Revenge of the Philosophical Mole: Another Response to David Miller on Nationality

ABSTRACT David Miller has written extensively on the ethical value of the nation. A satisfactory response to Miller's ideas on nationalism requires an assessment of the whole range of his writings on the subject. After stating the outlines of Miller's conception of 'nationality', I evaluate the most important arguments for and against any attribution of ethical importance to the nation. Finally, I assess Miller's commitment to conational ethical priority in the context of duties of justributive justice. My main conclusions are as follows. (i) Miller's conservative strategy of justification is unacceptable, and a critical strategy suggests several plausible arguments for valuing national attachments. These arguments are not conclusive, however, (ii) In so far as Miller's position depends on real historical connections between persons, it is susceptible to the objection from historical myth. (iii) Miller offers an unexpected and ultimately unsuccessful response to the claim that national sentiments are partial and hence biased, (iv) Miller provides no good reason to believe that the duties of distributive justice are owed in the first instance to conationals.     

From Incommensurability to Dialogue: A Response to David Lichtenstein

This response to David Lichtenstein (this issue) explores the opportunities and challenges that arise from the conceptual pluralism within the field of psychoanalysis. It argues that the Kleinian and Lacanian theoretical frameworks are in many ways incommensurable, but it also maintains that this should not translate into an either/or approach that privileges one framework over the other. Acknowledging the foundational differences between Kleinian and Lacanian theories should not forestall the possibility of productive and mutually beneficial dialogue carried out in good faith.     

David Miller on Immigration Policy and Nationality

abstract   David Miller's recent statement of the case for restrictive immigration policies can plausibly be construed as an application of a 'liberal nationalist' position. The paper first addresses Miller's critique of distributive justice arguments for open borders, which relies on nationality as determinative of the scope of distributive justice and as giving rise to national collective responsibility. Three interpretations of his main positive reason for restricting immigration, which concerns the importance of a shared public culture, are then discussed: culture as having valuable social functions, as a context of choice, and as an object of self-determination. The paper assesses the plausibility of Miller's nationalist arguments, and concludes that they are either implausible or peculiarly weak compared to other considerations in favour of restrictions. Several of the arguments may alternatively be construed as non-nationalist, and it is argued that Miller's arguments are more plausible when considered as such. The broader implication is that, even if the concern with nationality is relevant and legitimate in other areas of politics, it is, perhaps surprisingly, either inappropriate or insignificant in relation to immigration policy.     

Christian Ethics In Jewish Terms: A Response to David Novak

While appreciating the illuminating qualities of Novak's account of natural law, Hauerwas also regards it as problematic precisely because of the unhealthy tension that remains between Novak's claim regarding the inseparability of theology and ethics, on the one hand, and his contention that the Noachian laws may 'be taken to be a universal requirement'of human reason, on the other. Hauerwas' central reservation is that Novak's account is the danger of abstracting from the law's sanctifying intent; i.e., its purpose to form a holy people. A consequence for Jewish-Christian dialogue, then, is a misplaced concentration on the role of the law in these respective traditions rather than different understandings of sanctification between (and within) these respective traditions.     

Response to Ellens,Miller, and Anderson

Pastoral Psychology -     

Hume's Preference for the Enquiry: A Reply to Miller

Jon Charles Miller argues that the ‘New Humeans’ stress the primacy of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding over A Treatise of Human Nature, and that this is indefensible because it relies on omitting and distorting negative aspects surrounding Hume's statements of this preference. Miller's argument is not successful: first, the battle lines between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Humeans are not reducible to the primacy of either text; nor are his specific objections to the letters convincing. Moreover, the Enquiry is not, as Miller supposes, softer than the Treatise on controversial religious questions. In fact, his particular focus on religious questions provides a plausible explanation for Hume's preference.