Perceived aversiveness of recommended solution and locus of control as determinants of response to danger

As determined by their scores on Rotter's Locus of Control scale (Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80 (1, Whole No. 609)), internal and external subjects were exposed either to a high-, low-, or no-fear message on the dangers of exposure to a sunlamp. It was recommended to half the subjects in each condition that they apply a cream which was described as producing minimal skin irritation (low aversiveness), while half the subjects received recommendations to apply a cream described as producing considerable skin irritation (high aversiveness). It was predicted that (a) a high-fear message would be more effective than a low-fear message in getting subjects to use the cream, especially when the recommended behavior was perceived as low in aversivensss; and (b) a high-fear message would be more effective than a low fear message for subjects classified as internals. The second prediction was confirmed, and the first was tentatively supported. Results were interpreted in terms of the perceptual processes which may mediate the relationship between fear and action. The findings did not support the fear-drive model.     

Identity Implications of Influence Goals A Revised Analysis of Face-Threatening Acts and Application to Seeking Compliance With Same-Sex Friends

Although politeness theory offers one explanation for how threats to face arise during compliance-gaining episodes, it neither predicts the conditions under which seeking compliance will create multiple face threats nor explains how such threats arise within specific contexts. The authors challenge and revise politeness theory by analyzing potential implications for both parties' face when the logical preconditions for seeking compliance are framed by specific influence goals. In a test of a revised analysis of face threats, young adults imagined asking favors, giving advice, and enforcing obligations with same-sex friends. Perceived face threats, interaction goals, and message qualities varied substantially across compliance-gaining situations defined by these goals. Directions for exploring the identity implications of influence goals across relationships and cultures are discussed.     

Conciliatory strategies and relative power

In an investigation of variations of a conciliatory strategy, 96 subjects, half female and half male, played a modified Prisoner's Dilemma in which their relative power, in terms of control over the other's outcomes, was less than, equal to, or greater than that of a simulated other. After 10 trials on which (s)he was 50% competitive, the other either did or did not send a handwritten note of general intent to be cooperative. In the second block of 10 trials, the other either was 100% cooperative or began with cooperation and stayed with it as long as the subject did not exploit. When the subject did exploit, the other made the competitive choice on the following trial as a form of retaliation, but followed this retaliation by a return to cooperation on the next trial so that there were never two consecutive competitive choices. During this second block, the simulated other always signaled in advance, with an explicit message, which choice (s)he was about to make. In a third block, the other was 100% cooperative in all conditions and sent no messages. As hypothesized, subjects whose power was equal to or less than that of the other were more cooperative in response to conciliation than were subjects whose power was greater than that of the other. Subjects who received the general note of intent were more cooperative than those who did not, but only in the equal and low power conditions. The subjects in the equal power condition who experienced retaliation were more cooperative than those who did not, but those in the unequal conditions tended to react negatively to retaliation. The results were discussed in terms of Osgood's (Peace Research Reviews, 1979, 8(2), 77–92) GRIT strategy and outcome control in interaction.     

Imposed and chosen monitoring and blunting strategies in the dental setting: Effects, self-efficacy, and coping preference

Abstract In the present study, 94 dental patients received either monitoring (i.e., paying attention) or blunting (i.e., distraction) coping instructions during treatment. Half of the patients were given the possibility of choice, whereas the other half were offered one of both strategies without choice. A majority of the patients (n=61) indicated that the intervention had resulted in a decrease of their anxiety. Some indications were found for the monitoring strategy to be more effective than the blunting strategy. More specifically, monitoring strategy subjects reported that they had experienced less distress during treatment than blunting strategy subjects. In agreement with this finding, self-efficacy ratings of monitoring strategy subjects were higher than those of blunting strategy subjects. Possibility of choice and coping preference had no substantial influence on effectiveness of the interventions.     

Focal changes in cerebral blood flow produced by monetary incentive during a mental mathematics task in normal and depressed subjects

The purpose of this experiment was to determine the effect of incentive-induced arousal on the diffuse and regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) response during cognitive activation for normal and depressed groups. Two normal rest CBF measurements were followed by two mental mathematics activation CBF measurements. For the first activation measurement, half the subjects in each group were offered monetary incentive for correct performance and half the subjects received no monetary incentive. All subjects were offered monetary incentive on the final activation run. The effect of monetary incentive on the first activation run was to increase CBF activation at four detectors in the left hemisphere. Incentive did not affect the CBF activation response when introduced following practice on the activation task (on the final run). Depressed groups had lower resting blood flow than normals, but the distribution of flow and the CBF response to incentive were almost identical in the two groups.     

Verbal accounts and attributions of social motives

The effects of verbal accounts offered by a threatener on targets' subsequent attributions of the threatener's social motives was studied. Following a standardized interaction in a Prisoner's Dilemma game the subjects' opponent offered one of three accounts for using threats: cooperative intent, establishment of transrelational equity, or ignorance. In a fourth condition the confederate offered no account for his actions. Attributions were assessed by having subjects rate each of four responses representative of the social motives of cooperation, competition, apathy, and deceit in five different situations. It was found that the type of account had specific attributional effects. A cooperative account led to a correspondent inference of a cooperative disposition, a transrelational equity account was apparently perceived as illegitimate and led to an attribution of a deceitful motive, and an excuse of ignorance was linked with apathy.     

Effects of Soliciting Opinions on Contributions to a Public Good1

In a field study, subjects were mailed a request for a monetary contribution toward the maintenance of a public good. One half the subjects received only this request, while the other half received the request along with a short questionnaire that asked for subjects' opinions regarding how their contributions might be best put to use. It was predicted that subjects to whom questionnaires were sent, through enhanced perceptions of efficacy and ingroup identity, would contribute more money than subjects not given the opportunity to communicate their opinions The results, however, indicated that the manipulation had the reverse effect: subjects in the questionnaire condition contributed less money than subjects in the nequestionnaire condition. A post hoc explanation for the data based on the notion of “symbolic” helping actions is provided, and implications for solicitation programs and for research on social dilemmas are discussed.     

The Effect of Instructor Gender and Race/Ethnicity on Gaining Compliance in the Classroom1

How instructors' gender and race impacts their ability to gain compliance in the classroom when utilizing various bases of social power was investigated using a 2 × 2 × 3 between‐subjects design. Male and female participants (n = 297) completed the Interpersonal Power Inventory while viewing a photo depicting an instructor. The instructors depicted were male or female of varying ethnicities (Caucasian, African American, and Latino). Results indicated that instructor gender and race influenced student compliance rates when soft (subtle and noncoercive) bases of power were utilized. With regard to individual power bases, student gender, instructor gender, instructor race, and the Instructor Gender × Instructor Race interaction were found to impact compliance rates. Implications for classroom instructors, as well as other powerholders, are discussed.     

The generality of learned helplessness in the rat

Two experiments were simultaneously conducted in which two different groups of 40 rats each were exposed to one of two different stressors. In both experiments half the subjects were pretreated with shock, half with underwater exposure. For each pretreatment stressor, half the subjects were allowed to escape, the other half were not. The experiments differed in the test task used. Approximately 24 hr after pretreatment, one-half the subjects from each pretreatment group received 20 water-escape trials in an underwater maze, the other half received 20 shock-escape trials in a two-way shuttle box. The subjects in each of the inescapable pretreatment conditions were slower to escape in the subsequent shock-escape and water-escape tasks when compared with subjects in the corresponding escapable pretreatment condition. The “learned helplessness” effect appeared to be no smaller when aversive stimuli were changed between pretreatment and test than when they remained the same.     

Equity,equality, and the protestant ethic: Allocating rewards following fair and unfair competition

Female undergraduates scoring high and low on the Mirels-Garrett Protestant Ethic (PE) Scale divided a fixed reward between themselves and a co-worker following competition on a clerical task. Half the subjects were told that they had either won or lost in fair competition. The remaining subjects were told they had either won or lost because of an error that gave a favorable advantage to one of the performers. When the competition was fair, high PEs distributed the rewards available according to an equity norm, keeping more than half when they won and less than half when they lost. When the competition was unfair, high PEs attempted to reestablish fairness by compensating the performer with the unfair disadvantage. However, low PEs kept approximately half the reward regardless of fairness and regardless of whether they won or lost.     

Cognitive dissonance and the placebo response: The effect of differential justification for undergoing dummy injections

Studied the effects of cognitive dissonance on pain perception and attitudes towards injections in 48 student subjects of both sexes (average age = 20.5). In a ‘forced compliance’ design, subjects received sets of painful radiant heat stimuli, projected to their inside forearms, which they rated for painfulness and to which their GSR amplitude was recorded. During these stimuli, they ‘chose’ to receive an experimental (placebo) injection. The degree of justification for agreeing to be injected was varied. Subjects in the high-justification (HJ) condition were paid for their compliance, while subjects in the low-justification (LJ) condition were not paid. Two predictions were made from dissonance theory. The first prediction, that only LJ subjects would manifest significant post-injection analgesia when compared to subjects in a no-choice control condition, was confirmed, considering both pain ratings (p < 0.01) and GSR (p < 0.025). The second prediction, that only LJ subjects would rate injections more favourably than control subjects on a post-experimental measure, was not confirmed. The relevance of these findings to explanation of the placebo effect is discussed.     

Gaze and emotional expression: The effects of message positivity-negativity and emotional intensity

The effects of emotional positivity-negativity and emotional intensity on actor's gaze were examined by simulating emotional situations to a camera. Female subjects were first asked to act out a neutral message as if they were speaking to a person to obtain a baseline for direct gaze. Subjects were then asked to perform a positive or a negative message to the camera. Half the subjects attempted to express the message with strong emotion; half expressed it with weak, ambivalent emotion. As expected, it was found that more direct gaze was maintained when expressing strong emotion. Whether the message was positive or negative did not affect gaze direction. The results were discussed in relation to the dimensions of nonverbal communication.     

Experiences that motivate moral development: The role of cognitive dissonance

It has been found in previous research concerning Kohlberg's stages of moral development that engagement in a “real-life” moral dilemma sometimes leads to an advance in an individual's level of moral thought. It is argued in this study that such moral growth is often motivated by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance, which, it is suggested, frequently accompanies choice and commitment in moral contexts. Subjects in the present study delivered counterattitudinal messages that contained arguments that were either 1 stage higher or 1 stage lower than their characteristic level of moral reasoning. Half of the subjects freely chose to deliver these messages, and half did not. Afterwards, subjects' attitudes toward the issues discussed in their messages and their tendency to conceptualize moral issues in terms of the higher or lower levels of reasoning contained in their messages were assessed. The subjects who (a) had freely chosen to deliver the message, and (b) had delivered the message containing higher level arguments used significantly more advanced moral reasoning after their counterattitudinal advocacy than they had before it. These subjects showed greater change in their attitudes regarding the topic discussed in their message than other subject groups. These results suggest that moral behavior will be likely to promote moral growth (a) if it occurs under circumstances that promote cognitive dissonance (e.g., free choice) and (b) if advanced moral ideas are made salient during the dissonance reduction process.     

The origins of cognitive dissonance: evidence from children and monkeys

In a study exploring the origins of cognitive dissonance, preschoolers and capuchins were given a choice between two equally preferred alternatives (two different stickers and two differently colored M&M's, respectively). On the basis of previous research with adults, this choice was thought to cause dissonance because it conflicted with subjects' belief that the two options were equally valuable. We therefore expected subjects to change their attitude toward the unchosen alternative, deeming it less valuable. We then presented subjects with a choice between the unchosen option and an option that was originally as attractive as both options in the first choice. Both groups preferred the novel over the unchosen option in this experimental condition, but not in a control condition in which they did not take part in the first decision. These results provide the first evidence of decision rationalization in children and nonhuman primates. They suggest that the mechanisms underlying cognitive-dissonance reduction in human adults may have originated both developmentally and evolutionarily earlier than previously thought.     

The relationship between cognitive dissonance and helping behavior

An experiment was conducted to study the relationship between cognitive dissonance and helping behavior. A counterattitudinal procedure was employed to arouse dissonance. For half of the participants, an experimental confederate entered the room and elicited an opportunity for them to offer help. In this situation, fewer subjects in the dissonance condition offered help than subjects in the no‐dissonance condition. The least helping occurred among dissonance subjects with the highest level of commitment to the counterattitudinal task. Those with a medium level of commitment offered significantly more help. Despite the fact that results in line with Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory (subjects' attitudinal change) were obtained in the no‐helping situation, in helping situations, dissonance subjects who offered help presented significantly less attitude change than those who did not offer it. This was considered to be a result of helpfulness reducing dissonance arousal.     

The role of free choice in memory for past decisions

After choosing between different options, people tend to remember the features of the options in ways that favour the chosen alternative. The present experiment examined how limitations on freedom to choose between options affected this memory bias. Participants were given a series of two-option choices and were either allowed free choice between options or were assigned to an option. Participants assigned to an option were led to believe that either the selection was random or was made in their best interest based on their personality profile. Results indicated that the choice and best interest conditions demonstrated memory attributions that favoured their received options, whereas the assignment condition did not. These findings support the view that memory biases towards received options are not unique to free choice situations, but may stem from expectations and implicit theories about how and why the choice was made.     

The role of free choice in memory for past decisions

After choosing between different options, people tend to remember the features of the options in ways that favour the chosen alternative. The present experiment examined how limitations on freedom to choose between options affected this memory bias. Participants were given a series of two-option choices and were either allowed free choice between options or were assigned to an option. Participants assigned to an option were led to believe that either the selection was random or was made in their best interest based on their personality profile. Results indicated that the choice and best interest conditions demonstrated memory attributions that favoured their received options, whereas the assignment condition did not. These findings support the view that memory biases towards received options are not unique to free choice situations, but may stem from expectations and implicit theories about how and why the choice was made.     

Observer states and traits and the imitative process: A test of a new formulation

In three studies the formulation was tested that characteristics of the observer have an effect on imitation only in situations which provide little information concerning appropriate or expected behaviors. In Experiment I, female college students of high, medium, and low need for social approval underwent either a high or low arousal manipulation. Subjects observed a videotaped model who engaged in a size judgment task. For half the subjects the model received verbal reward (high information); for the other half the model received no feedback (low information). Subsequently, the model and subject responded alternately in the task during which no feedback was given. Neither need for social approval nor manipulated arousal was found to be systematically related to imitation in either information condition. However, the hypothesized relationships were found when subjects' arousal or anxiety levels were determined by self ratings. These results were replicated in a second, similar experiment. In a third experiment, which involved an improved arousal manipulation, the hypothesized relationships were confirmed.     

Effectiveness of filler items in disguising scale purpose.

Subjects (n = 246) were asked to identify the trait(s) measured by Rotter's Interpersonal Trust Scale with and without filler items, either by responding freely or by circling traits listed on a sheet. Half the subjects were informed prior to filling out the questionnaire that their task was to identify the traits being measured by the questionnaire; the remaining half of the subjects were informed of their task after they completed the questionnaire. Very few subjects were able to identify correctly the trait being measured by Rotter's scale regardless of the experimental condition. Most subjects named multiple traits. It was concluded that the use of filler items per se was not the key factor in disguising the true purpose of Rotter's test; rather item wording may have produced multiple interpretations.