Comparison processes in social judgment: mechanisms and consequences

This article proposes an informational perspective on comparison consequences in social judgment. It is argued that to understand the variable consequences of comparison, one has to examine what target knowledge is activated during the comparison process. These informational underpinnings are conceptualized in a selective accessibility model that distinguishes 2 fundamental comparison processes. Similarity testing selectively makes accessible knowledge indicating target-standard similarity, whereas dissimilarity testing selectively makes accessible knowledge indicating target-standard dissimilarity. These respective subsets of target knowledge build the basis for subsequent target evaluations, so that similarity testing typically leads to assimilation whereas dissimilarity testing typically leads to contrast. The model is proposed as a unifying conceptual framework that integrates diverse findings on comparison consequences in social judgment.     

Selectional processes in causality judgment

Two experiments illustrate the way in which competition between potential causes occurs when subjects are asked to judge the extent to which an action is the cause of an outcome. In the first experiment, it was found that introducing occurrences of the outcome in the absence of the action reduced causality judgments, but this effect was attenuated if these outcomes were signaled by another stimulus. In the second experiment, a delay between the action and the outcome reduced judgments, but this could be abolished by inserting a stimulus between the action and the outcome. The results are discussed in terms of a view of causality judgment that assumes that such judgments are based on associations between the mental representations of the action and the outcome.     

Explicit and implicit processes in multicue judgment

In two experiments, a multicue probability learning task was used to train participants in relating judgments to a criterion, on the basis of several cues that could or could not be relevant. The outcome feedback had 25% added noise to simulate real-world experience-based learning. Judgmental strategies acquired were measured by individual multiple linear regression analyses of a test phase (with no feedback) and were compared with self-ratings of cue relevance. In a third experiment, participants were instructed explicitly on cue relevance, with no training phase. The pattern of results suggested that both implicit and explicit cognitive processes influenced judgments and that they may have been sensitive to different task manipulations in the learning phase. On more complex tasks, despite weak explicit learning, explicit processes continued to influence judgments, producing a decrement in performance. These findings explain why studies of expert judgment often show only moderate levels of self-insight, since people have only partial access to the processes determining their judgments.     

Response system processes in absolute judgment

Consistent relationships are found between Ss′ absolute judgments of the value of a stimulus and the previous sequence of both stimuli and responses. The form and magnitude of these sequential effects are shown to depend on the presence or absence of feedback and on task difficulty. The pattern of the sequential effects found allows the conclusion that they are due to purely response-system processes. A two-stage model of the judgment process is proposed, and it is argued that observed assimilative effects account for the central tendency effects observed in category judgments.     

Semantic congruity and expectancy as separate processes

In two experiments, we investigated the role of expectancy in producing congruity effects in comparative judgment. In Experiment 1, instructions to choose the larger or smaller term either preceded pairs for comparative judgment or preceded individual words for lexical decision. If expectancy in interpreting the comparative judgment terms accounts for the congruity effect, the lexical decision task also should show a congruity effect. However, there were large congruity effects in comparative judgment but not in lexical decision. In this experiment, we used an infiniteset design to make sure that semantic information was needed on comparative judgment trials. In Experiment 2, comparative judgment pairs were preceded by a prime word that either was or was not a category label for the terms in the pairs. There were both congruity and priming effects, with no interaction between the two. This result implies that expectancy and the semanticcongruity effect come from separate processes.     

Accountability and judgment processes in a personality prediction task

In this experiment, we investigated the impact of accountability--social pressures to justify one's views to others--on cognitive processing in a personality-prediction task. Subjects were presented with the responses of actual test-takers to 16 items from Jackson's Personality Research Form (PRF) and asked to predict how these individuals responded to an additional set of 16 items from the same test. Subjects were assigned to a no-accountability condition (they learned that all of their responses would be anonymous), a preexposure-accountability condition (they learned of the need to justify their responses before seeing the test-takers' PRF responses), and a postexposure-accountability condition (they learned of the need to justify their responses after seeing the test-takers' PRF responses). Preexposure-accountability subjects reported more integratively complex impressions of test-takers, made more accurate behavioral predictions, and reported more appropriate levels of confidence in their predictions than did either no-accountability or postexposure-accountability subjects. We conclude by considering possible psychological mediators of these effects as well as the broader theoretical implications of the findings for the development of contingency models of judgment and choice.     

Bias and error in human judgment

Currently prevalent views of human inference are contrasted with an integrated theory of the epistemic process. The prevailing views are characterized by the following orienting assumptions: (1) There exist reliable criteria of inferential validity based on objectively veridical or optimal modes of information processing. (2) Motivational and cognitive factors bias inferences away from these criteria and thus enhance the likelihood of judgmental error. (3) The layperson's epistemic process is pluralistic; it consists of a diverse repertory of information-processing strategies (heuristics, schemas) selectively invoked under various circumstances. By contrast, the present analysis yields the following conclusions: (1) There exist no secure criteria of validity. (2) Psychological factors that bias inferences away from any currently accepted criteria need not enhance the likelihood of error. (3) The inference process may be considered unitary rather than pluralistic. The various strategies and biases discussed in the literature typically confound universal epistemic process with specific examples (or contents) of such processes. Empirical support for the present analysis is presented, including evidence refuting proposals that specific contents of inference are of universal applicability; evidence suggesting that people do not, because of a reliance on subnormative heuristics, underutilize nonnative statistical information—rather, people seem unlikely to utilize any information if it is nonsalient or (subjectively) irrelevant; and evidence demonstrating that the tendency of beliefs to persevere despite discrediting information can be heightened or lowered by introducting appropriate motivational orientations.     

Event-related potentials, semantic processes, and expectancy factors in word recognition

Electrophysiological activity was recorded at 16 scalp locations during a word recognition task in order to investigate the effect of expectancy factors on ERPs. In each of 160 trials two stimuli (S1 and S2) were presented with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 1500 msec. There were four experimental conditions. In the word-antonym (W-A) and the word-nonantonym (W-NA) conditions, both S1 and S2 were words. The subjects' task was to think of the antonym to S1 and respond as fast as possible after the presentation of S2 by pressing a "YES" button if S2 was an antonym to S1 (in the W-A trials), or a "NO" button if S2 was not an antonym to S1 (in the W-NA trials). In the nonword-word (NW-W) and nonword-nonword (NW-NW) conditions S1 was a nonword, while S2 was either a word (in NW-W trials) or a nonword (in NW-NW trials). If S1 was not a word, the subjects were instructed to wait for S2, and respond as fast as possible by pressing the "YES" button if it was a word an the "NO" button if it was not a word. EEG was sampled during a time epoch that started 100 msec before the onset of S1 and continued for another 2560 msec. The ERPs were analyzed separately for each experimental condition and for time epochs related to S1, to S2, and to the SOA. Expected antonyms were recognized significantly faster than any other words or nonwords. The RTs to words in the W-NA and NW-W condition, and to nonwords in the NW-NW condition did not differ significantly from each other. The ERP difference between the four conditions following S2 was interpreted in terms of a negative-going potential which appeared prior to the P300, during a time period which started 200 msec and ended 550 msec from stimulus onset. The negativity related to nonwords was significantly larger than the negativity related to words. The negativity related to the expected antonym was almost nonexistent. It is speculated that this negativity has the same origin as N400, and that it might be related to the process of lexical access.     

Cue interaction in human contingency judgment

Most studies of human contingency judgment have been based on the assumption that frequency information about one predictor is assessed in isolation of information about other predictors. Recent evidence, however, suggests that the judged predictive strength of one cue is influenced by the predictive strengths of other copresent cues. Two experiments demonstrate that stimuli with the same outcome contingencies may nonetheless have different predictive strengths as the result of cue interaction. The first experiment, in which a within-subject design was used, provides a demonstration of blocking. A stimulus presented in compound with a strong predictor was rated as less predictive than another stimulus that was presented in compound with a nonpredictive cue. In the second experiment, cue interactions in conditioned inhibition were examined. A stimulus gained negative predictive strength as the result of compound presentations with a positive predictor when the outcome was not presented. This negative predictor was compared with an otherwise analogous stimulus that was not presented in compound with a positive predictor. These results support the use of animal-conditioning models as accounts of human contingency learning.     

Diagnostic hypothesis generation and human judgment

Diagnostic hypothesis-generation processes are ubiquitous in human reasoning. For example, clinicians generate disease hypotheses to explain symptoms and help guide treatment, auditors generate hypotheses for identifying sources of accounting errors, and laypeople generate hypotheses to explain patterns of information (i.e., data) in the environment. The authors introduce a general model of human judgment aimed at describing how people generate hypotheses from memory and how these hypotheses serve as the basis of probability judgment and hypothesis testing. In 3 simulation studies, the authors illustrate the properties of the model, as well as its applicability to explaining several common findings in judgment and decision making, including how errors and biases in hypothesis generation can cascade into errors and biases in judgment.     

Judgment processes in motivation: Anchoring and adjustment effects on judgment and behavior

The behavioral correlates of human judgment have received little attention from judgment and decision making researchers. One behavioral domain that provides for the study of judgment-behavior relations is task motivation (i.e., the allocation of time and effort to a task). Judgments of contingent relations are primary components of several theories of motivation, including expectancy theories and the theory of behavior in organizations proposed by Naylor, Pritchard, and Ilgen (1980). The characteristics of heuristic judgment processes are hypothesized to affect contingency judgments and thus behavioral allocations of time and effort. This paper examines the effects of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic upon (a) judgments of future effort and performance and (b) upon actual allocations of time and effort using several types of anchoring information. Results indicate that both irrelevant and relevant information have strong anchoring effects on effort and performance judgments, but do not have concomitant effects on behavior. Implications for the role of judgment in motivation and for the link between judgment and behavior are discussed.     

Individuals and dyads in a multiple-cue judgment task: Cognitive processes and performance

Virtually all studies of multiple-cue judgment focus on the learning by individuals. In a multiple-cue judgment task the authors examined if people acquire rule or exemplar knowledge as a function of learning the task alone or in dyads. Learning in dyads was expected to promote explicit rule-based thinking as a consequence of verbalization (social abstraction effect) and to improve performance due to the larger joint exemplar knowledge base (exemplar pooling effect). In two experiments the results suggest more accurate judgment by dyads, evidence for an exemplar pooling effect, but no evidence for the social abstraction effect. In contrast to most previous research, social interaction proved beneficial and allowed the dyads to surpass their combined individual performance.     

Comparison of two models of similarity judgment

The conventional multidimensional distance model of similarity judgment was compared with a new model in which component differences are weighted and then averaged. To evaluate the models, qualitative and quantitative predictions were derived from Romney and D'Andrade's (1964) componential analysis of American kinship terms, and these predictions were tested by having subjects rate the similarity (in experiment 1) and the difference (in experiment 2) between all possible pairs of 12 kinship terms. In both experiments, violations of qualitative predictions for both a simple distance model and a simple averaging model revealed that the componential analysis was not sufficient to account for the data. However the averaging model was able to account for the data when the dichotomous dimension of lineality used by Romney and D'Andrade was replaced by a continuous dimension of immediacy or closeness of kin. In contrast, no comparable elaboration under the distance model was successful. These results were discussed in terms of the likely psychological processes underlying similarity judgment.     

Inconsistency and uncertainty in multi-attribute judgment of human performance

This paper examines the effect of uncertainty and inconsistency on the judgment of human performance. The results indicate that the effect of inconsistency on judgment is not mediated by subjective uncertainty. We find that both the level and the extremity of judgment decrease with uncertainty. These effects are explained, respectively, by uncertainty aversion and by regressiveness. We also find that both the level and the extremity of judgment of human performance increase with inconsistency. These effects are explained by reliance on integration rules in which judgment is based primarily on some aspects of the information, while other aspects are, to some extent, ignored.     

Trial order and retention interval in human predictive judgment

The influences of order of trial type and retention interval on human predictive judgments were assessed for a cue that was reinforced on half of its training presentations. Subjects observed 10 cue-outcome presentations (i.e., reinforced trials) and 10 cue-alone presentations (i.e., nonreinforced trials) in one of three different orders: all nonreinforced trials followed by all reinforced trials(latent inhibition), reinforced and nonreinforced trials interspersed (partial reinforcement), or al lreinforced trials followed by all nonreinforced trials (extinction). Ratings were based mainly on the most recent event type (i.e., a recency effect) when the test occurred immediately after training but were based mainly on initial event types (i.e., a primacy effect) when the test occurred after a 48-h delay. The subjects tested both immediately and with a long retention interval did not exhibit this shift to primacy (i.e., the recency effect persisted). These results demonstrate noncatastrophic forgetting and the flexible use of trial order information in predictive judgments.     

Episodic and semantic knowledge in emotional self-report: evidence for two judgment processes

Three studies involving 3 participant samples (Ns = 39, 55, and 53) tested the hypothesis that people retrieve episodic emotion knowledge when reporting on their emotions over short (e.g., last few hours) time frames, but that they retrieve semantic emotion knowledge when reporting on their emotions over long (e.g., last few months) time frames. Support for 2 distinct judgment strategies was based on judgment latencies (Studies 1 and 2) and priming paradigms (Studies 2 and 3). The authors suggest that self-reports of emotion over short versus long time frames assess qualitatively different sources of self-knowledge.     

The need for process research on psychophysical judgment: comments on "Ratio and subtractive processes in psychophysical judgment" by Veit

This article is a commentary on Veit's article "Ratio and Subtractive Processes in Psychophysical Judgment." Veit's article makes an important contribution to the area of psychophysical judgment by providing a systematic approach that combines measurement and psychological theory. Using multi-factor designs and a cross-task scale-invariance criterion, Veit shows how to concurrently examine the integration rule, response-transformation function, and psychophysical function for judgment tasks. The need to expand this methodology to further understand the operations and processes underlying psychophysical judgment is stressed in the present article, and an illustration involving feedback mechanisms is provided.     

Using our best judgment in conducting human research

The federal regulations of human research were written to permit the use of discretion so that research can fit the circumstances under which it is conducted. For example, the researcher and institutional review board (IRB) could waive or alter some informed consent elements if they deem this the morally and scientifically best way to conduct the research. To do so, however, researchers and IRBs would first have to use mature moral and scientific judgment. They might also have to rely on empirical research to discover the most effective way to act on their moral sense (e.g., to discover how best to approach potential research participants and explain the nature and purpose of the research participation for which they are being recruited, to ensure comprehension and competent decision making). On discovering the most ethical way to proceed, they would then need to look to the federal regulations of human research to discover how to document their decision and justify it within that somewhat flexible regulatory structure. Unfortunately, many IRBs and researchers fail to take these sensible steps to solve ethical problems and proceed immediately to a default requirement of the regulations that places science at odds with the regulations and, ostensibly, with ethics. The following articles in this special issue are about the process of learning to engage in ethical problem solving and using the flexibility permitted by the federal regulations. These articles extricate researchers from the mindset that has gotten them into trouble, and, ideally, provoke them to use mature common sense and moral judgment.