame subscale against the newly introduced Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI; Tangney, 1990) for shame and guilt dispositions. Fiftynine college undergraduates completed randomly ordered personality inventories reflecting constructs theoretically relevant to the presence of shame and guilt proneness. Correlations between the affect measures and personality variables showed evidence of validity for all shame scales. The PFQ2 Guilt subscale also demonstrated construct validity when partialled for shame, but the SCAAI did not. Second, we tested hypotheses regarding the relative importance of shame and guilt to various symptom types (Symptom Checklist-90-Revised; Derogatis, 1983) using 71 college undergraduates.. Both emotions were approximately equally related to all major symptom clusters, but there was some-evidence for differential patterns of relative importance for shame and guilt to different symptoms.     

Dehumanization and Guilt as Distinct but Related Predictors of Support for Reparation Policies

In two studies, we predicted that support for reparation policies would be influenced positively by feelings of group-based guilt and negatively by dehumanization of the outgroup. We also hypothesized that a valence manipulation of the ingroup's behavior would cause differences in such support which would be mediated by guilt. In the first study, we manipulated the valence of past ingroup behavior and assessed guilt, dehumanization, and reparation support. As expected, guilt predicted positively and dehumanization negatively participants' support. In addition, guilt partially mediated the manipulation effects on policy support. Consistent with previous research, guilt and dehumanization were unrelated. In Study 2, we assessed individual differences in dehumanization before the manipulation and examined their associations with guilt and reparation support. Initial analyses replicated Study 1. In addition, guilt partially mediated the influence of dehumanization on reparation support. Results suggest that the presence of guilt motivates support for reparation policies, while the absence of guilt explains in part why individual differences in dehumanization inhibit such support.     

Evolving Concepts of Evolution: The Case of Shame and Guilt

Evolutionary biologists often refer to a distinction between ultimate and proximate explanation. On the one hand, such a distinction points to important issues for social psychologists, especially in terms of what it means to say that people experience emotions such as guilt and shame. On the other hand, the value of the ultimate/proximate distinction depends on how it is understood because its application can be problematic. We illustrate the use and possible misuse of the distinction in terms of its application to the differentiation of the self‐conscious emotions guilt and shame.     

For Shame: Feminism,Breastfeeding Advocacy,and Maternal Guilt

In this paper, we provide a new framework for understanding infant‐feeding‐related maternal guilt and shame, placing these in the context of feminist theoretical and psychological accounts of the emotions of self‐assessment. Whereas breastfeeding advocacy has been critiqued for its perceived role in inducing maternal guilt, we argue that the emotion women often feel surrounding infant feeding may be better conceptualized as shame in its tendency to involve a negative self‐assessment—a failure to achieve an idealized notion of good motherhood. Further, we suggest, both formula‐feeding and breastfeeding mothers experience shame: the former report feeling that they fail to live up to ideals of womanhood and motherhood, and the latter transgress cultural expectations regarding feminine modesty. The problem, then, is the degree to which mothers are vulnerable to shame generally, regardless of infant feeding practices. As an emotion that is less adaptive and potentially more damaging than guilt, shame ought to be the focus of resistance for both feminists and breastfeeding advocates, who need to work in conjunction with women to oppose this shame by assisting them in constructing their own ideals of good motherhood that incorporate a sense of self‐concern.