Sensitivity to social contingency or stability of interaction? Modelling the dynamics of perceptual crossing

We introduce a series of evolutionary robotics simulations that address the behaviour of individuals in socially contingent interactions. The models are based on a recent study by Auvray, Lenay and Stewart [(2006). The attribution of intentionality in a simulated environment: The case of minimalist devices. In Tenth meeting of the association for the scientific study of consciousness, Oxford, UK, 23-26 June, 2006] on tactile perceptual crossing in a minimal virtual environment. In accordance, both the empirical experiments and our simulations point out the essential character of global embodied interaction dynamics for the sensitivity to contingency to arise. Rather than being individually perceived by any of the interactors, sensitivity to contingency arises from processes of circular causality that characterise the collective dynamics. Such global dynamical aspects are frequently neglected when studying social cognition. Furthermore, our synthetic studies point out interesting aspects of the task that are not immediately obvious in the empirical data. They, in addition, generate new hypotheses for further experiments. We conclude by promoting a minimal but tractable, dynamic and embodied account to social interaction, combining synthetic and empirical findings as well as concrete predictions regarding sensorimotor strategies, the role of time-delays and robustness to perturbations in interactive dynamics.     

Collective rationality in interactive decisions: evidence for team reasoning

Decision theory and game theory rest on a fundamental assumption that players seek to maximize their individual utilities, but in some interactive decisions it seems intuitively reasonable to aim to maximize the utility of the group of players as a whole. Such team reasoning requires collective preferences and a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. Findings from two experiments provide evidence for collective preferences and team reasoning. In lifelike vignettes (Experiment 1) and abstract games (Experiment 2) with certain structural properties, most players preferred team-reasoning strategies to strategies supporting unique Nash equilibria, although individually rational players should choose equilibrium strategies. These findings suggest that team reasoning predicts strategy choices more powerfully than orthodox game theory in some games.     

Nash equilibrium, team reasoning and cognitive hierarchy theory

This paper comments on two experiments, carried out by Colman, Pulford and Rose, which investigate the prevalence of team reasoning. I argue that because the first experiment uses 'decomposable' games, it cannot discriminate between team-reasoning and the conceptually distinct 'prosocial' orientation. In the second experiment, Colman et al. find more support for the team reasoning hypothesis than for the rival hypothesis that subjects choose Nash equilibrium strategies. I suggest that the most credible explanation of the data is that some subjects are team reasoners while others act according to cognitive hierarchy theory.     

Sentencing,severity, and social norms: A rank-based model of contextual influence on judgments of crimes and punishments

Context effects have been shown to bias lay people's evaluations of the severity of crimes and punishments. To investigate the cognitive mechanisms behind these effects, we develop and apply a rank-based social norms approach to judgments of perceived crime seriousness and sentence appropriateness. In Study 1, we find that (a) people believe on average that 84% of people illegally download software more than they do themselves and (b) their judged severity of, and concern about, their own illegal software downloading is predicted not by its amount but by how this amount is believed (typically inaccurately) to rank within a social comparison distribution. Studies 2 and 3 find that the judged appropriateness of a given sentence length is highly dependent on the length of other sentences available in the decision-making context: The same objective sentence was judged as approximately four times stricter when it was the second longest sentence being considered than when it was the fifth longest. It is concluded that the same mechanisms that are used to judge the magnitude of psychophysical stimuli bias judgments about legal matters.     

Team reasoning and collective rationality: piercing the veil of obviousness

The experiments reported in our target article provide strong evidence of collective utility maximization, and the findings suggest that team reasoning should now be included among the social value orientations used in cognitive and social psychology. Evidential decision theory offers a possible alternative explanation for our results but fails to predict intuitively compelling strategy choices in simple games with asymmetric team-reasoning outcomes. Although many of our experimental participants evidently used team reasoning, some appear to have ignored the other players' expected strategy choices and used lower-level, nonstrategic forms of reasoning. Standard payoff transformations cannot explain the experimental findings, nor team reasoning in general, without an unrealistic assumption that players invariably reason nonstrategically.     

The effect of accountability on loss aversion

This paper investigates the effect of accountability—the expectation on the side of the decision maker of having to justify his/her decisions to somebody else—on loss aversion. Loss aversion is commonly thought to be the strongest component of risk aversion. Accountability is found to reduce the bias of loss aversion. This effect is explained by the higher cognitive effort induced by accountability, which triggers a rational check on emotional reactions at the base of loss aversion, leading to a reduction of the latter. Connections to dual-processing models are discussed.     

I saw it for longer than you: the relationship between perceived encoding duration and memory conformity

The memory conformity effect is when people's memories become similar to one another's following a discussion. The present study examined whether an individual's beliefs in the quality of their memory, relative to another person's, mediates susceptibility to memory conformity. Perceived encoding duration was manipulated by telling dyad members that one person had encoded a set of pictures for either half or twice as long as their partner. In fact, actual encoding duration was the same for all participants. Dyad members each encoded slightly different versions of otherwise identical pictures and discussed them prior to an individual free recall test. Participants who believed that they had encoded the pictures for half as long as their partner were more susceptible to memory conformity, as indicated by their increased tendency to report errant items at test that had been encountered from their partner rather than items that they had actually seen. This effect of perceived encoding duration on memory conformity was mediated through response order. A source monitoring test found that these unseen items were errantly attributed to the pictures approximately 50% of the time. The findings are discussed in relation to the role of metamemory in susceptibility to memory conformity.     

Resolution of conflicts between internal and external information sources on a time reproduction task: the role of perceived information reliability and attributional style

Erroneous knowledge of results (KR) that conflicts with other internal or external information sources is preferentially used and misguides performance on motor and mental timing tasks. Buekers et al. [J. Motor Behavior 26 (1994) 27] hypothesized that KR is used preferentially because participants deem it to be the most reliable information source. We tested this hypothesis in two experiments. We manipulated subjective reliability of information and information content and demonstrated that both reliability and content are assessed and used. In a third experiment we examined whether attributional style affected the use of internal and external information. While KR was present, attributional style was unrelated to performance. However, when erroneous KR was withdrawn, participants who scored high in internal attributional style or high in controllability showed more accurate performance. Whereas evaluation of information quality is explicit, information provided by the KR, whether accurate or not, may influence both implicit and explicit aspects of the tasks.     

Sensory and affective judgments of skin during inter- and intrapersonal touch

Here we report two experiments that investigated the tactile perception of one’s own skin (intrapersonal touch) versus the skin of other individuals (interpersonal touch). In the first experiment, thirteen female participants rated, along four perceptual attributes, the skin of their own palm and volar forearm, then that of several of the other participants. Ratings were made using visual analogue scales for perceived smoothness, softness, stickiness, and pleasantness. One’s own skin was rated less pleasant than the skin of others. For both intra- and interpersonal touch, the forearm skin was rated smoother, softer, less sticky and more pleasant than the palmar skin. In the second experiment, ten pairs of female participants rated each other’s palm and volar forearm skin, with the skin of the touched individual being assessed before and after the application of skin emollients that alter skin feel. As in the first experiment, the untreated skin of others was rated more pleasant than the participants’ own skin, and the forearm versus palm differences were replicated. However, the emollient had generally larger effects on self-assessments than the assessments of others, and the site effect showed greater positive sensory and pleasantness increases for palm versus volar forearm. The disparate results of the two experiments suggest that attention, influenced by the ecological importance of the stimulus, is more important to assessment of touched skin than ownership of the skin or the contribution to self-touch made by the additional receptors in the passively touched skin. In both experiments, the pleasantness of touched skin was associated with the skin’s perceived smoothness and softness, with weak trends toward negative associations with its perceived stickiness, consistent with prior research using inanimate surfaces (e.g., textiles and sandpapers).     

Social inhibition of return

Responses to a target stimulus can be slower when it appears in the same rather than a different location to a previous event, an effect known as inhibition of return (IOR). Recently, it has been shown that when two people alternate responses to a target, one person’s responses are slower when they are directed to the same locations as their partner’s previous response. The present study sought to investigate this highly novel effect, which we term social IOR (SIOR), in relation to what is known of IOR in individuals performing alone. We found that only a real conspecific can induce SIOR in another person, whereas an animated conspecific cannot. Additionally, SIOR emerges at locations to which a conspecific has been inferred to respond, even when direct observation of his/her responses is prevented. Finally, SIOR can be induced without the abrupt visual transients normally associated with the generation of IOR. These findings suggest that SIOR is the result of stronger activations of IOR mechanisms, or that it is subserved by entirely separate inhibitory processes.     

"With a little help from my friends...": the role of co-witness relationship in susceptibility to misinformation

Inaccuracies in eyewitness accounts can occur when witnesses are exposed to post-event misinformation via discussion with a co-witness. The current study examined the role of co-witness relationship by comparing the memory performance of pairs of romantic couples, friends and previously unacquainted strangers with that of individuals. Ninety-six participants viewed an event and then discussed the witnessed event with a stranger, a romantic partner or a friend. One member of each pair saw a theft take place during the witnessed event. Individual group participants did not discuss the witnessed event with anyone. Results indicate that all co-witness dyads produced less accurate recall accounts than participants who did not interact with another witness. However, witnesses who were previously acquainted with their co-witness (either in a friendship or romantic relationship) were significantly more likely to report information obtained from their co-witness that they had not seen themselves. Prior acquaintance also led to an increased number of incorrect attributions of both guilt and innocence.     

I see into your mind too well: working memory adjusts the probability judgment of others' mental states

Although an increasing number of studies on adults have indicated that working memory (WM) contributes to the ability to understand the mental states of others (i.e., theory of mind), the detailed mechanism by which WM contributes to successful reasoning has not previously been revealed. This study shows that WM modulates the degree of attribution of one's own knowledge to others' mental states. Participants were asked to read a story twice (Experiment 2) or as carefully as possible (Experiment 3) and to estimate the probability percentages of possible choices for a naive protagonist's behavior. The participants were then asked to maintain either a two- or seven-letter alphabet string (i.e., a light or heavy WM load, respectively) during the probability estimation but not during the story comprehension. The results showed that compared to the participants with a light WM load, those with a heavy WM load estimated a significantly higher probability of the choice indicating that the protagonist would behave on the basis of a fact that the participants knew but the protagonist did not. This result indicates that WM moderates the extent to which adults attribute their own knowledge to others' mental states. The role of WM in theory of mind and in heuristic strategy for making probability judgments was then discussed.     

Relative - not absolute - judgments of credibility affect susceptibility to misinformation conveyed during discussion

People remember different details about the same events, and when they discuss events they exchange new – and misleading – information. Discussion can change memory, especially when the source of new information is highly credible. But we do not know whether the effects of credibility are based on absolute judgments – judging a source's credibility independently from our own credibility – or relative judgments – judging a source's credibility only in relation to our own credibility. We addressed this question by manipulating subjects' expectations, leading them to believe that they either had the same, higher or lower “visual acuity” than their partner while they watched a movie together. To create ample opportunities for the pairs to mention misleading details to one another, each member unknowingly saw a different version of the movie. The pairs then discussed some of the critical differences, but not others. Later, everyone took an independent recognition test. Subjects' susceptibility to misinformation depended on their own credibility relative to their partner's, supporting the idea that susceptibility to misinformation depends on relative differences in credibility.     

Perceptions of morality and competence in (non)interdependent games

Individuals’ actions and their stated beliefs affect how others perceive them. In a prisoner’s dilemma, a defector who expects others to cooperate is perceived as less moral than a defector who expects others to defect; a cooperator who expects others to defect is perceived as less competent than a cooperator who expects others to cooperate (Experiment 1). This pattern suggests that in a context of interdependence, a stated expectation that the behavior of others will resemble one’s own may protect one’s social reputation. When outcomes are not interdependent, expectations do not moderate the effects of behavior on reputation (Experiment 2). In such a context, inductive reasoning is sufficient to explain social projection. Both types of results are replicated in a modified N-person social dilemma (Experiment 3), further validating the inductive-reasoning hypothesis.     

Neuro-cognitive mechanisms of decision making in joint action: a human-robot interaction study

In this paper we present a model for action preparation and decision making in cooperative tasks that is inspired by recent experimental findings about the neuro-cognitive mechanisms supporting joint action in humans. It implements the coordination of actions and goals among the partners as a dynamic process that integrates contextual cues, shared task knowledge and predicted outcome of others’ motor behavior. The control architecture is formalized by a system of coupled dynamic neural fields representing a distributed network of local but connected neural populations. Different pools of neurons encode task-relevant information about action means, task goals and context in the form of self-sustained activation patterns. These patterns are triggered by input from connected populations and evolve continuously in time under the influence of recurrent interactions. The dynamic model of joint action is evaluated in a task in which a robot and a human jointly construct a toy object. We show that the highly context sensitive mapping from action observation onto appropriate complementary actions allows coping with dynamically changing joint action situations.     

Collective rationality: the integrative model explains it (as) well

In this commentary, I argue that there is indeed considerable evidence in support of the notion that people tend to reason from a collective (or team) perspective by asking themselves questions such as "What do we want, and what should I do help achieve it?" [Colman, A. M., Pulford, B. D., & Rose, J. (2008). Collective rationality in interactive decisions: Evidence for team reasoning. Acta Psychologica]. As such, in my view, team reasoning -- and thinking, feeling, and acting in terms of collective rationality -- is consistent with a social utility model (or transformational model) which considers the weights that people attach not only to outcomes for self, but also to outcomes for other, and to equality in outcomes [Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,77, 337-349]. This commentary provides an illustration demonstrating that the integrative model is well-suited to account for the findings observed by Colman et al. (2008).     

Simple mechanisms for gathering social information

Social contexts are notoriously complex, yet decisions are nevertheless made by using simple strategies. We argue that the concept of fast and frugal heuristics provides a promising framework for understanding how we gather social information to make decisions in social environments. That is, we assume that under limitations of time, energy, and computational resources people use cognitively based shortcuts that rely on information from social environments to solve different types of real problems. We review three successful applications of heuristics to the social arena. We first introduce some commonly faced social inference problems (e.g., selecting a mate or deciding whether to cooperate with someone) and then discuss how individuals can use simple strategies to solve such problems. For each problem, we consider how social environments are structured, and how we take advantage of this structure when using heuristics to make inferences and decisions.     

Domain general mechanisms account for imagined transformations of whole body perspective

Three experiments investigated the contribution of domain general processes to imagined transformations of whole body perspective. In a task where participants make left–right judgements about a schematic human figure, reaction times made from the point of view of the figure are longer when the figure does not share the same spatial orientation as the participant and are substantially longer than those made from the participant's own point of view. These phenomena have been attributed to a specialised mechanism for imagined perspective transformations. In the present experiments, the effect of orientation on performance was influenced by factors that affect spatial stimulus–response (S–R) compatibility; it was attenuated with reduced dimensional overlap and reversed by crossed S–R mappings. Performance in a control experiment in which no figure was present suggests that processes moderating S–R mappings may account for the effect of adopting another's point of view. Our findings demonstrate a role for domain general processes in imagined transformations of whole body perspective, imply that egocentric codes for spatial relationships within visually presented bodies are automatically generated, and undermine evidence for a specialised mechanism for imagined perspective transformations.     

Less may be more when choosing is difficult: Choice complexity and too much choice

Although consumers readily seek choice and abundance, the so-called too-much-choice effect suggests that having many alternatives to choose from eventually leads to negative consequences, such as decreased post-choice satisfaction. The present research extends this research by highlighting the role of choice complexity. It is argued that too-much-choice effects are associated with choice complexity, which is influenced not only by the number of alternatives, but also by other features of the choice set, such as the number of attributes that alternatives are differentiated upon. These other influences of choice complexity may propel or hinder the emergence of too-much-choice effects. Two experiments tested this hypothesis by orthogonally manipulating the number of alternatives and the number of attributes. Results revealed a too-much-choice effect when alternatives were differentiated on many attributes, but not when alternatives were differentiated on few attributes. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

I still think it was a banana: memorable 'lies' and forgettable 'truths'

Interpersonal influences on cognition can distort memory judgements. Two experiments examined the nature of these 'social' influences, and whether their persistence is independent of their accuracy. Experiment 1 found that a confederate's social proximity, as well as the content and the confidence of their utterances, interactively modulates participants' immediate conformity. Notably, errant confederate statements that 'lied' about encoded material had a particularly strong immediate distorting influence on memory judgements. Experiment 2 revealed that these 'lies' were also memorable, continuing a day later to impair memory accuracy, while accurate confederate statements failed to produce a corresponding and lasting beneficial effect on memory. These findings suggest that an individual's 'informational' social influence can be selectively heightened when they express misinformation to someone who suspects no deceptive intent. The methods newly introduced here thus allow multiple social and cognitive factors impinging on memory accuracy to be manipulated and examined during realistic, precisely controlled dyadic social interactions.