Collective rationality in interactive decisions: evidence for team reasoning

Decision theory and game theory rest on a fundamental assumption that players seek to maximize their individual utilities, but in some interactive decisions it seems intuitively reasonable to aim to maximize the utility of the group of players as a whole. Such team reasoning requires collective preferences and a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. Findings from two experiments provide evidence for collective preferences and team reasoning. In lifelike vignettes (Experiment 1) and abstract games (Experiment 2) with certain structural properties, most players preferred team-reasoning strategies to strategies supporting unique Nash equilibria, although individually rational players should choose equilibrium strategies. These findings suggest that team reasoning predicts strategy choices more powerfully than orthodox game theory in some games.     

Team reasoning and collective rationality: piercing the veil of obviousness

The experiments reported in our target article provide strong evidence of collective utility maximization, and the findings suggest that team reasoning should now be included among the social value orientations used in cognitive and social psychology. Evidential decision theory offers a possible alternative explanation for our results but fails to predict intuitively compelling strategy choices in simple games with asymmetric team-reasoning outcomes. Although many of our experimental participants evidently used team reasoning, some appear to have ignored the other players' expected strategy choices and used lower-level, nonstrategic forms of reasoning. Standard payoff transformations cannot explain the experimental findings, nor team reasoning in general, without an unrealistic assumption that players invariably reason nonstrategically.     

Sentencing,severity, and social norms: A rank-based model of contextual influence on judgments of crimes and punishments

Context effects have been shown to bias lay people's evaluations of the severity of crimes and punishments. To investigate the cognitive mechanisms behind these effects, we develop and apply a rank-based social norms approach to judgments of perceived crime seriousness and sentence appropriateness. In Study 1, we find that (a) people believe on average that 84% of people illegally download software more than they do themselves and (b) their judged severity of, and concern about, their own illegal software downloading is predicted not by its amount but by how this amount is believed (typically inaccurately) to rank within a social comparison distribution. Studies 2 and 3 find that the judged appropriateness of a given sentence length is highly dependent on the length of other sentences available in the decision-making context: The same objective sentence was judged as approximately four times stricter when it was the second longest sentence being considered than when it was the fifth longest. It is concluded that the same mechanisms that are used to judge the magnitude of psychophysical stimuli bias judgments about legal matters.     

I saw it for longer than you: the relationship between perceived encoding duration and memory conformity

The memory conformity effect is when people's memories become similar to one another's following a discussion. The present study examined whether an individual's beliefs in the quality of their memory, relative to another person's, mediates susceptibility to memory conformity. Perceived encoding duration was manipulated by telling dyad members that one person had encoded a set of pictures for either half or twice as long as their partner. In fact, actual encoding duration was the same for all participants. Dyad members each encoded slightly different versions of otherwise identical pictures and discussed them prior to an individual free recall test. Participants who believed that they had encoded the pictures for half as long as their partner were more susceptible to memory conformity, as indicated by their increased tendency to report errant items at test that had been encountered from their partner rather than items that they had actually seen. This effect of perceived encoding duration on memory conformity was mediated through response order. A source monitoring test found that these unseen items were errantly attributed to the pictures approximately 50% of the time. The findings are discussed in relation to the role of metamemory in susceptibility to memory conformity.     

Resolution of conflicts between internal and external information sources on a time reproduction task: the role of perceived information reliability and attributional style

Erroneous knowledge of results (KR) that conflicts with other internal or external information sources is preferentially used and misguides performance on motor and mental timing tasks. Buekers et al. [J. Motor Behavior 26 (1994) 27] hypothesized that KR is used preferentially because participants deem it to be the most reliable information source. We tested this hypothesis in two experiments. We manipulated subjective reliability of information and information content and demonstrated that both reliability and content are assessed and used. In a third experiment we examined whether attributional style affected the use of internal and external information. While KR was present, attributional style was unrelated to performance. However, when erroneous KR was withdrawn, participants who scored high in internal attributional style or high in controllability showed more accurate performance. Whereas evaluation of information quality is explicit, information provided by the KR, whether accurate or not, may influence both implicit and explicit aspects of the tasks.     

"With a little help from my friends...": the role of co-witness relationship in susceptibility to misinformation

Inaccuracies in eyewitness accounts can occur when witnesses are exposed to post-event misinformation via discussion with a co-witness. The current study examined the role of co-witness relationship by comparing the memory performance of pairs of romantic couples, friends and previously unacquainted strangers with that of individuals. Ninety-six participants viewed an event and then discussed the witnessed event with a stranger, a romantic partner or a friend. One member of each pair saw a theft take place during the witnessed event. Individual group participants did not discuss the witnessed event with anyone. Results indicate that all co-witness dyads produced less accurate recall accounts than participants who did not interact with another witness. However, witnesses who were previously acquainted with their co-witness (either in a friendship or romantic relationship) were significantly more likely to report information obtained from their co-witness that they had not seen themselves. Prior acquaintance also led to an increased number of incorrect attributions of both guilt and innocence.     

Relative - not absolute - judgments of credibility affect susceptibility to misinformation conveyed during discussion

People remember different details about the same events, and when they discuss events they exchange new – and misleading – information. Discussion can change memory, especially when the source of new information is highly credible. But we do not know whether the effects of credibility are based on absolute judgments – judging a source's credibility independently from our own credibility – or relative judgments – judging a source's credibility only in relation to our own credibility. We addressed this question by manipulating subjects' expectations, leading them to believe that they either had the same, higher or lower “visual acuity” than their partner while they watched a movie together. To create ample opportunities for the pairs to mention misleading details to one another, each member unknowingly saw a different version of the movie. The pairs then discussed some of the critical differences, but not others. Later, everyone took an independent recognition test. Subjects' susceptibility to misinformation depended on their own credibility relative to their partner's, supporting the idea that susceptibility to misinformation depends on relative differences in credibility.     

I see into your mind too well: working memory adjusts the probability judgment of others' mental states

Although an increasing number of studies on adults have indicated that working memory (WM) contributes to the ability to understand the mental states of others (i.e., theory of mind), the detailed mechanism by which WM contributes to successful reasoning has not previously been revealed. This study shows that WM modulates the degree of attribution of one's own knowledge to others' mental states. Participants were asked to read a story twice (Experiment 2) or as carefully as possible (Experiment 3) and to estimate the probability percentages of possible choices for a naive protagonist's behavior. The participants were then asked to maintain either a two- or seven-letter alphabet string (i.e., a light or heavy WM load, respectively) during the probability estimation but not during the story comprehension. The results showed that compared to the participants with a light WM load, those with a heavy WM load estimated a significantly higher probability of the choice indicating that the protagonist would behave on the basis of a fact that the participants knew but the protagonist did not. This result indicates that WM moderates the extent to which adults attribute their own knowledge to others' mental states. The role of WM in theory of mind and in heuristic strategy for making probability judgments was then discussed.     

Preferences for different questions when testing hypotheses in an abstract task: Positivity does play a role, asymmetry does not

Previous studies on hypothesis-testing behaviour have reported systematic preferences for posing positive questions (i.e., inquiries about features that are consistent with the truth of the hypothesis) and different types of asymmetric questions (i.e., questions where the hypothesis confirming and the hypothesis disconfirming responses have different evidential strength). Both tendencies can contribute - in some circumstances - to confirmation biases (i.e., the improper acceptance or maintenance of an incorrect hypothesis). The empirical support for asymmetric testing is, however, scarce and partly contradictory, and the relative strength of positive testing and asymmetric testing has not been empirically compared. In four studies where subjects were asked to select (Experiment 1) or evaluate (Experiments 2-4) questions for controlling an abstract hypothesis, we orthogonally balanced the positivity/negativity of questions by their symmetry/asymmetry (Experiments 1-3), or by the type of asymmetry (confirmatory vs disconfirmatory; Experiment 4). In all Experiments participants strongly preferred positive to negative questions. Their choices were on the other hand mostly unaffected by symmetry and asymmetry in general, or - more specifically - by different types of asymmetry. Other results indicated that participants were sensitive to the diagnosticity of the questions (Experiments 1-3), and that they preferred testing features with a high probability under the focal hypothesis (Experiment 4). In the discussion we argue that recourse to asymmetric testing - observed in some previous studies using more contextualized problems - probably depends on context-related motivations and prior knowledge. In abstract tasks, where that knowledge is not available, more simple strategies - such as positive testing - are prevalent.     

Limitations of gaze transfer: Without visual context,eye movements do not to help to coordinate joint action,whereas mouse movements do

Remote cooperation can be improved by transferring the gaze of one participant to the other. However, based on a partner's gaze, an interpretation of his communicative intention can be difficult. Thus, gaze transfer has been inferior to mouse transfer in remote spatial referencing tasks where locations had to be pointed out explicitly. Given that eye movements serve as an indicator of visual attention, it remains to be investigated whether gaze and mouse transfer differentially affect the coordination of joint action when the situation demands an understanding of the partner's search strategies. In the present study, a gaze or mouse cursor was transferred from a searcher to an assistant in a hierarchical decision task. The assistant could use this cursor to guide his movement of a window which continuously opened up the display parts the searcher needed to find the right solution. In this context, we investigated how the ease of using gaze transfer depended on whether a link could be established between the partner's eye movements and the objects he was looking at. Therefore, in addition to the searcher's cursor, the assistant either saw the positions of these objects or only a grey background. When the objects were visible, performance and the number of spoken words were similar for gaze and mouse transfer. However, without them, gaze transfer resulted in longer solution times and more verbal effort as participants relied more strongly on speech to coordinate the window movement. Moreover, an analysis of the spatio-temporal coupling of the transmitted cursor and the window indicated that when no visual object information was available, assistants confidently followed the searcher's mouse but not his gaze cursor. Once again, the results highlight the importance of carefully considering task characteristics when applying gaze transfer in remote cooperation.     

Neuro-cognitive mechanisms of decision making in joint action: a human-robot interaction study

In this paper we present a model for action preparation and decision making in cooperative tasks that is inspired by recent experimental findings about the neuro-cognitive mechanisms supporting joint action in humans. It implements the coordination of actions and goals among the partners as a dynamic process that integrates contextual cues, shared task knowledge and predicted outcome of others’ motor behavior. The control architecture is formalized by a system of coupled dynamic neural fields representing a distributed network of local but connected neural populations. Different pools of neurons encode task-relevant information about action means, task goals and context in the form of self-sustained activation patterns. These patterns are triggered by input from connected populations and evolve continuously in time under the influence of recurrent interactions. The dynamic model of joint action is evaluated in a task in which a robot and a human jointly construct a toy object. We show that the highly context sensitive mapping from action observation onto appropriate complementary actions allows coping with dynamically changing joint action situations.     

Letter search does not affect semantic priming in a probe naming task

The normally robust semantic priming effect observed in lexical decision is usually reduced to the point of being absent, when a letter search has to be performed on the prime. It has been argued that semantic activation is thus not an automatic process but rather cognitively controlled and therefore adaptable to task demands. We examined the effects of letter search priming on pronunciation times and found a reliable semantic priming effect, following letter search that was not affected at all relative to a standard condition, where participants silently read the prime. Thus the nature of the prime task did not seem to affect the processing mode employed, semantic access occurred even though attention was focused on surface properties of the prime.     

Conjunction errors in recognition memory: modality-free errors for older adults but not for young adults

A dual-process theory of memory was applied to processes in normal aging, with a focus on recognition errors in the feature-conjunction paradigm (i.e., false recognition of blackbird after studying parent words blackmail and/or jailbird). Study repetition was manipulated so that some parent words occurred once and others occurred three times. Age-related differences on hit scores occurred for two experiments. The results for feature and conjunction conditions showed repetition effects but no age-related differences when participants were uninformed of the lures (Experiment 1). However, age-related differences emerged when the retrieval of modality source information created a way to evade conjunction errors (Experiment 2). In the second experiment, study repetition decreased errors for the young adults but increased errors for the older adults, and young adults were better able than older adults to avoid conjunction errors when the parent words had been repeated. For older adults, the conjunction errors were modality-free. The results provide additional evidence that older adults experience difficulty in recollecting aspects of a study experience, and the results from groups of young adults required to respond quickly on the tests provide converging evidence for this conclusion.     

Task switching in video game players: Benefits of selective attention but not resistance to proactive interference

Research into the perceptual and cognitive effects of playing video games is an area of increasing interest for many investigators. Over the past decade, expert video game players (VGPs) have been shown to display superior performance compared to non-video game players (nVGPs) on a range of visuospatial and attentional tasks. A benefit of video game expertise has recently been shown for task switching, suggesting that VGPs also have superior cognitive control abilities compared to nVGPs. In two experiments, we examined which aspects of task switching performance this VGP benefit may be localized to. With minimal trial-to-trial interference from minimally overlapping task set rules, VGPs demonstrated a task switching benefit compared to nVGPs. However, this benefit disappeared when proactive interference between tasks was increased, with substantial stimulus and response overlap in task set rules. We suggest that VGPs have no generalized benefit in task switching-related cognitive control processes compared to nVGPs, with switch cost reductions due instead to a specific benefit in controlling selective attention.     

When three is not always two against one: Coalitions in experimental three-person cooperative games

Four models of coalition formation are tested in a computer-controlled experiment in which three players negotiated to form coalitions in order to gain rewards for themselves. Formation of the grand coalition of all three players as well as any of the three possible 2-person coalitions is permitted. The results indicate that the grand coalition is the most likely to form, followed by the coalition between the two strongest players. The individually rational bargaining set model of coalition formation is supported over an egalitarian model, the Shapley value, and the coalitionally rational bargaining set model. Various measures of the progress of negotiations are introduced, examined, and discussed in an effort to provide an increased data base for the establishment of a behavioral theory of bargaining and coalition formation.     

'Obsessed with goals': functions and mechanisms of teleological interpretation of actions in humans

Humans show a strong and early inclination to interpret observed behaviours of others as goal-directed actions. We identify two main epistemic functions that this 'teleological obsession' serves: on-line prediction and social learning. We show how teleological action interpretations can serve these functions by drawing on two kinds of inference ('action-to-goal' or 'goal-to-action'), and argue that both types of teleological inference constitute inverse problems that can only be solved by further assumptions. We pinpoint the assumptions that the three currently proposed mechanisms of goal attribution (action-effect associations, simulation procedures, and teleological reasoning) imply, and contrast them with the functions they are supposed to fulfil. We argue that while action-effect associations and simulation procedures are generally well suited to serve on-line action monitoring and prediction, social learning of new means actions and artefact functions requires the inferential productivity of teleological reasoning.     

Age of acquisition, not word frequency affects object recognition: evidence from the effects of visual degradation

Four experiments examined how age of acquisition (AoA) and word frequency (WF) interact with manipulations of image quality in a picture-naming task. Experiments 1 and 2 examined the effect of overlaying the to-be-named picture with irrelevant contours. The magnitude of the AoA effect increased when the contours were added (Experiment 1), but the effect of WF remained constant (Experiment 2). Experiments 3 and 4 examined the effects of reducing the contrast of the contours defining the to-be-named picture. Both the effects of AoA (Experiment 3) and WF (Experiment 4) remained constant in the face of contrast reduction. These results provide an empirical dissociation of the effects of AoA and WF. The results are consistent with the idea that both AoA and the addition of irrelevant contours affect the efficiency of object recognition, but WF affects later processes involved in retrieval of object names. The theoretical implications of these findings in relation to accounts of AoA and frequency and their functional localisation in the lexical system are discussed.     

More conflict does not trigger more adjustment of cognitive control for subsequent events: A study of the bivalency effect

Encountering a conflict triggers an adjustment of cognitive control. This adjustment of cognitive control can even affect subsequent performance. The purpose of the present study was to determine whether more conflict triggers more adjustment of cognitive control for subsequent performance. To this end, we focussed on the bivalency effect, that is, the adjustment of cognitive control following the conflict induced by bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two tasks). In two experiments, we tested whether the amount of conflict triggered by bivalent stimuli affected the bivalency effect. Bivalent stimuli were either compatible (i.e., affording one response) or incompatible (i.e., affording two different responses). Thus, compatible bivalent stimuli involved a task conflict, whereas incompatible bivalent stimuli involved a task and a response conflict. The results showed that the bivalency effect was not affected by this manipulation. This indicates that more conflict does not trigger more adjustment of cognitive control for subsequent performance. Therefore, only the occurrence of conflict – not its amount – is determinant for cognitive control.     

To think or not to think,that is the question: Individual differences in suppression and rebound effects in autobiographical memory

Two studies explored the effects of forget instructions on autobiographical memory at immediate test and following delays of either 12–13 months, or 3–4 months. Using the Autobiographical Think/No-Think procedure (cf., Noreen & MacLeod, 2013), 24 never-depressed participants (Study 1) first generated 12 positive and 12 negative autobiographical memories and associated cues. Participants were then asked to recall the memory associated with some of the cues (i.e., ‘think’ condition), or to avoid saying or thinking about the memory associated with other cues (i.e., ‘no-think’ condition). Participants were then asked to recall the memories associated with all the cues at immediate test and following a delay of 12–13 months. Participants were found to be successful at forgetting both positive and negative autobiographical memories following ‘no-think’ instructions at immediate test but this forgetting effect did not persist following a 12–13 month delay. This pattern of remembering and forgetting was replicated in a second study (using 27 never-depressed participants) following a 3–4 month delay. Participants who had been less successful at forgetting ‘no-think’ memories at immediate test, were more likely to show rebound effects for those memories following a delay compared to memories which received neither ‘think’ nor ‘no-think’ instructions. Individual differences in inhibitory control and the efficacy of potential therapeutic interventions of ‘no-think’ instructions are considered.