Nonconscious relationship reactance: When significant others prime opposing goals

Individuals nonconsciously and unintentionally pursue goals they associate with relationship partners ( [Fitzsimons and Bargh, 2003] and [Shah, 2003]). Here, we demonstrate conditions under which individuals nonconsciously and unintentionally reject goals they associate with relationship partners and instead pursue opposing goals. In Experiment 1, participants were subliminally primed with the name of a controlling significant other who had a particular goal for them. Without awareness or intent, participants pursued a goal that directly opposed their significant other’s wishes. In Experiment 2, chronic reactance was shown to moderate this effect: Low-reactant individuals adopted a subliminally primed significant other’s goal, whereas high-reactant individuals pursued an opposing goal. This research suggests that in response to controlling significant others and among chronically reactant individuals, the nonconscious activation of relational representations can automatically elicit oppositional goal pursuits, even when pursuit of an oppositional goal results in a personally suboptimal outcome.     

The effects of nonconsciously priming emotion concepts on behavior

Current empirical evidence regarding nonconsciously priming emotion concepts is limited to positively versus negatively valenced affect. This article demonstrates that specific, equally valenced emotion concepts can be nonconsciously activated, remain inaccessible to conscious awareness, and still affect behavior in an emotion-specific fashion. In Experiment 1A, participants subliminally primed with guilty emotion adjectives showed lower indulgence than did participants subliminally primed with sad emotion adjectives; even after the addition of a 5-min time delay, these results were replicated in Experiment 1B. Participants in the different priming conditions showed no differences in their subjective emotion ratings and were unaware of the emotion prime or concept activation. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated these findings using a helping measure, demonstrating that individuals primed with guilt adjectives show more helping than do individuals primed with sadness adjectives. In all studies, effects were moderated by individuals' specific emotion-response habits and characteristics.     

Thinking of you: nonconscious pursuit of interpersonal goals associated with relationship partners

The mere psychological presence of relationship partners was hypothesized to trigger interpersonal goals that are then pursued nonconsciously. Qualitative data suggested that people tend to pursue different interpersonal goals within different types of relationships (e.g., mother, best friend, coworker). In several studies, priming participants' relationship representations produced goal-directed behavior (achievement, helping, understanding) in line with the previously assessed goal content of those representations. These findings support the hypothesis that interpersonal goals are component features of relationship representations and that mere activation of those representations, even in the partner's physical absence, causes the goals to become active and to guide behavior nonconsciously within the current situation.     

Nonconscious goals can shape what people want to feel

Goals can determine what people want to feel (e.g., Tamir et al., 2008), but can they do so even when they are primed outside of conscious awareness? In two studies, participants wanted to feel significantly less angry after they were implicitly primed with a collaboration goal, compared to a neutral prime. These effects were found with different implicit priming manipulations, direct and indirect measures of emotional preferences, and when controlling for concurrent emotional experiences. The effects were obtained in social contexts in which the potential for collaboration was relatively higher (Study 1) and lower (Study 2). Also, similar effects were found when collaboration was activated nonconsciously (Studies 1–2) and consciously (Study 2). By showing that nonconscious goals can shape emotional preferences, we demonstrate that what people want to feel can be determined by factors they are unaware of.     

Self-regulation of priming effects on behavior

In three experiments, we tested whether people can protect their ongoing goal pursuits from antagonistic priming effects by using if-then plans (i.e., implementation intentions). In Experiment 1, concept priming did not influence lexical decision time for a critical stimulus when participants had formed if-then plans to make fast responses to that stimulus. In Experiment 2, participants who were primed with a prosocial goal allowed a confederate who asked for help to interrupt their work on a focal task for a longer time if they had merely formed goal intentions to perform well than if they had also formed implementation intentions for concentrating on the task. In Experiment 3, priming the goal of being fast increased driving speed and errors for participants who had formed mere goal intentions to drive only as fast as safety allowed or who had formed no goal intentions, whereas the driving of participants who had formed such goal intentions as well as implementation intentions showed no such priming effects. Our findings indicate that implementation intentions are an effective self-regulatory tool for shielding actions from disruptive concept- or goal-priming effects.     

无意识目标对道德取向的调节作用

已有研究表明目标可以在无意识的条件下被激活并自动地引导行为以达成目标,但该过程是否通过调节心理准备状态实现尚不清楚。本研究考察了无意识目标对个体道德取向的影响。实验1通过语义启动方式激活被试的成就目标,结果发现,与未激活任何目标的被试相比,激活了无意识成就目标的被试更偏向功利主义道德取向。实验2激活被试母亲的概念,结果发现这部分被试比对照组更偏向道义主义道德取向。上述结果表明,自动激活的目标可以影响个体的道德取向,使个体面对道德情境时能做出更合适的行为以达成目标。     

Goal priming,public transportation habit and travel mode selection: The moderating role of trait mindfulness

Habits in travel mode occur in a stable context and create strong links between travel goals and travel modes in memory. As a consequence, priming a travel goal (i.e., going to a place) in memory increases the accessibility of the associated travel mode among habitual users of this transportation mode. We posit that individual differences in attention to present moment and experience (dispositional mindfulness construct; Brown & Ryan, 2003) could moderate the interaction between travel goal priming and habit strength. In this study, habitual vs. non-habitual users of a subway line were nonconsciously primed with travel goals that were strongly associated with the use of a subway line. In the second part of the study, participants chose, among four travel modes, the one(s) that allowed reaching a specific place. Priming and habit strength contributed non-additively to decision times, but among low-mindfulness participants only. Among non-habitual users, priming speeded decisions at high levels of mindfulness, but slowed decisions at low levels of mindfulness. From a fundamental and applied point of view, discussion focuses on processes crossing habits, non-deliberated responses to environmental cues, and mindfulness.     

Goal pursuit is grounded: The link between forward movement and achievement

We tested whether forward movement is cognitively associated with the achievement goal. We exposed participants to simple visual cues of forward movement, or not, and then measured their achievement motivation. The findings show that incidental exposure to forward movement cues nonconsciously activated an achievement goal. In Experiment 1, those primed with forward movement versus control cues showed significantly greater implicit positivity toward the concept of achievement. In Experiment 2, those primed with forward movement versus control cues performed significantly better on word puzzles. There was no effect on participants' conscious achievement motivation. We discuss the implications of the results for the perspective of goal pursuit as grounded cognition.     

Catching nonconscious goals in the act of decision making

Research has consistently found that goals triggered by environmental cues can influence decision making processes outside of conscious awareness. This lack of awareness led naturally to the presumption that decision makers could not report the activation level of nonconsciously primed goals. This paper shows that goal activation levels can be reported, so long as the report is made during the decision process on a continuous goal activation scale. These results indicate that default lack of awareness is less a limitation of the cognitive system and more a function of the method used to recover goals during a decision process.     

Taking a closer look: On the operation of nonconscious impression formation

In this article, we analyzed the information processing that underlies nonconscious impression formation. In the first experiment, the nonconscious activation of the impression formation goal led to a faster analysis of the trait implications of behaviors, compared with a control group. In Experiment 2, participants who were nonconsciously primed with an impression formation goal were more likely than those in a control condition to form associations in memory between behaviors and implied traits. In Experiment 3, nonconsciously primed participants were more sensitive than those in a control condition to whether inconsistent trait information was relevant or irrelevant to the actor’s disposition. Moreover, in Experiments 2 and 3, those with a nonconscious goal showed just as much evidence of impression formation as those who were consciously and intentionally trying to form an impression. Implications for nonconscious goal-pursuit and impression formation are discussed.     

无意识自我控制目标启动对自我损耗的补偿效应

本研究基于对无意识目标启动的研究,采用阈上、阈下启动方式探讨无意识目标启动对自我损耗的补偿作用。实验1发现,阈上无意识目标启动能够有效提高自我控制,促进自控表现。实验2发现,阈下无意识目标启动对自我损耗存在补偿效应。上述结果提示,通过无意识启动方式激活自我控制目标,可以克服自我损耗的不良效应,且无需意识参与。     

On the Emergence of Human Goal Pursuit: The Nonconscious Regulation and Motivation of Goals

Experimental research in social psychology has discovered that human goal pursuit can emerge in the absence of conscious awareness. Whereas these goal-priming effects are commonly explained in terms of habitual automatic processes, recent studies shed new light on the matter. Building on this recent work, this paper attempts to promote a more comprehensive understanding and examination of the potential mechanisms that enable people to pursue their goals in a nonconscious fashion. Specifically, it addresses (i) the human capacity to pursue goals without awareness of the activation and operation of the goal, even when habits are inadequate; and (ii) the fundamental role of positive affect in nonconsciously modulating the motivation of goals and their pursuit.     

Limitations of semantic priming procedures for automatic goal activation

According to the auto-motive model, behavioral goals can be automatically activated by situational cues and may subsequently guide behavior without individual awarness. Semantic priming has become a popular paradigm for investigating effects of automatic goal activation. Nevertheless, a critical assumption of the model, i.e., that goals can be activated by semantic primes related to situational features associated with the goal, is often assumed rather than tested in experiments using semantic priming procedures. Results of four studies testing the potential of such a prime for goal activation by assessing emotional responses, subjective goal importance, behavioral intentions, and enhanced perception of goal-related stimuli do not support this assumption. The implications of these findings and a critical evaluation of results of other studies are discussed in terms of possible limitations of semantic priming procedures for testing hypotheses derived from the auto-motive model.     

Task interest and actual performance: the moderating effects of assigned and adopted purpose goals

This research examined whether and which purpose goals moderate the relationship between task interest and actual performance and whether assigned goals have different effects (Study 1) than adopted goals (Study 2). Two studies were conducted using a full 2 X 2 design of the performance-mastery and approach-avoidance distinctions, plus control conditions. In the control conditions, that is, in a neutral purpose goal context, the expected positive relationship between initial task interest and actual performance was found. In a purpose goal context, this link held only for a congruent mastery-approach goal (either assigned or adopted). The gain in task interest found in a neutral purpose context was observed in the purpose goal conditions only when participants attained their purpose goals. It was concluded that having an incongruent purpose goal may undermine the positive effect of prior task interest on actual performance as well as on subsequent task interest.     

Cues to intention: the role of movement information

Body movement provides a rich source of cues about other people’s goals and intentions. In the present research, we investigate how well people can distinguish between different social intentions on the basis of movement information. Participants observed a model reaching toward and grasping a wooden block with the intent to cooperate with a partner, compete against an opponent, or perform an individual action. In Experiment 1, a temporal occlusion procedure was used as to determine whether advance information gained during the viewing of the initial phase of an action allowed the observers to discriminate across movements performed with different intentions. In Experiment 2, we examined what kind of cues observers relied upon for the discrimination of intentions by masking selected spatial areas of the model (i.e., the arm or the face) maintaining the same temporal occlusion as for Experiment 1. Results revealed that observers could readily judge whether the object was grasped with the intent to cooperate, compete, or perform an individual action. Seeing the arm was better than seeing the face for discriminating individual movements performed at different speeds (natural-speed vs. fast-speed individual movements). By contrast, seeing the face was better than seeing the arm for discriminating social from individual movements performed at a comparable speed (cooperative vs. natural-speed individual movements, competitive vs. fast-speed individual movements). These results demonstrate that observers are attuned to advance movement information from different cues and that they can use such kind of information to anticipate the future course of an action.     

Short-term action intentions overrule long-term semantic knowledge

In the present study, we investigated whether the preparation of an unusual action with an object (e.g. bringing a cup towards the eye) could selectively overrule long-term semantic representations. In the first experiment it was found that unusual action intentions activated short-term semantic goal representations, rather than long-term conceptual associations. In a second experiment the reversal of long-term priming effects was replicated, while reducing the need for internal verbalization as a possible strategy to accomplish the task. Priming effects in the first two experiments were found to involve the selection of object knowledge at a semantic level, rather than reflecting a general effect of action preparation on word processing (Experiment 3). Finally, in a fourth experiment short-term priming effects were shown to extend beyond a lexical level by showing faster responses to pictures representing the short-term action goal. Together, the present findings extend the ‘selection-for-action’ principle previously used in visual attention to a semantic level, by showing that semantic information is selectively activated in line with the short-term goal of the actor.     

The projection of implicit and explicit goals

In 3 studies, the authors analyzed whether projection occurs for both conscious and nonconscious goals. In Experiment 1, participants who were predisposed to hold a learning goal over a performance goal rated others as possessing more of a learning goal. In Experiment 2, participants who were either implicitly primed with or explicitly assigned to have the goal to compete perceived others as striving for competitive goals more than control participants. In Experiment 3, the authors demonstrated that it was the actual goal to compete rather than the trait construct of competitiveness that was projected. The control of automatic goal projection effects is discussed, and interpersonal consequences of goal projection are delineated.     

The time for doing is not the time for change: effects of general action and inaction goals on attitude retrieval and attitude change

Implicit in many informal and formal principles of psychological change is the understudied assumption that change requires either an active approach or an inactive approach. This issue was systematically investigated by comparing the effects of general action goals and general inaction goals on attitude change. As prior attitudes facilitate preparation for an upcoming persuasive message, general action goals were hypothesized to facilitate conscious retrieval of prior attitudes and therefore hinder attitude change to a greater extent than general inaction goals. Experiment 1 demonstrated that action primes (e.g., "go," "energy") yielded faster attitude report than inaction primes (e.g., "rest," "still") among participants who were forewarned of an upcoming persuasive message. Experiment 2 showed that the faster attitude report identified in Experiment 1 was localized on attitudes toward a message topic participants were prepared to receive. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 showed that, compared with inaction primes, action primes produced less attitude change and less argument scrutiny in response to a counterattitudinal message on a previously forewarned topic. Experiment 6 confirmed that the effects of the primes on attitude change were due to differential attitude retrieval. That is, when attitude expression was induced immediately after the primes, action and inaction goals produced similar amounts of attitude change. In contrast, when no attitude expression was induced after the prime, action goals produced less attitude change than inaction goals. Finally, Experiment 7 validated the assumption that these goal effects can be reduced or reversed when the goals have already been satisfied by an intervening task.     

Preconscious effects of temporary goals on attention

Two experiments examined whether accessible goals preconsciously direct selective attention. Goal activation was manipulated by one's goal pursuit being either undermined or affirmed (resulting in an experienced state of either incompleteness or completeness). Attention responses were assessed through a Stroop-like task (Experiment 1) and a response-time task in which participants indicated a stimulus' direction of motion (Experiment 2). Results showed that when goals were accessible, attention was drawn toward goal-relevant items—even when these items were to be ignored and when responses occurred too fast for conscious control. Accessible goals directed implicit cognition (i.e., attention toward stimuli associated with the goal), despite the fact that these goals were not chronically held, but manipulated in the lab.     

Controlling the unconscious: attentional task sets modulate subliminal semantic and visuomotor processes differentially

Are unconscious processes susceptible to attentional influences? In two subliminal priming experiments, we investigated whether task sets differentially modulate the sensitivity of unconscious processing pathways. We developed a novel procedure for masked semantic priming of words (Experiment 1) and masked visuomotor priming of geometrical shapes (Experiment 2). Before presentation of the masked prime, participants performed an induction task in which they attended to either semantic or perceptual object features designed to activate a semantic or perceptual task set, respectively. Behavioral and electrophysiological effects showed that the induction tasks differentially modulated subliminal priming: Semantic priming, which involves access to conceptual meaning, was found after the semantic induction task but not after the perceptual induction task. Visuomotor priming was observed after the perceptual induction task but not after the semantic induction task. These results demonstrate that unconscious cognition is influenced by attentional control. Unconscious processes in perceptual and semantic processing streams are coordinated congruently with higher-level action goals.