Changing your mind about things unseen: Toddlers' sensitivity to prior reliability

The goal of this research was to investigate the extent to which young children use the past reliability of another person’s statements to make inferences about the accuracy of that person’s claims about a hidden toy. When children interacted with a previously reliable speaker, both 30- and 36-month-olds searched in the new location of the toy, in line with the speaker’s statement. When children interacted with an unreliable speaker, the 36-month-olds were less likely to rely on her false statement and instead searched either in the original location of the toy or in a neutral location. The 30-month-olds, however, searched in the location indicated by the speaker even when the speaker was unreliable. These results show that by 36 months of age, children begin to use reliability in processing a speaker’s episodic claims and can flexibly update their representations of absent objects depending on the reliability of the speaker.     

Yu and your mind

This note is a brief reply to the main argument of Qiuen Yu: 1992, Consistency, Mechanicalness, and the Logic of the Mind,Synthese 90, 145–79.     

The strategic nature of changing your mind

In two experiments, we studied how people’s strategy choices emerge through an initial and then a more considered evaluation of available strategies. The experiments employed a computer-based paradigm where participants solved multiplication problems using mental and calculator solutions. In addition to recording responses and solution times, we gathered data on mouse cursor movements. Participants’ motor behavior was revealing; although people rapidly initiated movement to the calculator box or the answer input box, they frequently changed their minds and went to the other box. Movement initiation direction depended on problem difficulty and calculator responsiveness. Ultimate strategy selection also depended on these factors, but was further influenced by movement initiation direction. We conclude that strategy selection is iterative, as revealed by these differences between early cursor movement and eventual strategy implementation. After rapidly initiating movement favoring one strategy, people carefully evaluate the applicability of that strategy in the current context.     

Asserting your mind: Interruptions extremize consumer choices

Interruptions prevail in the retail environment, especially during consumer decision-making. However, scant research has examined whether and how interruptions that suspend decisions affect consumer choices. We posit that interruptions heighten the consumers' preference certainty, which leads to a choice extremity effect—consumers choose their preferred products even more and their unpreferred products even less. Six experiments provide convergent evidence for the choice extremity effect and the underlying process. Study 1a shows that interruptions lead to choice extremity with a vice product (i.e., chips). Study 1b confirms the effect in the context of incentive-compatible choices. Study 2 replicates the choice extremity effect with a virtue product (i.e., yogurts). Study 3 further tests the robustness of the effect with a decision-related interruption. Study 4 shows that preference certainty mediates the effect of interruptions on choice extremity and rules out the level of arousal and task involvement as alternative accounts. Using a moderation approach, Study 5 shows that the choice extremity effect disappears when consumers have high self-concept clarity. The present study contributes to research on interruptions, preference certainty, and consumer choices and provides implications for marketers.     

Knowing your heart and your mind: The relationships between metamemory and interoception

Humans experience a unified self that integrates our mental lives and physical bodies, but many studies focus on isolated domains of self-knowledge. We tested the hypothesis that knowledge of one’s mind and body are related by examining metamemory and interoception. We evaluated two dimensions of metamemory and interoception: subjective beliefs and the accuracy of those beliefs compared to objective criteria. We first demonstrated, in two studies, that metamemory beliefs were positively correlated with interoceptive beliefs, and this was not due to domain-general confidence. Finally, we showed that individuals with better metamemory accuracy also had better interoceptive accuracy. Taken together, these findings suggest a common mechanism subserving knowledge of our cognitive and bodily states.     

Make up your mind: octopus cognition and hybrid explanations

In order to argue that cognitive science should be more accepting of explanatory plurality, this paper presents the control of fetching movements in the octopus as an exemplar of a cognitive process that comprises distinct and non-redundant representation-using and non-representational elements. Fetching is a type of movement that representational analyses can normally account for completely—but not in the case of the octopus. Instead, a comprehensive account of octopus fetching requires the non-overlapping use of both representational and non-representational explanatory frameworks. What this need for a pluralistic or hybrid explanation implies is that cognitive science should be more open to using both representational and non-representational accounts of cognition, depending on their respective appropriateness to the type of cognition in question.

     

The more your mind wanders,the smaller your attentional blink: An individual differences study

The present studies investigate the hypothesis that individuals who frequently report experiencing episodes of mind wandering do so because they under-invest attentional/executive resources in the external environment. Here we examined whether self-reported instances of mind wandering predict the magnitude of the “attentional blink” (AB) in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task, since a prominent view is that the AB derives from an over-investment of attention in the information stream. Study 1 demonstrates that subjective reports of mind wandering in a sustained attention task have a negative predictive relation with respect to the magnitude of the AB measured in a subsequent RSVP task. In addition, using the Spontaneous and Deliberate Mind Wandering Questionnaire in Study 2, we were again able to show that trait-level mind wandering in everyday life negatively predicts AB magnitude. We suggest that mind wandering may be the behavioural outcome of an adaptive cognitive style intended to maximize the efficient processing of dynamic and temporally unpredictable events.     

Your mind wanders weakly, your mind wanders deeply: Objective measures reveal mindless reading at different levels

When the mind wanders, attention turns away from the external environment and cognitive processing is decoupled from perceptual information. Mind wandering is usually treated as a dichotomy (dichotomy-hypothesis), and is often measured using self-reports. Here, we propose the levels of inattention hypothesis, which postulates attentional decoupling to graded degrees at different hierarchical levels of cognitive processing. To measure graded levels of attentional decoupling during reading we introduce the sustained attention to stimulus task (SAST), which is based on psychophysics of error detection. Under experimental conditions likely to induce mind wandering, we found that subjects were less likely to notice errors that required high-level processing for their detection as opposed to errors that only required low-level processing. Eye tracking revealed that before errors were overlooked influences of high- and low-level linguistic variables on eye fixations were reduced in a graded fashion, indicating episodes of mindless reading at weak and deep levels. Individual fixation durations predicted overlooking of lexical errors 5s before they occurred. Our findings support the levels of inattention hypothesis and suggest that different levels of mindless reading can be measured behaviorally in the SAST. Using eye tracking to detect mind wandering online represents a promising approach for the development of new techniques to study mind wandering and to ameliorate its negative consequences.     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Washing away your sins will set your mind free: physical cleansing modulates the effect of threatened morality on executive control

The effect of threatened morality on negative emotions and on altruistic behaviour has been shown to diminish following physical cleansing (hand-washing). We hypothesised that threatened morality will broadly impair the executive control system, and that physical cleansing will moderate this detrimental effect. Thirty-seven participants were asked to write about an immoral deed they had committed, whereupon half of them were allowed to wipe their hands. Three executive control tasks—Stroop, stop-signal, and object interference—were then administered to all participants. Participants who had not wiped their hands, but not those who did, demonstrated impaired performance, compared to hand-washing controls, in all three tasks. We conclude that threatened morality has a detrimental effect on executive control, specifically on conflict monitoring and response inhibition, and that physical cleansing “frees” this system, counteracting the detrimental effects of morality threats. We discuss possible implications for obsessive–compulsive disorder, which is characterised by deficient executive control and in which both threatened morality and physical cleansing are central concerns.     

Controlling your mind without ironic consequences: Self-affirmation eliminates rebound effects after thought suppression

Thought suppression can ironically lead to a rebound of unwanted thoughts [Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 101, 34-52.]. The present research explored whether self-affirmation may eliminate rebound effects after thought suppression. Participants either suppressed or used stereotypes in an impression formation task. Subsequently, self-affirmation was manipulated by providing participants with positive or neutral personality feedback, and stereotype accessibility was assessed. The results showed that suppression led to a rebound of stereotypic associations among neutral-feedback participants, but not among positive-feedback participants. The authors conclude that self-affirmation enhances the efficiency of mental control.     

First impressions: making up your mind after a 100-ms exposure to a face

People often draw trait inferences from the facial appearance of other people. We investigated the minimal conditions under which people make such inferences. In five experiments, each focusing on a specific trait judgment, we manipulated the exposure time of unfamiliar faces. Judgments made after a 100-ms exposure correlated highly with judgments made in the absence of time constraints, suggesting that this exposure time was sufficient for participants to form an impression. In fact, for all judgments-attractiveness, likeability, trustworthiness, competence, and aggressiveness-increased exposure time did not significantly increase the correlations. When exposure time increased from 100 to 500 ms, participants' judgments became more negative, response times for judgments decreased, and confidence in judgments increased. When exposure time increased from 500 to 1,000 ms, trait judgments and response times did not change significantly (with one exception), but confidence increased for some of the judgments; this result suggests that additional time may simply boost confidence in judgments. However, increased exposure time led to more differentiated person impressions.     

What's on your mind: The influence of the contents of working memory on choice

Information maintained in working memory (WM) has the potential to bias selective attention and limit executive attention. The current study assessed the influence of information in WM on the tasks one chooses to perform in a multitasking environment. Participants held either identities or locations in WM while performing voluntary task-switching trials on stimuli that did or did not match the information they were attempting to maintain. A bias toward performing the task associated with stimuli that had recently been encoded into WM was found. The results suggest that information in WM can influence choice within a multitasking environment.     

My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic

We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents’ beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs (‘no preferences’), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own (‘my preferences’), and the special case that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are exactly as their own (‘preference refinement’). This multi-agent belief interaction is frame characterizable. We provide examples for introspective agents. We investigate which of these forms of belief interaction are preserved under three common forms of belief revision.     

Speak your mind and I will make it right: the case of “selection task”

ABSTRACT

The “Wason selection task” is still one of the most studied tasks in cognitive psychology. We argue that the low performance originally obtained seems to be caused by how the information of the task is presented. By systematically manipulating the task instructions, making explicit the information that participants are required to infer in accordance with the logical interpretation of the material implication “if, then”, we found an improvement in performance. In Experiment 1, the conditional rule has been formulated within a relevant context and in accordance with the conversational rules of communication, hence transmitting the actual meaning of the material implication. In Experiment 2, a similar improvement has been obtained even without the realistic scenario, only by making explicit the unidirectionality of the material implication. We conclude that task instructions are often formulate neglecting the conversational rules of communication, and this greatly reduces the possibility to succeed in the task.     

I see into your mind too well: working memory adjusts the probability judgment of others' mental states

Although an increasing number of studies on adults have indicated that working memory (WM) contributes to the ability to understand the mental states of others (i.e., theory of mind), the detailed mechanism by which WM contributes to successful reasoning has not previously been revealed. This study shows that WM modulates the degree of attribution of one's own knowledge to others' mental states. Participants were asked to read a story twice (Experiment 2) or as carefully as possible (Experiment 3) and to estimate the probability percentages of possible choices for a naive protagonist's behavior. The participants were then asked to maintain either a two- or seven-letter alphabet string (i.e., a light or heavy WM load, respectively) during the probability estimation but not during the story comprehension. The results showed that compared to the participants with a light WM load, those with a heavy WM load estimated a significantly higher probability of the choice indicating that the protagonist would behave on the basis of a fact that the participants knew but the protagonist did not. This result indicates that WM moderates the extent to which adults attribute their own knowledge to others' mental states. The role of WM in theory of mind and in heuristic strategy for making probability judgments was then discussed.     

Let me read your mind: Personality judgments based on a person’s natural stream of thought

Past research on the accuracy of personality judgments has largely focused on person perception scenarios that are public in nature (e.g., face-to-face interactions, personal websites). This study investigated the accuracy of personality judgments on the basis of highly private information: a person’s natural stream of thought. Nine naïve judges rated the personality of 90 targets on the basis of their 20-min stream-of-consciousness essays. Judges’ level of accuracy was significant and substantial for all Big Five dimensions. The substantial and relatively uniform accuracy across all Big Five dimensions suggests that a person’s moment-to-moment thoughts provide good information for the accurate judgment of personality in general rather than specific diagnostic information for the accurate judgment of private traits such as Neuroticism.