Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky

Gigerenzer has argued that it may be inappropriate to characterize some of the biases identified by Kahneman and Tversky as "errors" or "fallacies," for three reasons: (a) according to frequentists, no norms are appropriate for single-case judgments because single-case probabilities are meaningless; (b) even if single-case probabilities make sense, they need not be governed by statistical norms because such norms are "content-blind" and can conflict with conversational norms; (c) conflicting statistical norms exist. I try to clear up certain misunderstandings that may have hindered progress in this debate. Gigerenzer's main point turns out to be far less extreme than the position of "normative agnosticism" attributed to him by Kahneman and Tversky: Gigerenzer is not denying that norms appropriate for single-case judgments exist, but is rather complaining that the existence and the nature of such norms have been dogmatically assumed by the heuristics and biases literature. In response to this complaint I argue that single-case probabilities (a) make sense and (b) are governed by probabilistic norms, and that (c) the existence of conflicting statistical norms may be less widespread and less damaging than Gigerenzer thinks.     

A critique of Tversky and Kahneman's distinction between fallacy and misunderstanding

Tversky and Kahneman explain cognitive errors in terms of either misunderstanding or fallacy , but have failed to define these concepts. Therefore, they are unable to derive strict diagnostic criteria for distinguishing between them. The lack of conceptual clarification also has prevented them from recognizing the circular relationship between understanding and logicality. Diagnosis of understanding presupposes logicality, and diagnosis of logicality presupposes understanding. This circularity follows when understanding is defined as grasping what is and is not logically implied by a given expression as intended, and when fallacy is defined as logical error. Alternative definitions are discussed and rejected. Tversky and Kahneman fail to realize that one cannot explain and understand what is genuinely illogical, and that, therefore, errors must always be regarded as failure to understand, that is, as logical inference from erroneous premises.     

强纲领的建构与解构(上)--兼论SSK研究纲领的转向

使爱丁堡学派著称于学术界的强纲领 ,是由其领袖人物布鲁尔 (D .Bloor)和巴恩斯(B .Barnes)提出的。布鲁尔在“维特根斯坦与曼海姆的数学社会学” ( 1973 )一文和《知识及社会意象》 ( 1976)一书中 ,巴恩斯在《科学知识和社会学理论》 ( 1974)一书中 ,先后阐述了强纲领的四条原则 ,即因果性 (causality)、公正性 (impartiality)、对称性 (symmetry)和反身性 (reflexivity)。强纲领的提出 ,标志着科学知识社会学 (sociologyofscientificKnowledge ,下简称SSK)的诞生。在强纲领的启蒙下 ,SSK迅速形成了科学争论研究、实验室研究和科学话…     

Sortal concepts and causal continuity: comment of Rips, Blok, and Newman (2006)

L. J. Rips, S. Blok, and G. Newman (2006) proposed that singular concepts, which support the tracing of individual objects across their existence, are governed by a principle of causal continuity. They purported to show that causal continuity is better than existing theories at explaining judgments of the persistence of individual objects. This article makes 3 points. First, the construct of causal connectedness entails a wide variety of different explanatory factors; calling them all causal has questionable explanatory value. There is little evidence that the ultimate basis for identity judgments in many cases is causal. Second, the authors suggest that causal knowledge is indeed important to identity, but that it is important in the context of sortal concepts; different causal information matters for different kinds of things. Finally, the authors consider whether causal knowledge or sortal concepts are more fundamental to tracing individual identity, that is, whether causal knowledge is necessary for identity judgments. The authors appeal to research in developmental psychology that has begun to address this debate, supporting the primacy of sortal concepts. Although there continues to be shortcomings of all theories of object persistence, it is not clear that the causal continuer theory brings new clarity to the puzzle.     

A Psychometric Evaluation of Poloma and Pendleton's (1991) and Ladd and Spilka's (2002, 2006) Measures of Prayer

Prayer has increasingly been used as an empirical measure of religiosity. Recent developments include Ladd and Spilka's Inward, Outward and Upward Prayer Scale, which measures what respondents think about while praying, and Poloma and Pendleton's Measure of Prayer Type, which measures four different dimensions of prayer as well as degree of intimacy with the divine. The present study provides a factor analytical evaluation of both measures, including an examination of total scale and subscale reliability. The measures were administered to a sample of 518 Irish respondents. Although the total scales and subscales were found to be reliable, confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the hypothesized factor structures were a less than optimal fit of the data, while correlational analysis revealed a conceptual overlap between the measures.