Literature as a Meaningful Life Laboratory

Meaningful life is emotionally marked off. That’s the general point that Johansen (IPBS: Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 44, 2010) makes which is of great importance. Fictional abstractions use to make the point even more salient. As an example I’ve examined Borges’ famous fiction story. Along with the examples of Johansen it provides an informative case of exploring symbolic mechanisms which bind meaning with emotions. This particular mode of analysis draws forth poetry and literature in general to be treated as a “meaningful life laboratory”. Ways of explanation of emotional effect the art exercises on people, which had been disclosed within this laboratory, however, constitute a significant distinction in terms that I have designated as “referential” and “substantive”. The former appeals to something that has already been charged with emotional power, whereas the latter comes to effect by means of special symbolic mechanisms creating the emotional experience within the situation. Johansen, who tends to explain emotions exerted by the art without leaving the semiotic perspective, is drawn towards the “referential” type of explanation. Based upon discussions in theory of metaphor and Robert Witkin’s sociological theory of arts it is demonstrated an insufficient of “referential” explanation. To overcome a monopoly of “referential” explanation of emotional engagement, in particular, in literature, means to break away from the way of reasoning, stating endless references to “something else”, presupposing the existence of something already significant and therefore sharing its effects.     

First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality

In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, the proposal runs headlong into the now familiar “bootstrapping” objection that helped illuminate the need to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the first place. Lastly, even if Southwood is right—the demands of rationality just are the demands or our first-personal standpoints—the explanation as to why our standpoints generate reasons will entail that we sometimes have no reason at all to be rational.     

Dr. Mom? Conversational Play and the Submergence of Professional Status in Childbirth

Through a close analysis of various moments within two hours of video-taped interaction, we investigate properties of the setting that the participants cannot ignore even as they transform them in various ways. These properties are not under local control. What is under control is revealed in the participants' “play” with the properties, including dangerous, “deep” play. In this process, some properties of the participants are rarely mentioned (e.g., that the laboring woman is an MD), others are repeatedly emphasized (e.g. the strength of contractions). And others appear in ways that have not been dealt with adequately in current theoretical frameworks. To deal with life-threatening lies, and jokes about lies, we must move away from theories of hegemonic particularity that rely on a habitus. Rather we must acknowledge the practical understandings revealed in the collective submergence of that which may be actively noted as potentially relevant and then set aside so that other tasks can be foregrounded and achieved.     

Background shifts affect explanatory style: how a pragmatic theory of explanation accounts for background effects in the generation of explanations

Cognitive scientists are interested in explanation because it provides a window into the cognition that underlies one’s understanding of the world. We argue that the study of explanation has tended to focus on what makes an explanation “bona fide” as opposed to the processes involved in how the explanation is generated. In the current study, we asked participants to respond to the request for an explanation within a novel domain after we manipulated their initial exposure to the domain, and thus the background of the request. In two experiments, we found evidence that the background shaped participants’ interpretations of the prompt for the explanation and that this, in turn, influenced whether they used a causal or functional style of explanation when responding to the prompt. We also asked participants to evaluate a number of explanations and found that the manipulation of the background did not have the same effect on the evaluative tasks. Our data support a pragmatic approach (e.g. The scientific image. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980) to the study of explanation generation, a philosophical approach which argues that the background influences the interpretation of the question, the development of a relevance relation which connects the question and explanation, and the identification of some set of candidate answers. We also suggest there is an important difference between the process of generating an explanation and evaluating an explanation, a difference that has escaped the attention of cognitive scientists thus far.     

Funny business in branching space-times: infinite modal correlations

The theory of branching space-times is designed as a rigorous framework for modelling indeterminism in a relativistically sound way. In that framework there is room for “funny business”, i.e., modal correlations such as occur through quantum-mechanical entanglement. This paper extends previous work by Belnap on notions of “funny business”. We provide two generalized definitions of “funny business”. Combinatorial funny business can be characterized as “absence of prima facie consistent scenarios”, while explanatory funny business characterizes situations in which no localized explanation of inconsistency can be given. These two definitions of funny business are proved to be equivalent, and we provide an example that shows them to be strictly more general than the previously available definitions of “funny business”.     

��Justice is happiness��?��An analysis of Plato��s strategies in response to challenges from the sophists

The challenge from the sophists with whom Plato is confronted is: Who can prove that the just man without power is happy whereas the unjust man with power is not? This challenge concerns the basic issue of politics: the relationship between justice and happiness. Will the unjust man gain the exceptional “happiness of the strong” by abusing his power and by injustice? The gist of Plato’s reply is to speak not of “justice” but of “intrinsic justice,” i.e., the strength of virtue which, in his account, is the fundamental good of man. Nevertheless, many contend that intrinsic justice is actually injustice, for the division of power in the state is undemocratic while in the soul, the suppression of desire by the reason. Plato’s advocacy of hierarchical, elite political system has enraged democrats, while his idea of “philosopher king” has enraged the aristocrats as well. So, who will appreciate Plato’s effort?     

Interference resolution in major depression

In two experiments, we investigated individual differences in the ability to resolve interference in participants diagnosed with major depressive disorder (MDD). Participants were administered the “Ignore/Suppress” task, a short-term memory task composed of two steps. In Step 1 (“ignore”), participants were instructed to memorize a set of stimuli while ignoring simultaneously presented irrelevant material. In Step 2 (“suppress”), participants were instructed to forget a subset of the previously memorized material. The ability to resolve interference was indexed by response latencies on two recognition tasks in which participants decided whether a probe was a member of the target set. In Step 1, we compared response latencies to probes from the to-be-ignored list with response latencies to nonrecently presented items. In Step 2, we compared response latencies to probes from the to-be-suppressed list with response latencies to nonrecently presented items. The results indicate that, compared with control participants, depressed participants exhibited increased interference in the “suppress” but not in the “ignore” step of the task, when the stimuli were negative words. No group differences were obtained when we presented letters instead of emotional words. These findings indicate that depression is associated with difficulty in removing irrelevant negative material from short-term memory.     

Choosing remedies after accidents: Counterfactual thoughts and the focus on fixing “human error”

The present research is motivated by an interest in why organizational decision makers so often respond to accidents with remedy plans that focus narrowly on correcting human error rather than more environment-focused plans or more encompassing plans. We investigated the role of counterfactual thinking in the decision-making tendency toward human-focused plans. Our experiments indicated that even in a domain where human-focused remedies were not otherwise appealing, many participants decided on human-focused remedies after they had generated an “if only” conjecture about the accident. This reflects that human actions are often selected as the focus of “if only” conjectures and, importantly, that this focus “locks in” and carries through to subsequent remedy decisions. Our hypothesis that remedy plans are produced from “if only” thoughts was supported over several alternative interpretations. We discuss implications for research on the relation between counterfactual thinking and adaptive learning.     

Object permanence in adult common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus): not everything is an “A-not-B” error that seems to be one

In this paper, we describe a behaviour pattern similar to the “A-not-B” error found in human infants and young apes in a monkey species, the common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). In contrast to the classical explanation, recently it has been suggested that the “A-not-B” error committed by human infants is at least partially due to misinterpretation of the hider’s ostensively communicated object hiding actions as potential ‘teaching’ demonstrations during the A trials. We tested whether this so-called Natural Pedagogy hypothesis would account for the A-not-B error that marmosets commit in a standard object permanence task, but found no support for the hypothesis in this species. Alternatively, we present evidence that lower level mechanisms, such as attention and motivation, play an important role in committing the “A-not-B” error in marmosets. We argue that these simple mechanisms might contribute to the effect of undeveloped object representational skills in other species including young non-human primates that commit the A-not-B error.     

Care of the Self and Patient Participation in Genetic Discourse: A Foucauldian Reading of the Surgeon General's “My Family Health Portrait” Program

Critics of genetic discourse are concerned that deterministic and discriminatory views of genetics are increasingly becoming adopted. These views argue that current genetic discourse becomes a source of power whereby powerful institutions harm people with so-called “bad” genes. This essay argues that current analyses of the power of genetics discourse are grounded in an improper reading that disempowers patients. Deploying Michel Foucault's concept “care of the self,” this essay claims that genetics discourse is better understood as a way that patients take on power through rhetoric rather than a force that has power over patients. Through a close reading of the “My Family Health Portrait” program, this paper argues that patients experience a process of “subjection” wherein they become agents of and objects of genetics discourse both. This alternative mode of analyzing the power of genetics discourse has implications for our collective understanding of the operations of the care of the self and the uses of genetic information that we propose.     

Reduction: the Cheshire cat problem and a return to roots

In this paper, I propose two theses, and then examine what the consequences of those theses are for discussions of reduction and emergence. The first thesis is that what have traditionally been seen as robust, reductions of one theory or one branch of science by another more fundamental one are a largely a myth. Although there are such reductions in the physical sciences, they are quite rare, and depend on special requirements. In the biological sciences, these prima facie sweeping reductions fade away, like the body of the famous Cheshire cat, leaving only a smile. ... The second thesis is that the “smiles” are fragmentary patchy explanations, and though patchy and fragmentary, they are very important, potentially Nobel-prize winning advances. To get the best grasp of these “smiles,” I want to argue that, we need to return to the roots of discussions and analyses of scientific explanation more generally, and not focus mainly on reduction models, though three conditions based on earlier reduction models are retained in the present analysis. I briefly review the scientific explanation literature as it relates to reduction, and then offer my account of explanation. The account of scientific explanation I present is one I have discussed before, but in this paper I try to simplify it, and characterize it as involving field elements (FE) and a preferred causal model system (PCMS) abbreviated as FE and PCMS. In an important sense, this FE and PCMS analysis locates an “explanation” in a typical scientific research article. This FE and PCMS account is illustrated using a recent set of neurogenetic papers on two kinds of worm foraging behaviors: solitary and social feeding. One of the preferred model systems from a 2002 Nature article in this set is used to exemplify the FE and PCMS analysis, which is shown to have both reductive and nonreductive aspects. The paper closes with a brief discussion of how this FE and PCMS approach differs from and is congruent with Bickle’s “ruthless reductionism” and the recently revived mechanistic philosophy of science of Machamer, Darden, and Craver.     

Misinterpretation of conditional statements in Wason's selection task

Errors may be made on Wason's selection task because either (a) the rule to be tested is misunderstood, or (b) reasoning from that rule is inaccurate, or both. We report two experiments using the experimental paradigm introduced by Gebauer and Laming in which subjects are given six problems in succession. We use the subset of cards selected by each subject as (a) an indication of how the rule is understood and, when that selection is consistent throughout all six problems (so that we can infer a consistent understanding of the rule), as (b) a basis for evaluating the accuracy of the subject's reasoning according to three independent criteria. Experiment 1 adds an exactly parallel contextual version of the task to permit comparison between performances (by the same subjects) on the two versions. Experiment 2 repeats Exp. 1, but with negatives inserted in the conditional rule. Most subjects make a consistent selection of cards throughout all six problems, but typically appear to misunderstand the rule. This is so in both abstract and contextual tasks and replicates the finding by Gebauer and Laming. Most misunderstandings consisted of either (a) reading the simple conditional rule as a bi-conditional or (b) substituting “top/underneath” for “one side/other side”. In Exp. 1 subjects seldom misevaluated the rule they appeared to be testing, but such “errors” of evaluation were common in Exp. 2. Negatives confuse the subjects and should not be used in any conditional application that matters. In Exp. 2 (but not 1) there was a significant correlation between interpretations of the two tasks. We provide an explanation of “matching bias” (it results from the confluence of the two common misunderstandings above) and comment on “mental models” which are, at present, unable to accommodate the variety of results we present here. We also relate our experimental paradigm to the conditional inference task and to truth tables. Received: 26 February 1999 / Accepted: 5 November 1999     

Exploring the hardship of ease: Subjective and objective effort in the ease-of-processing paradigm

Numerous studies examined the role of processing effort in judgments using the “ease-of-processing” paradigm in which participants generate or retrieve few or many issue-relevant thoughts. Because earlier studies only assessed the subjective effort, it is unclear if this paradigm also mobilizes objective effort, and how such effort relates to subjective effort. These questions were addressed in two experiments modeled on standard tasks from the processing effort literature: “ease of argument generation” (Study 1) and “ease of retrieval” (Study 2). In both experiments we simultaneously measured subjective effort (via self-report) and objective effort (via cardiovascular reactivity). The results showed that processing ease manipulations (generation or retrieval of few vs. many exemplars) influence not only subjective effort, but also objective effort, as reflected especially by increases of systolic blood pressure in the many exemplars condition. However, only subjective effort was related to judgment. In the discussion, we consider the role of various forms of effort and other relevant variables in “processing ease” effects.     

Bergmann’s dilemma: exit strategies for internalists

Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of “weak awareness internalism” that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of “strong awareness internalism” that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s “vicious regress” horn. We note along the way that these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma’s other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat.     

Can the World Help Us in Fixing the Reference of Natural Kind Terms?

According to Putnam the reference of natural kind terms is fixed by the world, at least partly; whether two things belong to the same kind depends on whether they obey the same objective laws. We show that Putnam's criterion of substance identity only “works” if we read “objective laws” as “OBJECTIVE LAWS”. Moreover, at least some of the laws of some of the special sciences have to be included. But what we consider to be good special sciences and what not depends upon our values. Hence, “objective laws” cannot be read as “OBJECTIVE LAWS”. It follows that the reference of natural kind terms cannot be fixed by the world, not even partly. The final conclusion applies to a variety of realisms. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Influence of Language Form and Conventional Wording on Judgments of Illness

Prior research indicates that category labels influence category judgments, but little is known regarding the effects for familiar categories with significant social consequences. The present studies address this issue by examining the effect of linguistic form on judgments of illnesses. Both mental and physical illnesses were presented in each of three linguistic forms: noun, adjective, and possessive phrase. In Study 1, participants were asked to judge the permanence of a set of novel illnesses that differed in wording (e.g., “He is a baxtermic”; “He is baxtermic”; “He has baxtermia”). In Studies 2 and 3, participants were asked to judge which forms of wording were most familiar for actual mental illnesses (e.g., schizophrenia) and physical illnesses (e.g., diabetes). In Study 4, participants were asked to judge the permanence of a set of familiar illnesses that differed in wording. The results indicated that for novel illnesses, nouns (“is a”) imply greatest permanence and possessive nouns (“has”) imply least permanence. However, for familiar illnesses, permanence judgments are also influenced by how frequently each form appears in ordinary language use. Mental illnesses are more often expressed with relatively permanent forms (“is” and “is a”) , whereas physical illnesses are more often expressed with relatively transient forms (“has”). The results demonstrate the importance of both linguistic form and conventional wording patterns on how categories are interpreted.     

Some philosophical thoughts on the nature of technology

Much of the effort put into discovering or defining the nature of technology has been along “party lines,” for example, either favoring technology or not. Although there is a clear divergence in the stand that various authors take with respect to this topic, I believe they share a common assumption, namely, that there is such a thing as “the essence” or “nature” of technology. My claim in this paper is that the broad use to which we put the term “technology” is better understood on the model of “family resemblance,” a model put forward by Ludwig Wittgenstein, than it is on models that utilize the notion of “essence” or “nature.” Not only does the family resemblance model serve us better in understanding the wide variety of uses of the term, but it also helps to ameliorate the antipathy between the parties that their discussions often invoke.     

列维纳斯面对康德、黑格尔、海德格尔——当代哲学关于"存在论"的争论

Levinas subverts the traditional “ontology-epistemology,” and creates a “realm of difference,” the realm of “value,” “ethic,” and “religion,” maintaining that ethics is real metaphysics. According to him, it is not that “being” contains the “other” but the other way round. In this way, the issues of ethics are promoted greatly in the realm of philosophy. Nonetheless, he does not intend to deny “ontology” completely, but reversed the relationship between “ontology (theory of truth)” and “ethics (axiology),” placing the former under the “constraint” of the latter. Different from general empirical science, philosophy focuses more on issues irrelevant to ordinary empirical objects; it does have “objects,” though. More often than not, the issues of philosophy cannot be conceptualized into “propositions”; nevertheless, it absolutely has its “theme.” As a discipline, philosophy continuously takes “being” as its “theme” and “object” of thinking. The point is that this “being” should not be understood as an “object” completely. Rather, it is still a “theme-subject.” In addition to an “object,” “being” also manifests itself in an “attribute” and a kind of “meaning” as well. In a word, it is the temporal, historical, and free “being” rather than “various beings” that is the “theme-subject” of philosophy. Translated by Zhang Lin from Wen Shi Zhe 文史哲 (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), 2007, (1): 61–70