Can We Trust Our Memories? C. I. Lewis's Coherence Argument

In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis's view on the roleof coherence – what he calls 'congruence' – in thejustification of beliefs based on memory ortestimony. Lewis has two main theses on the subject. His negativethesis states that coherence of independent items ofevidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusionunless each item has some credibility of its own. Thepositive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherenceof independently obtained items of evidence – such asconverging memories or testimonies – raises the probabilityof a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemicjustification, or, to use Lewis's expression, 'rationaland practical reliance'.It turns out that, while thenegative thesis is essentially correct (apart from aslight flaw in Lewis's account of independence), astrong positive connection between congruence andprobability – a connection of the kind Lewis ultimatelyneeds in his validation of memory – is contingent on thePrinciple of Indifference. In the final section we assess therepercussions of the latter fact for Lewis's theory in particularand for coherence justification in general.     

Accidentally True Belief and Warrant

The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by Thomas Crisp is also defective. I conclude by presenting my own suggestion as to how the account can be made less vulnerable to counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. Although I stay within the confines of Proper Functionism here, I think that my proposal (modulo a few details) could be attached to other externalist accounts of warrant as well.     

Peirce on Education: Nurturing the First Rule of Reason

Through an exegetic reading of Peirce’s minor texts on higher education, I find that Peirce’s conception of a “Liberal Education” is close to the Herbartian conception of Bildung. Peirce calls for a general education with the ambition of qualifying critical thinkers with the capacity to go beyond the strict rules and narrow borders of the artes liberales, – the different subject matters or sciences taught at a university. Thus, Peirce’s conception of a liberal education is closely linked to his interpretation of common sense – or sensis communis – as a critical commonsensism. To him, it is urgent to educate and nurture “the first rule of reason,” described as a will to learn, a curiosity, a dissatisfaction of what you already incline to think, and an intense desire to find things out. The nurturing of this “first rule of reason” is thus about educating an intellectual community of critical thinkers who are able to question authoritative beliefs, knowing how to debunk them, and how to turn away from obiter dictum.     

The Knowledge Argument, Abilities, And Metalinguistic Beliefs

In this paper I discuss a variant of the knowledge argument which is based upon Frank Jackson's Mary thought experiment. Using this argument, Jackson tries to support the thesis that a purely physical – or, put generally: an objectively scientific – perspective upon the world excludes the important domain of `phenomenal' facts, which are only accessible introspectively. Martine Nida-Rümelinhas formulated the epistemological challenge behind the case of Mary especially clearly. I take her formulation of the problem as a starting-point and present a solution which is based solely on the concepts of capability and of metalinguistic beliefs. References to epiphenomenal facts, phenomenal knowledge etc. will be avoided completely. I specify my proposal against the backdrop of Burge's critical reflections about metalinguistic reinterpretation of expressions of belief and the externalist thesis held by Burge, Putnam and others that meanings and mental states are dependent upon the environment. My solution is then compared with Lewis' and Nemirow's ability objection. Finally I argue that the much discussed ``knowing what it is like' has in its ordinary meaning nothing much to do with `phenomenal knowledge' or knowledge of `epiphenomenal' facts.     

Peirce on Educational Beliefs

This article contends that Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) may enhance our understanding of educational beliefs and that Peirce’s logic may be a tool to distinguish between a dogmatic and a pragmatic justification of such beliefs. The first part of the article elaborates on Peirce’s comprehension of beliefs as mediated, socially situated and future-oriented. The second part points to how Peirce promotes his “method of inquiry” as an ethos of science. The method is not judged by the conclusions it lead to or by the knowledge it may produce. Contrary, as the results are unavoidably provisional and rectifiable, Peirce holds the method productive due to the norms guiding the inquiry: (1) the pragmatic principle, (2) the social principle, (3) fallibilism and (4) abduction. In sum, when adopting a peircean conception, educational research, theory building and practice should be characterized as a mutual commitment towards shared processes of joint learning. In that, Peirce’s method of inquiry may be fruitful in sorting dogmatism from pragmatism.     

Beliefs, Persons and Practices: Beyond Tolerance

The central thesis of this paper is that, for most issues of multiculturalism, regarding them as a problem of tolerance puts us on the wrong track because there are certain biases inherent in the principle of tolerance. These biases – individualism, combined with a focus on religion and a focus on beliefs rather than on persons or practices – can be regarded as distinctly Protestant. Extending the scope of tolerance may seem a solution but if we really want to counter these biases, the principle of tolerance becomes so general that it loses any distinctive meaning. Therefore, we should accept the limited scope of tolerance and its biases. The principle of tolerance can still be useful for some problems where there is a clear and direct link to political or religious beliefs. Moreover, it should be cherished as a more general attitude or practice in Dutch society. For most problems of multiculturalism, however, we should appeal to broader theoretical frameworks that do justice to persons and practices.     

Vector Reliability: A new Approach to Epistemic Justification

Critics of reliability theories of epistemic justificationoften claim that the `generality problem' is an insurmountabledifficulty for such theories. The generality problem is theproblem of specifying the level of generality at which abelief-forming process is to be described for the purposeof assessing its reliability. This problem is not asintractable as it seems. There are illuminating solutionsto analogous problems in the ethics literature. Reliabilistsought to attend to utilitarian approaches to choices betweeninfinite utility streams; they also ought to attend towelfarist approaches to social choice situations that donot demand full aggregation of individual welfares.These analogies suggest that the traditional `single number'approach to reliability is misguided. I argue that a newapproach – the `vector reliability' approach – is preferable.Vector reliability theories associate target beliefs withreliability vectors – that is, structured collections ofreliability numbers – and construct criteria of epistemicjustification that appeal to these vectors. The bulk of thetheoretical labor involved in a reliability account of epistemicjustification is thus transferred from picking a uniquereliability number to constructing a plausible criterionof epistemic justification.     

Constructivism and the Limits of Reason: Revisiting the Kantian Problematic

The main focus of this paper ison ways in which Kantian philosophy can informproponents and opponents of constructivismalike. Kant was primarily concerned withreconciling natural and moral law. His approachto this general problematic was to limit andseparate what we can know about things(phenomena) from things as they are inthemselves (noumena), and to identify moralagency with the latter. Revisiting the Kantianproblematic helps to address and resolve longstanding epistemological concerns regardingconstructivism as an educational philosophy inrelation to issues of objectivity andsubjectivity, the limits of theoretical andpractical reason, and the relation betweenhuman experience and the world. It also servesto address ethical concerns regardingliberation from limited self-interests andcontexts conditioned by localised beliefs andinclinations. In light of revisiting theKantian problematic, both Glasersfeld's radicalview of constructivism and Jardine's socialcritique of constructivism are found wanting.Beyond constructivism, Kant's distinctionbetween phenomena and noumena and the limits ofreason that follow from it are brieflyconsidered in terms of Merleau-Ponty's noveldouble-embodied notion of flesh as anontological primitive – as a matter of beingboth in, and of, the world – with an aim tomore intimate connections between epistemologyand ethics.     

Consciousness: The transcendentalist manifesto

Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted in the articulation of an intuition: no matter how much we know about the brain, this will not allow us to see how it produces or constitutes phenomenal consciousness. Developing a theme first explored by Kant, and then later by Sartre, this paper argues that the real problem posed by phenomenal consciousness is quite different. Consciousness, it will be argued, is not an empirical but a transcendental feature of the world. That is, what it is like to have an experience is not something of which we are aware in the having of that experience, but an item in virtue of which the genuine (non-phenomenal) objects of our consciousness are revealed as being the way they are. Phenomenal consciousness, that is, is not an empirical object of awareness but a transcendental condition of the possibility of there being empirical objects of awareness.     

A Puzzle Concerning Time Perception

According to a plausible and influential account of perceptual knowledge, the truth-makers of beliefs that constitute perceptual knowledge must feature in the causal explanation of how we acquire those beliefs. However, this account runs into difficulties when it tries to accommodate time perception – specifically perception of order and duration – since the features we are apparently tracking in such perception are (it is argued) not causal. The central aim of the paper is to solve this epistemological puzzle. Two strategies are examined. The first strategy locates the causal truth-makers within the psychological mechanism underlying time perception, thus treating facts about time order and duration as mind-dependent. This strategy, however, is problematic. The second strategy modifies the causal account of perceptual knowledge to include a non-causal component in the explanation of belief-acquisition, namely chronometric explanation. Applying this much more satisfactory approach to perceptual knowledge of time, we can preserve the mind-independence of order and duration, but not that of time's flow.     

Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?

In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility ofanti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner isnot convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained inprint. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person'sself-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from herfirst-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner'sacceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning – hisattempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our sincere utterances ofcertain sentences would express in various possible worlds. I describe aweird possible world in which a person who uses Brueckner's reasoning endsup with false beliefs about what thoughts her sincere utterances of certainsentences would express in various possible worlds. I recommend that wereject Brueckner's problematic conception of self-knowledge, and adopt onethat better fits the way we actually ascribe self-knowledge.     

Critique of an epistemic account of fallacies

An epistemic account of fallacies is one which takes it as a necessary condition for a fallacy that it has a tendency to produce false or unwarranted beliefs. The most sophisticated form of this account occurs in an article by Robert J. Fogelin and Timothy J. Duggan (Fallacies,Argumentation 1, 1987, pp. 255–262). I criticize the Fogelin and Duggan proposal, in particular, and epistemic accounts, more generally. Though an epistemic approach is attractive, it enlarges the class of fallacies, beyond what would be permitted by traditional accounts. I also question thenecessity of fallacies leading to unwarranted beliefs. Some fallacies are fallacious due to their expected harm to argument practices. This position touches on a theme in the work of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, though I criticize their notion of rules of argument as too broad.     

“I think it, therefore it’s true”: Effects of self-perceived objectivity on hiring discrimination

A sense of personal objectivity may prompt an “I think it, therefore it’s true” mindset, in which people assume that their own beliefs and introspections are, by definition, valid and therefore worthy of being acted on. In the present studies, priming a sense of personal objectivity increased gender discrimination, particularly among decision-makers who endorsed stereotypic beliefs or who had stereotypic thoughts made cognitively accessible through implicit priming. Implications for discrimination in organizational contexts, and for theories of attitude–behavior consistency, are discussed.     

Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters

Contemporary moral philosophy assumes an account of what it means to legitimately change one’s mind in ethics, and I wish to challenge this account by enlarging the category of the legitimate. I am just as eager to avoid illegitimate mind-changing brought on by deceit or brainwashing, but I claim that legitimacy should be defined in terms of transparency of method. A social reformer should not be embarrassed to admit that he acquired many beliefs about justice while reading Dickens. As such, appeals to the heart and the imagination are just as legitimate, within limits, as appeals to the mind; and showing can be as legitimate as telling. To demonstrate this, I consider the example of a vegetarian trying to ‘convert’ a carnivore. I then ask what it means when the carnivore claims to have been previously mistaken.     

Reflections on Israel Scheffler's Philosophy of Religion

The burden of this piece is to draw together into a coherent whole the somewhat diverse strands of Israel Scheffler's thought on the philosophy of religion. Extrapolating from personal discussions with Professor Scheffler, various of his books, articles, and other unpublished materials authored and kindly provided by him, I contend that he adumbrates a post-empiricist rendering of religious belief which masterfully avoids some philosophical problems, while unwittingly giving rise to others. Committed to the view that the methodology of science – in one or other of its more acceptable guises – provides the most reliable measure of the content and structure of reality. Scheffler is bound conceptually to redefine Jewish belief in such a way that the traditional conflict between religion and science never emerges. Consistent with this end, he is concerned to divest traditional Judaism of its metaphysical garb, so that what remains are simply the matters of living to which religion ought properly on his view address itself. The Bible is thus reconceptualized as a piece of rich literature, of no real difference in logical kind to any other piece of rich literature, except that it defines uniquely, along with the Torah and other relevant Jewish literature, the history of the particular community whose perception of human values and meaningfulness forms the core of what it is to be Jewish.While I have no quibble whatsoever with Scheffler that the Bible and other religious teachings provides a profound reservoir for cognitive insight into the matters of quality living and appropriate social interaction, I argue that the divorce of religious values from the metaphysics of religion is in the end misguided. My problem with Scheffler's philosophy of religion is not so much with what he has found to be central to religion, as what he has failed to find in religion. By jettisoning its metaphysical basis, he has jettisoned what is inevitably fundamental to Judaism – namely, a resolute belief in God. This being so, an atheist could more readily adopt Scheffler's version of Judaism than could the theist – an outocme which should be problematic for both the theist and the atheist.     

In defence of folk psychology

Conclusion Our argument has been that a commonsense functionalist approach to our folk conception of beliefs and desires shows that it is very likely that they exist, where commonsense functionalism is understood as implicitly defined by our folk practice in moving back and forth between behaviour, situations, and beliefs and desires. Completed neuroscience will indeed provide a complete story about when and why we do what we do, but will incorporate rather than eliminate beliefs and desires in this complete story. The irony is that our defence uses an account of folk psychology fully in accord with that provided by eliminativism's sympathizers when they insist that folk psychology is a theory. They see this insistence as opening the way for serious consideration of the possibility that folk psychology is radically mistaken. Any theory can be radically mistaken. But, of course, folk psychology is radically mistaken for a great many objects — the Taj Mahal, for instance. The Taj Mahal does not have beliefs and desires precisely because it does not satisfy the theory. Our point is that because the theory is a purely functional theory, the evidence that we satisfy it (and for that matter that the Taj Mahal does not) is peculiarly strong evidence.     

A Functional Role Analysis of Reasons

One strategy for providing an analysis of practical rationality is to start with the notion of a practical reason as primitive. Then it will be quite tempting to think that the rationality of an action can be defined rather simply in terms of ‘the balance of reasons’. But just as, for many philosophical purposes, it is extremely useful to identify the meaning of a word in terms of the systematic contribution the word makes to the meanings of whole sentences, this paper argues that it is extremely useful to explain the nature of practical reasons in terms of the systematic contributions that such reasons make to the wholesale rational statuses of actions. This strategy gives us a clear view of two logically distinct normative roles for practical reasons – justifying and requiring – that are often conflated, and it allows us to give clear definitions of what ‘the strength of a reason’ means within each of these roles. The final section of the paper explores some implications of the resulting view for the internalism/externalism debate about practical reasons, and for the practical significance of moral theory.     

What's left is closer to right : A response to keating

The present paper attempts to respond to criticisms made by Keating (1988, Developmental Review, 8, 376–384) regarding the present author's earlier paper which described a recasted model of formal operations ( Byrnes, 1988, Developmental Review, 8, 66–87). This earlier paper made a distinction between conceptual and procedural knowledge at the level of formal operations, and presented evidence supporting this recasted model. Keating (1988) argues that the recasted model fails to capture what Piaget originally intended, that it fails to incorporate a procedural knowledge component, and that there is some question as to what would constitute empirical support for the model. The present paper discusses each of these criticisms and others in turn, and clarifies earlier arguments.     

Heterosexual adolescents’ and young adults’ beliefs and attitudes about homosexuality and gay and lesbian peers

Reports on the school climate for gay and lesbian students in the United States suggest that negative attitudes toward gay and lesbian individuals are quite common in adolescence. Very little research, however, has investigated adolescents’ sexual prejudice from a developmental perspective. In this study, 10th- (N = 119) and 12th- (N = 145) grade adolescents and college-aged young adults (N = 86) completed a questionnaire assessing their beliefs and attitudes about homosexuality, their comfort with gay and lesbian students, and their judgments and reasoning regarding the treatment of gay or lesbian peers in school. Results indicate that middle adolescents (14–16) are more likely than older adolescents (16–18) and young adults (19–26) to exhibit sexual prejudice related to social interaction with gay and lesbian peers. Interestingly, however, age-related differences in beliefs about whether homosexuality was right or wrong were not found. These findings provide evidence for age-related differences in some aspects of sexual prejudice but not others and underscore the importance of using multiple measures in assessing the development of this type of prejudice.