Expectation theories of decision making for duplex gambles

Complete tests of subjectively expected utility (SEU), subjectively expected value (SEV), expected utility (EU) and expected value (EV) theories were made for duplex gambles without measuring subjective probability or subjective utility. All gambles were hypothetical and offered on booklets. The duplex gambles consisted of winning gambles, which offered a chance to win a certain amount of money or to break even; and losing gambles, which offered a chance to lose a certain amount of money or break even.The results indicated that SEU, SEV and EU theories could not account for the strategies of 33%, 53% and 86% of the Ss respectively in the losing form of gambles, while EV theory accounted for 78% of the behavior of Ss.In the winning form of gambles, SEU, SEV and EU theory held for 77%, 65%, and 54% of the Ss respectively, while EV theory held for only 40% of the Ss. Suggestions for further research were made.     

A solution to a problem raised in Luce and Marley (2005)

Luce and Marley [2005. Ranked additive utility representations of gambles: Old and new axiomatizations. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 30, 21-62] examined various relations between mathematical forms for the utility of joint receipt ⊕ of gambles and for the utility of uncertain gambles. Their assumptions lead to a bisymmetry functional equation which, when the gambles are ranked, is defined on a restricted domain. Maksa [1999. Solution of generalized bisymmetry type equations without surjectivity. Aequationes Mathematicae, 57, 50-74] solved the general case and Kocsis [2007. A bisymmetry equation on restricted domain. Aequationes Mathematicae, 73, 280-284] presents the solution for the ranked case. The latter solution allows us to solve open problem 5 in Luce and Marley (2005) by showing that the assumptions of their Theorem 19 for an order-preserving ranked additive utility (RAU) representation U imply that U is a ranked weighted utility (RWU) representation that is additive over ⊕.     

Additivity and expected utility in risky multiattribute preferences

This experiment analyzed human preferences among even chance gambles for commodity bundles. The purpose of the experiment was to test several independence assumptions that distinguish between models for risky multiattribute preferences. In particular, the additivity and the expected utility part of the additive expected utility model were tested symmetrically. The degree and form of model violations were established, and the effects of instructions and of response modes were examined. All independence assumptions were violated by a bias to prefer a gamble or a commodity bundle that was previously matched against a standard. Systematic and strong violations that superseded this bias questioned the validity of the additive expected utility model. In violation of the additivity part of that model subjects consistently preferred the gamble with more balanced outcomes when comparing gambles with identical marginal probability distributions. This trend, called multiattribute risk aversion, was independent of subjects' single attribute risk attitude. Instructions and response modes had no noticeable impacts on these response patterns.     

A multiplicative model of the utility of survival duration and health quality

Survival duration and health quality are fundamentally important aspects of health. A utility model for survival duration and health quality is a model of the subjective value of these attributes. We investigate the hypothesis that the utility (subjective value) of survival duration and health quality is determined by a multiplicative model. According to this model, there are separate subjective scales for the utility of survival duration and health quality. If F(Y) equals the utility of surviving Y years, and G(Q) equals the utility of living in health state Q, then the multiplicative model proposes that F(Y)G(Q) equals the utility of surviving Y years in health state Q. This model provides a simple explanation for several intuitively compelling relationships. First, the distinction between better-than-death and worse-than-death health states corresponds to the assignment of positive or negative utilities to different health states. Second, a zero duration of survival removes any reason to prefer one health state over any other, just as multiplying the utility of health quality by zero eliminates differences between the utilities of different health states. Third, the subjective difference between Y years in pain and Y years free from pain increases as Y increases as if the difference in utility between pain and no pain were being multiplied by the utility of surviving Y years. A critical prediction of the multiplicative model is the hypothesis that preferences between gambles for health outcomes satisfy a property called utility independence. Individual analyses revealed that most subjects satisfy utility independence, thereby supporting the multiplicative utility model. Some subjects appear to violate a fundamental assumption of utility theory: They appear to violate the assumption that a single utility scale represents both the ordinal preference relations between certain outcomes and the subjective averaging that underlies the utility of gambles. The violation is inferred from an inconsistency between preferences for multiattribute outcomes when they are viewed as certain outcomes and when they are viewed as the outcomes of gambles.     

A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents

The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility (given her preferences). However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being (amongst other things) always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise degrees of belief and full knowledge of all a priori truths. Ordinary subjects do not look very rational when compared to the kinds of agents usually talked about in decision theory. In this paper, I will develop an expected utility representation theorem aimed at the representation of those who are neither probabilistically coherent, logically omniscient, nor expected utility maximisers across the board—that is, agents who are frequently irrational. The agents in question may be deductively fallible, have incoherent credences, limited representational capacities, and fail to maximise expected utility for all but a limited class of gambles.     

A simple model for the utility of gambling

A model of the utility of gambling is presented in a modified von Neumann-Morgenstern format. Axioms imply a utility function that preserves preferences between sure things and between gambles. The addition of a utility of gambling term to the expected utility of a gamble preserves preference comparisons between gambles and sure things. Aspects of the utility of gambling are noted, and comparisons are made to standard concepts of risk attitudes.The author is indebted to Joseph Sani for valuable discussions on the topic of this paper.     

Seven independence concepts and continuous multiattribute utility functions

This paper examines seven independence concepts based on a preference relation on the set of simple probability measures defined on a set of multiattribute consequences. Three of the independence relations involve gambles and the other four are based on riskless preferences over the n-tuples in the consequence set. The main theorems state conditions under which one or more of the risky independence relations can be derived from a riskless independence relation in conjunction with other conditions. The other conditions include a risky independence condition which differs from the one(s) to be derived, the assumption that the consequence set is a convex subset of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space, and the assumption that the individual's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on the consequence set is continuous.     

Subjective expected utility without preferences

This paper proposes a theory of subjective expected utility based on primitives only involving the fact that an act can be judged either “attractive” or “unattractive”. We give conditions implying that there are a utility function on the set of consequences and a probability distribution on the set of states such that attractive acts have a subjective expected utility above some threshold. The numerical representation that is obtained has strong uniqueness properties.     

Additivity of risk in portfolios

A collection of gambles constituting a portfolio may itself be represented as a single gamble played once. A portfolio may be constructed by requiring each component gamble to be played once, and there is a theory of additive risk which requires that the perceived risk of the portfolio be an additive function of the perceived riskiness of the component gambles. Alternatively, a portfolio may be constructed as a probability mixture of the component gambles, and there is a theory of expected risk which requires that the perceived risk of the portfolio be the average of the riskiness of the component gambles. Existing evidence suggests that both of these theories cannot be true. A test of additivity of portfolios under both kinds of composition functions was made under two forms of display, the components displayed separately and fused as a single gamble. This experiment supports expected risk and rejects additive risk, especially under fused display.     

Risky decision: Attention and path dependency as a function of response mode

It was previously shown and was here replicated that the amount of money required to induce a subject to exchange one gamble for a second and then the second for a third depends on the second (intermediate) gamble. This path dependency cannot be explained by any of the algebraic models (including SEU), nor can it be explained as a simple attention effect. A model was put forward which explains the effect in terms of differential masking depending on a kind of stimulus—response compatibility. The effect of response mode on path dependency was examined in this study; similarity judgements showed no consistent path dependency nor did difference in rated attractiveness of gambles presented in pairs, but rated attractiveness was different for gambles presented singly. Since it might be that monetary response emphasises the monetary aspects, that is, the winning amount of the gamble, it was thought that a probability response would emphasise the probability of winning. However, when subjects were asked to set the probability of winning $ 12 which would induce them to exchange one gamble for another, not only was no path dependency observed, but the subjects' responses seemed to depend only on the difference in expected value of the gambles. This suggests the possibility of developing response-display modes which would eliminate or at least attenuate the inconsistencies observed in risky decision processes.     

An empirical assessment of the form of utility functions

Utility functions, which relate subjective value to physical attributes of experience, are fundamental to most decision theories. Seven experiments were conducted to test predictions of the most widely assumed mathematical forms of utility (power, log, and negative exponential), and a function proposed by Rachlin (1992). For pairs of gambles for real monetary gains, undergraduate and nonstudent subjects either reported an equalizing amount for 1 outcome that made the gambles subjectively equal or chose between gambles where the amounts were varied across trial, which allowed the equalizing amount to be estimated from their pattern of choices. Using a novel method that eliminates several limitations of previous research, I manipulated the outcomes across trials such that each type of utility function predicted a linear relationship between the equalizing amounts and the amounts of the other outcomes, and made point predictions for either the slope or intercept of that relationship. In a meta-analysis across experiments, systematic departures from the point predictions were observed for each type of utility function. Thus, the data imply that despite their historical importance and incorporation in many psychological and economic decision theories, the most widely assumed models of utility are incorrect.     

The Influence of Positive Affect on the Decision Rule in Risk Situations: Focus on Outcome (and Especially Avoidance of Loss) Rather Than Probability

Two experiments examined the influence of positive affect on probability estimation and choice. Participants in whom positive affect had been induced, as well as no-manipulation controls, were asked to make both numerical evaluations of verbal probabilities in three-outcome gambles and actual betting decisions about similar gambles. Results from Experiment 1 showed the phenomenon labeledcautious optimism:Positive affect participants significantly overestimated the probabilities associated with phrases for winning relative to their estimates of probability of losing for the same phrases (optimism), while participants in a control condition did not; yet, in actual gambling situations, affect condition participants were much less likely to gamble than were controls when a real loss was possible (caution). Results of the betting task from Experiment 2 further indicated that affect participants used a betting-decision rule that was different from that of controls: They bet less than controls in gambles where potential losses were large, even though probability of loss was small, and they bet more than controls in gambles where the amount of the potential loss was small, even though the probability of loss was moderate or large. These findings suggest that positive affect can promote an overt shift from a decision rule focusing primarily on probabilities to one focusing on utilities or outcome values, especially for losses. Taken together, the results are compatible with an interpretation of the influence of positive affect in terms of an elaboration of positive cognitive material, and purposive behavior in decisions, rather than in terms of mere response bias.     

Information overload or search-amplified risk? Set size and order effects on decisions from experience

How do changes in choice-set size influence information search and subsequent decisions? Moreover, does information overload influence information processing with larger choice sets? We investigated these questions by letting people freely explore sets of gambles before choosing one of them, with the choice sets either increasing or decreasing in number for each participant (from two to 32 gambles). Set size influenced information search, with participants taking more samples overall, but sampling a smaller proportion of gambles and taking fewer samples per gamble, when set sizes were larger. The order of choice sets also influenced search, with participants sampling from more gambles and taking more samples overall if they started with smaller as opposed to larger choice sets. Inconsistent with information overload, information processing appeared consistent across set sizes and choice order conditions, reliably favoring gambles with higher sample means. Despite the lack of evidence for information overload, changes in information search did lead to systematic changes in choice: People who started with smaller choice sets were more likely to choose gambles with the highest expected values, but only for small set sizes. For large set sizes, the increase in total samples increased the likelihood of encountering rare events at the same time that the reduction in samples per gamble amplified the effect of these rare events when they occurred—what we call search-amplified risk. This led to riskier choices for individuals whose choices most closely followed the sample mean.     

Neurobiological studies of risk assessment: A comparison of expected utility and mean-variance approaches

When modeling valuation under uncertainty, economists generally prefer expected utility because it has an axiomatic foundation, meaning that the resulting choices will satisfy a number of rationality requirements. In expected utility theory, values are computed by multiplying probabilities of each possible state of nature by the payoff in that state and summing the results. The drawback of this approach is that all state probabilities need to be dealt with separately, which becomes extremely cumbersome when it comes to learning. Finance academics and professionals, however, prefer to value risky prospects in terms of a trade-off between expected reward and risk, where the latter is usually measured in terms of reward variance. This mean-variance approach is fast and simple and greatly facilitates learning, but it impedes assigning values to new gambles on the basis of those of known ones. To date, it is unclear whether the human brain computes values in accordance with expected utility theory or with mean-variance analysis. In this article, we discuss the theoretical and empirical arguments that favor one or the other theory. We also propose a new experimental paradigm that could determine whether the human brain follows the expected utility or the mean-variance approach. Behavioral results of implementation of the paradigm are discussed.     

Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

RATIONAL VERSUS PLAUSIBLE ACCOUNTING EQUIVALENCES IN PREFERENCE JUDGMENTS

Subjective expected utility (SEU) embodies four distinct principles of rational behavior. Although all have been called into some question empirically, the least plausible and least studied is the property that formally equivalent gambles are treated as indifferent in preference. The paper describes some results that arise when this property is sharply weakened and to some degree replaced by alternative rational and not-so-rational-assumptions. The resulting utility representations, like SEU, are weighted averages of the utilities of consequences, but with the weights dependent on more than the underlying chance event. In rank-dependent cases, which arise from a restricted assumption about formally equivalent gambles, the weights depend on the rank position of the corresponding consequence. In ank-and sign-dependent models, they depend both on the rank position of the consequence associated to the event and on whether it is a gain or a loss. The theory giving rise to the latter involves an additional primitive, namely, joint receipt of gambles, in terms of which new rational and irrational assumptions are invoked. The result generalizes prospect theory to gambles with more than a single gain and a single loss.