西方四种心理学流派近19年在中国的发展

本文通过对 1 980～ 1 998年间 6种“核心”心理学期刊所发表论文题目的关键词、参考文献引用杂志的分析 ,对认知心理学、行为主义、精神分析和神经科学四种心理学流派在中国的发展做了研究 ,得出以下结果 :(1 )认知心理学研究论文的数量快速增长 ,神经科学领域的研究略有增加 ;(2 )四学派在中国受重视的程度依次为认知心理学、神经科学研究、行为主义、精神分析 ;(3 )精神分析和行为主义的研究极少。     

Teleological behaviorism.

A psychological science of efficient causes, using internal mechanisms to explain overt behavior, is distinguished from another psychological science, based on Aristotelian final causes, using external objects and goals to explain overt behavior. Efficient-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of how a particular act is emitted; final-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of why a particular act is emitted. Physiological psychology, modern cognitive psychology, and some parts of behaviorism including Skinnerian behaviorism are efficient-cause psychologies; final-cause psychology, a development of Skinnerian behaviorism, is here called teleological behaviorism. Each of these two conceptions of causality in psychology implies a different view of the mind, hence a different meaning of mental terms.     

Hypothetical high-level cognitive functions cannot be localized in the brain: another argument for a revitalized behaviorism

A key epistemological difference between behaviorism and cognitivism concerns their respective attitudes toward the analysis of so-called cognitive processes into functional modules. Behaviorists generally say it is not possible. Cognitivists argue that this is an achievable goal. The question has been concretized by recent developments in brain imaging technology. A consideration of the matter suggests that technical and conceptual difficulties abound in the effort to localize "high-level cognitive functions" in narrowly circumscribed regions of the brain. Some of the most serious involve the ambiguous definition of the putative mental components that are to be localized and the generally unacknowledged nonlinear complexity of both psychological processes and the brain. In addition, the imaging techniques themselves are replete with technical difficulties that raise additional questions about this particular application, even though these wonderful machines can make extraordinary contributions to our knowledge of brain anatomy and physiology. The cumulative implication of these difficulties is that the cognitive approach to the study of scientific psychology has once again set out on a search for a chimera. New approaches to behaviorism may be required to set psychology back on the correct track.     

Wilhelm Wundt and the cognitive shift

This paper compares Wundtian and cognitive psychology with respect to immediate and mediate experience, non-functionalism, and the status of the experiment. It is pointed out that the perspective of immediate experience, which can also be found in early American functionalism, has disappeared in the wake of behaviorism. Next cognitive psychology, which to some extent represents a correction of behaviorism, is compared with Wundt's system. It is concluded that in spite of certain similarities the Wundtian and the cognitive perspective are irreconcilably opposed.     

Modern Molar Behaviorism And Theoretical Behaviorism: Religion And Science.

Baum and staddon disagree on the status of internal states in behavior analysis. Baum advocates molar behaviorism, treating behavior in temporally extended segments and so avoiding the need for internal states. Staddon argues that internal states merely represent the effects of different histories and that their use brings behavior analysis in line with the established sciences. The dispute is one form of the age‐old molar—molecular controversy that characterized Aristotle's disagreement with Plato. Both molar and molecular analyses have their place, but molar behaviorism may apply more naturally to a variety of phenomena, ranging from the matching law and avoidance learning to socalled “higher mental processes.” When molecular analysis involves internal states, as in Staddon's Theoretical Behaviorism (or New Behaviorism), misunderstanding will be inevitable and behaviorism will be seen as one more instance of the mediational theories in which psychology has long been mired. Such theories have long dominated the physical sciences, where their usefulness is indisputable, but psychology is far behind the physical sciences and nonmediational molar behaviorism better suits a discipline that lacks the methods and the data of the established sciences.     

Did John B. Watson Really “Found” Behaviorism?

Developments culminating in the nineteenth century, along with the predictable collapse of introspective psychology, meant that the rise of behavioral psychology was inevitable. In 1913, John B. Watson was an established scientist with impeccable credentials who acted as a strong and combative promoter of a natural science approach to psychology when just such an advocate was needed. He never claimed to have founded “behavior psychology” and, despite the acclaim and criticism attending his portrayal as the original behaviorist, he was more an exemplar of a movement than a founder. Many influential writers had already characterized psychology, including so-called mental activity, as behavior, offered many applications, and rejected metaphysical dualism. Among others, William Carpenter, Alexander Bain, and (early) Sigmund Freud held views compatible with twentieth-century behaviorism. Thus, though Watson was the first to argue specifically for psychology as a natural science, behaviorism in both theory and practice had clear roots long before 1913. If behaviorism really needs a “founder,” Edward Thorndike might seem more deserving, because of his great influence and promotion of an objective psychology, but he was not a true behaviorist for several important reasons. Watson deserves the fame he has received, since he first made a strong case for a natural science (behaviorist) approach and, importantly, he made people pay attention to it.     

Behaviorism and Unity in Psychology

The defining feature of behaviorism is that it works with publicly observable stimuli and responses. One version, stimulus-response behaviorism, predicts responses from stimuli or situations. Another version, response-response behaviorism, predicts targeted responses from other responses. Unobservable mental states are intervening variables—hypothetical constructs if they have postulated material existence—that mediate these relationships. Cognition, affect, and reaction tendency are the major conceptual categories in this psychology. Its basic axioms state that behavior is (a) a function of enduring potentials for and temporary instigation to action, (b) controlled by excitation and inhibition, and (c) a blend of coping in situations in which organisms have control and adaptation in situations in which control is lacking. This view offers the hope of bringing unity to psychology.     

How the challenge of explaining learning influenced the origins and development of John B. Watson's behaviorism

Before he invented behaviorism, John B. Watson considered learning one of the most important topics in psychology. Watson conducted excellent empirical research on animal learning. He developed behaviorism in part to promote research and elevate the status of learning in psychology. Watson was much less successful in the adequacy and originality of the mechanisms he proposed to explain learning. By assimilating the method of classical conditioning and adopting Pavlov's theory of stimulus substitution, Watson linked behaviorism with a new method that could compete with both Titchener's method of introspection and Freud's methods of psychoanalysis. Watson's interest in explaining psychopathology led to the discovery of conditioned emotional responses and a behavioristic explanation for the learning of phobic behavior. Watson established learning as a central topic for basic research and application in American psychology.     

An empirical analysis of trends in psychology

The present research examined trends in the prominence of 4 widely recognized schools in scientific psychology: psychoanalysis, behaviorism, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. The results, which replicated across 3 measures of prominence, showed the following trends: (a) psychoanalytic research has been virtually ignored by mainstream scientific psychology over the past several decades; (b) behavioral psychology has declined in prominence and gave way to the ascension of cognitive psychology during the 1970s; (c) cognitive psychology has sustained a steady upward trajectory and continues to be the most prominent school; and (d) neuroscience has seen only a modest increase in prominence in mainstream psychology, despite evidence for its conspicuous growth in general. The authors use these findings as a springboard for discussing different views of scientific prominence and conclude that psychologists should evaluate trends in the field empirically, not intuitively.     

Origins of the cognitive (r)evolution

The well documented cognitive "revolution" was, to a large extent, an evolving return to attitudes and trends that were present prior to the advent of behaviorism and that were alive and well outside of the United States, where behaviorism had not developed any coherent support. The behaviorism of the 1920 to 1950 period was replaced because it was unable to address central issues in human psychology, a failure that was inherent in part in J. B. Watson's founding manifesto with its insistence on the seamless continuity of human and nonhuman animal behavior. The "revolution" was often slow and piecemeal, as illustrated by four conferences held between 1955 and 1966 in the field of memory. With the realization that different approaches and concepts were needed to address a psychology of the human, developments in German, British, and Francophone psychology provided some of the fuel of the "revolution."     

Epistemological barriers to radical behaviorism

The historian and philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard proposed the concept of epistemological barriers to describe the intellectual challenges encountered by scientists in their work. In order to embrace novel ways of approaching a problem in science, scientists must overcome barriers or obstacles posed by their prior views. For example, Einsteinian physics presents scientists with claims that space is curved and that time and space are on the same continuum. We utilize Bachelard's concept of epistemological barriers to describe the differences between the intellectual journeys students pursuing advanced studies face when attempting to accept cognitive psychology or radical behaviorism. We contend that the folk psychological beliefs that students typically hold when entering these studies pose less challenge to cognitive psychology than to radical behaviorism. We also suggest that these barriers may also partly be involved in the problematic exegesis that has plagued radical behaviorism. In close, we offer some suggestions for dealing with these epistemological barriers.     

Behaviorism: Are reports of its death exaggerated?

Despite reports that behaviorism is dead or dying, examination of the data indicates otherwise. The opinions of psychology historians, the number of professional associations devoted to behaviorism, and the increasing number of behavioral publications all support the conclusion that behaviorism is vital and growing.     

Beyond behaviorism: on the automaticity of higher mental processes

The first 100 years of experimental psychology were dominated by 2 major schools of thought: behaviorism and cognitive science. Here the authors consider the common philosophical commitment to determinism by both schools, and how the radical behaviorists' thesis of the determined nature of higher mental processes is being pursued today in social cognition research on automaticity. In harmony with "dual process" models in contemporary cognitive science, which equate determined processes with those that are automatic and which require no intervening conscious choice or guidance, as opposed to "controlled" processes which do, the social cognition research on the automaticity of higher mental processes provides compelling evidence for the determinism of those processes. This research has revealed that social interaction, evaluation and judgment, and the operation of internal goal structures can all proceed without the intervention of conscious acts of will and guidance of the process.     

Some historical and conceptual relations among logical positivism, operationism, and behaviorism

Historical and conceptual relations among logical positivism, conventional operationism, and behaviorism are examined from the standpoint of Skinner's radical behaviorism. Although logical positivism and conventional operationism sought the formulation and application of an epistemology based strictly upon physicalistic principles and experiential verification, the application of that epistemology in psychology has resulted in the perpetuation, rather than the resolution, of a number of mentalistic, if not outright dualistic, problems.     

Pavlov's position toward American behaviorism

Pavlov's development of the conditional reflex theory coincided with the rise of American behaviorism. Substituting an objective physiology for a subjective psychology, Pavlov saw in the rise of American behaviorism a clear confirmation of his method and theory. But in the early 1930s, Lashley attacked Pavlov's theory of specific cerebral localization of function, proposing instead the concept of an internal cerebral organization; Guthrie objected to Pavlov's centralist interpretation of conditioning, proposing instead a peripheralist interpretation; while Hull challenged Pavlov's theory of sleep and hypnosis as the manifestations of inhibition. Pavlov replied with critiques of Lashley's, Guthrie's, and Hull's views, and, convinced that Lashley and Guthrie misunderstood his position, repeated his method's and theory's basic propositions. Yet, Pavlov never gave up the expectation that American behaviorism would accept his conditional reflex theory and saw in Hunter's 1932 statements a support of his assumptions.     

Understanding the “cognitive revolution” in psychology

In this paper it is argued that the “cognitive revolution” in psychology is not best represented either as a Kuhnian “paradigm shift,” or as a movement from an instrumentalist to a realist conception of psychological theory, or as a continuous evolution out of more “liberalized” forms of behaviorism, or as a return to the form of “structuralist” psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener. It is suggested that the move from behaviorism to cognitivism is best represented in terms of the replacement of (operationally defined) “intervening variables” by genuine “hypothetical constructs” possessing cognitive “surplus meaning,” and that the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s continued a cognitive tradition that can be traced back to the 1920s. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Radical behaviorism and scientific frameworks. From mechanistic to relational accounts.

A substantial portion of B. F. Skinner's scholarship was devoted to developing methods and terms for a scientific study of behavior. Three concepts central to scientific accounts--cause, explanation, and theory--are examined to illustrate the distinction between mechanistic and relational frameworks and radical behaviorism's relationship to those frameworks. Informed by a scientific tradition that explicitly rejects mechanistic interpretations, radical behaviorism provides a distinctive stance in contemporary psychology. The present analysis suggests that radical behaviorism makes closer contact with the "new world view" advocated by physicists and philosophers of science than does much of contemporary psychology.     

Examining the acceptance of and resistance to evolutionary psychology

The field of psychology remains a divided one. Several different sub-disciplines (e.g., developmental, cognitive, behaviorism, social, etc.) form what could be a unified scientific area. However, there is no widely accepted theory of unification. Charles Darwin once theorized that evolutionary theory would change the foundation of psychology; but over the years, evolutionary psychology has been met with hostile resistance from some of the prominent psychologists within the other sub-disciplines. Yet in recent years, all of the divided sub-disciplines of psychology have been slowly implementing evolutionary principles into their literature and research. This slow integration of evolutionary psychology into the other sub-disciplines indicates the possibility of a unified psychology with evolution as its foundation. This paper briefly reviews the literature within each major sub-discipline of psychology to show their implementation of evolutionary psychological theories, indicating the possibility of evolutionary psychology becoming the unifying paradigm upon which the entire field of psychology can be based. A call for action to continue this process is also discussed.     

Radical behaviorism and the subjective-objective distinction

The distinction between subjective and objective domains is central to traditional psychology, including the various forms of mediational stimulus-organism-response neobehaviorism that treat the elements of a subjective domain as hypothetical constructs. Radical behaviorism has its own unique perspective on the subjective-objective distinction. For radical behaviorism, dichotomies between subjective and objective, knower and known, or observer and agent imply at most unique access to a part of the world, rather than dichotomous ontologies. This perspective leads to unique treatments of such important philosophical matters as (a) dispositions and (b) the difference between first- and third-person psychological sentences.