Is aversive learning a marker of risk for anxiety disorders in children?

Aversive conditioning and extinction were evaluated in children with anxiety disorders (n=23), at-risk for anxiety disorders (n=15), and controls (n=11). Participants underwent 16 trials of discriminative conditioning of two geometric figures, with (CS+) or without (CS-) an aversive tone (US), followed by 8 extinction trials (4 CS+, 4 CS-), and 8 extinction re-test trials averaging 2 weeks later. Skin conductance responses and verbal ratings of valence and arousal to the CS+/CS- stimuli were measured. Anxiety disordered children showed larger anticipatory and unconditional skin conductance responses across conditioning, and larger orienting and anticipatory skin conductance responses across extinction and extinction re-test, all to the CS+ and CS-, relative to controls. At-risk children showed larger unconditional responses during conditioning, larger orienting responses during the first block of extinction, and larger anticipatory responses during extinction re-test, all to the CS+ and CS-, relative to controls. Also, anxiety disordered children rated the CS+ as more unpleasant than the other groups. Elevated skin conductance responses to signals of threat (CS+) and signals of safety (CS-; CS+ during extinction) are discussed as features of manifestation of and risk for anxiety in children, compared to the specificity of valence judgments to the manifestation of anxiety.     

Is there any "free" choice? Self and dissonance in two cultures

Four experiments provided support for the hypothesis that upon making a choice, individuals justify their choice in order to eliminate doubts about culturally sanctioned aspects of the self, namely, competence and efficacy in North America and positive appraisal by other people in Japan. Japanese participants justified their choice (by increasing liking for chosen items and decreasing liking for rejected items) in the standard free-choice dissonance paradigm only when self-relevant others were primed, either by questionnaires (Studies 1-3) or by incidental exposure to schematic faces (Study 4). In the absence of these social cues, Japanese participants showed no dissonance effect. In contrast, European Americans justified their choices regardless of the social-cue manipulations. Implications for cognitive dissonance theory are discussed.     

Cognitive dissonance and self-monitoring: A matter of context?

In Study 1, high and low self-monitors wrote counterattitudinal essays. For some, we made it salient that they would be endorsing an opinion contrary to that of their peers. For others, no context was provided. Post-essay attitudes of high, relative to low, self-monitors were more consistent with essay topic after opposing peers. Post-essay attitudes of low and high self-monitors did not differ significantly in the no-context condition. In Study 2, high and low self-monitors wrote counterattitudinal essays in the context of opposing either their peers' beliefs or their own values. Post-essay attitudes of low, relative to high, self-monitors tended to conform more to their essays when they believed that they had written in opposition to their values. When writing in opposition to their peers, however, post-essay attitudes of high and low self-monitors did not differ significantly. We discuss the results in terms of the role that self-concept plays in the initiation of dissonance processesStudy 2 is based on the senior honors thesis of the second author conducted under the supervision of the first author, and both studies were supported by a Faculty Research Grant from Union College to the first author. We would like to thank Alice M. Isen, Mark Snyder, Hugh Foley, and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this article, and Nicole Audette, Amy Goldstein, Suzanne Shaker, and Courtney Shapiro for their assistance in collecting and analyzing data.     

‘Perceived ownership’ or cognitive dissonance?

In 1992 a study by Beggan claimed it had confirmed the existence of Nuttin's ‘mere ownership effect’. This study examined an alternative mechanism for Beggan's findings in the form of forced compliance cognitive dissonance. Seventy‐three participants volunteered for the study (66 females and seven males). Results support the view that cognitive dissonance, accepting ownership of a target that was earlier perceived with negative affectivity, is a sufficient condition to enhance estimates of a target object. Ownership per se was not found to be a sufficient condition to enhance owner's estimates of an owned object. In light of this finding cognitive dissonance is offered as a possible mechanism for explaining the previous reports of a perceived ownership effect. This mechanism may also be applicable to instant endowment and mere ownership phenomena. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Extinction after aversive conditioning: An associative or nonassociative process?

A series of three eyelid-conditioning experiments with rabbits examined the traditional extinction procedure in which the CS is presented in the absence of US presentations. The first study employed a savings test to demonstrate that the rate of reacquisition is faster after a conventional extinction procedure than after a procedure in which the CS and US have been unpaired. The second experiment indicated that this readiness to respond in reacquisition was related to a carry-over effect from the initial acquisition trials. The third study demonstrated that acquisition and reacquisition are similar when the US is maintained in extinction but not when it is omitted. These results imply that procedures which retain the US during extinction are more effective than the conventional CS-alone extinction procedure in eliminating or inhibiting the associative connection between the CS and the US.     

Twenty five on: Yet another version of cognitive dissonance theory?

The aim of this article is to highlight, 25 years on, the innovations of Festinger's theory of dissonance as regards its conception of cognitive functioning. Analysis of the dissonance ratio, on the basis of which Festinger evaluated the total amount of dissonance D/(D + C) gives rise to three propositions: (1) The total amount of dissonance is evaluated on the basis of a particular cognition G. (2) This cognition is neither the denominator, nor the numerator of the dissonance ratio; it is the cognitive expression of an effective conduct. (3) No presupposition is made concerning possible consonance or dissonance-relations between cognitions C and D. Thus reduction in dissonance is not presented as a process that always orients cognitive activity toward greater consistency, but as a rationalization of conduct which may adapt to an increase in certain inconsistencies, and even generate them. This new insight into Festinger's theory may be thought of as a new version that is quite distinct, both from earlier revisions of the theory, and from the various theories of cognitive consistency. It is hoped, moreover, that it will provoke reflection concerning the current orientatlons of cognitivism in social psychology.     

Cognitive dissonance in children: Justification of effort or contrast?

Justification of effort is a form of cognitive dissonance in which the subjective value of an outcome is directly related to the effort that went into obtaining it. However, it is likely that in social contexts (such as the requirements for joining a group) an inference can be made (perhaps incorrectly) that an outcome that requires greater effort to obtain in fact has greater value. Here we present evidence that a cognitive dissonance effect can be found in children under conditions that offer better control for the social value of the outcome. This effect is quite similar to contrast effects that recently have been studied in animals. We suggest that contrast between the effort required to obtain the outcome and the outcome itself provides a more parsimonious account of this phenomenon and perhaps other related cognitive dissonance phenomena as well. Research will be needed to identify cognitive dissonance processes that are different from contrast effects of this kind. nt]mis|This research was facilitated by a fellowship from the Fulbright Scholar Program and the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council, as well as by a visiting professorship at the University of Lille III for T.R.Z. Preparation of the article was facilitated by National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH 63726 to T.R.Z.     

When does dissonance fail? The time dimension in attitude measurement1

Results of previous research dealing with the effect of differential monetary reinforcement (for the composition of a counterattitudinal essay) upon attitude change have been contradictory Cohen (1962), for example, discovered a negative relationship between reinforcement and attitude change, results consistent with dissonance theory expectations, Rosenberg (1965) explained these findings in terms of evaluation apprehension and, eliminating this factor through the spatial and temporal separation of the conflict-induction, attitude-measurement sections of his experiment, obtained a positive relationship In the present study, an attempt was made to integrate these findings through the systematic variation of the time lag between conflict arousal and attitude measurement, a variable on which the Cohen and Rosenberg studies differed Consistent with the hypothesis, the present research disclosed a dissonance effect (p < 03) in the immediate measurement condition and a reinforcement effect (p < 002) with delayed attitude measurement. These results were employed in a discussion of the complex nature of human conceptual functioning     

What Is Music? Is There a Definitive Answer?

Philosophers frequently defend definitions by appealing to intuitions and contemporary folk classificatory norms. I raise methodological concerns that undermine some of these defenses. Focusing on Andrew Kania's recent definition of music, I argue that the way in which it has been developed leads to problems, and I show that a number of other definitions of interest to philosophers of art (and others) run into similar problems.     

What Is Dissent?

Res Publica - Dissent&nbsp;is a word we come across frequently these days. We read it in the newspapers, use it in discussions with friends and colleagues—perhaps even engage in the...     

Is Phosphorus Hesperus?

It is argued that philosophers who adopt the perdurance theory of persistence and who subscribe to the principle of Unrestricted Mereological Composition (UMC) are in a position to regard “Phosphorus is Hesperus” as false.     

Is Mother Other?

Abstract

The discourse of maternality figures a contentious site for feminist theology. If figured in terms of a fecund womb, maternality risks reinscribing women in a masculine symbolic order of world-making that has long conflated women’s differences with motherhood, narrowly defined in terms of fecundity. After considering the ways identifying female sexual difference with motherhood reifies a masculine model of subjectivity, this paper turns to Lynne Huffer’s reading of feminist psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray to suggest that maternality has the potential to interrupt the self-same movement of masculine discourse and engender an ethical space of difference of and for the other. Examining Irigaray’s interweaving of maternality with pleasure to create space for women’s desires, this paper concludes that the ambiguity of desires through which maternality is constituted challenges the care-driven, natality-centered discourse of maternality itself. As a scene of unresolved desire between flesh and discourse, immanence and transcendence, self and other, maternality can be narrated to disrupt views of mother as origin that would otherwise return motherhood to a figure of sameness and to construct a possibility of desire for intersubjective becoming that is at once beyond narration and entirely concrete. Maternality thus presents desires unrecognizable within a prevailing symbolic framework in a way that bears witness to the disruptiveness of those desires and engenders radical alterity.     

Is open-mindedness truth-conducive?

What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue? A straightforward and influential answer to this question has been given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue only insofar as it is truth-conducive. In this paper I shall contend that recent arguments advanced by Jack Kwong in defence of the reliabilist view are good as far as they go, in that they advance the debate by usefully clarifying ways in how best to understand the nature of open-mindedness. But I shall argue that these considerations do not establish the desired conclusions that open-mindedness is truth-conducive. To establish these much stronger conclusions we would need an adequate reply to what I shall call Montmarquet’s objection. I argue that Linda Zagzebski’s reply to Montmarquet’s objection, to which Kwong defers, is inadequate. I conclude that it is contingent if open-mindedness is truth-conducive, and if a necessary tie to truth is what makes an intellectual virtue a virtue, then the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is jeopardised. We either need an adequate reliabilist response to Montmarquet’s objection, or else seek alternative accounts of what it is that makes a virtue a virtue. I conclude by briefly outlining some alternatives.