RAWLS AND THE STATUS OF POLITICAL LIBERTY

Abstract:  In his late work, Rawls makes strong claims about the status of political liberty. These claims, if accepted, would have significant implications for the content of "justice as fairness." I discuss the nature of these claims, clarifying Rawls's fair value guarantee of the political liberties and critically discussing the arguments that he and others have given for assigning special importance to the political liberties. I conclude that justice as fairness, properly understood, is not a deeply democratic conception of justice.     

MUTUALITY AND ONE-SIDEDNESS IN KJELL ASKILDSEN'S THE DOGS OF THESSALONIKI: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE

The aim of this paper is to bring to the fore how a talented writer is able to describe everyday human relationships in a way that makes visible their most central, underlying dynamics. After reviewing some of the psychoanalytic literature, the author presents a collection of short stories by the Norwegian author, Kjell Askildsen. These works illustrate how the fear of incest, sado-masochistic, exhibitionistic, and addictive defenses can play the rôle of “directors” of human dramas. Askildsen, with relentless accuracy, decribes a longing for reciprocity and defences against it. In such a conflict, reciprocity is felt dangerous and only momentarily fulfilled, and defences are necessary.     

EQUALITY, AMBITION AND INSURANCE

It is difficult for prioritarians to explain the degree to which justice requires redress for misfortune in a way that avoids imposing unreasonably high costs on more advantaged individuals whilst also economising on intuitionist appeals to judgment. An appeal to hypothetical insurance may be able to solve the problems of cost and judgment more successfully, and can also be defended from critics who claim that resource egalitarianism is best understood to favour the ex post elimination of envy over individual endowments.     

STANDARDS OF EQUALITY AND HUME'S VIEW OF GEOMETRY

It has been argued that there is a genuine conflict between the views of geometry defended by Hume in the Treatise and in the Enquiry: while the former work attributes to geometry a different status from that of arithmetic and algebra, the latter attempts to restore its status as an exact and certain science. A closer reading of Hume shows that, in fact, there is no conflict between the two works with respect to geometry. The key to understanding Hume's view of geometry is the distinction he draws between two standards of equality in extension.     

LIBERTY,NECESSITY AND CHANCE: HOBBES'S GENERAL THEORY OF EVENTS

Locke characterizes sensitive knowledge as knowledge of the existence of external objects present to the senses, and in terms of an ‘assurance’ that falls short of the certainty of intuition and demonstration. But it is unclear how this fits with his general definition of knowledge, as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, and it is unclear how that assurance can amount to knowledge, rather than amounting to mere probability (which he contrasts with knowledge). Some contend that Locke does not regard sensitive knowledge as genuine knowledge, but only honourifically calls it knowledge. In contrast, I argue that Locke holds that sensitive knowledge is knowledge, though he takes the conditions for it to be very different from the conditions for intuitive and demonstrative knowledge. It is not the assurance alone which Locke thinks qualifies sensitive knowledge as such: it is also the fact that the assurance arises from the actual employment of the senses upon external objects, and the fact that the senses do not generally deceive us, which he thinks qualifies sensitive knowledge as genuine knowledge. That there is a (tacit) form of externalism in Locke's account of sensitive knowledge is the main thesis of this paper.     

平等与民主

当我们思考公共空间和语言时,会发现有一种不可忽视的关联似乎将它们连结在一起,倘若我们同意从民主角度来看待它们。汉娜·阿伦特告诉我们,在基督教贬低古代之后,现代革命是与古希腊人重新获得联系的一种方式,在古希腊人看来,政治平等是参与的平等以及被统治者和统治者之间没有分歧、共同生活的能力。但是,新的情况是公共领域不再为一小部分不为生活必需品所累的人保留。     

ASSOCIATIVE OBLIGATIONS,VOLUNTARISM, AND EQUALITY

Samuel Scheffler has identified two important objections to associative obligations, the voluntarist objection and the distributivist objection. The voluntarist is concerned about protecting the autonomy of the agent who is supposed to have associative obligations. However, the appropriate account of the source of associative obligations reveals that they pose no threat to autonomy, if we understand autonomy in a weak rather than a strong sense. The distributivist is worried about the claims of outsiders being ignored as the result of insiders having associative obligations to one another. This objection loses much of its force when we understand the genuine implications of associative obligations.