Experiences in K and K

In this paper the author explores and expands Bion's concepts of K and -K and delineates the nature of the relationship between the two. While Bion views envy as a principal motivating force for –K, his conception of –K goes considerably beyond this. The author explores manifestations of –K not driven by envy and, consequently, not necessarily pathological or pathogenic. –K is viewed by the author as a psychological process, which may serve many functions, including the communication of the patient's fear that knowing will bring on psychological catastrophe. –K, under circumstances that he describes, may serve to protect the individual's sense of continuity of being. The need to know the truth (K) may be at odds with the need to survive psychically, for example, when a person fears that the truth will kill him, or those he loves and depends upon. This idea is explored in two ways: first, by means of a discussion of the Oedipus myth in which Oedipus attempts to evade knowing for fear of recognizing that a prophesied catastrophe has already occurred; and, second, by means of a clinical exploration of the confiict between the need to know and the need to survive. The author discusses his analytic work with a severely disturbed patient for whom not knowing was felt to be essential to her psychic survival. Her need not to know reached a point where she psychically obliterated the analyst through the use of negative hallucination.     

g2K

To answer the questions posed by the organizers of the millennial debate on g, or general cognitive ability, we begin by briefly reviewing its history. We tackle the question of what g is by addressing g as a psychometric score and examining its psychological and physiological correlates. Then tacit knowledge and other non-g characteristics are discussed. Next, we review the practical utility of g in personnel selection and conclude by explaining its importance to both organizations and individuals.     

超模态逻辑K[T_nK]和K[TK_n](英文)

本文的工作是在D.M.Gabbay的一篇论文《超模态逻辑理论:在模态逻辑中的模转换》基础上所做的,主要是将他的两类满足关系扩充到n+1种满足关系,然后在此基础上得到两类一般性的逻辑类K[T_nK]和K[TK_n],其中n≥1。我们得到了一些更为一般性的结论:（1）逻辑类K[T_nK]的定理模式是:对任意n≥1,□^j+（n+1）kp→□^i+（n+1）kp,其中0≤in]的定理模式是:□^1+（n+1）kp→□^（n+1）kp,其中b≥1。不过,□^j+（n+1）kp→□^i+（n+1）kp,其中0≤in]的定理模式,因此,（3）每一个逻辑K[T_nK]都是相应的逻辑K[TK_n]的真扩张,其中n≥1;（4）必然化规则在两类逻辑K[T_nK]和K[TK_n]中都不成立,但是,这样的规则成立,即如果A分别是两类逻辑K[T_nK]和K[TK_n]的定理,那么对于任意n≥1,□ⁿ⁺¹A也分别是逻辑类K[T_nK]和K[TK_n]的定理;（5）等值替换规则在逻辑类K[T_nK]和K[TK_n]下都不封闭;此外,（6）我们将D.M.Gabbay的从超模态逻辑到正规模态逻辑K的两类翻译τ₀和τ₁扩充到n+1类翻译τ₀,τ₁,…,τ_n。在超模态逻辑K[T_nK]和K[TK_n]与正规模态逻辑K之间,我们找到了点模型满足对应理论,即对任意的超模态逻辑公式α,在某个世界ω上为真,当且仅当,在正规模态逻辑K中τ_i（α）在世界ω上也为真。其中τ_i（α）是公式α从超模态逻辑到正规模态逻辑K的翻译。     

The emotional experience of K

The author raises the question of the emotional experience of K in Bion's schema of affective links, L, H, and K, suggesting that it is the emotional experience of feeling curious. He explores the central role curiosity has in 'On arrogance' and 'Attacks on linking' and hypothesizes that in Learning from experience the more complex notion of K is introduced in its place. Thus, Bion's affective schema is taken to be a version of Freud's account of experience in terms of instinctual impulses recast in terms of emotional experience. Freud's primary developmental dichotomy, the tensions between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, can be seen as the dichotomy of tensions between the emotional experience of L/H and the emotional experience of K. This suggests that the potential tension between K and L/H is critical to what happens in the consulting room. Finally the author argues that containing as a developmental dynamic is an expression of a K-state-of-mind and thus the container is thus a container-in-K. It concludes that one important aspect of what Bion called -K is an attack on a K-state-of-mind by an intrusion of L/H which has the effect of contaminating and dominating the urge to know.     

K ⊈ E

In a series of very influential works, Tim Williamson has advanced and defended a much discussed theory of evidence containing, among other claims, the thesis that, if one knows P, P is part of one's evidence (K ? E). I argue that K ? E is false, and indeed that it is so for a reason that Williamson himself essentially provides in arguing against the thesis that, if one has a justified true belief in P, P is part of one's evidence: together with a very plausible principle governing the acquisition of knowledge by non‐deductive inference based on evidence, K ? E leads, in a sorites‐like fashion, to what would seem a series of unacceptably bootstrapping expansions of one's evidence. I then develop some considerations about the functions of and conditions for evidence which are suggested by the argument against K ? E. I close by discussing the relationship of the argument with anti‐closure arguments of the style exemplified by the preface paradox: I contend that, if closure is assumed, it is extremely plausible to expect that the diagnosis of what goes wrong in the preface‐paradox‐style argument cannot be used to block my own argument.     

Selecting K of N alternatives

In some decision contexts (e.g. graduate admissions) the task to select a subset of k distinct alternatives from among the N > k > 1 options available. For moderate values of N and k, the number of possible subsets of size k becomes quite large. Assuming alternatives are evaluated using consistent, though not explicit weights, selecting k, rather than 1, empirically excludes a substantial proportion (more than 80%) of the subsets; unfortunately to the unaided decision maker it is not obvious which subsets should be excluded. The tendency of subjects to select excludable subsets can be called an ‘infeasibility’ bias. The experimental evidence surprisingly shows no ‘infeasibility’ bias, as subjects overwhelmingly chose non-excluded selections.     

Some Normal Extensions of K4.3

This paper proves the finite model property and the finite axiomatizability of a class of normal modal logics extending K4.3. The frames for these logics are those for K4.3, in each of which every point has a bounded number of irreflexive successors if it is after an infinite ascending chain of (not necessarily distinct) points.