The value of distrust

We assume that a state of distrust is the mental system’s signal that the environment is not normal—things may not be as they appear. Hence, individuals sense they should be on guard. In particular, they are likely to avoid routine strategies, ones proven to be optimal and regularly used in normal environments, because these strategies are easily anticipated by whoever may be seeking to deceive them. Conversely, a state of trust is associated with a feeling of safety. The environment is as it normally is and things really are as they appear to be. Thus, individuals see no reason to refrain from doing what they routinely do. Accordingly, we hypothesize that figuring out a new situation depends on the type of environment and the actor’s state of mind: in normal environments, where routine strategies are optimal, individuals who trust should outperform those who distrust; however, in unusual environments, where non-routine strategies are optimal, individuals who distrust should outperform those who trust. This paper reports three experiments that manipulate distrust via orienting tasks that participants perform prior to attempting to predict a series of events (Experiments 1 and 2) or solve matchstick arithmetic problems (Experiment 3). Performance success depends on discovering and implementing an appropriate rule. We found that, as predicted, the manipulation of distrust sensitized participants to the existence of non-routine contingencies, that is, contingencies that were not expected.     

The value of grandparents

This paper is a slightly revised version of a paper presented on 26 October 1989 as one of the Tavistock Open Lectures. The role of grandparents is discussed and the value of a supportive presence, both externally and internally, is emphasised, especially at birth and at times of mental illness. This concept is extended to the maternal or ‘grand’-maternal role adopted by agencies attempting to improve the quality of mental care, and its value is also visible in the transference in psychotherapeutic work.     

The value of value: Further excursions on the meaning and role of customer value

Grounded on fundamental marketing principles, the concept of customer value has been revisited and refined by academicians and practitioners for the last 30 years. However, research devoted to achieving a consistent theoretical and conceptual development of value‐related concepts has proceeded apace without ever reaching full closure. The present essay seeks reasons behind remaining deficiencies in value‐related research and offers a review intended to move our understanding of customer value toward what promises to become a more enlightened future. The topic of value is approached by theoretical analysis and conceptual development. First, “the challenge” of value research is presented: the researcher faces a topic that is central to the marketing discipline but that suffers from various conceptual and methodological difficulties. Second, among the literature on value from the last three decades, two main research areas are selected: the conceptual delimitation and the methodological links between quality, satisfaction, and value. Third, as a conclusion, we identify several streams of research that promise to expand future knowledge in the area of customer value. Several tables and figures that provide a systematic and structured review of value‐related knowledge support this inventory of the state‐of‐the‐art in value research. Even the most patient theoretical development of value‐related concepts tends to resist full conceptual closure. The breadth of customer value and its richness for marketing implications encourage novel and refreshing approaches. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The value of practical usefulness

Some moral theories, such as objective forms of consequentialism, seem to fail to be practically useful: they are of little to no help in trying to decide what to do. Even if we do not think this constitutes a fatal flaw in such theories, we may nonetheless agree that being practically useful does make a moral theory a better theory, or so some have suggested. In this paper, I assess whether the uncontroversial respect in which a moral theory can be claimed to be better if it is practically useful can provide a ground worth taking into account for believing one theory rather than another. I argue that this is not the case. The upshot is that if there is a sound objection to theories such as objective consequentialism that is based on considerations of practical usefulness, the objection requires that it is established that the truth about what we morally ought to do cannot be epistemically inaccessible to us. The value of practical usefulness has no bearing on the issue.     

The strategic value of essentialism

Social essentialism—the belief that individuals contain an underlying essence determined by the social categories they belong to—has generally been regarded as a harmful cognitive process that results in prejudice and other forms of injustice at the group level. Trait essentialism, also termed a fixed mindset—the belief that people's trait levels are determined and relatively unchangeable—has been construed as a parallel impediment to self‐improvement at the individual level. However, each of these domains contains findings that do not fit this narrative, suggesting that such essentialized thinking is not always detrimental at either the group or individual level and that its effects may instead depend on motivation and context. Incorporating advances in research on moral judgment and identity allow for a reconciliation of the variable effects of social and trait essentialism. In some instances, essentialism can be a strategy for reducing blame over uncontrollable aspects of individuals and groups and for identity formation.     

The social value of risk-taking

In this study, the following hypothesis concerning the social value of risk-taking is advanced: young men who wish to assert themselves and to gain prestige tend to take greater risks in public when together with other young men than do young men who do not have these wishes, whereas there is no such difference in risk-taking in private. This hypothesis is empirically tested and is supported.