Rationalizing two-tiered choice functions through conditional choice

Set-valued choice functions provide a framework that is general enough to encompass a wide variety of theories that are significant to the study of rationality but, at the same time, offer enough structure to articulate consistency conditions that can be used to characterize some of the theories within this encompassed variety. Nonetheless, two-tiered choice functions, such as those advocated by Isaac Levi, are not easily characterized within the framework of set-valued choice functions. The present work proposes conditional choice functions as the proper carriers of synchronic rationality. The resulting framework generalizes the familiar one mentioned above without emptying it and, moreover, provides a natural setting for two-tiered choice rules.     

The probabilistic nature of preferential choice

Previous research has developed a variety of theories explaining when and why people's decisions under risk deviate from the standard economic view of expected utility maximization. These theories are limited in their predictive accuracy in that they do not explain the probabilistic nature of preferential choice, that is, why an individual makes different choices in nearly identical situations, or why the magnitude of these inconsistencies varies in different situations. To illustrate the advantage of probabilistic theories, three probabilistic theories of decision making under risk are compared with their deterministic counterparts. The probabilistic theories are (a) a probabilistic version of a simple choice heuristic, (b) a probabilistic version of cumulative prospect theory, and (c) decision field theory. By testing the theories with the data from three experimental studies, the superiority of the probabilistic models over their deterministic counterparts in predicting people's decisions under risk become evident. When testing the probabilistic theories against each other, decision field theory provides the best account of the observed behavior.     

The Miraculous Choice Argument for Realism

The miracle argument for scientific realism can be cast in two forms: according to the miraculous theory argument, realism is the only position which does not make the empirical successes of particular theories miraculous. According to the miraculous choice argument, realism is the only position which does not render the fact that empirically successful theories have been chosen a miracle. A vast literature discusses the miraculous theory argument, but the miraculous choice argument has been unjustifiably neglected. I raise two objections to Richard Boyd's defense of the latter: (1) we have no miracle free account of the emergence of take-off theories and (2) the anti-realist can account for the non-miraculous choice of empirically successful theories by attributing mere empirical adequacy to background theory. I argue that the availability of extra-empirical criteria that are arguably truth conductive but not theory-laden suffices to answer (1), and the unavailability of extra-empirical criteria that are conductive to empirical adequacy but not necessarily to truth (and are also not theory-laden) constitutes to reply to (2). The prospects for a realist victory are at least somewhat promising, on a controversial assumption about the rate at which empirically successful theories emerge.     

Testing two classes of theories about group induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly cautious or overly risky. Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Two experiments were conducted, the results of which give considerable support to persuasive-argument theories and none to those based on interpersonal comparison: When a member did not know whether others were arguing for their own position or were forced to support a position contrary to the one they had originally chosen, and the former in fact was the case, typical shifts in choice were obtained. However, if a member had to argue for a position contrary to the one he had initially chosen (and thus he would not be able to muster highly persuasive arguments) typical shifts did not occur, even though another's initial choice could be accurately inferred.     

Interpersonal comparison versus persuasive argumentation: A more direct test of alternative explanations for group-induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly “cautious” or overly “risky”. Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Thus, if in a factorial design one independently varied (a) the number of others' choices available for comparison and (b) the number of arguments others presented in support of these choices, interpersonal comparison theories would predict the magnitude of the shift to be a function of (a) and not of (b), while theories of persuasive argumentation would predict the opposite. When such an experiment was performed the only reliable main effects were based on the number of arguments, (b), as predicted by persuasive arguments. In no instance did effects involving (a) approach significance.     

Relativistic hidden variable theories?

I show that for any quantum dynamics and any choice of observables as hidden variables an adequate hidden variable theory always exists. I argue that hidden variable theories have no more problems in reconciling non-locality with relativity than no-hidden-variable theories.     

The Impact of Phantom Decoys on Choices and Perceptions

Phantoms are dominating, attractive alternatives that are unavailable at the time of choice. They occupy different positions in the attribute space, and their unavailability can be either known or unknown to individuals. Although different theories have offered explanations for the influence that phantoms exert on individual choices, they have largely overlooked phantom knowledge. Contradictory predictions can be drawn from these theories, and none provides a good account of the pattern of effects that emerges from our data. We suggest that these contradictions appear because the different theories do not address phantom location and knowledge jointly. When considering phantom knowledge together with location, we observe a consistent overall pattern of effects that encompasses all predictions that could be made on the basis of each theory. We find that known phantoms are stronger when close, and favor the target product, whereas unknown phantoms are stronger when far, and favor the competitor. Finally, we look beyond shifts in choice shares and find that phantom decoys can also affect individuals' post‐choice evaluations and reactions in terms of perceived justice, decision satisfaction, and repatronage intention. Our results show that post‐choice evaluations are driven by phantom knowledge, not phantom location. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

In Defense of the Jurisdiction Theory of Rights

This essay critically examines three theories of moral rights, theBenefit, the Interest, and the Choice theories. The Interest andChoice theories attempt to explain how rights can be more robustthan seems possible on the Benefit theory. In particular, moralrights are supposed to be resistant to trade-offs to supportprincipled anti-paternalism, to constitute a distinct dimensionof morality, and to provide right holders with a range ofdiscretionary choice. I argue that these and other featuresare better yet provided by a fourth theory of moral rights, theJurisdiction theory.     

Choice probabilities and choice functions

Choice probabilities are basic to much of the theory of individual choice behavior in mathematical psychology. On the other hand, consumer economics has relied primarily on preference relations and choice functions for its theories of individual choice. Although there are sizable literatures on the connections between choice probabilities and preference relations, and between preference relations and choice functions, little has been done—apart from their common ties to preference relations—to connect choice probabilities and choice functions. The latter connection is studied in this paper. A family of choice functions that depends on a threshold parameter is defined from a choice probability function. It is then shown what must be true of the choice probability function so that the choice functions satisfy three traditional rationality conditions. Conversely, it is shown what must be true of the choice functions so that the choice probability function satisfies a version of Luce's axiom for individual choice probabilities.     

Vector Reliability: A new Approach to Epistemic Justification

Critics of reliability theories of epistemic justificationoften claim that the `generality problem' is an insurmountabledifficulty for such theories. The generality problem is theproblem of specifying the level of generality at which abelief-forming process is to be described for the purposeof assessing its reliability. This problem is not asintractable as it seems. There are illuminating solutionsto analogous problems in the ethics literature. Reliabilistsought to attend to utilitarian approaches to choices betweeninfinite utility streams; they also ought to attend towelfarist approaches to social choice situations that donot demand full aggregation of individual welfares.These analogies suggest that the traditional `single number'approach to reliability is misguided. I argue that a newapproach – the `vector reliability' approach – is preferable.Vector reliability theories associate target beliefs withreliability vectors – that is, structured collections ofreliability numbers – and construct criteria of epistemicjustification that appeal to these vectors. The bulk of thetheoretical labor involved in a reliability account of epistemicjustification is thus transferred from picking a uniquereliability number to constructing a plausible criterionof epistemic justification.     

When gift-giving produces dissonance: Effects of subliminal affiliation priming on choices for one's self versus close others

Past research on cognitive dissonance indicated that people from independent (e.g. European-American) and interdependent (e.g. East-Asian) cultural backgrounds show different patterns of choice justification: whereas choice made for oneself affirms the independent view of the self, choice made for close others affirms the interdependent view of the self. We hypothesized that interpersonal choice considerations may be temporally accessible even among habitually independent European-Americans. The present research provides the first experimental evidence that choice justification varies as a function of both subliminal affiliation priming and the target of choice (self vs. close others). Results from three studies indicate that subliminal priming of affiliation increases justification of a choice European-Americans made for a close other, while decreasing justification of a choice made for the self. Implications for theories related to cognitive dissonance, subliminal processing and cultural meaning systems are discussed.     

Attention and attribute overlap in preferential choice

Attributes that are common, or overlapping, across alternatives in two-alternative forced preferential choice tasks are often non-diagnostic. In many settings, attending to and evaluating these attributes does not help the decision maker determine which of the available alternatives is the most desirable. For this reason, many existing behavioural theories propose that decision makers ignore common attributes while deliberating. Across six experiments, we find that decision makers do direct their attention selectively and ignore attributes that are not present in or associated with either of the available alternatives. However, they are as likely to attend to common attributes as they are to attend to attributes that are unique to a single alternative. These results suggest the need for novel theories of attention in preferential choice.     

I, zombie

Certain recent philosophical theories offer the prospect that zombies are possible. These theories argue that experiential contents, or qualia, are nonphysical properties. The arguments are based on the conceivability of alternate worlds in which physical laws and properties remain the same, but in which qualia either differ or are absent altogether. This article maintains that qualia are, on the contrary, physical properties in the world. It is shown how, under the burden of the a posteriori identification of qualia with physical properties, a reasoned choice can be made between the two types of theories which ultimately favors materialism and rejects zombies.     

Perspective effects in nondeontic versions of the Wason selection task

Perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task occur when people choose mutually exclusive sets of cards depending on the perspective they adopt when making their choice. Previous demonstrations of perspective effects have been limited to deontic contexts--that is, problem contexts that involve social duty, like permissions and obligations. In three experiments, we demonstrate perspective effects in nondeontic contexts, including a context much like the original one employed by Wason (1966, 1968). We suggest that perspective effects arise whenever the task uses a rule that can be interpreted biconditionally and different perspectives elicit different counterexamples that match the predicted choice sets. This view is consistent with domain-general theories but not with domain-specific theories of deontic reasoning--for example, pragmatic reasoning schemas and social contract theory--that cannot explain perspective effects in nondeontic contexts.     

基于期望值最大化的理论何时失效：风险决策中为自己-为所有人决策差异的眼动研究

主流的风险决策理论专家发展了一系列基于期望值最大化(expectation-maximization)的理论, 以期捕获所有人的风险决策行为。然而大量证据表明, 这些基于期望值最大化的理论并不能如同描述性理论那样理想地描述单一个体的决策行为。本研究采用眼动追踪技术, 系统考察了个体在为所有人决策与为自己决策时的风险决策行为及信息加工过程的差异。本研究发现, 基于期望值最大化的理论可捕获为所有人决策或为自己多次决策时的情况, 却不能很好捕获个体为自己进行单次决策时的情况。本研究结果有助于理解基于期望值最大化的理论与启发式/非基于期望值最大化的理论的边界, 为风险决策理论的划分和发展提供实证参考。     

Theory Choice,Theory Change,and Inductive Truth-Conduciveness

Studia Logica - (I) Synchronic norms of theory choice, a traditional concern in scientific methodology, restrict the theories one can choose in light of given information. (II) Diachronic norms of...