The formation of Soviet cultural theory of music (1917–1948)

This article explores the continuities and discontinuities of pre-Revolutionary intellectual traditions in 1920s Soviet culture and the Stalin-era cultural revolution. Through examination of the pre-revolutionary philosophical legacy underpinning Soviet musicological theory, I demonstrate that there are decisive features, such as Soviet Prometheanism, that characterize the musicology of the 1920s that both underline and differ from the pre-revolutionary philosophy of music and the musicology of the 1930s. I offer the basic outlines of a Soviet cultural theory of music formulated by Russian music critic, historian, composer and musicologist Boris Asafiev (1884–1949) in the 1920s. Explaining and describing what I mean by a particular cultural theory of music in the Soviet context forms the core issue of my article.

     

Technical expertise and the construction of the rural Yishuv, 1882–1948

In fin de sièecle Europe, political economy viewed science as an indispensable tool of state power. Accordingly, in the early 1900s exponents of Zionist political economy saw the World Zionist Organization (WZO) as a government with the responsibility to direct the nation-building enterprise in Palestine. The principle beneficiaries of assistance from the WZO, youthful pioneer laborers from eastern Europe,shared the WZO's reverence for technical knowledge, but distrusted technicians, whom they associated with authoritarianism. In the eyes of the pioneer laborers, a technican should not lead, but rather make vital resources available to the workers to use as they saw fit. Key figures in the WZO's settlement institutions accepted this subordinate status for the technician and employed technical experts to guide,rather than direct, the labor movement in the construction of publicly-funded, co-operative agricultural settlements. From its beginning, however, the Zionist movement featured an alternative conception of technical expertise, drawn more from business economics than political economy, and tending to favor as its model the corporation rather than the state. One characteristic of this approach was the conviction that apolitical experts should direct settlement activity.For a brief period during the 1920s, champions of this approach wielded influence over the WZO's settlement institutions. But as a result of the tumultuous events of the years 1929–1939, the Zionist settlement enterprise fused politics and economics tightly together. From the mid-1930s on to the founding of the state of Israel, technical expertise was mobilized to serve the political and military leadership of the Yishuv. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The family as portrayed on prime-time television, 1947–1990: Structure and characteristics

Successful family series across four decades of American prime-time television were examined. Family portrayals were defined as either conventional or nonconventional. Conventional families were categorized as couples without children and couples with children. Nonconventional families were categorized as single parent or contrived. Additional family characteristics were also recorded including sex of single parent, reason for singleness, social class status, females employed outside the home, live-ins, race, and whether the presentation was dramatic or comedic. The data show a trend toward more equal presentation of conventional and nonconventional families, few divorced or female single parents, and few minority families. Implications of findings are discussed and future research questions suggested.     

Tradition versus tradition: Mizrahi pupils in National Religious schools in Israel, 1948–1990

Absorbing the immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa in Israel was one of the Israeli education system’s important tasks. This article deals with the way the National Religious schools treated these new immigrants and their descendants, known as Oriental Jews, Mizrahi Jews, or “Mizrahim.” The differences between Mizrahi Jews and Ashkenazi Jews (those of European ancestry) were related to differences in religious traditions, academic level, and religious observance. Educators imposed the Ashkenazi tradition on Mizrahi pupils. This created social tension and alienated Mizrahi pupils from the system. On the other side, Ashkenazi pupils who had difficulties with the heterogeneous educational environment left the public system and enrolled in more religious schools, which had a much smaller percentage of Mizrahi pupils. This segregation was even more common at the high school level. Ashkenazim attended yeshiva high schools, while Mizrahi pupils went to regular high schools. Small changes were evident by the 1990s. By that time, more Mizrahi pupils were attending the elite yeshivot, and the public system adopted a more multicultural attitude and included the Mizrahi tradition as well.     

Bishop Fulton J. Sheen: America’s public critic of psychoanalysis, 1947–1957

This paper examines the role of Bishop Fulton Sheen in the popularization of Freudian psychoanalysis in the United States during the 1940s and 50s. Social historians argue that Freudian ideas were pervasive in American culture during this period. While their claim speaks mainly to the impact of psychoanalysis on the cultural elite and college educated, they also suggest that Freudian ideas affected ordinary men and women. In the former case, the group impacted is small and not representative of the population as a whole; in the latter, the evidence is sparse and impressionistic. Neglected in their consideration is the influence of Fulton Sheen whose opinions on Freud reached an audience of 30,000,000 during the height of the popularity of his TV show, Life is Worth Living. Sheen's audience was more inclusive and representative of mainstream America. The negative and highly cautionary view of psychoanalysis he presented to many Americans was contrary to that which was promoted to and embraced by many of the college educated and likely shaped both their views of Freud and psychoanalytic therapy.     

Legacies,archives, afterlife: re-envisioning the Li-La-Lo theatre (Tel Aviv, 1944–1948)

This article suggests re-reading documents that remain from Li-La-Lo theatrical events, which include playbills, programmes, photos, archive files, and television shows. Through this historiographic way of working, that is, the re-reading of what remains from past performances but differently, this article will demonstrate what Tel Aviv offered to the artists, what the theatre as a cultural institution offered to the residents of the city and, in the broader circle, how Li-La-Lo was an intersection of performance traditions. Historical circumstances brought the Li-La-Lo artists to Tel Aviv, and the leaders and residents of the city, who cultivated normalcy, enabled them to continue to do what they knew best: perform. Thus, performance artists strengthened Tel Aviv’s status as a cultural centre, a symbol, and embodiment of cultural heterogeneity.     

Offence,offender, and victim characteristics in South Korean filicides, 1948–1962: A descriptive study

Filicide is defined as the killing of children from birth to age 18 by a natural or step-parent. The legal definition of filicide in Korea does not impose such age limits. Although families in contemporary Korea are nuclear in structure, they were multigenerational prior to the industrialisation that occurred during the second half of the twentieth century. While psychiatric and evolutionary theories have been predominantly used in the filicide literature, prior works have neglected to examine how culture shapes violence against one’s offspring. This paper explores the offence, offender, and victim characteristics in South Korean filicides (1948–1962) through a content analysis of a major newspaper (Chosun Ilbo). Results indicate that filicides occur in one-on-one contexts, primarily carried out by biological parents against their offspring while adoptive children appeared as victims due to the genealogical customs practiced in Korean society. Results indicate that more than 12% of filicide victims are adults. The implications of our findings are discussed.