Science,Politics and the Production of Biological Knowledge: New Trends and Old Challenges

In the history of biology, knowledge about human differences often has been produced through an interaction with politics and values assumed to be external to science. Two recent books—Jonathan Marks’ Is Science Racist? and Maurizio Meloni’s Political Biology—shed new light on this interplay. While Marks looks into the field of anthropology, Meloni offers a historiographical view on the soft-hard heredity debate. Based on these new contributions, this essay addresses a number of current ways in which society and science conceptualize human differences through categories like race, gender, and class. Especially, this refers to the separation of what is taken as natural and purportedly fixed, from what is cultural and changeable.     

Affect at the margins: Alternative empathies in A Small Place

Against the contemporary universalist injunction to ‘be empathetic’, this paper explores the possibilities of what I call ‘alternative empathies’ in the aftermath of the Atlantic slave trade and European colonialism. Offering an affective reading of Jamaica Kincaid's A Small Place (1988/2000), it examines how empathy expressed at the margins of postcolonial imaginaries might disrupt or refigure some of the dominant ways that affect is thought and mobilised in pervasive Euro-American liberal and neoliberal discourses. As a powerful commentary on the cultural, political, economic and affective links between slavery, colonialism, and contemporary practices of tourism in the Caribbean that has provoked intense emotional responses among its readers, A Small Place offers a pertinent site through which to consider how history, power and violence shape the meanings and effects of empathy. It illustrates how the affective afterlives of decolonisation shape contemporary subjectivities in ways that are not easy to penetrate, nor possible to undo, through the power of empathetic will alone. Yet it also points to the role that alternative empathies can play in interrogating ideas of time as linear and universal and space as self-contained, revealing how we live affectively through different temporalities and spatialities – with varying implications for our senses of possibility in and for the world. I thus argue that exploring alternative empathies might open out to affective politics which do not view emotions instrumentally as sources of – or solutions to – complex social and political problems, but rather examine diverse and shifting relations of feeling for what they might tell us about the affective workings of power in a transnational world.     

Serializing Masochist Subjectivities: Mapping Intensities from Deleuze’s Masoch to <Emphasis Type="Italic">Macho Sluts</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Fifty Shades of Grey</Emphasis>

In this article, I investigate the masochist practices and relations presented in the Fifty shades trilogy by E.L. James and Macho sluts by Pat Califia through the lenses of Coldness and cruelty—Deleuze’s essay on masochism—as well as the further developments of his thoughts on masochist relations as presented in the texts written with Guattari, expressly Anti-Oedipus (in terms of the development of their thought on the body without organs) and A thousand plateaus (as a further exposition on the BwO, but this time directly related to masochism). In particular, I am interested in the relationship of desire—and also sexual desire—to the capitalist machine, as well as the kinds of masochistic literatures and subsequent practices and affective registers that are produced in such a context. Finally, I begin to look at the affective structures needed by masochistic literatures, relations and practices for fomenting becomings that initiate subjectivities where each series is defined in terms of its haecceity so that subjective desire is not reduced to capitalist production.     

愿望采择发展水平对幼儿情感决策的影响

选取148名4岁儿童, 运用实验法考察了幼儿的愿望采择发展水平对其情感决策的影响。结果表明: (1) 幼儿的愿望采择水平对其情感决策具有显著影响。情境中他人愿望信息充足时, 幼儿会采择他人愿望并以此为线索为他人决策, 但对线索的利用程度受其愿望采择水平的制约。(2) 在无关于他人愿望信息提示的条件下, 4岁儿童为他人与为自己的情感决策不存在显著差异。(3) 4岁儿童能够采择他人的单一愿望, 但其冲突愿望采择能力还不成熟。     

A Problem for Generic Generalisations in Scientific Communication

Generic generalisations like ‘Opioids are highly addictive’ are very useful in scientific communication, but they can often be interpreted in many different ways. Although this is not a problem when all interpretations provide the same answer to the question under discussion, a problem arises when a generic generalisation is used to answer a question other than that originally intended. In such cases, some interpretations of the generalisation might answer the question in a way that the original speaker would not endorse. Rather than excising generic generalisations from scientific communication, I recommend that scientific communicators carefully consider the kinds of questions their words might be taken to answer and try to avoid phrasing that might be taken to provide unintended answers.     

How Emotions do not Provide Reasons to Act

If emotions provide reasons for action through their intentional content, as is often argued, where does this leave the role of the affective element of an emotion? Can it be more than a motivator and have significant bearing of its own on our emotional actions, as actions done for reasons? One way it can is through reinforcing other reasons that we might have, as Greenspan (2011) argues. Central to Greenspan’s account is the claim that the affective discomfort of an emotion, as a fact about the agent’s state of being, provides an additional normative reason to act to alleviate the state. This, I argue, is not correct, nor is it the best way to understand emotions as reason-reinforcers. In this paper, I thus do two things: I provide an examination of how and why the affect of emotion could provide reasons to act to alleviate it and I propose that the real way emotions reinforce reasons is through the way they orient our attention onto things that matter, registering them as salient.     

DISJUNCTIVISM AND NON-DISJUNCTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF THE DEBATE

ABSTRACT During the 'What is Realism?' symposium at the 2001 Joint Session, Professor Ayers raised a number of objections to the disjunctive theory of perception. However in his reply, Professor Snowdon protested that Ayers had failed to adequately engage with the disjunctivist's position. This apparent lack of engagement suggests that the terms of this debate are not as clear as they might be. In the light of this, the current paper offers a way in which we might shed light on the underlying nature of the dispute between disjunctivists and non-disjunctivists, and following this, goes on to recommend ways in which the debate might then be taken forward.     

Organizational and client commitment among contracted employees: A replication and extension with temporary workers

This study replicates and extends Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow’s study (Coyle-Shapiro, J.A.-M., & Morrow, P.C. 2006. Organizational and client commitment among contracted employees. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 28, 416-431) of organizational and client commitment among contracted employees. Our study focuses on temporary workers rather than long-term contracted employees, and also finds that perceived organizational support (POS) from a client organization indeed relates to affective organizational commitment towards the client. However, this study further suggests that client POS also relates to continuance commitment towards the client as well as affective and continuance commitment towards the temporary agency. Finally, temporary workers’ desire to pursue temporary work relates to affective commitment towards the temporary agency, but continuance commitment to the temporary agency is related to a preference for permanent employment.     

Eating Disorders: A Bond between Medicine,Culture and Psychoanalysis

Action in connection with the therapeutic process is often equated with acting out. The subtle behaviour that belongs to ?the complicated system of transmitting and receiving unconscious signals? (Sandler), with which the patient attempts to make the analyst behave as the object of transference or to fulfill an unconscious desire, is also described as acting out or micro-acting out (Treurniet). This fine-grained action, however, means nothing; it is not symbolic or communicative action. Its intention is, rather, to trigger effects and induce interactions. It occurs not only on the side of the analysand but also on that of the analyst, and is part of the unconscious communication in the therapeutic process. Presented here are some of the various interactive ways and means with which the analyst is prompted into unconscious action and certain, unnoticed, ways in that he turn ?treats? the patient. The analyst's action responses can bear the character of interpretations with which he may unintentionally reveal how he regards the behaviour of the patient.     

Why Not Interfere With Nature?

Advocates of an environmental ethic frequently claim that what makes an ethical theory truly and uniquely environmental is its commitment to the principle that environmental wholes such as species, ecosystems, and biotic communities are morally considerable. The prevailing view is that our primary duty towards these wholes is to respect their integrity, stability, and beauty, and that the best way to do this is to leave them alone, not interfere with them, and let nature follow its own course. But is that correct? Why should be refrain from interfering with nature? There are two ways an environmentalist might try to justify an exceptionaless, prima facie principle of noninterference. First, she might claim that there is a contingent but universal connection between human interference and ecosystemic harm. There is also an epistemic variant of this view. When faced with a decision concerning whether to interfere with an ecosystem, there will always be overwhelming reasons for thinking that interference will be harmful, regardless of the specific circumstances. Send, there might be some conceptual connection between interference and harm to ecosystems. For example, if the well-being of an ecosystem is identified with its wildness, and wildness is understood as the absence of human intervention or manipulation, then any human interference necessarily detracts from an ecosystem's wildness and thereby has a detrimental effect on its well-being. In this paper I examine these justifications in detail and argue that none can support an exceptionaless principle of noninterference.     

Why Response-Dependence Theories of Morality are False

Many response-dependence theorists equate moral truth with the generation of some affective psychological response: what makes this action wrong, as opposed to right, is that it would cause (or merit) affective response of type R (perhaps under ideal conditions). Since our affective nature is purely contingent, and not necessarily shared by all rational creatures (or even by all humans), response-dependence threatens to lead to relativism. In this paper, I will argue that emotional responses and moral features do not align in the way predicted by the response-dependence theorist who wishes to tie morality to emotional affect. I further argue that since response-dependence accounts that tie morality to any sort of affect (be it an emotion, a desire, a desire to desire, or so on) cannot explain the objectivity and universality of morality; and since we do not need a psychological response to play a truth-constituting role in morality in order to explain the normativity or content of morality, we should reject such response-dependence accounts.     

Automatic Optimism: Why People Assume Their Futures will be Bright

Why are people optimistic about their futures, continuously assuming that their futures will be full of the positive outcomes they desire and devoid of negative outcomes? This paper concerns the proposal that desire, represented as affective reactions to potential future events, causes optimism for the future. We propose that positive or negative affective reactions to future events innervate motivations to approach or avoid the events. These motivations can be satiated by judging that events that elicit positive affective reactions are likely to occur and events that elicit negative affective reactions are unlikely to occur. The tendency to be optimistic thus results from emotional processes that occur largely outside of conscious awareness. We discuss recent evidence that supports these propositions, the import of understanding optimism as the result of emotional processes for judgment and decision research as well as attempts to improve decision‐making, and remaining unresolved issues.     

Moral masquerades: Experimental exploration of the nature of moral motivation

Why do people act morally – when they do? Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that acting morally in the absence of incentives or sanctions is a product of a desire to uphold one or another moral principle (e.g., fairness). This form of motivation might be called moral integrity because the goal is to actually be moral. In a series of experiments designed to explore the nature of moral motivation, colleagues and I have found little evidence of moral integrity. We have found considerable evidence of a different form of moral motivation, moral hypocrisy. The goal of moral hypocrisy is to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of being moral. To fully reach the goal of moral hypocrisy requires self-deception, and we have found evidence of that as well. Strengthening moral integrity is difficult. Even effects of moral perspective taking – imagining yourself in the place of the other (as recommended by the Golden Rule) – appear limited, further contributing to the moral masquerade.     

The Interface Between Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) and Zen

While Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) highlights the norm of people's dogmatic, fanatical, and rigid religious beliefs, it has always favoured several aspects of Zen-Buddhism as a modus vivendi. Scientifically-based REBT and wisdom-oriented Zen have more in common than one might think at first sight. In this chapter, I, Albert Ellis and Maurits Kwee show how REBT and Zen have significant commonalities as well as differences. “What are these commonalities?”, and “What are the issues of mutual interest for REBT and Zen?” are the main questions that we deal with here. It is submitted that most of REBT theory and practice are in keeping with the spirit of Zen. We note that East and West may in some ways cross-fertilise each other in the interface between these two proposed ways of living. The narrative techniques of Zen by means of koans (e.g., analogies, metaphors, parables) and of REBT (its many cognitive, emotive, and behavioural methods derived from its phenomenological view of human neurosis) are somewhat complementary to each other. Zen practice, if stripped of its mystical and Utopian aspects, particularly by omitting the non-verifiable concepts of the ostensible “higher” (non-thinking) state of consciousness, can often even be merged with REBT. One main (cultural) difference is that Zen attempts to go beyond rationality/relativity by striving for a certain kind of self-realisation (the irrational experience of satari) through paradoxically abolishing the self. The end result of this is not that the Zen adept becomes a “better” human being, but often becomes more aware of the hassles of life and how to cope with them from day to day. Something like the REBT practitioner, who practices what she or he preaches, the Zen practitioner remains the ordinary (though unique) imperfect human being as she or he was before, sadder but a little wiser. REBT had better be integrated with the most useful of other therapies, including Zen, so that it becomes and remains effective with many (not all) people much (not all) of the time. Due to cultural differences, the practice of Zen is not always compatible with the practice of Zen. However, the practice of REBT does fit with (post)modern Zen as an open living system. This chapter is laced with two dozen classic and modern koans that are to be used readily in therapy by the reader.     

The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability

In order to explore how emotions contribute positively or negatively to understanding the meaning of complex socio-culturally specific phenomena, I argue that we must take into account the habitual dimension of emotions – i.e., the emotion repertoire that a feeling person acquires in the course of their affective biography. This brings to light a certain form of alignment in relation to affective intentionality that is key to comprehending why humans understand situations in the way they do and why it so often is especially hard to understand things differently. A crucial epistemic problem is that subjects often do not even enter a process of understanding, i.e., they do not even start to consider a specific object, theory, circumstance, other being, etc. in different ways than the familiar one. The epistemic problem at issue thus lies in an unquestioned faith in things being right the way they are taken to be. By acknowledging the habitual dimension of affective intentionality, I analyze reasons for this inability and suggest that being affectively disruptable and cultivating a pluralistic emotion repertoire are crucial abilities to overcome this epistemic problem.

     

Why be a good Human Being? Natural Goodness,Reason, and the Authority of Human Nature

The central claim of Aristotelian naturalism is that moral goodness is a kind of species-specific natural goodness. Aristotelian naturalism has recently enjoyed a resurgence in the work of philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Thompson. However, any view that takes moral goodness to be a type of natural goodness faces a challenge: Granting that moral goodness is natural goodness for human beings, why should we care about being good human beings? Given that we are rational creatures who can ‘step back’ from our nature, why should we see human nature as authoritative for us? This is the authority-of-nature challenge. In this essay, I state this challenge clearly, identify its deep motivation, and distinguish it from other criticisms of Aristotelian naturalism. I also articulate what I consider the best response, which I term the practical reason response. This response, however, exposes Aristotelian naturalism to a new criticism – that it has abandoned the naturalist claim that moral goodness is species-specific natural goodness. Thus, I argue, Aristotelian naturalists appear to face a dilemma: Either they cannot answer the authority-of-nature challenge, or in meeting the challenge they must abandon naturalism. Aristotelian naturalists might overcome this dilemma, but doing so is harder than some Aristotelians have supposed. In the final sections of the paper, I examine the difficulties in overcoming the dilemma, and I suggest ways that Aristotelians might answer the authority-of-nature challenge while preserving naturalism.     

Shame and Its Sons: Black Men,Fatherhood, and Filicide

Few passages of Scripture are more revered than the parable of the prodigal son. Whether through quotidian biblical readings or fiery Sunday morning sermons, the evocative images that it conjures up—the most prominent of which is that of a forlorn son returning home to a beneficent father—often causes those who encounter this story of redemption, believer and non-believer alike, to be enraptured in the ardor of spiritual ecstasy. It is a quintessential feel-good story. And yet, one must ask, how many prodigal sons are able to return to their fathers’ houses in like manner? Is it not troubling to consider the lack of such a welcome home for the countless prodigal sons among us? This interdisciplinary study examines such questions by underscoring not only the failed “return,” but, even more so, the lack of a “home” (a veritable place of return, so to speak) for black men who suffer from the inherent prodigality, the desire to spend all, of patriarchal manhood. It is for this reason that anatomizing the parable itself, which is done by utilizing the works of such scholars as Henri Nouwen, is not sufficient to address our concerns. Other interlocutors are needed, scholars of a different but not better perspicacity, who can speak to the deleterious intergenerational effects that a lack of home can have on a black man’s development, be it psychosocially, spiritually, or otherwise. The chosen participants for this somewhat uncommon dialogue are psychoanalyst John Bowlby and African American author Ernest Gaines. Both of these authors enunciate the ways in which the inability to return or, in some instances, retreat to what Bowlby calls a “secure base” traps a man within a deadly web of negative affect, such as shame, within which he entangles his sons as well. This is an unfortunate act of filicide.     

Cheapened altruism: Discounting personally affected prosocial actors

Are charitable donors always perceived as charitable? Three studies suggest that although having a personal connection to a cause motivates much charitable giving, donors who have been personally affected by the target cause are given less “credit” for their donations, i.e., are perceived as less intrinsically charitable. These donors are perceived as having selfish motivations even when they have nothing economic or social to gain from the donation. More specifically, personally-affected donors are perceived as driven by emotional selfishness, or a desire to improve their own hedonic state rather a desire to improve the welfare of others, which lessens the charitable credit that they receive. In addition, although donors who have been personally affected by the target cause are seen as less charitable, they are perceived more favorably in other ways (e.g., more loyal).