Inequality-Adjusted Happiness in Nations Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism Married in a New Index of Societal Performance

According to the utilitarian creed, the quality of a society should be judged using the degree of happiness of its members, the best society being the one that provides the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Following the egalitarian principle, the quality of a society should rather be judged by the disparity in happiness among citizens, a society being better if differences in happiness are smaller. Performance on these standards can be measured using cross-national surveys, where degree of happiness is measured using the mean response to a question about happiness and disparity expressed as the standard deviation. In this paper we marry these measures together in an index of ‘Inequality-Adjusted Happiness’ (IAH) that gives equal weight to either criterion. It is a linear combination of the mean happiness value and the standard deviation and it is expressed as a number on a 0–100 scale. We applied this index to 90 nations for the 1990s and observed large and systematic differences, IAH being higher in rich, free and well-governed countries. We also considered the trend over time for 14 rich countries and found that IAH has increased over the last 30 years.     

The Fear of Happiness Anthropological Motives

Anthropologies are different – but Man has seldom been defined as a creature of happiness. Especially in German philosophy there has been a deep scepticism against happiness, most famously in Schopenhauer's pessimistic world view, but also in the desperate visions and in the heroic cynicism following from them in Nietzsche's philosophy. Although Kant and Hegel – influenced by liberal (English) thoughts – have not under estimated the happiness of the single individual, the majority of philosophers – particularly the representatives of Philosophical Anthropology in the 20th century (Scheler, Plessner and Gehlen) – remained (as will be examined in this essay in more detail) sceptical about happiness as fulfilment. In this topos there is also an evident emotion against mass society and a cultural-critical aversion to the eudaimonia of consumerism. In this way, from the point of view of the educated elites, happiness in modern times can only be found in social and intellectual distance, e.g. in the security of contemplation (especially after fascism with its promises of an activism bringing happiness). The dominant element seems to be a philosophical fear of happiness, of decadence and of happy nivellement. Even Goethe had seen Dr. Faustus losing his life and eternal salvation when he was thinking of the moment as so beautiful that it should remain so forever. But in spite of all these attitudes and modes of sceptical thinking, it may be neither naïve nor uncritical to concur with Blaise Pascal: That pleasure is good and suffering bad does not need further evidence. The heart feels it.     

Happiness in Durkheim's Sociological Policy of Morals

Emile Durkheim's (1858–1917) concept of society has its most succinct expression in the call to view social facts, and especially moral norms, as things, as natural facts. A moral-political purpose is to prevent anomy. Anomy spreads when people view moral norms as contingent. It contains the seed of social anarchy and the source of unhappiness because it exposes humans to the chaos and the insatiability of their individual desires. The article places Durkheim's thinking within its social historical contexts.     

Perceived Sources of Happiness: A Network Analysis

This study investigated the perceived sources of happiness among young men and women. Rank scores of the perceived reasons for happiness were compared between the two groups and seven significant differences were discerned. Men ranked “sexual activity”, “sports”, being “liked” and having a “good social life” significantly higher than women. Women ranked “helping others”, having a “close family” and being “loved by loved ones” significantly higher than men. A modified form of network analysis was also conducted. Both networks demonstrated similar core representations of happiness with a focus on self-confidence, being free of stress, occupational and social factors, family support and personal relationships. However, the networks show an association between sexual activity and male personal relationships, whereas emotional factors are associated with female personal relationships. The male network also demonstrates the importance of sports and physical activity in male happiness. Despite some gender differences, it is suggested that the similarities within the mean rank scores and networks form the core elements of a shared social representation of happiness.     

The Power to Feel Fear and The One to Feel Happiness are the Same

The centre of Adorno's Critical Theory is occupied by the theme of happiness. He speaks of the impaired life, of the unjustness of society, of murderous prejudices, of the atrocities in history, of the dissonance in art, of the unhappy consciousness, because something better can only be described from a point of opposition. Happiness cannot be objectified as possession, it always needs to be experienced subjectively, somatically. (With happiness it is like with truth: One does not have it, one is in it.) Happiness cannot be prescribed and ordered; nothing can be done to guarantee happiness. (Happiness goes beyond doing.) Happiness (like fear) has to do with being open to experience which can overwhelm the self. Sexual and aesthetical experience are models for such overwhelming happiness. The sensation of happiness always is very personal, but in this experience the individual leaves its particularity behind. One has to differentiate between goal and object: Happiness may be a goal, but not it itself, only what obstructs it, can be an object of Critical Theory.     

行为决策视野中的幸福及其提升策略

人类的终极目标之一就是获得幸福。随着行为决策研究的不断发展, 近年来有许多行为决策领域的研究者开始了对幸福的探索。行为决策中的幸福法则包括：快乐编辑、少即是更好、巅峰-结尾法则、短视和损失规避。基于这些法则的提升幸福的策略主要包括：告诉消息的策略、赠送礼物的策略、使用损失规避提升幸福的策略、使用巅峰-结尾法则提升幸福的策略和克服行为短视的策略。     

On Simmel’s conception of philosophy

Over the past few decades, the work of Georg Simmel (1858–1918) has again become of interest. Its reception, however, has been fairly one-sided and selective, mostly because Simmel’s philosophy has been bypassed in favor of his sociological contributions. This article examines Simmel’s explicit reflections on the nature of philosophy. Simmel defines philosophy through three aspects which, according to him, are common to all philosophical schools. First, philosophical reasoning implies the effort to think without preconditions. Second, Simmel maintains that in contrast to other sciences, only philosophy is oriented toward constructing a general view of the world. Third, Simmel claims that philosophical work worthy of the name creates a sphere of a typical way of being in relation to world, a third sphere that is between the personal and the objective. According to Simmel, what has made philosophy’s eminent figures great is that they have advanced a type of thinking and developed it into a particularly interesting form, and this type can still correspond with the way we experience the world. It is significant that these three aspects through which Simmel defines philosophical activity emphasize the forms of questioning, not the contents or objects of thought. Still, he thinks that an interaction with concrete examples is always required in order to make philosophy a meaningful activity. This stance is reflected in the wide variety of topics studied by Simmel himself. In his last works Simmel began to emphasize another aspect of philosophy, its nature as a living movement of thought related to fundamental human limitedness: just as life itself ceaselessly reaches beyond its present form, so philosophy constantly strives to overcome the preconditions of thinking.

Commodification in law: ideologies,intractabilities, and hyperboles

In this paper I first aim to identify, from a perspective mindful of both analytic and Continental traditions, the central normative issues at stake in the various debates concerning commodification in law. Although there now exists a wealth of thoughtful literature in this area, I often find myself disoriented within the webs of moral criteria used to analyze the increasingly ubiquitous practice of converting legal goods into monetary values. I therefore attempt to distinguish and organize these often conflated conceptual distinctions across several registers of moral analysis. Second, I formulate what I consider the most illuminating questions regarding the criteria used to evaluate commodification in law. Critiques of commodification in law face what I call problems of ideology, intractability, and hyperbole, and identifying these issues helps to explain the momentum of the law and economics movement.

Happiness: Classic Theory in the Light of Current Research

Happiness is an eternal concern of philosophy and social science. Several classic intuitions about happiness get some support by the results of modern empirical research, not least, expectations about positive effects of technological development and individualization. The data do not confirm dismal predictions about anomic unhappiness. Though social development and transformation is ambivalent, the overall balance seems to be positive in modern societies.     

Understanding Happiness: A Look into the Chinese Folk Psychology

This qualitative study using a folk psychology approach explored what Chinese people think about happiness. One hundred and forty-two undergraduate students wrote free-format essays in response to a simple open-ended question, “What is happiness?” Using thematic analysis, four main themes were found. (1) Happiness can be defined in terms of (a) a mental state of satisfaction and contentment; (b) positive feelings/emotions; (c) a harmonious homeostasis; (d) achievement and hope; and (e) freedom from ill-being. (2) Happiness is a harmonious state of existence, under the following conditions: (a) the individual is satisfied or content; (b) the individual is the agent of his own happiness; (c) spiritual enrichment is emphasized more than material satisfaction; and (d) the individual maintains a positive outlook for the future. (3) The relationship between happiness and unhappiness is dialectical. These two distinct entities are locked in a never-ending relationship of interdependence: each depends on the other for contrast and meaning. Moreover, this relationship between the two opposites is also dynamic and constantly changing. (4) Happiness can be achieved, provided that one has the following abilities: (a) the wisdom of discovery; (b) the wisdom of contentment and gratitude; (c) the wisdom of giving; and (d)the wisdom of self-cultivation. These themes were discussed in the contexts of Chinese philosophical and folk views of happiness.     

In Pursuit of Happiness: How Some Young South African Children Construct Happiness

The purpose of the study was to explore the ways in which young South African children construct the notion of happiness. The small-scale study was conducted with children (n=42) in middle childhood between the ages of 6 and 13 years. Four fieldworkers were trained to elicit responses from young children through face-to-face, semi-structured interviews and six open-ended questions. This data collection strategy was twinned with the elicitation of graphic representations of ‘happiness’ as expressed and projected by the young children. Observations and audiotape data capturing served as secondary data sources. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed through theme analysis. Axial coding followed open coding as themes emerged. Graphic representations were analysed using basic psychological analysis techniques and then correlated with established themes from the interview data. Results from the study indicate that the participants in the study constructed ‘happiness’ predominantly in terms of relationships, recreation and the attainment of material possessions.     

Research Note: Happiness among Kuwaiti College Students

Happiness was assessed in 140 Kuwaiti students by means of a single item self-report. Its retest reliability after one week was good (r=+0.86). It is argued that single question suffices for measuring states like happiness. Average happiness appeared to be quite low compared to students in other countries. Possible reasons for the low level of happiness among Kuwaiti college students are discussed. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Happiness Trends Under Democracy: Where Will the New South African

Five years after South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, life satisfaction and happiness still reflect societal divides sowed by apartheid social engineering. The paper reports the indicators: life satisfaction, happiness and expectations for the future, from national surveys conducted between 1983 and 1999 for the South African Quality-of-Life Trends Project. Post-election euphoria, which saw all South Africans happy and satisfied with life for a brief moment in 1994, raises the question where the new set-level of subjective well-being will eventually come to rest. In 1999, in spite of some gains in living conditions, the level of life satisfaction of blacks has not risen above the mid-point and happiness is only slightly above the mid-point. Meanwhile, whites, who have forfeited their political dominance, continue to score above the mid-point on happiness and life satisfaction. The paper draws on the literature, particularly on quality-of-life trends in reunified Germany and paradoxical trends in African-American life satisfaction when discussing the dynamics underlying South African subjective well-being. It is argued that coping mechanisms may play an important role in determining levels of subjective well-being in the complex situation of South Africa.     

对以边沁、密尔为代表的功利主义的分析批判

边沁的功利主义为苦乐原理、效果论和功利原则这样三个理论基点所构成。这是一个有着内在逻辑困境的三原理。苦乐原理由于没有进行内在的质的区分,为密尔所修正,但密尔的修正突出了苦乐原理与效果论的内在不一致;同时,密尔以自我牺牲来补充功利主义,又暴露了功利主义原则的内在矛盾。还有,密尔以平等权利来为功利主义的最大幸福原理辩护,恰恰表明功利原则并非是可以成为一个理论的基础性原则或终极原则。斯马特的行动功利主义则进一步暴露了功利主义的非正义性特性。功利主义的这样三个典范表明仅仅诉诸功利原则无从走出内在逻辑困境。布兰特援引认知理论以及道义论原则,笔认为这才使功利主义从其困境中走出。     

Lay Theories of Happiness

Over 230 young people completed a battery of questionnaires measuring personality, self-esteem, and happiness as well as one developed specifically for this study on their theories of the causes of happiness. The 36 causes factored into six internally coherent and interpretable factors. Self-reported happiness, extraversion and sex were correlated with the lay theory factors. Four of the six factors were modestly (r < 0.20) correlated with the Oxford Happiness Inventory (OHI) scores. Path analysis, using the OHI as the dependent variable, showed self-esteem, extraversion and neuroticism direct predictors of happiness but that among the lay theories, only lay theories about optimism and contentment were direct predictors. Personality and demographic variables did predict the lay theories but the latter did not act as moderator or mediating factors between the former and happiness. The role and function of lay theories with respect to happiness are discussed.     

Two Philosophical Problems in the Study of Happiness

In this paper two philosophical issues are discussed that hold special interest for empirical researchers studying happiness. The first issue concerns the question of how the psychological notion(s) of happiness invoked in empirical research relates to those traditionally employed by philosophers. The second concerns the question of how we ought to conceive of happiness, understood as a purely psychological phenomenon. With respect to the first, I argue that 'happiness', as used in the philosophical literature, has three importantly different senses that are often confused. Empirical research on happiness concerns only one of these senses, and serious misunderstandings about the significance of empirical results can arise from such confusion. I then argue that the second question is indeed philosophical and that, in order to understand the nature of (what I call) psychological happiness, we need first to determine what a theory of happiness is supposed to do: what are our theoretical and practical interests in the notion of happiness? I sketch an example of how such an inquiry might proceed, and argue that this approach can shed more light on the nature and significance of happiness (and related mental states) than traditional philosophical methods.     

Happiness as an additional antecedent of schadenfreude

The current study examined whether dispositionally happy individuals feel less happiness when another person experiences a misfortune. Happy individuals are known to be less vulnerable to upward comparison information. In addition, schadenfreude is elicited by upward comparison targets (e.g. high achievers and tall poppies). Thus, it was assumed that happiness would decrease schadenfreude. The lower level of hostile feelings in happy individuals, which are elicited by threats to one’s person and inferiority heightened when confronted with a high achiever, was hypothesized to decrease schadenfreude. Studies 1 and 2 were conducted with scenario experiments, and the hypotheses were supported in both studies. Regression analyses revealed a significant direct effect of happiness on a reduction in schadenfreude. How not feeling schadenfreude when witness another person’s misfortune helps people maintain and/or increase their happiness is discussed.     

Economy, Values and Happiness in Norway

Why has the level of happiness in the Norwegian population not risen in parallel with the substantial increases in income and possessions in the period 1985–2001? An answer is sought by analysing data from a series of large representative surveys of the Norwegian population. Individual level correlations between indicators of health or family situation and happiness indicate that the measure of happiness is valid, and that happiness is not fully determined by personality traits, but affected also by changes in the circumstances of an individual. Several aspects of a person's economic situation turn out to have significant effects on happiness, in particular how the situation is subjectively experienced. Even if the development for some of these subjective indicators does not reflect the improvement in objective economic conditions, there is sufficient positive change to expect an increase in the level of happiness. The stability in aggregate happiness means that counteracting influences must have been present. One such factor is value orientation. An increasing tendency for Norwegians to give priority to income and material possessions appears to have had an adverse effect on happiness towards the end of the last millennium.