The Underdetermination of Total Theories

This paper criticizes the attempt to found the epistemological doctrine that all theories are evidentially underdetermined on the thesis that all theories have empirically equivalent rivals. The criticisms focus on the role of auxiliary hypotheses in prediction. It is argued, in particular, that if auxiliaries are underdetermined, then the thesis of empirical equivalence is undecidable. The inference from empirical equivalence to the underdetermination of total theories would seem to survive the criticisms, because total theories do not require auxiliaries to yield observational consequences. It is shown that, nevertheless, underdetermination cannot be established for total theories. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Underdetermination, Holism and the Theory/Data Distinction

I examine the argument that scientific theories are typically 'underdetermined' by the data, an argument which has often been used to combat scientific realism. I deal with two objections to the underdetermination argument: (i) that the argument conflicts with the holistic nature of confirmation, and (ii) that the argument rests on an untenable theory/data dualism. I discuss possible responses to both objections, and argue that in both cases the proponent of underdetermination can respond in ways which are individually plausible, but that the best response to the first objection conflicts with the best response to the second. Consequently underdetermination poses less of a problem for scientific realism than has often been thought.     

Duhem–Quine virtue epistemology

The Duhem?CQuine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and W. V. Quine. Duhem resolves underdetermination by appealing to a cluster of virtues called ??good sense??, and it has recently been argued by Stump (Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci, 18(1):149?C159, 2007) that good sense is a form of virtue epistemology. This paper considers whether Quine, who??s philosophy is heavily influenced by the very thesis that led Duhem to the virtues, is also led to a virtue epistemology in the face of underdetermination. Various sources of Quinian epistemic normativity are considered, and it is argued that, in conjunction with other normative commitments, Quine??s sectarian solution to underdetermination amounts to a skills based virtue epistemology. The paper also sketches formal features of the novel form of virtue epistemology common to Duhem and Quine that challenges the adequacy of epistemic value truth-monism and blocks any imperialist naturalization of virtue epistemology, as the epistemic virtues are essential to the success of the sciences themselves.     

Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?

The first part of this paper discusses Quine’s views on underdetermination of theory by evidence, and the indeterminacy of translation, or meaning, in relation to certain physical theories. The underdetermination thesis says different theories can be supported by the same evidence, and the indeterminacy thesis says the same component of a theory that is underdetermined by evidence is also meaning indeterminate. A few examples of underdetermination and meaning indeterminacy are given in the text. In the second part of the paper, Quine’s scientific realism is discussed briefly, along with some of the difficulties encountered when considering the ‘truth’ of different empirically equivalent theories. It is concluded that the difference between underdetermination and indeterminacy, while significant, is not as great as Quine claims. It just means that after we have chosen a framework theory, from a number of empirically equivalent ones, we still have further choices along two different dimensions.     

The underdetermination of theory by data and the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge

Advocates of the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge have argued that, because scientific theories are “underdetermined” by data, sociological factors must be invoked to explain why scientists believe the theories they do. I examine this argument, and the responses to it by J.R. Brown (1989) and L. Laudan (1996). I distinguish between a number of different versions of the underdetermination thesis, some trivial, some substantive. I show that Brown's and Laudan's attempts to refute the sociologists' argument fail. Nonetheless, the sociologists' argument falls to a different criticism, for the version of the underdetermination thesis that the argument requires, has not been shown to be true.     

A Hasty Retreat From Evidence: The Recalcitrance of Relativism in Feminist Epistemology

While feminist epistemologists have made important contributions to the deconstruction of the traditional representationalist model, some elements of the Cartesian legacy remain. For example, relativism continues to play a role in the underdetermination thesis used by Longino and Keller. Both argue that because scientific theories are underdetermined by evidence, theory choice must be relative to interpretive frameworks. Utilizing Davidson's philosophy of language, I offer a nonrepresentationalist alternative to suggest how relativism can be more fully avoided.     

On choosing between deterministic and indeterministic models: underdetermination and indirect evidence

There are results which show that measure-theoretic deterministic models and stochastic models are observationally equivalent. Thus there is a choice between a deterministic and an indeterministic model and the question arises: Which model is preferable relative to evidence? If the evidence equally supports both models, there is underdetermination. This paper first distinguishes between different kinds of choice and clarifies the possible resulting types of underdetermination. Then a new answer is presented: the focus is on the choice between a Newtonian deterministic model supported by indirect evidence from other Newtonian models which invoke similar additional assumptions about the physical systems and a stochastic model that is not supported by indirect evidence. It is argued that the deterministic model is preferable. The argument against underdetermination is then generalised to a broader class of cases. Finally, the paper criticises the extant philosophical answers in relation to the preferable model. Winnie’s (1998) argument for the deterministic model is shown to deliver the correct conclusion relative to observations which are possible in principle and where there are no limits, in principle, on observational accuracy (the type of choice Winnie was concerned with). However, in practice the argument fails. A further point made is that Hoefer’s (2008) argument for the deterministic model is untenable.     

What Demonstrative Induction Can Do Against the Threat of Underdetermination: Bohr,Heisenberg, and Pauli on Spectroscopic Anomalies (1921–24)

In this paper I argue that demonstrative induction can deal with the problem ofthe underdetermination of theory by evidence. I present the historical case studyof spectroscopy in the early 1920s, where the choice among different theorieswas apparently underdetermined by spectroscopic evidence concerning the alkalidoublets and their anomalous Zeeman effect. By casting this historical episodewithin the methodological framework of demonstrative induction, the localunderdetermination among Bohr's, Heisenberg's, and Pauli's rival theories isresolved in favour of Pauli's theory of the electron's spin.     

THE UNDERDETERMINATION/INDETERMINACY DISTINCTION AND THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION

Two of W. V. Quine's most familiar doctrines are his endorsement of the distinction between underdetermination and indeterminacy, and his rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. The author argues that these two doctrines are incompatible. In terms wholly acceptable to Quine, and based on the underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, the author draws an exhaustive and exclusive distinction between two kinds of true sentences, and then argues that this corresponds to the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction. In an appendix the author expands on one aspect of the underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, as construed here, and discusses, in passing, some of Quine's more general views on truth.     

Facial asymmetry is negatively related to assertive personality but unrelated to dominant personality in men

Fluctuating asymmetry (FA) is a putative indicator of development instability in humans and other species, and some literature supports a women’s preference for low degree of FA in opposite sex (e.g., symmetrical face). Also some personality traits associated to social status (e.g., dominance and assertiveness) are attractive to women due to direct and indirect benefits associated to high status. The aim of this work was to study the relationship between facial FA and dominant and assertive personalities. We found a negative correlation between facial FA and assertive personality but not between facial FA and dominant personality. Moreover, we found a positive correlation between assertive and dominant personality. Our results suggest that a low facial FA and assertive personality can be related to be advertising desirable traits and high status in men in order to be more attractive to women. This study supports the evidence shown by previous works which shows that a low facial FA is related with socially desirable and attractive aspects of personality.     

因果推理中的亚决定性

“亚决定性”是知识论和科学哲学中一个重要的概念。对这个概念的一种阐释是把它对应于可靠探索的不可能性。就是说,在一个（经验）问题中,给定一些公设和一些供选择的理论或假说,如果逻辑上不可能找到一种理论选择的方法能满足一定的可靠或成功标准,那么相对于这个标准就存在亚决定性。从这个观点看,亚决定性总是相对于一个问题设定,尤其是公设和成功标准而言的。本文从这个角度对近来的统计因果推理研究作一番梳理。首先,基于数理统计中的一致性概念,我会讨论和分析一系列可应用于因果推理的成功标准。对每一个标准,我会用一个相对简单的条件来刻画它对应的亚决定性。然后我对文献里一部分重要的结果作一个综述,以澄清什么样的公设可以消除什么样的亚决定性。     

Saying a bundle: meaning,intention, and underdetermination

Synthese - People often speak loosely, uttering sentences that are plainly false on their most strict interpretation. In understanding such speakers, we face a problem of underdetermination: there...     

Philosophical Responses to Underdetermination in Science

What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other scientific theories? This question elicited different answers from instrumentalists, logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists, antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I will summarize the diverse philosophical responses to the problem of underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination, and that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses.     

Metaphysical underdetermination: why worry?

Various forms of underdetermination that might threaten the realist stance are examined. That which holds between different ‘formulations’ of a theory (such as the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of classical mechanics) is considered in some detail, as is the ‘metaphysical’ underdetermination invoked to support ‘ontic structural realism’. The problematic roles of heuristic fruitfulness and surplus structure in attempts to break these forms of underdetermination are discussed and an approach emphasizing the relevant structural commonalities is defended.     

Verificationism, Realism And Scepticism

Verificationism has often seemed attractive to philosophers because of its apparent abilityto deliver us from scepticism. However, I argue that purely epistemological considerationsprovide insufficient reason for embracing verificationism over realism. I distinguish twotypes of sceptical problem: those that stem from underdetermination by the actual data,and those that stem from underdetermination by all possible data. Verificationismevades problems of the second sort, but is powerless in the face of problems of the firstsort. But problems of the first sort are equally pressing. Furthermore, there is some reasonto think that the two types of problem have a common origin. Thus the desire to avoidscepticism provides insufficient reason for adopting verificationism.     

From analytic pragmatism to historical materialism: Frankfurt school critical theory and the Quine-Duhem thesis

My aim in this paper is to explore an affinity between early critical theory and analytical philosophy. The affinity is in a fairly unexpected area: philosophy of science. I argue that early critical theory embraces a view of science which is a natural if somewhat unfamiliar extension of the pragmatist one defended by Quine. In particular, I argue that Horkheimer has a version of the Quine-Duhem thesis (“underdetermination of theory choice by the evidence”). How do the Frankfurt and analytical versions of the underdetermination thesis differ? Quine and others have taken the thesis to motivate a form of pragmatism. What this means is that it is certain interests that ultimately determine the choice of theory: chief among them, an interest in simplicity of our theories. However, the Critical Theorists offer us a distinctly historical materialist version of the underdetermination thesis, in which it is the imperatives of the prevailing mode of production, for example, capitalism, which are decisive. The result is an unfamiliar Marxist version of an otherwise familiar thesis from the analytic tradition.     

Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination

Anthony Brueckner has argued that claims about underdetermination of evidence are suppressed in closure-based scepticism (“The Structure of the Skeptical Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:4, 1994). He also argues that these claims about underdetermination themselves lead to a paradoxical sceptical argument—the underdetermination argument—which is more fundamental than the closure argument. If Brueckner is right, the status quo focus of some predominant anti-sceptical strategies may be misguided. In this paper I focus specifically on the relationship between these two arguments. I provide support for Brueckner’s claim that the underdetermination argument is the more fundamental sceptical argument. I do so by responding to a challenge to this claim put forward by Stewart Cohen (“Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:1, 1998). Cohen invokes an alternative epistemic principle which he thinks can be used to challenge Brueckner. Cohen’s principle raises interesting questions about the relationship between evidential considerations and explanatory considerations in the context of scepticism about our knowledge of the external world. I explore these questions in my defence of Brueckner.     

Use of a paired-stimulus demand analysis to evaluate demands for inclusion in functional analyses

Clinicians regularly use both indirect and direct assessments to identify preferred stimuli to include in control conditions and positive reinforcement test conditions in a functional analysis (FA). However, clinicians often rely on indirect assessment alone (e.g., caregiver report) to identify aversive stimuli to include in negative reinforcement test conditions. In this study, we evaluate a paired-stimulus demand analysis and validate assessment results via FA. Results indicate that, for all 4 participants, the demands selected least often evoked higher rates of destructive behavior than more frequently selected demands. We identified an escape function for all 4 participants in the escape–least selected (LS) condition (true positive finding) and for only 1 participant in the escape–most selected (MS) condition (false negative finding for 3 of 4 participants). These results support the utility of empirically deriving stimuli for inclusion in the negative reinforcement test condition of an FA to decrease the likelihood of false negative findings.     

Hidden Underdetermination: A Case Study in Classical Electrodynamics

In this article, I present a case study of underdetermination in nineteenth-century electrodynamics between a pure field theory and a formulation in terms of action at a distance. A particular focus is on the question if and how this underdetermination is eventually resolved. It turns out that after a period of overt underdetermination, during which the approaches are developed separately, the two programmes are merged. On the basis of this development, I argue that the original underdetermination survives in hidden form in ontological and methodological redundancies of the subsequent particle–field electrodynamics. Implications regarding criteria for theory choice and the realism debate are briefly addressed.     

Curve It, Gauge It, or Leave It? Practical Underdetermination in Gravitational Theories

Four empirically equivalent versions of general relativity, namely standard GR, Lorentz-invariant gravitational theory,and the gravitational gauge theories of the Lorentz and translation groups, are investigated in the form of a case study for theory underdetermination. The various ontological indeterminacies (both underdetermination and inscrutability of reference) inherent in gravitational theories are analyzed in a detailed comparative study. The concept of practical underdetermination is proposed, followed by a discussion of its adequacy to describe scientific progress. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.