Moral Panics: The Old and the New

The theory of moral panics has been prominent in the sociology of deviance since the 1970s. This article uses this theory to trace the rise of the moral panic around the high number of heroin overdose deaths in Australian in the mid to late 1990s. It argues, however, that much of the panic was generated by groups not traditionally associated with moral panics, but by political progressives in the field of illicit drugs as well as victims, parent groups, and those who work with illicit drug users. In this way it was not a conventional right-wing moral crusade, but it was no less a moral panic.     

Fan violence: Social problem or moral panic?

The author reviews the theoretical and empirical resources available for social scientists who study fan violence. Reviews of fan violence typically discuss the phenomenon from psychological, psychosocial, and sociological approaches. In this review, the author uses social problem and moral panic approaches to organize theories of and research into fan violence. The social problem approach focuses on what causes the “problem” of fan violence. The moral panic approach focuses on how fan violence becomes translated into a social problem. Moral panics are rapid and righteous appeals from the media and other agents of control that “something must be done” to extinguish a social menace. It is argued that both the social problem and moral panic approaches signify the importance of “we-group” versus “they-group” antagonisms in the creation and maintenance of fan violence.     

Googling in Fear: Measuring Moral Panic Using Internet Searches Before and After Obama’s 2008 Election

ABSTRACT

The rhetoric, rumor, and hostility that surrounded the election of Barack Obama in 2008 appeared to correspond with the notion of a “moral panic.” However, systematically measuring phenomena like moral panics, which are volatile and dispersed in nature, can be difficult. This paper utilizes Google search data combined with other sources to examine the reaction to the candidacy and initial election of Obama. Given the nature of this particular panic, we hypothesize that panic-induced searches will be greater in states with a larger presence of Evangelical Protestants and consumption of conservative media outlets. Results from a series of generalized least squares time-series and two-stage regression models demonstrate that searches related to “socialism” and the “Antichrist” grew significantly around Obama’s election, indicating Obama’s “folk devil” status and a growing moral panic. Additionally, the intensity of the panic appears to be moderated by religious cultures and media consumption. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.     

MORAL PERCEPTION AND THE CAUSAL OBJECTION

One of the primary motivations behind moral anti‐realism is a deep‐rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception – we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the perceiver. But, the objection continues, we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This papers demonstrates that the causal objection is unsound whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non‐secondary, natural properties; or non‐natural properties. 1     

The Production of Squatters as Folk Devils: Analysis of a Moral Panic that Facilitated the Criminalization of Squatting in the Netherlands

This article assesses recent improvements to Cohen’s original formulation of the concept of moral panic. A case study is made of a moral panic generated in the Dutch media regarding three accusations made by the police concerning booby traps and weapons caches in the squats of Amsterdam. These claims, while shown to be fantastical in nature, gave credence to a ideological discursive formation that portrayed the squatters’ movement as increasingly violent. Squatters were subsequently manufactured as folk devils requiring control via juridical repression, a process that resulted in the criminalization of squatting in 2010.     

Punctuated Equilibrium,Moral Panics and the Ethics Review Process

A review of the literature and ethnographic data from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom on the research ethics review process suggest that moral panics can become triggers for punctuated equilibrium in the review process at both the macro and microlevel, albeit with significantly different levels of magnitude and impact. These data suggest that neither the development of the ethics review process nor the process itself proceeds gradually, but both are characterized by periodic major shifts evoked by particular events or situations that result in varying levels of moral panic. One way to deal with this moral panic is to increase the regulation of research and the depth or intensity of the scrutiny of applications under ethics review. Moral panics at the macrolevel influence those at the microlevel and, if the moral panic evoked at the local or microlevel is not satisfactorily resolved, it will evoke action at a higher level. Understanding the evolution of research ethics review processes from this perspective might help make actions by ethics committees and policy makers more understandable and help explain why attention to research ethics are heightened at particular points in time. It may also provide a basis for developing recommendations for adaptations to the ethics review process and policy at both the local and macrolevel.     

The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory

Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this paper will defend the opposite reaction. Contrary to what recent discussions lead us to expect, practical reason is not simply a philosophical fiction lacking empirical roots. Empirical research does not exclude the possibility that practical reason can play a substantive role; rather, there is evidence that it can help us both to determine our first personal moral judgments and to motivate us to act on them.     

《孟姜女传说》与齐鲁文化——兼谈其中的主要文化素

《孟姜女传说》是中国四大民间传说之一。2006年山东淄博将其申报为国家级非物质文化遗产后,就其真正的归属地问题却产生了争议。通过文献考索与田野调查,我们认为：齐鲁,特别是淄博泰山齐长城遗址及周围地区是孟姜女传说的发源地。秦始皇之所以进入《孟姜女传说》,其直接因素是他修了＂万里长城＂,而深层原因是他的齐鲁文化情结。＂文化素＂是波亚托斯提出的概念,指的是通过符号感觉到或认识到的文化单位。从＂礼义＂、＂歌哭＂等文化素分析来看,齐鲁文化是《孟姜女传说》最核心的精神内核,齐鲁是它的文化出生地及传播的中心地带。     

What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?

Quasi-realists argue that meta-ethical expressivism is fully compatible with the central assumptions underlying ordinary moral practice. In a recent paper, Andy Egan has developed a vexing challenge for this project, arguing that expressivism is incompatible with central assumptions about error in moral judgments. In response, Simon Blackburn has argued that Egan's challenge fails, because Egan reads the expressivist as giving an account of moral error, rather than an account of judgments about moral error. In this paper I argue that the challenge can be reinstated, even if we focus only on the expressivist's account of judgments about moral error.     

The Economic Model of Forgiveness

It is sometimes claimed that forgiveness involves the cancellation of a moral debt. This way of speaking about forgiveness exploits an analogy between moral forgiveness and economic debt‐cancellation. Call the view that moral forgiveness is like economic debt‐cancellation the Economic Model of Forgiveness. In this article I articulate and motivate the model, defend it against some recent objections, and pose a new puzzle for this way of thinking about forgiveness.     

Between Realism and Relativism: Moral Certainty as a Third Option

This paper is an attempt to lay out a meta-ethical position that is inspired by the framework of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. To achieve this goal, this paper is divided into two parts. First, I explore recent attempts to tie Wittgenstein's epistemology in On Certainty to moral epistemology. I argue that there can be a meaningful parallel drawn between the epistemic certainties discussed in On Certainty and what I consider to be moral certainties. These moral certainties are unjustified fundamental moral attitudes that underlie our moral practices. Then, I show how the debate over moral certainty has branched into two directions. One direction presents the concept of moral certainty as a naturalistic concept. On this reading, moral certainties transcend time and place since they are rooted in our natural tendencies to act or not act in certain ways. The other direction presents moral certainty as a distinctly relativistic concept. On this reading, we have our moral certainties because we belong to communities that agree on these certainties. In the second section, I argue that we have both natural, universal certainties and localized, relative certainties. I also argue that our localized certainties are constrained by non-moral facts about ourselves and about the world. To make this argument, I rely on Wittgenstein's concept of “general facts of nature.” The result of the paper is a meta-ethical position that can be located in between moral relativism and moral realism.     

the role of presidential rhetoric in the creation of a moral panic: reagan,bush, and the war on drugs

Although it is known that state initiatives can help produce moral panics, the role policy rhetoric assumes in creating, sustaining, and terminating moral panics has not been theoretically addressed. This article offers a typology of drug policies and illustrates how each is used at varying stages of a moral panic. It is argued that moral panics begin when proactive and punitive statements are used in combination. Moral panics subside when reactive and rehabilitative rhetorical statements are issued concurrently. The argument is empirically tested by analyzing the presidential addresses of the Reagan and Bush administrations for drug-related statements. Regression analysis, analysis of variance, and crosstabular analyses are used to test several hypotheses derived from the theoretical discussion. The empirical evidence supports the theoretical discussion and the constructionist perspective of social problems.     

GOLEMS IN THE BIOTECH CENTURY

The legend of the golem, the creation of life through mystical and magical means, is the most famous postbiblical Jewish legend. After noting recent references to the golem legend in fiction, film, art, and scientific literature, I outline three stages of the development of the legend, including its relationship to the story of Frankenstein. I apply teachings about the golem in classical Jewish religious literature to implications of the legend for ethical issues relating to bioengineering, reproductive biotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence, artificial life, and corporate ethics. The golem legend emerges as a source of prudent guidance through the minefield of ethical and spiritual problems emerging from current and expected developments in biotechnology.     

What Pessimism about Moral Deference Means for Disagreement

Many writers have recently argued that there is something distinctively problematic about sustaining moral beliefs on the basis of others’ moral views. Call this claim pessimism about moral deference. Pessimism about moral deference, if true, seems to provide an attractive way to argue for a bold conclusion about moral disagreement: moral disagreement generally does not require belief revision. Call this claim steadfastness about moral disagreement. Perhaps the most prominent recent discussion of the connection between moral deference and moral disagreement, due to Alison Hills, uses pessimism about the former to argue for steadfastness about the latter. This paper reveals that this line of thinking, and others like it, are unsuccessful. There is no way to argue from a compelling version of pessimism about moral deference to the conclusion of steadfastness about moral disagreement. The most plausible versions of pessimism about moral deference have only very limited implications for moral disagreement.     

The role of hyperventilation in panic disorder: a response to Ley (1991)

Ley (Behaviour Research and Therapy, 29, 301–304, 1991) provided a reinterpretation of experimental findings on the efficacy of breathing retraining plus cognitive restructuring in reducing the symptomatology of patients with panic disorder with agoraphobia which were presented in a 1989 article in this journal. On the basis of his reinterpretation, they concluded that our findings supported the central role of hyperventilation in panic attacks. Ley's arguments are discussed and we conclude that his reinterpretation provides new arguments against a hyperventilation theory of panic. Furthermore, recent evidence from empirical studies does not support a central role for hyperventilation in panic attacks.     

Why are some moral beliefs perceived to be more objective than others?

Recent research has investigated whether people think of their moral beliefs as objectively true facts about the world, or as subjective preferences. The present research examines variability in the perceived objectivity of different moral beliefs, with respect both to the content of moral beliefs themselves (what they are about), and to the social representation of those moral beliefs (whether other individuals are thought to hold them). It also examines the possible consequences of perceiving a moral belief as objective. With respect to the content of moral beliefs, we find that beliefs about the moral properties of negatively valenced acts are seen as reliably more objective than beliefs about the moral properties of positively valenced acts. With respect to the social representation of moral beliefs, we find that the degree of perceived consensus regarding a moral belief positively influences its perceived objectivity. The present experiments also demonstrate that holding a moral belief to be objective is associated with a more ‘closed’ response in the face of disagreement about it, and with more morally pejorative attributions towards a disagreeing other person.     

Love,Respect, and Individuals: Murdoch as a Guide to Kantian Ethics

I reconsider the relation between love and respect in Kantian ethics, taking as my guide Iris Murdoch's view of love as the fundamental moral attitude and a kind of attention to individuals. It is widely supposed that Kantian ethics disregards individuals, since we don't respect individuals but the universal quality of personhood they instantiate. We need not draw this conclusion if we recognise that Kant and Murdoch share a view about the centrality of love to virtue. We can then see that respect in the virtuous person cannot be blind to the individual, as critics of Kantian ethics contend. My approach contrasts recent efforts (Velleman and Bagnoli) to assimilate Kantian respect to Murdochian love, which overlook Murdoch's distinctive claims about the singularity of moral activity. This idea is not as un‐Kantian as it seems, and it should inform any Kantian ethics that aims to address the charge about individuals.     

A Reply to McDonald: A Defense in Favor of Requirement Conflicts

In "The Presumption in Favor of Requirement Conflicts" Julie McDonald has offered some serious and challenging criticisms of the recent literature centered around the moral dilemmas debate. If McDonald is correct, the philosophers who have contributed to this debate share some questionable presuppositions about the role and significance of an adequate moral theory. It is beyond dispute that the moral dilemmas debate has elevated the importance of requirement conflicts above other types of conflicts. McDonald argues that this is a needlessly restrictive way to approach the issue. She maintains that the potential for unavoidable moral residue in the form of guilt, as well as the chance of moral unresolvability, are the two central concerns which motivate the issue. These concerns then figure into her diagnosis of the implicit background assumptions that explain the rationality of the debate. In what follows I shall consider whether or not the participants to this debate are forced to accept these assumptions.     

Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: from Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance

How should we understand the notion of moral objectivity? Metaethical positions that vindicate morality’s objective appearance are often associated with moral realism. On a realist construal, moral objectivity is understood in terms of mind-, stance-, or attitude-independence. But realism is not the only game in town for moral objectivists. On an antirealist construal, morality’s objective features are understood in virtue of our attitudes. In this paper I aim to develop this antirealist construal of moral objectivity in further detail, and to make its metaphysical commitments explicit. I do so by building on Sharon Street’s version of “Humean Constructivism”. Instead of the realist notion of attitude-independence, the antirealist account of moral objectivity that I articulate centres on the notion of standpoint-invariance. While constructivists have been criticized for compromising on the issue of moral objectivity, I make a preliminary case for the thesis that, armed with the notion of standpoint-invariance, constructivists have resources to vindicate an account of objectivity with just the right strength, given the commitments of ordinary moral thought and practice. In support of this thesis I highlight recent experimental findings about folk moral objectivism. Empirical observations about the nature of moral discourse have traditionally been taken to give prima facie support to moral realism. I argue, by contrast, that from what we can tell from our current experimental understanding, antirealists can capture the commitments of ordinary discourse at least as well as realists can.