The Price of Charity: Christian Love and Financial Anxieties

Love and money, according to the intuitive logic of Christian political theology, stand in opposition to each other. Where economic relations obtain, relations of love are understood to be absent or distorted. The opposition between the two has led social theorists and political theologians—including John Milbank, Kathryn Tanner, and Daniel M. Bell—to understand Christian love as a reservoir of opposition to the politics of contemporary financialized capital. This opposition, however, ignores the complex interrelationship that has characterized Christian thought about love and money. Love and money—and their apparent competitive relationship—have been understood throughout the history of Christian thought on the basis of a relationship both maintain to the notion of indebtedness. This paper argues that any apparent tension between Christian theological caritas and oikonomia must to be contextualized in terms of a shared relationship between both of these concepts and the organization and administration of relations of debt and obligation.     

Liberalism,Autonomy and Conjugal Love

Res Publica - This paper argues that a liberal state is justified in promoting relationships of conjugal love – the form of relationship that is the basis of the institution of marriage...     

SAVING THE “SECULAR”: The Public Vocation of Moral Theology1

The London suicide bombings of July 7, 2005 were partly the revolt of moral earnestness against a liberal society that, enchanted by the fantasy of rationalist anthropology, surrenders its passionate members to a degrading consumerism. The “humane” liberalism variously espoused by Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls, and Jeffrey Stout offers a dignifying alternative; but it is fragile, and each of its proponents looks for allies among certain kinds of religious believer. Stanley Hauerwas, however, counsels Christians against cooperation. On the one hand, he is right to resist, insofar as liberalism illiberally excludes theology from public discourse. On the other hand, not all humane liberalism does this: Stout's, for example, is genuinely polyglot, requiring not a common secularist language but a common ethic of communicating. Such a liberal ethic and its attendant anthropology merit the support of Christians: there may be more to be said about the Kingdom of God than respect, tolerance, and fairness, but there will not be less. The Christian has good theological reasons to expect some concord with other inhabitants of secular space. Ethical distinctiveness is no measure of theological integrity; and neither theology (pace Barth) nor biblical narrative (pace Richard Hays) should be expected to do all of the ethical running. If Christians are to be thorough in their moral theology and intelligible in their public statements, then they must borrow non‐theological material, formulate abstract concepts, and engage in casuistical analysis. Nevertheless, if an anxious insistence on distinctiveness is a mistake, concern for theological integrity is not. When the moral theologian borrows ethical material from elsewhere, he should integrate it into a theological vision structured by the Christian salvation‐historical narrative, which will sometimes modify the meaning of what is incorporated. So in affirming humane, polyglot liberalism, the moral theologian will at the same time make salutary qualifications. One of these is the assertion of the need of liberal institutions to own and promote their moral and anthropological commitments. In such a confessionally liberal society, universities in general, and the Arts and Humanities in particular, would recover their vocation to form citizens in communicative virtues and to offer them a dignifying, morally serious vision of human being that could save future generations from a degrading consumerism on the one hand and violent over‐reaction on the other.     

Seeing Through the Fog: Love and Injustice in Bleak House

The author takes up a provocative question poised by Charles Taylor about the relationship between our commitments to a good such as neighbor love and the possibilities of achieving and sustaining social justice. Taylor's concern is not only that we make such a commitment but that we make it in such a way that we avoid its ability to lead us towards injustice rather than justice. After articulating conceptions of love, justice, and injustice, the author turns to Charles Dickens's treatment of love and injustice in Bleak House , to explore more fully how love can lead to injustice, and also its potential role in promoting justice. Dickens's view, profoundly shaped by his own sense of Christian virtues, helps us see the inner workings of love, justice, and injustice, so that we can appreciate their interconnectedness anew and understand better the urgency of Taylor's question for our time.     

The Power of Invitation: The Moral Discourse of Kairos Palestine

Abstract: In this article I analyze the moral discourse of the Palestinian kairos document A Moment of Truth (2009) using the distinctions between prophetic, ethical, narrative, policy, and participatory discourse offered by James M. Gustafson and Lisa S. Cahill. I conclude that the document articulates a sixth variety: invitational discourse. This is a kind of moral discourse that invites a wide range of groups and individuals into a normative discussion on a given issue.     

Moral Philosophy and the Ontology of Relations

The essay undertakes to explore the possibilities of mutually fruitful dialogue between moral philosophy and ontology, in particular, the ontology of relations. The latter copes with the question of how relations relate, whereas moral philosophy often ignores the ontological implications of such crucial relations as love and interpersonality. The paper proceeds as follows. First, the ontology of relations is discussed. Second, various examples are analysed. From this, a conception of relation instantiation emerges, according to which to determine which relation actually obtains, one has to take into account (a) the context, (b) the specific content or meaning of the relation, and (c) some action or decision or mode of existence of the relata. This conception suggests that relation instantiation cannot be explained by a single formula. By the help of this conception, Hume's thesis of the identity of killing relations between human and nonhuman beings is questioned. Then, the relation of love is analysed. It is shown that love as a moral relation is perfectly explicable in terms of ontology. Moreover, its essence is best captured by the interrelation of the particulars, the relation of love as a universal, and by the relating action of the particulars. Finally, the alleged relation of universal fraternity (interpersonality as such), linking up each human being to all other human beings, is discussed.     

马克思的道德哲学批判

通过彰显马克思的“类存在物”及其“有意识的生命活动”、“自由自觉的活动”等概念的意蕴可以使其被遮蔽了的道德哲学批判得到澄明。人作为“类存在物” ,不但指认了人是社会的存在物 ,而且指证了永恒不变之人性观的虚幻性 ,从而超越了亚里士多德的“人是政治动物”的内涵 ;使人成为“类存在物”的“有意识的生命活动”则内置了马克思对道德准则的理解 ,使他对任何的非人格化的超历史的道德形式主义的合法性产生质疑 ;而人的自由自觉的活动体现了手段性活动与目的性活动统一 ,因而成为人的终极价值和道德本体 ,这构成了对各种形式的道德目的论的批判。     

Moral Philosophers as Ethical Engineers: Limits of Moral Philosophy and a Pragmatist Alternative

Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law‐like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question (a) whether this is possible and (b) what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a “social technology” that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing “moral technology” and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life.     

Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Mary Wollstonecraft on the imagination

The article compares Rousseau’s and Wollstonecraft’s views on the imagination. It is argued that though Wollstonecraft was evidently influenced by Rousseau, there are significant differences between their views. These differences are grounded in their different views on the faculty of reason and its relation to the passions. Whereas Rousseau characterizes reason as a derivative faculty, grounded in the more primary faculty of perfectibility, Wollstonecraft perceives reason as the faculty defining human nature. It is argued that contrary to what is often assumed, Wollstonecraft’s conception of the imagination is not primarily characterized by its Romantic features, but rather by the close affinity she posits between reason and the imagination. This close affinity has several consequences. One consequence is that she is less worried than Rousseau about the imagination wandering without external constrains, because she believes in reason’s ability to guide the imagination by choosing its objects. Ultimately the difference between Rousseau’s and Wollstonecraft’s views on the imagination helps us understand why she was a passionate philosopher of the Enlightenment while he was one of its first, perceptive and most articulate critics.     

Self and society in the claims of individualism

The paper argues that an assessment of individualism requires distinguishing five individualistic claims about the self and society: 1) Philosophical Individualism holds that individuals are distinct from society in their reality and capacity for knowledge; 2) The dignity of the individual is a moral belief about the status of human beings; 3) The ideal of individuality is a value belief about the value of diversity; 4) Moral individualism is a comprehensive moral theory based upon philosophical individualism; 5) Political liberalism is a theory of social justice based on construing human dignity in terms of equal liberty. It is argued that philosophical individualism should be rejected and, hence, moral individualism, that individuality is desirable but not obligatory, and that political liberalism, if it can avoid a tendency toward favoring individualistic conceptions of the good, is necessary for dignity in a modern society.     

儒家道德哲学及其审美境界

中国审美文化从本质意义上说是一种与天地亲和的生命文化,儒家传统最基本的特征就是肯定天人之间所具有本体论的一致性,因此儒家不从信仰出发来解释生命的伟大德行,而是从生生不息的生命本身来观照道德的本源。儒家作为生命的实践者,凭借其内在的生命力量,通过澄心静虑、心游目想,通过直观感悟、直觉体悟,以达到人生境界与审美境界的合一。这一过程既是道德主体的一种心理体验,更是道德主体通过一种外在践履工夫的求证。     

The Dual Moral Self: Moral Centrality and Internal Moral Motivation

In this study, the relationship between two aspects of the moral self, moral centrality and internal moral motivation, was analyzed. It is argued that these 2 aspects are conceptually distinct but nonetheless empirically related. Based on a cross-sectional study of 205 adolescents (M age = 14.83 years, SD = 2.21 years) it was found that moral centrality and internal moral motivation, even though substantially correlated, interacted in predicting moral emotion expectancies. Even though moral centrality was unrelated to adolescents’ age it predicted a longitudinal increase in internal moral motivation over a 1-year interval. Overall, the findings call for a differentiation of moral centrality and internal moral motivation as 2 distinct but interrelated aspects of moral self-development that follow different developmental trajectories and are differentially related to age. At the same time, the study points out that adolescence may be less important for the development of the moral self than commonly assumed.     

Kant and Rousseau on the Critique of Philosophical Theology: The Primacy of Practical Reason

This paper explores the Rousseauian background to Kant’s critique of metaphysics and philosophical theology. The core idea is that the rejection of metaphysics and philosophical theology is part of a turn from theoretical to practical reason influential on European philosophy of religion, a turn we associate with Kant but that is prefigured by Rousseau. Rousseau is not, however, a thinker normally associated with the notion of metaphysical criticism, nor the notion of the primacy of practical reason. The paper draws out this dimension of Rousseau’s thinking and its importance for Kantian thought. It will proceed by discussing the Kant-Rousseau connection; demonstrate the importance of practical philosophy for Kant and the critical project generally; overview Kant’s critique of metaphysics; and turn to a consideration of Rousseau, particularly from the text émile. Given the indisputable influence of Rousseau on Kant, the purpose of this paper is to explore the ways that Rousseau’s own rejection of philosophical theology might be suggestive to those interested in Kant and the way in which it throws new light on Kant’s philosophy of religion. As well as drawing out the Kant-Rousseau connection, it also, implicitly, defends the general orientation of these philosophers as one that is important, perhaps vital, to philosophy of religion.

A Back-Turning Harmony: Conflict as a Source of Political Community

It is widely assumed that community presupposes consensus on the good. As a result, liberals who acknowledge the permanence of pluralism have struggled to explain how a liberal society could realise the good of community. Here it is argued that our initial assumption is wrong. Conflict can serve as a source of political community. Our devotion to the things we care about provides us with reason to embark on a quest aimed at the elimination of conflict. The quest will require us to engage in the cooperative activity of dialogue with our moral adversaries. It is in this activity of dialogue, and not at the quests end, that political community can be located.     

Rousseau's Descartes: The Rejection of Theoretical Philosophy as First Philosophy

Rousseau's Savoyard Vicar makes creative use of Descartes's meditative method by applying it to practical life. This ‘misuse’ of the Cartesian method highlights the limits of the thinking thing as a ground for morality. Taking practical philosophy as first philosophy, the Vicar finds bedrock certainty of the self as an agent in the world and of moral truths while distancing himself from Cartesian positions on the distinction, union and interaction of mind and body. Rousseau's Moral Letters harmonize with the Vicar's view. Descartes would reject the Vicar's appropriation, as real-life problems cannot wait on meditation to answer them.     

文艺的信念:反抗道德虚假与道德虚无

在人类生活中,审美艺术创造发挥着重要的作用,它激发着人们的想象,显现着生命的形象力量。从价值论意义上说,人类生命活动的审美反恩,就是要探索生命的自由伦理,反抗道德虚假与道德虚无。道德虚假的盛行,是公正价值不畅的必然结果;道德虚无的兴起,是怀疑主义思潮作用的后果。现代文艺伦理学必须重建新型价值伦理,通过生命自由形象的创造,表达我们时代的内在呼声。     

Thinking About a Word—Love,for Example

What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word.     

Liberalism and the Privatised Family: The Legacy of Rousseau

This article argues that the intellectual legacy of Rousseau is at the root of the failure of 20th century egalitarian theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin to engage intellectually with feminist theorists working within the liberal tradition. Through an extended critique of Rousseau’s delineation of the relationship between liberal citizenship and the private family, it argues that the failure of such liberal theorists to take gender hierarchy seriously is a consequence of their attempt to place the private family outside the sphere not only of politics, but also of justice.     

Liberalism,Abstract Individualism,and the Problem of Particular Obligations

In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’ presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally flawed. For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees.