Does anxiety-linked attentional bias to threatening information reflect bias in the setting of attentional goals,or bias in the execution of attentional goals?

Heightened anxiety vulnerability is characterised by an attentional bias that favours the processing of negative information. However, this anxiety-linked attentional bias is amenable to two quite different explanations. One possibility is that it reflects anxiety-linked bias in the setting of attentional goals that favours setting the goal of attending towards negative information over the alternative goal of attending away from such information. Another possibility is that it reflects anxiety-linked bias in the execution of attentional goals that enhances the execution of the former attentional goal compared to the latter. The present study introduces a novel methodology designed to discriminate the validity of these competing hypotheses, by examining anxiety-linked attentional bias under two conditions. One condition left attentional goals unconstrained. The other condition imposed the attentional goal of either attending towards more negative or more benign emotional stimuli. The finding that anxiety-linked attentional bias was observed only under the former condition supported the hypothesis that anxiety is characterised by a bias favouring the setting attentional goals involving vigilance rather than avoidance of negative information, while giving no support to the hypothesis that anxiety is characterised by a bias reflecting enhanced execution of the former attentional goal compared to the latter.     

What's in a name? Attachment-related attentional bias

Participants completed a dot probe task that presented pairs of first names: the participant's own name and a neutral name (Experiments 1-4), the name of their attachment figure and a neutral name (Experiments 1-4), or the name of a known person and a neutral name (Experiments 2-4). A significant attentional bias effect was found for the attachment name in attachment-related contexts, whether they were threatening or positive. The results of Experiments 2 and 4 showed that the attentional bias effects for the attachment name were not driven by familiarity effects and could not be interpreted in terms of salience. Attachment anxiety was associated with hypervigilance toward the attachment name in threatening and positive attachment contexts. Attachment avoidance was unrelated to any attentional bias effects.     

Is the emotional modulation of the attentional blink driven by response bias?

Several studies have shown that the attentional blink (AB; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) is diminished for highly arousing T2 stimuli (e.g., Anderson, 2005). Whereas this effect is most often interpreted as evidence for a more efficient processing of arousing information, it could be due also to a bias to report more arousing stimuli than neutral stimuli. We introduce a paradigm that allows one to control for such a response bias. Using this paradigm, we obtained evidence that the diminished AB for taboo words cannot be explained by a response bias. This supports the idea that the emotional modulation of the AB is caused by attentional processes.     

What kind of bias is hindsight bias?

When people are asked to recollect a former response after having received feedback information, their recollection tends to approach the feedback answer. This phenomenon is referred to as hindsight bias. Recently, Erdfelder and Buchner proposed a multinomial model designed to independently measure the contributions of reconstruction and recollection processes. On its basis, they only found firm evidence for the contribution of reconstruction biases to hindsight effects. In the present study, we tried to experimentally enhance the probability of recollection biases by (a) reducing the depth of processing of the original estimate, (b) minimizing the distinctness of the original estimate and feedback, and (c) combining both treatments. The empirical data were analyzed using a variant of the Erdfelder and Buchner model which allows for the experimental manipulation of the feedback answer. This model is shown to adequately describe the data of our experiment. Moreover, although both treatments were effective in that the first one reduced correct recollections in general and the second one diminished differences between original estimates and recalled estimates, the parameter estimates indicate that the probability of recollecting the original estimate is not hampered by feedback information, even under conditions which are thought to enhance memory impairments. Received: 10 December 1995 / Accepted: 29 October 1997     

Constraint-evading surrogacy: the missing piece in Radical Embodied Cognition’s non-representationalist account of intentionality?

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - Radical Embodied Cognition (REC) is an anti-representationalist approach to the nature of basic cognition proposed by Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin. While...     

Measuring direct and indirect aggression: behavior of is there a response bias?

Critics of self-report methods suggest that participants are likely to underreport their own negative behaviors given concerns about social desirability. The current study examined the problem of self-report bias by comparing individuals' estimates of their own and others' aggressive behavior. Undergraduate students (95 women, 50 men) completed the Richardson Conflict Response Questionnaire with regard to either their own behavior or that of another person of the same sex. As expected, participants reported significantly less aggression for themselves than for others. However, self and other ratings showed the same pattern of sex differences. These results suggest that, although individuals may underreport their own aggressive behaviors, this tendency may not affect relationships among variables.     

Spatial asymmetries in viewing and remembering scenes: Consequences of an attentional bias?

Given a single fixation, memory for scenes containing salient objects near both the left and right view boundaries exhibited a rightward bias in boundary extension (Experiment 1). On each trial, a 500-msec picture and 2.5-sec mask were followed by a boundary adjustment task. Observers extended boundaries 5% more on the right than on the left. Might this reflect an asymmetric distribution of attention? In Experiments 2A and 2B, free viewing of pictures revealed that first saccades were more often leftward (62%) than rightward (38%). In Experiment 3, 500-msec pictures were interspersed with 2.5-sec masks. A subsequent object recognition memory test revealed better memory for left-side objects. Scenes were always mirror reversed for half the observers, thus ruling out idiosyncratic scene compositions as the cause of these asymmetries. Results suggest an unexpected leftward bias of attention that selectively enhanced the representations, causing a smaller boundary extension error and better object memory on the views’ left sides.     

Supporting the attentional momentum view of IOR: is attention biased to go right?

Inhibition of return (IOR) refers to the finding that individuals are slower to respond to a target presented at a previously attended location than they are to respond to a target presented at a novel location (Posner & Cohen, 1984). The attentional momentum theory is a recent view of how attention moves around the environment, and it provides an account for the IOR effect that does not rely on an inhibitory mechanism (Pratt, Spalek, & Bradshaw, 1999). The present paper supports the attentional momentum viewpoint in two ways: first, by replicating the finding that reaction times to targets at the uncued locations are not all the same (Pratt et al., 1999) and second, by showing that responses made to all locations on the cued side of fixation, and not just to the locations that attention had previously traversed, are slower than are responses made to locations on the opposite side of fixation. We also demonstrate that there is a directional bias to the IOR effect that results in the effect's being larger when attention moves in a left-to-right manner.     

Hindsight bias: a by-product of knowledge updating?

With the benefit of feedback about the outcome of an event, people's recalled judgments are typically closer to the outcome of the event than their original judgments were. It has been suggested that this hindsight bias may be due to a reconstruction process of the prior judgment. A model of such a process is proposed that assumes that knowledge is updated after feedback and that reconstruction is based on the updated knowledge. Consistent with the model's predictions, the results of 2 studies show that knowledge after feedback is systematically shifted toward feedback, and that assisting retrieval of the knowledge prior to feedback reduces hindsight bias. In addition, the model accounts for about 75% of cases in which either hindsight bias or reversed hindsight bias occurred. The authors conclude that hindsight bias can be understood as a by-product of an adaptive process, namely the updating of knowledge after feedback.     

Consciousness of targets during the attentional blink: a gradual or all-or-none dimension?

Models of consciousness differ in whether they predict a gradual change or a discontinuous transition between nonconscious and conscious perception. Sergent and Dehaene (Psychological Science, 15, 720-728, 2004) asked subjects to rate on a continuous scale the subjective visibility of target words presented during an attentional blink. They found that these words were either detected as well as targets outside the attentional-blink period or not detected at all, and interpreted these results as support for a discontinuous transition between nonconscious and conscious processing. We present results from 4 attentional-blink experiments showing that this all-or-none rating pattern disappears with the use of an alternative measure of consciousness (post-decision wagering) and a more difficult identification task. Instead, under these circumstances, subjects used the consciousness rating scales in a continuous fashion. These results are more consistent with models that assume a gradual change between nonconscious and conscious perception during the attentional blink.     

Motor proficiency and emotional/behavioural disturbance in autism and Asperger's disorder: another piece of the neurological puzzle?

The relationship of motor proficiency with emotional/behavioural disturbance, autistic symptoms and communication disturbance was investigated in children diagnosed with autism and Asperger's disorder (AD). The Movement Assessment Battery for Children was used as a measure of motor impairment, and the Developmental Behavioural Checklist was used as a measure of emotional/behavioural disturbance in the following groups: AD (n?=?22), high functioning autism (HFA) (n?=?23), LFA (n?=?8) and typically developing children (n?=?20). The HFA group had more difficulty with motor items, such as ball skills and balance, than did the AD group. There were significant positive correlations between impairments in motor proficiency (in particular ball skills and balance) and emotional/behavioural disturbance, autistic symptoms and communication disturbance. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that there are qualitative and quantitative differences in the motor profile between autism and AD. In addition, the association between motor proficiency impairment and emotional/behavioural disturbance in autism and AD emphasizes the importance for screening of co-occurring emotional/behavioural symptoms in individuals with motor difficulties. These findings have implications for the potential use of adjunct motor measures in the diagnosis and definition of autism spectrum disorders.     

Over-estimation in numerosity estimation tasks: More than an attentional bias?

Over- and under-estimation have been observed in numerosity estimation and approximate arithmetic tasks. Two different models have been proposed to account for these reverse patterns of performance: 1) the bi-directional mapping account (Crollen, Castronovo, & Seron, 2011); 2) the operational momentum hypothesis (McCrink, Dehaene, & Dehaene-Lambertz, 2007). Our study was designed to examine whether the operational momentum could account for the over-estimation found in numerosity estimation tasks. To this aim, a series of 3 experiments involving a symbolic to non-symbolic numerical mapping and a rightward or leftward displacement along the mental number line were designed. Over-estimation was observed in these three tasks irrespective of the direction and size of the displacement to be done on the mental number line. These results thus clearly demonstrated that overestimation was not merely due to an attentional bias, but rather relied on the cognitive operation of mapping two differently scaled numerical representations.     

Decomposing serial learning: What is missing from the learning curve?

Our current understanding of serial learning relies on the form of the learning curve and on changes in the serial position curve over repeated study-test trials (Ward, 1937). The averaging of data that produces these functions obscures the detailed history of memory for individual items over the course of study-test trials. Extending Tulving’s (1964) analysis of free recall learning, we present a new analysis of serial learning that tracks the acquisition and forgetting of item and order information at the level of individual items. Applying this analysis to two large data sets on serial list learning allows us to discern among hypotheses that are indistinguishable solely on the basis of the learning curve.     

State-dependent changes of prefrontal–posterior coupling in the context of affective processing: Susceptibility to humor

The aim of the present study was to examine whether interindividual differences in the coupling or decoupling of prefrontal and posterior cortices during the exposure to social–emotional information may predict an individual’s positive emotional responsiveness. Susceptibility to humor was assessed in a behavioral paradigm several weeks after the EEG recordings. State-dependent changes of prefrontal–posterior EEG beta coherence were recorded during stimulation with other people’s auditory expressions of cheerfulness and sadness. Greater decreases of coherence during the stimulation with positive affect expressions prospectively predicted greater positive emotional responsiveness, indicated by higher amusement ratings in response to cartoons and higher scores in a questionnaire measure of exhilarability. Greater increases of coherence during the stimulation with negative affect expressions did not predict perceived funniness but were related to shorter response latencies to the amusement ratings. The results further support the notion that a more loose prefrontal–posterior coupling may be related to loosening of control of the prefrontal cortex over incoming emotional information and, thus, to a propensity to deeper emotional involvement and a greater impact of perceptual input, whereas increased prefrontal–posterior coupling may be related to strong control and the propensity to protect oneself from becoming emotionally affected.     

Temporal dynamics of need satisfaction and need frustration. Two sides of the same coin?

We study the dynamics of need satisfaction and need frustration by examining how need satisfaction and need frustration change over time and how these changes relate to changes in motivation. To investigate this, volunteers were assessed daily during a delineated activity, resulting in a total sample of 77 volunteers and 467 completed daily diaries. Bayesian confirmatory factor analysis on the within-person level confirmed a bifactor solution: autonomy, competence, and relatedness were distinguished by three specific factors, but the majority of variance was explained by two strongly correlated (need satisfaction and need frustration) factors. The strong correlation between need satisfaction and need frustration further translated in the development of their relationship over time. That is, Bayesian latent growth curve modelling revealed a simultaneous, yet opposite, growth curve. Contrary to our expectations, neither of them could be related to behavioural internalization or externalization. These results imply that, at the within-person level, momentary need satisfaction and frustration are difficult to distinguish, and affecting one may automatically affect the other. Also, the relationships within the self-determination framework, such as the proposed link between need satisfaction and behavioural internalization may be better reframed with attention to the time-frame in which they occur.     

The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are; this is called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic‐analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead attributable to the rater's processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available (Experiments 1–3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we found support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be internally consistent.     

Framework for a new dialogue between psychoanalysis and neurosciences: is the combined neuro-psychoanalytic approach the missing link?

Freud's legacy deriving from his work The project for a scientific psychology (1895) could give a new impetus to the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neurosciences. A rapproachment phase is warrented. Based on the work of psychoanalysts who are themselves neuroscientists (such as Mauro Mancia, Martha Koukkou and Harold Shevrin) or have a long term dialogue with neuroscientists (Arnold Modell), three points of epistemological congruence are described:

1. dualism is no longer a satisfactory solution
2. cautions for the centrality of interpretation (hermeneutics)
3. the self-criticism of neuroscientists

     

Searching beneath the shelf in macaque monkeys: evidence for a gravity bias or a foraging bias?

The reasons underpinning search biases in 2 species of macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta and Macaca arctoides) were explored over the course of 3 experiments requiring monkeys to search for a hidden food reward. The results reveal that monkeys are adept at exploiting perceptual cues to locate a food reward but are unable to use physical constraints such as solidity as cues to the reward's location. Monkeys prefer to search for a food reward beneath a solid shelf, not because they have an expectation that the reward should be there, but rather because, in the absence of usable cues, this bias emerges as a default search option. It is hypothesized that this bias may have its roots in a history of competition for food resources.     

Is there a position bias in the learning of influence structures?

An experiment was conducted to determine the nature of position biases in the cognitive representation of hierarchical social structures. A position in such a structure reflects the relative influence of its occupants. Using DeSoto's technique, 24 Dutch and 24 French Ss learned either a completely ordered or incompletely ordered structure. No significant differences were found between countries. The completely ordered structure was found easier to learn than the incomplete ones. According to the results of previous studies (Van Kreveld and Zajonc, 1966; Poitou, 1970) the learning curves for completely and incompletely ordered structures were expected to be respectively curvilinear and monotonic. The results did not support this expectation.     

What is a Natural Conception of the World?

Continental philosophers such as Heidegger and Nicolai Hartmann and analytic philosophers such as Ryle, Strawson, and Jennifer Hornsby may be interpreted as using competing intellectual strategies within the framework of one and the same research programme, the programme of developing a natural conception of the world. They all argue that the Manifest Image of the world (to use Sellars's terminology) is compatible with, or even more fundamental than, the Scientific Image. A comparative examination of these strategies shows that Hartmann's strategy of stratification is superior to those of Heidegger, Ryle, and Strawson.