Is there a profession of engineering?

This article examines three common arguments for the claim that engineering is not a profession: 1) that engineering lacks an ideal internal to its practice; 2) that engineering’s ideal, whether internal or not, is merely technical; and 3) that engineering lacks the social arrangements characteristic of a true profession. All three arguments are shown to rely on one or another definition of profession, each of which is inadequate. An alternative to these definition is offered. It has at least two advantages. On the one hand, it emphasizes the importance of professional community, the role of occupation in defining profession, the centrality of a moral ideal, and the necessity for morally binding standards (beyond ordinary morality). On the other hand, the alternative definition is in part independent both of moral theory and sociology. This article concludes by considering what light the alternative definition can throw on the professional status of engineers serving the Nazis.     

Is there a logic of incoherence?

What should we do when we discover that our assessment of probabilities is incoherent? I explore the hypothesis that there is a logic of incoherence—a set of universally valid rules that specify how incoherent probability assessments are to be repaired. I examine a pair of candidate‐rules of incoherence logic that have been employed in philosophical reconstructions of scientific arguments. Despite their intuitive plausibility, both rules turn out to be invalid. There are presently no viable candidate‐rules for an incoherence logic on the table. Other ways of dealing with incoherence are surveyed, and found either to be unsatisfactory or to rely on a logic of incoherence in the end. The resolution of these antagonistic conclusions is left to future researchers.     

Is there a nonverbal period of development?

That the infant lives in a nonverbal sensorimotor world is widely believed. Yet this notion is being challenged by research, in a range of fields, that depicts the young infant as actively attuned to aural speech from birth and able to process and use its sounds and meanings well before the end of the first year. Following a selective review of the research on infant speech processing between birth and age twelve months, three questions are identified that highlight the theoretical and clinical implications of this research for psychoanalytic conceptualizations of infancy, the nature of language, and clinical process. The research, it is concluded, identifies the operation of linguistic and conceptual processes in early life, processes that may intersect with the experiential and emotional processes with which psychoanalysis is already concerned. Moreover, this research raises questions about the view that the nature of infancy is essentially nonverbal.     

Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?

It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (ii) for each such pair of theories, there is no fact of the matter as to which of them is superior; or more precisely, they are tied in terms of factual accuracy. These are sweeping claims that cannot be fully justified in a single paper. But arguments are given here that motivate these theses, i.e., that suggest that they are very likely true.     

Is there a Bayesian justification of hypothetico-deductive inference?

Many philosophers have claimed that Bayesianism can provide a simple justification for hypothetico-deductive (H-D) inference, long regarded as a cornerstone of the scientific method. Following up a remark of van Fraassen (1985), we analyze a problem for the putative Bayesian justification of H-D inference in the case where what we learn from observation is logically stronger than what our theory implies. Firstly, we demonstrate that in such cases the simple Bayesian justification does not necessarily apply. Secondly, we identify a set of sufficient conditions for the mismatch in logical strength to be justifiably ignored as a “harmless idealization”. Thirdly, we argue, based upon scientific examples, that the pattern of H-D inference of which there is a ready Bayesian justification is only rarely the pattern that one actually finds at work in science. Whatever the other virtues of Bayesianism, the idea that it yields a simple justification of a pervasive pattern of scientific inference appears to have been oversold.     

Is there a primordial Torah?

Is Orthodox Judaism committed to the existence of a Torah that pre-existed the world? This paper argues that Orthodoxy is so committed unless it can find compelling philosophical or theological reasons to reject the possibility of such an entity, and then to re-interpret allegorically all of the texts that speak of such a Torah. Providing an ontology of primordial texts, I argue that no compelling reason can be found to deny the existence of the primordial Torah.     

Is there a neutral metalanguage?

Logical pluralists are committed to the idea of a neutral metalanguage, which serves as a framework for debates in logic. Two versions of this neutrality can be found in the literature: an agreed upon collection of inferences, and a metalanguage that is neutral as such. I discuss both versions and show that they are not immune to Quinean criticism, which builds on the notion of meaning. In particular, I show that (i) the first version of neutrality is sub-optimal, and hard to reconcile with the theories of meaning for logical constants, and (ii) the second version collapses mathematically, if rival logics, as object languages, are treated with charity in the metalanguage. I substantiate (ii) by proving a collapse theorem that generalizes familiar results. Thus, the existence of a neutral metalanguage cannot be taken for granted, and meaning-invariant logical pluralism might turn out to be dubious.

     

Is there a direct relation between the development of vocabulary and grammar?

Previous studies of individual differences have revealed strong correlations between children's vocabulary and grammatical abilities, and these data have been used to support theoretical accounts positing direct developmental relations between these two areas of language. However, between‐person differences do not necessarily reflect intra‐individual dynamics. Thus, in the present study, we analysed longitudinal data from three annual assessments of vocabulary and grammar in 217 children (M_age = 4 years and 3 months at first assessment) using a modelling strategy with some utility in distinguishing relations at the between‐ and within‐person levels. The results revealed strong correlations between grammar and vocabulary at the between‐person level, but the evidence of direct dependencies between the variables at the within‐person level was rather limited. Specifically, we found a small direct contribution from grammar to vocabulary for children between the ages of 4 and 5, but there was no evidence of any direct contributions from vocabulary to grammar. Further analyses suggested that the home literacy environment may represent a common source of individual differences in children's vocabulary and grammatical skills. In light of these results, we argue that the evidence of direct relations between vocabulary and grammatical development in preschool‐aged children may not be as strong as previously assumed.     

Behaviorism and mentalism: Is there a third alternative?

Behaviorism and mentalism are commonly considered to be mutually exclusive and conjunctively exhaustive options for the psychological explanation of behavior. Behaviorism and mentalism do differ in their characterization of inner causes of behavior. However, I argue that they are not mutually exclusive on the grounds that they share important foundational assumptions, two of which are the notion of an innerouter split and the notion of control. I go on to argue that mentalism and behaviorism are not conjunctively exhaustive either, on the grounds that dropping these common foundational assumptions results in a distinctively different framework for the explanation of behavior. This third alternative, which is briefly described, is a version of non-individualism.     

Population density and pathology: Is there a relationship?

The relationship between population density and pathology is assessed in New York City. Although there are substantial simple correlations between density and various pathologies, controlling for income and ethnicity causes all relationships to disappear except for a slight correlation between density and psychiatric terminations. It is concluded that density, measured as people per acre and persons per room, has little or no independent effect on pathology.     

Is there a general factor of preference for complexity?

It has been assumed that preferences for different aspects of complexity in visual patterns are intercorrelated. Evidence purporting to demonstrate this was examined and found to be inconclusive. The preferences of 111 Ss using three sets of patterns showed no correlation between preference for asymmetry, for multiplicity, and for heterogeneity of elements.     

Is there a linear or a nonlinear relationship between rotation and configural processing of faces?

Research suggests that inverted faces are harder to recognise than upright faces because of a disruption in processing their configural properties. Reasons for this difficulty were explored by investigating people's ability to identify faces at intermediate angles of rotation. Participants were asked to discriminate blurred famous and unfamiliar faces presented at nine angles. Blurred faces were used to minimise featural processing strategies, and to assess the effects of rotation that are specific to configural processing. The results indicate a linear relationship between angle of rotation and recognition accuracy. It appears that configural processing becomes gradually more disrupted the further a face is oriented away from the upright. The implications of these findings for competing explanations of the face-inversion effect are discussed.