Christology and Anti‐Humanism

This article engages the current anti‐humanist or post‐human ethos from the point of view of Christology. Invoking Alain Badiou's claim that “the man of humanism has not survived the twentieth century”, it argues that the death of “the man of humanism” ushers in a situation in which the Christian proposal can be clarified in two crucial ways: (1) Christology is the core of Christian anthropology, and therefore must be the first and last word of the Church's formulation of her answer to the question that is every human life; (2) there is no neutral “human” ground in which the Church can carry on a discourse about “humanism” or “natural law”. The current situation thus forces a theological decision: either the death of man or the God‐Man.     

Anti‐reductionism and Expected Trust

According to anti‐reductionism, audiences have a default (but defeasible) epistemic entitlement to accept observed testimony. This paper explores the prospects of arguing from this premise to a conclusion in ethics, to the effect that speakers enjoy a default (but defeasible) moral entitlement to expect to be trusted when they testify. After proposing what I regard as the best attempt to link the two, I conclude that any argument from the one to the other will depend on a strong epistemological assumption that has not yet been discussed in this connection.     

Wittgenstein's Anti‐Platonist Argument

Many interpreters have noted that §§138–242 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is dominated by an attack on a platonist or classical realist conception of rules and meaning. In this paper, I address the lack of clarity that still exists concerning the nature and strength of the arguments in those sections. I argue that Wittgenstein's attack is genuinely compelling if viewed as an intricate reductio ad absurdum argument that runs all the way through §§138–201. On my reading, the well‐known regress‐of‐interpretations argument is merely one stage in the overall reductio and is not sufficient on its own to generate the rule‐following paradox.     

Anti‐Atomism about Color Representation

According to anti‐atomism, we represent color properties (e.g., red) in virtue of representing color relations (e.g., redder than). I motivate anti‐atomism with a puzzle involving a series of pairwise indistinguishable chips. I then develop two versions of anti‐atomism.     

Understanding Anti‐Arab Reactions Post‐9/11: The Role of Threats,Social Categories,and Personal Ideologies1

This study examined social psychological processes associated with anti‐Arab reactions (prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination) following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Participants (N= 201) responded to an online survey. Perceived threats, self‐categorization, social dominance orientation, and just‐world beliefs were tested for their effectiveness in predicting anti‐Arab reactions. The results reveal that self‐categorization and social dominance orientation each individually accounted for a substantial percentage of the variance, while perceived threats accounted for a relatively small amount of the variance in anti‐Arab responses. However, an integrated model demonstrated that social dominance orientation, threats, self‐categorization, and a threat by self‐categorization interaction provided the best prediction of anti‐Arab reactions. Results are discussed in terms of the theoretical and practical applications for understanding out‐group derogation following political‐cultural world events.     

Anti‐bullying intervention: Implementation and outcome

Background. The participant role approach represents a view of bullying as a group process in which bystanders often encourage the bullying or silently witness it, while little support is given to the victim (e.g. Salmivalli, Lagerspetz, Björkqvist, Österman, & Kaukiainen, 1996 ). There is a discrepancy between students' attitudes (which are often against bullying) and their actual behaviour in bullying situations, and this may be an important factor contributing to the persistence of the problem. Aim. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the effects of an anti‐bullying intervention programme targeting the group as a whole. Class teachers who attended a 1‐year training course carried out the interventions in school classes. The present evaluation of the project is based on multi‐level modelling, assessing the programme effects after 12 months of intervention, utilizing a cohort longitudinal design with adjacent cohorts ( Olweus & Alsaker, 1991 ) also taking into account the degree of implementation of the programme. Sample. The intervention was implemented in 48 school classes (Grades 4, 5, and 6) from 16 Finnish schools, involving 1,220 children (600 girls and 620 boys). Method. The present report is based on questionnaire data collected at two assessment points during the project, assessing the frequencies of bullies and victims, the extent of observed and experienced bullying, students' attitudes and efficacy beliefs related to bullying, and their participant role behaviours (self‐ and peer‐reported). Reports were collected from teachers about the concrete actions taken in order to compare the actual content of the intervention to what had been planned. Results. A positive impact of the intervention programme was found on several outcome variables (e.g. frequencies of bullies and victims, observed and experienced bullying, attitudes and efficacy beliefs, and to some extent, participant role behaviours). The intervention effects were found more often in Grade 4 than in Grade 5, and often only in schools with a high degree of implementation of the programme.     

(ANTI)‐Anti‐Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis

Anti‐intellectualists about knowledge‐how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti‐intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge‐how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti‐intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument‐by‐counterexample to the anti‐intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti‐intellectualism remains unscathed.     

Anti‐Metaphysicalism,Necessity, and Temporal Ontology

This paper argues for a certain kind of anti‐metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects. Three different kinds of anti‐metaphysicalism are defined—namely, non‐factualism, physical‐empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non‐factualism or physical‐empiricism is true. Finally, the paper ends with a discussion of whether we should endorse non‐factualism or physical‐empiricism. An initial reason is provided for thinking that non‐factualism might be true, but in the end, the paper leaves this question open. The paper also argues against a certain kind of necessitarianism about the temporal ontology debate; but this isn't an extra job—the falsity of this necessitarian view falls out of the other arguments as a sort of corollary.     

Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist

Anti‐luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck is of no help to the anti‐luck epistemologist for it uses knowledge to explain luck, making this account of knowledge circular. The main lesson is that the only viable analysis of luck is not suited for the anti‐luck epistemologist's coveted noncircular analysis of knowledge.     

Analyzing Anti‐Asian Prejudice From a Racial Identity and Color‐Blind Perspective

The purpose of this study was to examine to what extent both racial identity and color‐blind racial attitudes help explain anti‐Asian prejudice across different socioracial groups. Participants of color from a culturally diverse West Coast university were surveyed (N = 260). Hierarchical regression analyses showed that resistance racial identity and color‐blind attitudes predicted anti‐Asian prejudice. Results further validated racial identity theory as a viable tool for understanding interracial relations among Asians and other socioracial minority groups.     

Humean and Anti‐Humean Internalism About Moral Judgements1

Motivational internalism about moral judgements is the plausible view that accepting a moral judgement is necessarily connected to motivation motivation. However, it conflicts with the Humean theory that motives must be constituted by desires. Simple versions of internalism run into problems with people who do not desire to do what they believe right. This has long been urged by David Brink. Hence, many internalists have adopted more subtle defeasible views, on which only rational agents will have a desire to act. I will argue that more complex versions run into problems with self‐effacing values of the sort Parfit highlights in another context. Such values can only be attained indirectly. After proposing a general account of motivation suited to the internalist thesis, I argue that Anti‐Humeanism is better suited to accommodating the internalist insight.     

Race,Religion, and Anti‐Poverty Policy Attitudes

Using the 2008 National Politics Study, the present study indicates that while African Americans are more likely than whites to hear sermons about poverty and other political issues, hearing such sermons more consistently associates with support for anti‐poverty government programs among non‐Hispanic whites than among both African Americans and Hispanics. The racially/ethnically marginalized status of blacks and Hispanics may contribute to these groups being more receptive than whites to religious messages emphasizing social inequality. The contrasting racial experiences of dominance and marginalization may also help explain why hearing politicized sermons is more meaningful to the progressive social welfare attitudes of whites than to African Americans and Hispanics. This expectation is rooted in the heightened variability of perspectives among whites and their religious organizations regarding the government's role in aiding the economically disadvantaged. Conversely, the vast majority of blacks and Hispanics support the government helping individuals who fallen upon hard times. The greater variability in opinion among whites may also allow for greater differences in opinion to emerge between whites who attend relative to those outside of religious congregations led by clergy emphasizing spiritual and political solidarity with the poor than is the case for African Americans and Hispanics.