Syllogistic: Old Wine in New Bottles

In the late nineteenth century there were two very active lines of research in the field of formal logic. First, logicians (mostly in English-speaking countries) were engaged in formulating a generally traditional logic as an algebra, a part of mathematics; second, logicians (mostly on the continent) were busy building a non-traditional logic that could serve, not as a part of, but as the foundation of, mathematics. By the end of the First World War the former line had been pretty well abandoned while the second continued to expand. However, that old abandoned line, stretching from Aristotle, through the Scholastics and then Leibniz to the nineteenth century algebraists, had not been completely forgotten. One of those logicians who has recently worked on the restoration (and, importantly, the extension) of that line is Fred Sommers. His Term Logic preserves a number of traditional insights (especially involving the theory of logical syntax), while also enjoying a power to account for formal inference at least comparable to that of the standard logic now in place.     

On Epistemological Shifts and Good Old French Wine (in New Bottles): Commentary on Elcheroth,Doise, and Reicher

In this article, we first suggest that the approach presented by Elcheroth, Doise, and Reicher is particularly relevant in view of the “neuroscientific turn” that faces political psychology. Thus, we note that the distinction between content and process and the predilection for general, intrapsychological, and content‐free explanations of political cognition and behavior are encouraged by these developments. We contrast the contribution of the social representations approach to the understanding of social conflict and social change with the approach promoted by these new perspectives. Next, we consider the four themes highlighted by Elcheroth et al. as distinctive of the social representations approach. We notice convergences between these themes and several areas of “mainstream” social and political psychology and show that several of these themes have surfaced in these fields without making reference to this approach.     

Herman Bavinck and the Problem of New Wine in Old Wineskins

Recent years have witnessed a flowering in Bavinck studies and a new focus on the synthetic character of Bavinck's theology. Bavinck's epistemology represents a prime example of this synthetic character, as Bavinck recasts the principia of Reformed Orthodoxy in a trinitarian framework, which in turn is used to address a residual problem of post‐Enlightenment philosophy. While ingenious, certain inconsistencies emerge on account of the sheer complexity of Bavinck's principia. This article explores two inconsistencies that have been identified in the secondary literature and the extent to which these inconsistencies threaten the coherence of Bavinck's epistemology as a whole.     

Old Wine for a New Bottle: Toward a New Video Projective Technique

Virtually all of the research conducted on black populations in the past has been done with culturally biased instruments which has led to the image of the black personality as a sick white man or as culturally deviant.     

Causation in a New Old Key

I argue (1) that it is not philosophically significant whether causation is linguistically represented by a predicate or by a sentence connective; (2) that there is no philosophically significant distinction between event- and states-of-affairs-causation; (3) that there is indeed a philosophically significant distinction between agent- and event-causation, and that event-causation must be regarded as an analog of agent-causation. Developing this point, I argue that event-causation's being in the image of agent-causation requires, mainly, (a) that the cause is temporally prior to the effect, (b) that the cause necessitates (is sufficient with necessity) for the effect. Causal necessity is explained as a derivative of nomological necessity, and finally, via a definition of the causal sentence connective, the logic of event-causation is shown to be a part of temporal modal logic.     

Stuffed Cabbage in the Old New School Cafeteria

The purpose of this lecture is to celebrate the memory of Aron Gurwitsch by examining and enlarging the domain of phenomenological clarification of some elements of what Gurwitsch called the logic of reality. Chief among those elements are the nature of the taken-for-grantedness of our existential belief, the difference between presentive and non-presentive indices of reality and the ground for the self-illumination of the world of working.     

Historical inductions,Old and New

Synthese - I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root...     

Emotion in Schizophrenia: Old Mystery, New Understanding

Early theories of schizophrenia emphasized emotional features, yet empirical research into the nature of emotion in schizophrenia has only recently been conducted. Drawing from the paradigms developed by emotion researchers and theorists, a number of replicable findings on emotion in schizophrenia have now emerged. Compared with nonpatients, schizophrenia patients exhibit very few outward displays of emotion, yet they exhibit subtle, microexpressive displays. Schizophrenia patients report experiencing strong emotions in response to emotional material, yet they do not often report experiencing strong pleasant emotions in daily living. These emotion disturbances have important social and intervention implications, and they point to a number of important directions for research.     

Constructing a New Theory From Old Ideas and New Evidence

A central tenet of constructivist models of conceptual development is that children's initial conceptual level constrains how they make sense of new evidence and thus whether exposure to evidence will prompt conceptual change. Yet little experimental evidence directly examines this claim for the case of sustained, fundamental conceptual achievements. The present study combined scaling and experimental microgenetic methods to examine the processes underlying conceptual change in the context of an important conceptual achievement of early childhood—the development of a representational theory of mind. Results from 47 children (M age = 3.7 years) indicate that only children who were conceptually close to understanding false belief at the beginning of the study, and who were experimentally exposed to evidence of people acting on false beliefs, reliably developed representational theories of minds. Combined scaling and microgenetic data revealed how prior conceptual level interacts with experience, thereby providing critical experimental evidence for how conceptual change results from the interplay between conceptions and evidence.